FOOTNOTES
[1] Difficulties connected with Kant's view of self-consciousness will be ignored, as having been sufficiently considered.
[2] Cf. p. 207.
[3] B. 137, M. 85.
[4] A. 105, Mah. 199.
[5] B. 162, M. 99.
[6] Cf. pp. 291-3.
[7] We should have expected Kant to have noticed this difficulty in A. 105, Mah. 199, where he describes what is involved in the relation of representations to an object, for his instance of representations becoming so related is the process of combining elements into a triangle, which plainly requires a synthesis of a very definite kind. For the reasons of his failure to notice the difficulty cf. p. 207.
[8] Pp. 168-9.
[9] 'To relate' is used rather than 'to recognize as related', in order to conform to Kant's view of knowledge. But if it be desired to take the argument which follows in connexion with knowledge proper (cf. p. 242), it is only necessary to substitute throughout 'to recognize as related' for 'to relate' and to make the other changes consequent thereon.
[10] Cf. A. 100-2, Mah. 195-7 (quoted pp. 171-2); A. 113, Mah. 205; A. 121-2, Mah. 211-2.
[11] Wahrnehmung.
[12] Anschauung.
[13] A. 119-23, Mah. 210-3.
[14] And also the first and last sentence of the fourth paragraph, where Kant speaks not of 'phenomena which are to be apprehended', but of the 'apprehension of phenomena' as necessarily agreeing with the unity of apperception.
[15] p. 220.
[16] It should be noted that in the last paragraph but one Kant does not say 'our knowledge that phenomena must have affinity is a consequence of our knowledge that there must be a synthesis of the imagination', but 'the affinity of all phenomena is a consequence of a synthesis in the imagination'. And the last paragraph precludes the view that in making the latter statement he meant the former. Cf. also A. 101, Mah. 196.
[17] On this interpretation 'entering the mind' or 'being apprehended' in the fourth paragraph does not refer merely to the apprehension of elements one by one, which is preliminary to the act of combining them, but includes the act by which they are combined. If so, Kant's argument formally involves a circle. For in the second and third paragraphs he argues that the synthesis of perceptions involves reproduction according to rules, and then, in the fourth paragraph, he argues that this reproduction presupposes a synthesis of perceptions. We may, however, perhaps regard his argument as being in substance that knowledge involves reproduction by the imagination of elements capable of connexion, and that this reproduction involves production by the imagination of the data of sense, which are to be reproduced, into an image.
[18] If the preceding interpretation (pp. 223-4) be thought the correct one, it must be admitted that Kant's vindication of the affinity breaks down for the reason given, p. 220.
[19] The understanding being taken to include the imagination, as being the faculty of spontaneity in distinction from the passive sensibility.
[20] In order to meet a possible objection, it may be pointed out that if AB and BC be given in isolation, the contiguity implied in referring to them as AB and BC will not be known.
[21] Cf. pp. 27-9.
[22] I can attach no meaning to Mr. Bertrand Russell's assertion that relations have no instances. See The Principles of Mathematics, § 55.
[23] Cf. p. 217.
[24] Cf. p. 180, and pp. 280-3.
[25] Cf. p. 137 init.
[26] The absurdity of the problem really propounded is also concealed from Kant in the way indicated, pp. 180 fin.-181 init.
[27] Vorgestellt.
[28] Cf. p. 123.
[29] B. 162, M. 99.
[30] B. 139-42, M. 87-8. Cf. 209, note 3, and pp. 281-2.
[31] It is for this reason that the mathematical illustrations of the synthesis are the most plausible for his theory. While we can be said to construct geometrical figures, and while the construction of geometrical figures can easily be mistaken for the apprehension of them, we cannot with any plausibility be said to construct the physical world.
[32] A. 125, Mah. 214. Cf. the other passages quoted pp. 211-12.
[33] Cf. Ch. VI.
[34] A. 109, Mah. 202.
[35] B. 130, M. 80.
[36] To say that 'combining', in the sense of making, really presupposes consciousness of the nature of the whole produced, would be inconsistent with the previous assertion that even where the reality known is something made, the knowledge of it presupposes that the reality is already made. Strictly speaking, the activity of combining presupposes consciousness not of the whole which we succeed in producing, but of the whole which we want to produce.
It may be noted that, from the point of view of the above argument, the activity of combining presupposes actual consciousness of the act of combination and of its principle, and does not imply merely the possibility of it. Kant, of course, does not hold this.
[37] B. 152, M. 93; cf. also Mah. 211, A. 120.
[38] Cf. A. 102-3, Mah. 197-8. The fact is that the appeal to reproduction is a useless device intended by Kant—and by 'empirical psychologists'—to get round the difficulty of allowing that in the apprehension (in memory or otherwise) of a reality not present to perception, we are really aware of the reality. The difficulty is in reality due to a sensationalistic standpoint, avowed or unavowed, and the device is useless, because the assumption has in the end to be made, covertly or otherwise, that we are really aware of the reality in question.
[39] B. 179, M. 109. Cf. the whole passage B. 176-81, M. 107-10 (part quoted pp. 249-51), and p. 251.
[40] Cf. Locke and Hume.
[41] Cf. Caird, i. 394, where Dr. Caird speaks of 'the distinction of the activity of thought from the matter which it combines or recognizes as combined in the idea of an object'. (The italics are mine.) The context seems to indicate that the phrase is meant to express the truth, and not merely Kant's view.
[42] Cf. the account of judgement in Mr. Bradley's Logic.
[43] Cf. the account of inference in Mr. Bradley's Logic.
[44] Cf. Bradley, Logic, pp. 370 and 506.
[45] Cf. p. 124.