FOOTNOTES
[1] B. 20, M. 13.
[2] pp. 23-5.
[3] Cf. p. 24, note 1.
[4] Cf. p. 24, notes 2 and 3.
[5] E. g. the conception of 'cause and effect', and the law that 'all changes take place according to the law of the connexion between cause and effect'.
[6] Gesetzt.
[7] B. 121-3, M. 75-6.
[8] B. 120-1, M. 73-4.
[9] Cf. B. 137-8, M. 85, and B. 160 note, M. 98 note.
[10] B. 91-105, M. 56-63.
[11] B. 92-4, M. 56-7.
[12] B. 74-6, M. 45-6.
[13] Kant, in illustrating the nature of a judgement, evades the difficulty occasioned by his account of perception, by illustrating a 'perception' by the 'conception of body', and 'objects' by 'certain phenomena'. He thereby covertly substitutes the relation of universal and individual for the relation of an appearance and the object which causes it.
[14] It is not Kant's general account of judgement given in this passage, but the account of perception incompatible with it, which leads him to confine his illustrations to universal judgements.
[15] We may note three minor points. (1) Kant's definition of function as 'the unity of the act of arranging [i. e. the act which produces unity by arranging] different representations under a common representation' has no justification in its immediate context, and is occasioned solely by the forthcoming description of judgement. (2) Kant has no right to distinguish the activity which originates conceptions, or upon which they depend, from the activity which uses conceptions, viz. judgement. For the act of arranging diverse representations under a common representation which originates conceptions is the act of judgement as Kant describes it. (3) It is wholly artificial to speak of judgement as 'the representation of a representation of an object'.
[16] B. 95, M. 58.
[17] To this failure in Kant's argument is due the difficulty in following his transition from 'function' to 'functions' of judgements. The judgement, as Kant describes it, always does one and the same thing; it unifies particulars by bringing them under a universal. This activity does not admit of differentiation.
[18] Moreover, the forms of judgement clearly lack the systematic character which Kant claims for them. Even if it be allowed that the subdivisions within the four main heads of quantity, quality, relation, and modality are based upon single principles of division, it cannot be said that the four heads themselves originate from a common principle.
[19] In the case of the third division, the plurality unified will be two prior judgements.
[20] It may be noted that the account cannot be merely inappropriate to the general problem, if it be incompatible with that assumed by Formal Logic.
[21] This expectation is confirmed by Kant's view that judgement introduces unity into a plurality by means of a conception. This view leads us to expect that different forms of judgement—if there be any—will be distinguished by the different conceptions through which they unify the plurality; for it will naturally be the different conceptions involved which are responsible for the different kinds of unity effected.
[22] B. 106, M. 64.
[23] B. 102-5, M. 62-3.
[24] Cf. p. 166.
[25] B. 102-5, M. 62-3.
[26] As we shall see later, the real importance of the passage in which Kant professes to effect the transition from the forms of judgement to the categories (B. 102-5, M. 62-3) lies in its introduction of a new and important line of thought, on which the transcendental deduction turns. Consideration of it is therefore deferred to the next chapter.
[27] I owe this view of the distinction to Professor Cook Wilson's lectures on logic.
[28] 'Some coroners are doctors' of course in some contexts means, 'it is possible for a coroner to be a doctor,' and is therefore not numerical; but understood in this sense it is merely a weakened form of the universal judgement in which the connexion apprehended between subject and predicate terms is incomplete.
[29] No doubt, as the schematism of the categories shows, Kant does not think that the hypothetical judgement directly involves the conception of cause and effect, i. e. of the relation of necessary succession between the various states of physical things. The point is, however, that the hypothetical judgement does not involve it at all.