FOOTNOTES
[1] The formulation of them in the first edition is slightly different.
[2] B. 218-24, M. 132-6; and B. 262-5, M. 159-61.
[3] B. 263-4, M. 160-1; B. 289, M. 174-5.
[4] This assumption is of course analogous to the assumption which underlies the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories, that knowledge begins with the successive origination in us of isolated data of sense.
[5] Wahrgenommen.
[6] A. 182-4 and B. 225-7, M. 137-8. This formulation of the conclusion is adapted only to the form in which the first analogy is stated in the first edition, viz. "All phenomena contain the permanent (substance) as the object itself and the changeable as its mere determination, i. e. as a way in which the object exists." Hence a sentence from the conclusion of the proof added in the second edition is quoted to elucidate Kant's meaning; its doctrine is as legitimate a conclusion of the argument given in the first edition as of that peculiar to the second.
[7] B. 225, M. 137.
[8] Cf. Caird, i. 541-2.
[9] B. 291, M. 176 (in 2nd ed. only). Cf. B. 277 fin.-278 init., M. 168 (in 2nd ed. only).
[10] The account of the first analogy as a whole makes it necessary to think that Kant in the first two sentences of the proof quoted does not mean exactly what he says, what he says being due to a desire to secure conformity with his treatment of the second and third analogies. What he says suggests (1) that he is about to discuss the implications, not of the process by which we come to apprehend the manifold as temporally related in one of the two ways possible, i. e. either as successive or as coexistent, but of the process by which we decide whether the relation of the manifold which we already know to be temporal is that of succession or that of coexistence, and (2) that the necessity for this process is due to the fact that our apprehension of the manifold is always successive. The context, however, refutes both suggestions, and in any case it is the special function of the processes which involve the second and third analogies to determine the relations of the manifold as that of succession and that of coexistence respectively.
[11] Cf. B. 225, M. 137 (first half).
[12] I owe this comment to Professor Cook Wilson.
[13] B. 232-3, M. 141 fin.
[14] The term 'permanent' is retained to conform to Kant's language. Strictly speaking, only a state of that which changes can be said to persist or to be permanent; for the substratum of change is not susceptible of any temporal predicates. Cf. p. 306.
[15] B. 291, M. 176.
[16] B. 230-1, M. 176.
[17] Cf. pp. 300-1.
[18] Cf. B. 229, M. 140; B. 232-3, M. 141-2; and Caird, i. 545 and ff.
[19] This is not disproved by B. 247-51, M. 150-2, which involves a different conception of cause and effect.
[20] B. 240, M. 146. For the general view, cf. Caird, i. 556-61.
[21] The preceding paragraph is an addition of the second edition.
[22] B. 234, M. 142.
[23] Cf. A. 104-5, Mah. 198-9, and pp. 178-86 and 230-3.
[24] B. 234-6, M. 143-4. Cf. B. 242, M. 147.
[25] pp. 133-4; cf. pp. 180 and 230-1.
[26] Cf. p. 209, note 3, and p. 233.
[27] The italics are mine.
[28] Caird, i. 557.
[29] Cf. pp. 137 and 231.
[30] The italics are mine.
[31] This is implied both by the use of 'also' and by the context.
[32] The italics are mine.
[33] B. 235-6, M. 143 (quoted p. 279).
[34] The sense is not affected if 'the latter' be understood to refer to the connexion of the manifold in the object.
[35] B. 236-41, M. 144-6.
[36] The italics are mine. 'According to which' does not appear to indicate that the two orders referred to are different.
[37] Cf. B. 242 fin., M. 147 fin.
[38] The italics are mine
[39] Anstellen.
[40] The italics are mine.
[41] The italics are mine.
[42] B. 244, M. 148. Cf. B. 243, M. 148 (first half) and B. 239, M. 145 (second paragraph). The same implication is to be found in his formulation of the rule involved in the perception of an event, e. g. "In conformity with such a rule, there must exist in that which in general precedes an event, the condition of a rule, according to which this event follows always and necessarily." Here the condition of a rule is the necessary antecedent of the event, whatever it may be.
[43] Cf. B. 165, M. 101, where Kant points out that the determination of particular laws of nature requires experience.
[44] He definitely implies this, B. 234, M. 142.
[45] Cf. B. 165, M. 101, where Kant points out that the determination of particular laws of nature requires experience.
[46] Cf. B. 237, M. 144.
[47] Cf. p. 320.
[48] This statement of course includes the third analogy.
[49] Cf. Chh. IV and VI.
[50] Cf. p. 275.
[51] Anschauung.
[52] Wahrnehmung.
[53] Verstandesbegriff.
[54] B. 257-8, M. 156-7.
[55] B. 233-4, M. 142.
[56] B. 259, M. 157.