The Laws of War, Affecting Commerce and Shipping

by H. Byerley Thomson

SECTION II.

Contraband of War.

[Sidenote: Contraband of War.]

The general freedom of neutral commerce is subject to certain restrictions with respect to neutral commerce. Among these is the trade with the enemy in certain articles, called Contraband of War. These are generally warlike stores, and articles which are directly auxiliary to warlike purposes. Writers on this subject have made distinctions between those things useful only for the purposes of war, those which are not so, and those which are susceptible of indiscriminate use in war and peace.

All seem to agree in excluding the first class from neutral trade; and, in general, admitting the second. The chief difference is about the third class. The last kind of articles—for example, money, provisions, ships, and naval stores, according to Grotius, are sometimes lawful articles of neutral trade, and sometimes not; and the question depends upon circumstances. This is perhaps the truest ground of decision, as we shall see in subsequent illustrations.[166]

Thus, these articles become contraband, ipso facto, if carried to a besieged town, camp, or port. So in a naval war, ships and materials for ships, are contraband, although timber and cordage may be used for other purposes, besides fitting out ships of war; and so horses and saddles are not of necessity warlike stores, except when comparing the quality, manufacture, or quantity attempted to be imported into the hostile state, with the circumstances and condition of the war, it appears (if not to be impossible) to be in the highest degree unlikely, that they should be designed for any other purposes besides the purposes of war.[167]

[Sidenote: Provisions, when Contraband.]

Common Provisions are not Contraband in general prize law, except in the single case of being sent to a beseiged or blockaded place.[168]

It is a modern practice, in order to remove all possible doubt as to what goods are contraband, for nations at war to enumerate them particularly in treaties or compacts with neutral states; and such treaties leave the neutral, with which they are made, at liberty to supply the enemy with all goods that are not enumerated in them. These treaties do not operate as a law; but like other treaties, are binding only between the nations that are parties to them.[169]

[Sidenote: Lord Stowell's Opinion on Contraband of War.]

The Opinions of our great English authority, Lord Stowell, on this subject, are contained in two judgments, of which the following is the substance:—

"In 1673, many unwarrantable rules were laid down by public authority respecting Contraband. It was expressly asserted by a person of great knowledge and experience in the English Admiralty, that by its practice corn, wine, and oil, were liable to be deemed contraband. In much later times, many sorts of provisions, such as butter, salted fish, and rice, have been condemned as Contraband. The modern established rule was, that generally they are not contraband, but may become so under circumstances arising out of the peculiar situation of the war, or the condition of the parties engaged in it; among the causes which tend to prevent provisions from being treated as contraband, one is that they are of the growth of the country which exports them.

"Another circumstance, to which some indulgence, by the practice of nations, is shown, is where the articles are in their native and unmanufactured state. Thus, iron is treated with indulgence, though anchors and other instruments fabricated out of it, are directly contraband. Hemp is more favourably considered than cordage; and wheat is not considered so noxious a commodity as any of the final preparations of it for human use. But the most important destination is, whether the articles are destined for the ordinary uses of life, or for military uses. The nature and quality of the port to which the articles are going, is a test of the matter of fact on which the distinction is to be applied. If the port is a general commercial port, it shall be understood that the articles were going for civil use, although occasionally a frigate or other ship of war may be constructed in that port. On the contrary, if the great predominant character of a port is that of a port of naval equipment, it shall be contended that the articles were going for military use, although, merchant ships resort to the same place, and although it is possible that the articles might have been applied to civil consumption; for it being impossible to ascertain the final application of an article, ancipitis usus, it is not an injurious rule which deduces both ways the final use from immediate destination; and the presumption of a hostile use, founded on its destination to a military port, is very much inflamed, if at the time when the articles were going, a considerable armament was notoriously preparing, to which a supply of those articles would be eminently useful."[170]

In a later case he seems to have modified his opinion with respect to undoubted naval stores, either so by nature, or intended as such for the occasion. He says—

"The character of the port is immaterial, since naval stores, if they are to be considered as contraband, are so without reference to the nature of the port, and equally, whether bound to a mercantile port only, or to a port of military equipment. The consequences of the supply may be nearly the same in either case. If sent to a mercantile port, they may be applied to immediate use in the equipment of privateers, or they may be conveyed from the mercantile to the naval port, and there become subservient to every purpose to which they could have been applied if going directly to a port of naval equipment."[171]

[Sidenote: Controversy between England and America on Contraband
Provisions.]

The doctrine of the English Admiralty Court, as to provisions becoming contraband, was adopted by the Government in the instructions given to their cruisers, on the 8th June, 1793, directing them to stop all vessels laden wholly, or in part, with corn, flour, or meal, bound for France, and to send them into a British port to be purchased by Government; or to be released on condition that the master should. give security to dispose of his cargo in the ports of some country in amity with his Britannic Majesty. This was resisted by the Neutral Powers, Sweden, Denmark, and especially the United States.

This order was justified upon the ground, that by the modern law of nations, all provisions are to be considered as contraband, and as such liable to confiscation, wherever depriving an enemy of these supplies is one of the means intended to be employed for reducing him to terms. The actual situation of France, (it was said,) was notoriously such, as to lead to the employing this mode of distressing her by the joint operations of the various powers engaged in the war; and the reasonings of the text writers applying to all cases of this sort were more applicable to the present case, in which the distress resulted from the unusual mode of war adopted by the enemy himself, in having armed almost the whole laboring class of the French nation, for the purpose of commencing and supporting hostilities against almost all European Governments; but this reasoning was most of all applicable to a trade, which was in a great measure carried on by the then actual rulers of France, and was no longer to be regarded as a mercantile speculation of individuals, but as an immediate operation of the very persons who had declared war, and were then carrying it on against Great Britain.

This reasoning was resisted by the neutral powers—Sweden, Denmark, and especially the United States. The American Government insisted, that when two nations go to war, other nations who choose to remain at peace, retain their natural right to pursue their agriculture, manufactures, and ordinary vocations; to carry the produce of their industry for exchange to all countries, belligerent or neutral, (as usual;) to go and come freely without injury or molestation; in short, that the war, (amongst other) should be for neutral purposes, as if it did not exist; the only exceptions being trade in implements of war, or to a place blockaded by its enemy. That there were sufficient treaties to decide what were implements of war. Corn, flour, and meal, were not of the class of contraband.

The result of this controversy was a treaty with the United States in 1794. It confined contraband to military and naval stores; and with respect to provisions not generally contraband, it was agreed,

"That whenever such articles became contraband by the Law of Nations, and should for that reason be seized, the same should not be confiscated, but the owners thereof should be speedily and completely indemnified; and the captors, or in their default, the Government under whose authority they act, should pay to the masters or owners of such vessels the full value of all such articles, with a reasonable mercantile profit thereon, together with the freight, and also the demurrage incident to such detention."

The instructions of June, 1793, had been revoked previously to the signature of this treaty; but before its ratification, the British Government issued, in April, 1795, an order in council, instructing its cruizers to stop and detain all vessels laden wholly, or in part, with corn, flour, meal, and other provisions, and bound to any port in France, and to send them to such ports as might be most convenient, in order that such corn, &c., might be purchased on behalf of Government.

This last order was subsequently revoked, and the question of its legality became the subject of discussion in a mixed commission, constituted under the treaty, to decide upon the claims of American citizens, by reason of irregular or illegal seizures of their vessels and cargoes, under the authority of the British Government.

A full indemnification was allowed by the commissioners, under the 7th article of the Treaty of 1794, to the owners of vessels and cargoes seized under the orders in council, as well for the loss of a market as for the other consequences of their detention.

It was, however, urged on the part of the United States, that the 18th article of the Treaty of 1794, manifestly intended to leave the question where it was before, namely, that when the law of nations, existing at the time the case arises, pronounces the articles contraband, they may for that reason be seized; when otherwise, not so. Each party was thus left free to decide what was contraband in its own courts of the law of nations, leaving any false appeal to that law to the usual remedy of reprisals and war.[172]

Since the ratification of this treaty, we have a decision of Lord Stowell, in 1799, on this very subject, in the case of the Haabet, which, however, arose on a question of insurance.

"The right of taking possession of provisions is no peculiar claim of this country; it belongs generally to belligerent nations: the ancient practice of Europe, or at least of several maritime states of Europe, was to confiscate them entirely. A century has now elapsed since this claim has been asserted by some of them. A more mitigated practice has prevailed in later times, of holding such cargoes subject only to a right of pre-emption; that is, to a right of purchase, upon a reasonable compensation, to the individual whose property is thus diverted. This claim on the part of the belligerent cannot go beyond cargoes avowedly bound to the enemy's ports, or suspected on just grounds to have a concealed destination of that kind. The neutral can only expect a reasonable compensation. He cannot look to the price he would obtain in the enemy's port. An enemy, distressed by famine, may be driven by his necessities to pay a famine price; but it does not follow that the belligerent, in the exercise of his rights of war, is to pay the price of distress."[173]

"It is a mitigated exercise of war, on which any purchase is made; and no rule has established that such a purchase shall be regulated exactly on the same terms of profit which would have followed the adventure, if no such exercise of war had intervened; it is a reasonable indemnification, and a fair profit, that is due, reference being had to the price originally paid by the exporter, and the expenses he has incurred."

[Sidenote: Neutral Vessels Transporting Enemy's Forces.]

Transporting the Enemy's Forces, subjects a Neutral Vessel to confiscation, if captured by the opposite belligerent. Sir Wm. Scott says, in the leading case on this subject—

"That a vessel hired, by the enemy, for the conveyance of military persons is to be considered as a transport, subject to condemnation, has been in a recent case, held by this Court, and on other occasions.[174] What is the number of military persons that shall constitute such a case it may be difficult to define. In the former cases there were many, in the present they are fewer in number; number alone is an insignificant circumstance in the considerations on which the principles of law on this subject are built; since fewer persons of high quality and character may be of more importance than a much greater number of persons of lower condition. To send out one veteran general of France to take command of the forces at Batavia might be a much more noxious act than the conveyance of a whole regiment. The consequences of such assistance are greater, and therefore it is what the belligerent has a stronger right to prevent and punish. In this instance the military persons are three,[175] and there are besides two other persons who were going to be employed in civil capacities in the Government of Batavia. *** It appears to me, on principle, to be but reasonable that, whenever it is of sufficient importance to the enemy that such persons should be sent out on the public service, and at the public expense, it should afford equal ground of forfeiture against the vessel that may be let out for a purpose so intimately connected with hostile operations.[176] The fact of the vessel having been pressed into the enemy's service does not exempt her. The master cannot aver that he was an involuntary agent."[177]

[Sidenote: Neutral Ships Carrying Enemy's Despatches.]

Carrying the Despatches of the Enemy is also a ground of condemnation.

"In the transmission of Despatches may be conveyed the entire plan of a campaign, that may defeat all the plans of the other belligerent, in the world. It is a service, therefore, which, in whatever degree it exists, can only be considered in one character—as an act of the most hostile nature. The offence of fraudulently carrying despatches in the service of the enemy being greater than other contraband, some other penalty has to be affixed. The confiscation of the noxious article would be ridiculous when applied to Despatches. There would be no freight dependent on their transportation. The vehicle (i.e. the ship) in which they are carried must, therefore, be forfeited."[178]

[Sidenote: Ambassadors excepted.]

The Despatches of an Ambassador or other Public Minister of the Enemy, resident in a neutral country, are an exception to this rule, being the despatches of persons who are in a peculiar manner the favourite object of the Law of Nations, residing in the neutral country for the purpose of preserving peace and the relations of amity between that state and their own government.

The ambassador of the enemy may be stopped on his passage, but when he has arrived in the neutral country, he becomes a sort of middleman, and is entitled to peculiar privileges.[179]

[Sidenote: Penalty for Contraband Trade.]

Under the present Law of Nations, a Contraband Cargo cannot affect the ship; the carrying of contraband articles is attended only with loss of freight and expenses, except where the ship belongs to the owner of the contraband cargo, or where the simple misconduct of carrying a contraband cargo has been connected with some malignant and aggravating circumstances.[180]

[Sidenote: Additional Penalties.]

The aggravation of fraud justifies additional Penalties; thus, the carriage of contraband with a false destination, will work a condemnation of the ship as well as the cargo; the false destination being intended to defeat the right of pre-emption.[181] Generally, false papers will extend the taint of contraband to the vessel.

It is also an established rule, that the transfer of contraband by a neutral, from one port of a country to another, where it is required for the purposes of war, is subject to be treated in the same manner as an original importation into the country itself.[182]

[Sidenote: Return Voyage Free.]

Generally, the proceeds of the Return Voyage cannot be taken. From the moment of quitting port on a hostile destination, indeed, the offence is complete, and it is not necessary to wait till the goods are actually endeavouring to enter the enemy's port; but beyond that, if the goods are not taken in delicto, and in actual prosecution of such a voyage, the penalty is not now generally held to attach.[183]

SECTION III.

Blockades. Right of Search. Convoys.

[Sidenote: Blockades.]

We now pass on to the subject of Blockade, which is the next exception to the general freedom of neutral commerce in time of war.

A blockade is a high act of Sovran authority; it cannot be assumed or exercised by a commander, without special authority, provided his Government is sufficiently near at hand to superintend and direct the course of operations; but a commander on a distant station is supposed to carry with him such a portion of the Sovran authority as may enable him to act with energy against the commerce of the enemy, as against the enemy himself.[184]

Again, referring to Sir Wm. Scott's celebrated judgments, we find him saying,

"That to constitute a violation of a state of blockade, three things must be proved: first, the existence of the blockade; secondly, the knowledge of it, in the party supposed to have offended; and thirdly, some act of violation, either by going in, or coming out with a cargo, laden after the commencement of the blockade."

[Sidenote: First Rule of Blockade.]

I. There is no rule of law more established than this; that the Breach of a Blockade subjects the property so employed to confiscation. Every man knows it; the subjects of all states know it.

A lawful maritime blockade requires the actual presence of a sufficient force stationed at the entrance of the port, sufficiently near to prevent communication.

The blockade is to be considered legally existing, although the winds may occasionally blow off the blockading squadron. It is an accidental change which must take place in every blockade; but the blockade is not therefore suspended.

This axiom is laid down in all books of authority; and the law considers an attempt to take advantage of such an accidental removal as an attempt to break the blockade, and a mere fraud.[185]

When a blockading squadron is driven off by a superior force, the blockade is effectually raised, and it must be renewed by fresh notification, before foreign nations can be affected by an obligation to observe it as a blockade. The mere appearance of another squadron will not renew it, but it must be restored by the measures required for the original imposition of a blockade.[186]

[Sidenote: Second Rule of Blockade.]

It is necessary that the evidence of a blockade should be clear and decisive. A blockade may exist without a public declaration; although a declaration, unsupported by fact, will not be sufficient to establish it. In the War of 1798, the West India Islands were declared under blockade by Admiral Jervis; but the Lords of the Supreme Court held, that as the fact did not support the declaration, a blockade could not be deemed legally to exist. But the fact, on the contrary, duly notified on the spot, is of itself sufficient; for public notifications between governments are meant for the information of individuals; but if the individual is personally informed, that purpose is better obtained than by a public declaration.[187]

Where the vessel sails from a country lying near enough to the blockaded port to have constant information of the blockade, no notice is necessary of its continuance or relaxation; but when the country is at a distance beyond constant information, they may lawfully send their vessels on conjecture that the blockade is broken up, after it has existed a long time.[188] And this is important, as it must be remembered that even the intention to evade blockade is a fraudulent breach of it, and sailing towards the port is an overt act of that intent.[189]

There are two kinds of Blockade. 1. Simple Blockade, i.e. Blockade in Fact; and 2nd., Blockade in Fact, accompanied by a Notification. The first expires by the breaking up intentionally of the blockading squadron. The second, prima facie, does not expire until the repeal of the notification, but it is the duty of the belligerent country directly the blockade ceases, de facto, to revoke its proclamation. And it would appear that a notified blockade would only expire, in fact, after some unnecessary and long neglect to publish this revocation; otherwise neutral nations are bound until such publication.[190]

It has from time to time been stipulated, in treaties between belligerent and neutral countries, (as in the case of the Treaty between Great Britain and the United States, of 1794,) that vessels of the neutral country should not be considered as having notice of a blockade, until they have been duly and respectfully warned off; and it would only be on a second attempt to enter port that they would be liable to be seized. Under such a treaty a neutral vessel might lawfully sail for a blockaded port, knowing it to be blockaded.[191]

[Sidenote: Third Rule of Blockade.]

An act of Violation is essential to a Breach of Blockade; such as, either going in or coming out of the port with a cargo, laden after the commencement of the blockade: or being found so near to the blockaded port as to show, beyond a doubt, that the vessel was endeavouring to run into it: or where the intention is expressly avowed by the papers found on board.[192]

The time of shipment is very material; for although it may be hard to refuse a Neutral, liberty to retire with a cargo already laden, and by that act already become neutral property,—yet, after the commencement of a blockade, a neutral cannot be allowed to interpose in any way to assist the exportation of the property of the enemy. After the commencement of a blockade, a Neutral is no longer at liberty to make any purchase in that port.[193]

A Maritime Blockade is not in law violated by bringing or sending goods to the port through the internal canal navigation or land carriage of the country; and thus such goods are not liable to confiscation on ground of the blockade.

[Sidenote: Right of Search.]

On the great question of the Right of Search, the International Law has been summed up by Lord Stowell, in the case of the Maria, where the exercise of the right was attempted to be resisted, by the interposition of a convoy of Swedish ships of war.[194]

First, the right of visiting and searching merchant ships on the high seas, whatever be the ships, whatever be the cargoes, whatever be the destinations, is the incontestible right of the lawfully commissioned cruizers of a belligerent nation.

Secondly, that the authority of the Sovran of the neutral country, being interposed in any manner of mere force, cannot legally vary the rights of a lawfully commissioned belligerent cruizer. It cannot be maintained, that if a Swedish commissioned cruizer, during the wars of his own country, has a right, by the Laws of Nations, to visit and examine neutral ships, the King of England, (being Neutral to Sweden,) is authorized by law to obstruct the exercise of that right with respect to the merchants' ships of his country.

Thirdly, that the penalty for the violent contravention of this right, is the confiscation of the property withheld from visitation and search.

The judgment of condemnation, pronounced in this case, was followed by the Treaty of Armed Neutrality entered into by the Baltic Powers to resist the Right of Search, in 1800, which league was dissolved by the death of the Emperor Paul, and the points in controversy between those Powers and Great Britain were finally adjusted by the Convention of 5th of June, 1805.[195]

[Sidenote: Convoys.]

It now remains to say a few words on the subject of Convoy. Convoy is a ship or ships of war appointed by the Government, or by the Commander-in-Chief on a particular station, for the guard of merchant vessels bound to their destination. A warranty that the vessel shall sail with convoy, is very common in Policies of Insurance, and if not complied with, the Insurance becomes absolutely void.

This warranty to sail with convoy, does not mean that the vessel shall depart with convoy immediately from the lading port, but only from the place of rendezvous appointed for vessels bound from that port, and must be strictly and impartially maintained by force, to the uniform universal exclusion of all vessels not privileged by law.[196]

From many ports, and among others from the port of London, no convoy ever sails. It has therefore been held sufficient for a vessel bound from London to sail with convoy from the Downs, and even from Spithead, when there was no convoy appointed from the Downs. Neither does it require the vessel to sail with convoy bound to the precise place of her destination; but if the vessel sail with the only convoy appointed for vessels going to her place of destination, it is sufficient. It sometimes happens that the force first appointed, is to accompany the ships only for a part of their voyage, and to be succeeded by another; at other times a small force is detached from the main body to bring up to a particular point; if a vessel sail under the protection of a vessel thus appointed or detached, the warranty is satisfied.

But this warranty requires not only that the vessel shall sail under the protection of the convoy, but also that she shall continue during its course under the same protection, unless prevented from so doing by tempest or other unavoidable accident, in which case, the master and owners will be excused, if the master does all that is in his power to keep with the convoy.

The merchantman must, before sailing, obtain or endeavour to obtain, the sailing orders issued by the convoying squadron. The value of a convoy appointed by Government arises in a great degree from its taking the ships under control, as well as under protection; but this control cannot be exercised except by means of sailing orders. Otherwise, the master could not learn the rendezvous in case of dispersion by a storm, or obey signals in case of attack.

The obligation to sail with convoy does not depend merely on special agreement; but, by act of parliament, a merchant cannot sail without a convoy, on a foreign voyage, unless previously licensed to do so.[197]

SECTION IV.

[Sidenote: Armed Neutralities.]

It is not improbable the course of events in the present war may make it not uninteresting to my readers to have some short account of the origin and meaning of Armed Neutralities, especially as the principles on which they were founded may again be open to discussion. The right to take enemy's property on board neutral vessels has, in the present war, been waived by the Queen, in a declaration, dated Buckingham Palace, March 29th 1854. This is however tempered by a reservation of the right to search for contraband. Up to the present time the right to take enemy's goods on board a neutral vessel has in this country been steadily maintained; though in France it has been fluctuating; the interests of another commercial power became the origin of the extraordinary confederacies termed Armed Neutralities. At an early period it was an object of interest with Holland, a great commercial and navigating country, whose permanent policy was essentially pacific, to obtain a relaxation of the severe rules which had previously been observed in maritime warfare. The States General of the United Provinces having complained of the provisions in the French Ordinance of 1538, a treaty of commerce was concluded between France and the Republic in 1646, by which the law, as far as respected the capture and confiscation of neutral vessels for carrying enemy's property, was suspended; but it was found impossible to obtain, at that time, any relaxation as to the liability to capture of enemy's property in neutral vessels.

This latter concession, however, the United Provinces obtained from France by the treaty of alliance of 1662, and the commercial treaty signed at the same time with the peace, at Nimiguen, in 1671; confirmed by the treaty of Ryswick, in 1697. The maxim that free ships make free goods was coupled in these treaties with its correlative maxim, enemy's ships make enemy's goods.

The same concession was obtained by Holland from England in 1668 and 1674, as the price of an alliance between the two countries against the ambitious designs of Louis XIV.

In the subsequent war of 1756, a controversy arose between England and Holland, in which it was said, on the one hand, that England had violated the rights of neutral commerce; and on the other, that Holland had not fulfilled the guarantees under which those privileges had been granted.

Afterwards, when the American Revolution gave rise to a war between France and Great Britain, the latter power, instead of following the example of her enemy, (who had issued an ordinance prohibiting the seizure of neutral vessels, even when bound to or from enemy ports, unless carrying contraband,) issued an order in council, (March, 1780,) suspending the special stipulations respecting commerce and navigation contained in the Treaty of 1674.

This was the crisis of many complaints made by the neutral powers against Great Britain; and, in 1780, the Empress of Russia proclaimed the principles of the Baltic Code of Neutrality, and declared she would maintain them by force of arms.

This system of armed neutrality contained the following principles.

1. That commerce with the ports and roads of the enemy is free to neutral powers.

2. That the ship covers the cargo.

3. That those merchandizes only be considered as contraband, which are declared to be such by treaties with the belligerent powers, or with one of them.

4. That no place shall be considered as blockaded, till it is surrounded in such a manner by hostile ships that no person can enter it without manifest danger.

5. That these principles shall serve as a basis for decisions concerning the legality of prizes.

The principal powers of Europe, as Sweden, Denmark, Prussia, Germany, Holland, France, Spain, Portugal, Naples, and also the United States, acceded to the Russian principles of neutrality.

The Court of London answered this declaration by appealing to "the principles generally acknowledged as the Law of Nations, being the only law between powers where no treaties subsist;" and to

"the tenor of its different engagements with other powers, where those engagements had altered the primitive law by neutral stipulations, according to the will and convenience of the contracting parties."

England, being thus opposed to all the maritime world, was at this time obliged to smother her resentment; only simply expostulating with Russia. But the want of the consent of a power of such decided maritime superiority as that of Great Britain, was an insuperable obstacle to the success of the Baltic Conventional Law of Neutrality; and it was abandoned in 1793 by the naval powers of Europe, as not sanctioned by the existing law of nations, in every case in which the doctrines of that code did not rest upon positive compact.

During the protracted wars of the French Revolution, all the belligerent powers began by discarding in practice, not only the principles of the armed neutrality, but even the generally received maxims of international law by which neutral commerce in time of war had been previously regulated. France, on her part, revived the severity of her ancient prize code; decreeing not only the capture and condemnation of the goods of her enemies found on board neutral vessels, but even of the vessels themselves laden with goods of British growth, produce, and manufacture.

In 1801, principally in consequence of the doctrines of the British Admiralty Courts with regard to the right of search, great efforts were made by the Baltic powers to recall and enforce the doctrines of the armed neutrality of 1780. This attempt is generally known as the Armed Neutrality of 1800, and was met, promptly overpowered, and the confederacy finally dissolved, by the naval power of England. Russia gave up the point, and by her convention with England of the 17th of June, 1801, expressly agreed, that enemy's property was not to be protected on board of neutral ships.[198] This settlement was ended by the death of the Emperor Paul.