From the Black Mountain to Waziristan / Being an account of the border countries and the more turbulent of the tribes controlled by the north-west frontier province, and of our military relations with them in the past

by H. C. Wylly

OPERATIONS.

In the middle of the last century the favourite raiding ground of the restless spirits of the Utman Khels was the Hastnagar division. Early in 1852, they permitted one Ajun Khan, a notoriously disaffected man, to take up his residence in Utman Khel villages to the north of the district, and here he gathered together a band of adventurers like himself to raid upon our border. Finally in April, Ajun Khan collected some 200 mounted men, attacked Charsada, the headquarters of the division, plundered the treasury and slew some of our officials. On the following day he occupied Abazai, and then visited Pranghar and Nawedand, where he took up his quarters. Within a week, however, Sir Colin Campbell was moving troops out against him from Peshawar.

Expedition against the Independent Utman Khels, 1852.—Sir Colin Campbell established his headquarters at Abazai and there concentrated the following force:

First Troop, 1st Brigade Horse Artillery. Two 8–inch howitzers, 4th Battalion Artillery. 300 bayonets, 32nd Foot. One squadron 2nd Irregular Cavalry. One squadron Guides Cavalry. 2nd Company Sappers and Miners. 300 bayonets, 28th Native Infantry. 300 bayonets, 66th Gurkhas. Guides Infantry.

Expedition of 1852

On the 11th May the force moved out and destroyed Nawedand, experiencing some slight opposition, and while the operations were in progress Sir Colin was joined by the 1st Punjab Infantry under Captain Coke, and by two squadrons of the 1st Punjab Cavalry under Lieutenant Hughes. These regiments had left Kohat at 2 a.m. on the 8th and reached Peshawar, forty miles distant, the same day; there was a delay in crossing the Kabul River owing to the bridge of boats having been swept away, but by the evening of the 10th Coke’s party was across, arriving at Abazai at daybreak with a two hours’ halt en route. Finding at Abazai that Sir Colin had left to attack Nawedand, Coke again pushed on, took part in the attack, and returned with the force to Abazai, having thus covered another forty miles, or a total of eighty since 2 a.m. on the 8th.

On the 12th General Campbell moved about seven miles to Gandera, and on the 13th he attacked, carried and destroyed Pranghar, the stronghold of the Utman Khels, who were in considerable strength and held out gallantly against the fire of our ten guns. The force then withdrew.

At the end of this year the fort of Abazai was erected for the better security of this part of the border.

After this expedition, the conduct of the Independent Utman Khels—as distinguished from the Utman Khels of Sam Baizai—was uniformly good, and for more than twenty years the Indian Government had no grounds for any complaint against them. On the 9th December, 1876, however, an offence of the very gravest description was committed by this tribe, chiefly by men from Ambahar and the Laman; a number of them, instigated by persons of influence in British territory, attacking a body of unarmed coolies engaged in the preliminary operations connected with the canal about to be taken from the Swat River near Abazai. It appears that the party, consisting of a hundred men, surrounded the tents in which the coolies were sleeping about 2 a.m.; then, at a given signal, having cut through the ropes of the tents, threw them down and butchered the helpless, struggling inmates through the tent-cloth. The camp was then robbed of almost everything it contained, some of the dead and wounded being stripped of the very clothes on their backs. Of the sixty-five coolies, six were killed and twenty-seven wounded, some dangerously. Having plundered the camp, the raiders effected their escape to the hills before any assistance could reach the spot from Fort Abazai; but all the neighbouring headmen, suspected of complicity, were apprehended and sent into Peshawar.

It seems probable that this raid would never have taken place if proper steps had been taken for the protection of the men employed on the canal works—a project, and the taking up land for which, known to have aroused suspicion and dislike; and it cannot be denied that sufficient precautions were not taken by the responsible officers to prevent an attack of this kind, when the work was being carried on so near the border. It could not, however, have well been anticipated that a Muhammadan tribe would, without provocation and with no quarrel with the British Government, attack and kill an unarmed body of their co-religionists—a dastardly outrage, which brought down upon the perpetrators the virtual excommunication of the aged Akhund of Swat.

Expedition of 1878

Operations against the Independent Utman Khels, 1878.—In consequence of this affair, the Utman Khels were, as a tribe, excluded from British territory, but at the time it was not possible to take more active measures against them. At the beginning of 1878, however, it was proposed to Government that an attempt should be made to surprise the village of Sapri, where dwelt the man who had been the leader of the party concerned in the attack on the coolie camp; for it was felt that while he was at large and unpunished, any really satisfactory settlement with the tribe would be practically impossible; his village, moreover, was close to our border. The proposal was sanctioned, and at 7 p.m. on the 14th February, 1878, Captain Wigram Battye,[^[66]] accompanied by Captain Cavagnari,[^[67]] marched from Mardan with 264 sabres and twelve bayonets of the Guides, the infantry mounted on mules.

The party moved by the main Tangi-Abazai road for some distance, but on arrival near Tangi, the column turned off to the north, crossed the line of the Swat Canal, and arriving within two miles of Abazai, left the horses there under a small escort. The troops had marched thirty-two miles, making a long detour so as to avoid villages whence news of the movement might have been conveyed across the border. Moving on, the Swat River was struck, and its left bank ascended for about four miles to Mada Baba Ziarat, where a mountain torrent joins the river; and climbing a rough path by the side of this torrent, the kotal leading to the village of Sapri was soon reached. It was still dark, but from here Captain Battye sent a small party on to a spur commanding the village, and especially the towers of the man particularly wanted for the outrage near Abazai. With daylight the village was rushed, the tribesmen being taken completely by surprise, and Mian Rakan-ud-din, the leader, was shot down. Some of his immediate attendants surrendered, and others bolted to the hills above the village, whence they kept up a desultory fire on the troops. But Captain Battye was able to withdraw his party to Fort Abazai without further molestation. Our casualties were eight wounded.

As a result of this measure some of the Utman Khel villages showed themselves most anxious to effect a satisfactory settlement with Government; others, however—those of Zirak and Pakhai—remained recusant, and consequently, while the submission of the repentant villages was accepted, it was decided to coerce the remainder. On the 20th March, therefore, Lieutenant-Colonel Jenkins left Mardan for the Utman Khel border with a force composed of four guns of the Hazara Mountain Battery, 245 sabres and 453 bayonets of the Guides. The Zirak villages were first dealt with. The force entered the hills as day was breaking, and experienced no opposition at the first village, Tarakai, but moving on from here entered a valley formed by the Sulala range of hills and divided into two parts by the Tor Tam hill; on the near side of this hill were the remaining Zirak villages, and on the other were those of Pakhai. The first village was found to be deserted, but our troops were fired on from the others; the enemy were, however, easily dispersed and the remaining Zirak villages cleared. Leaving now the Guides cavalry in occupation, Colonel Jenkins secured possession of the Tor Tam hill with the infantry and guns without any serious opposition, and thence had the Pakhai villages at his mercy. The Zirak and Pakhai headmen were now called upon to submit, which they did after the usual hesitation, and agreed to pay the fines demanded of them. The force then withdrew from the valley unmolested, and bivouacked that night at the Jhinda outpost of the Swat canal works, having marched over forty miles since noon of the previous day. Mardan was again reached on the 22nd.

Punitive Measures

During 1882 there was a slight revival of trouble in connection with the canal works, but thenceforward the Utman Khels gave us no cause for complaint until 1895, when some divisions opposed General Low’s advance[^[68]] at the passage of the Swat River; they also shared in other attacks upon us during the operations of that spring, but no punitive measures were taken against them for these signs of hostility. In 1897 again large numbers of Utman Khels took part in the attacks on the Malakand; some assisted their old enemies the Mohmands in the fighting about Shabkadar; and others again of the divisions which live on the further bank of the Swat River helped in the assaults on Chakdara, and later tried to seize the bridge over the Panjkora, but were forestalled by General Meiklejohn.

The trans-frontier Utman Khels thereafter only broke out once, joining the Mamunds in the attack on General Jeffreys’ camp described in Chapter VII., but, on the whole, they remained quiet while our troops were in Bajaur, and even helped to keep open the lines of communications where these passed near their border.

Expedition against the Utman Khels, 1897.—As stated in Chapter V., General Blood had intended sending a brigade from Lower Swat into the Utman Khel country, but at the moment the services of the troops were required elsewhere, and operations against the Utman Khels had to be postponed. For the time, therefore, Government contented itself with imposing terms upon such clans as had shown themselves hostile, and demanding the submission of the whole tribe. By the close of the year, however, the Utman Khel generally had evinced no inclination to comply with our terms, and on the 22nd November, therefore, a small force was collected to compel submission. It was concentrated near Dargai, at the southern foot of the Malakand Pass, and was placed under the command of Colonel A. J. F. Reid; it was composed as under:

One squadron, 10th Bengal Lancers. No. 8 Bengal Mountain Battery. No. 5 Company Madras Sappers and Miners. 1st Battalion The Buffs. 21st Punjab Infantry. 35th Sikhs.

Expedition of 1897

In addition to the above, the 16th Bengal Infantry was sent to Abazai to protect the head of the Swat River canal, and to help the local political officers in dealing with the Utman Khels of the Laman. The initial destination of the force was the Totai Valley, and on the 23rd Colonel Reid marched to Hariankot at the foot of the pass leading to Kot, which was reached next day. The road over the pass, although it had been improved by working parties, was found very difficult for laden camels. On the west side of the pass the valley widens considerably, and is highly cultivated. The villagers of Lower Totai showed every sign of wishing to be friendly, and many jirgahs came in asking for terms. All the clans accepted our terms without hesitation, except the Agra jirgah, and the force accordingly arranged to march into that valley. Two routes were reconnoitred from Kot, but that via Silai Patai was eventually adopted, although it required much work to make it passable. The villagers along the route proved very submissive, bringing in supplies, and the Agra jirgah met Colonel Reid on their boundary to tender submission. On the 27th the troops marched to Bargholai along a very difficult track through a narrow gorge. The Agra Valley was thoroughly explored, reconnaissances were pushed forward to the passes, and much useful survey work was done. All the representatives of the Utman Khel had now submitted except the Kanauri Ismailzai, so a small column was detailed to visit the Kanauri villages, which lay high up in the hills above Kot, to the west of Colonel Reid’s camp. The road was very bad and steep, but halfway there the jirgah was met hurrying down to submit.

By the 4th December all the clans had complied with our terms, and the troops were withdrawn to Hariankot and the column broken up.

Since that date this tribe has given no serious trouble to the British Government.

CHAPTER VII.
THE CLANS OF BAJAUR AND DIR.[^[69]]

The inhabitants of both these countries are mainly Yusafzais—Tarkanri or Tarklanri Yusafzais in Bajaur, and Akozai Yusafzais in Dir.

Bajaur is bounded on the north by Dir, and on the east by Dir and Swat, on the south-east and south by the Utman Khel country, on the south again for a short distance by the Mohmands, and on the west by Afghanistan. It is an extremely mountainous country, watered by the Rud River, and including within its area the valleys of the Rud, of Babukarra, Watelai and Chaharmung.

The Bajauris or Tarkanris are Sarbani Pathans of the Khakhai Khel branch and representatives of the ancient Gandhari, with whom they returned from Kabul in the fifteenth century to the Peshawar Valley, and a hundred years later subjugated and dispossessed the Gujars, then in occupation of Bajaur. “In 1504,” we are reminded by Oliver, “the Emperor Baber acquired the sovereignty of Kabul and Ghazni, and in the following year made an extensive frontier tour, coming by the Khyber Pass to Peshawar, going along the whole border, and returning by the Sakhi Sarwar Pass and the Bori Valley to Ghazni. At this period the Pathan settlers are described as pretty well established in Laghman, Peshawar, Swat and Bajaur; though some of the original occupants still struggled for independence under their hereditary chiefs. During the next twenty-five years the Mogul Baber undertook many forays—for most of them could not be called anything else—to punish the hill Pathans, or to protect his own subjects, dispersing the men, carrying off the women and cattle; but, as a rule, the tribes were even then fully able to hold their own. Guided by the Dilazaks, he marched against Bajaur, carried the fortress of the original Sultan by escalade, using the new matchlocks, which greatly astonished the enemy, the net result being to extend the power of the Tarklanris.”

The Tarkanris have three main divisions:

1. Ismailzai. 2. Isozai. 3. Mamunds,

and of the different valleys into which Bajaur is split up, the Maidan Valley is occupied by the Ismailzai, the Baraul and Jandol Valleys by the Isozai, and the valleys of Babukarra, Chaharmung and Watelai by the Mamunds, who also own a good deal of land across the border in Afghanistan. Some six or seven alien tribes also live among the Bajauris—chiefly in the Jandol and Maidan Valleys. Originally Jandol belonged to Bajaur, but it has within recent years come under the political control of Dir, whose ruler, however, has little or no authority over the people of the Jandol Valley.

The Valleys of Bajaur

The Maidan Valley is about ten miles long, rich and fertile and well cultivated, watered by the Maidan or Kunai River. The Jandol Valley, whose northern and southern boundaries are the Janbatai Range and the Rud River, has a total area of some 144 square miles, being about fourteen miles long, with a breadth ranging from six to ten miles, and is also rich and well cultivated. The Baraul Valley is divided into an upper and a lower, the upper including the Janbatai district, and good crops are raised here, and iron of excellent quality is exported. The Babukarra Valley is about fifteen miles long, with an average width of five or six miles; the range of the Hindu Raj divides it from Asmar on the north, on the east the Takwara spur separates it from Jandol, on the west is the Mamund or Watelai Valley, while to the south, on the right bank of the Bajaur River, is the country of the Utman Khel. The Chaharmung Valley lies between the Mamund country on the north-east and the Kamangara Valley on the south-west. The Watelai Valley, occupied by the Mamunds, the most important section of the Tarkanris or Bajauris, lies between the valleys of Chaharmung and Babukarra; it is about thirteen miles in length, with a maximum breadth of ten miles, and is well cultivated, but has no main river of any importance running through it, and the bed of the valley is much cut up by deep nullahs. The Mamunds are probably the most warlike of the Tarkanris, and can put 12,000 men in the field, all well armed as frontier tribesmen go.

The position of the Khan of Nawagai requires some explanation. He is the hereditary chief of a branch of the Salarzai sub-division of the Mamunds, and also of all the Tarkanris, but his authority has of late years very greatly diminished, although he is still by no means without influence, even far beyond the borders of his own Khanate. His actual territory is an irregular tract of country on the left bank of the Rud River, together with the district of Surkamar; part of his country was encroached upon some years ago by the Mohmands, and he has never been sufficiently powerful to regain permanent possession of it.

The country known as Dir comprises roughly the whole area drained by the Panjkora River and its affluents, as far south as its junction with the Rud River of Bajaur. The Upper Panjkora Valley is known as the Panjkora Kohistan, and is divided into two parts called Bashkar and Sheringal. The principal subsidiary valleys of Dir are the Kashkar or Dir, the Baraul and the Maidan on the west, and the Ushiri and Talash Valleys on the east. The northern limit of Dir is the crest of the mountain range which divides it from Chitral and Yasin; the Durand line is the boundary on the west; on the east it is bounded by Kohistan, and on the south by the valley of Upper Swat and by Bajaur. From the mass of mountains to the north three giant spurs or ranges run down towards the south. The easternmost of these, forming the watershed between the Swat and the Indus Rivers, runs first due south and then west to the Malakand. The central forms the watershed between the Panjkora and Swat. The westernmost range is a continuation of the Hindu Raj, runs south-westerly, and forms the watershed between the Panjkora and Rud Rivers on the one side and the Kunar on the other. The most important pass which crosses it is the Lowari or Laorai (10,250 feet), open for convoys from April to November; it carries the main road from India to Chitral.

Description of Dir

The four sections of the Malizai sub-division of the Khwazozai-Akozais resident in Dir are:

1. Painda Khel. 2. Sultan Khel. 3. Nusrudin Khel. 4. Ausa Khel.

On the Panjkora River, commencing from the north, in the Kashkar Valley, in which the village of Dir is situated, is the Akhund Khel sub-section of the Painda Khel Malizais, to which the Khan of Dir belongs. Below these again, on the left bank of the river, are more of the Painda Khel, and on the right bank the Sultan Khel; and, still further down, the Sultan Khel, Nusrudin Khel and Ausa Khel on both banks of the river.

The route to Chitral from the Swat Valley leads through this country. Leaving the Swat River at Chakdara, the road turns abruptly to the west and enters the Uch Valley, passing by the Katgola Pass (3000 feet) into the Talash Valley, where, as Bellew tells us and as later travellers have confirmed, there are extensive ruins of massive fortifications on the south side of the valley and nine or ten miles from the Panjkora, covering the hills for a distance of several miles. From here the ascent is very steep to the summit of the Kamrani Pass, to the north-east of which, in a valley, lies Mundah, the stronghold of Mian Gul Jan, the quarrelsome younger brother of the Khan of Dir. The descent from the kotal to Sado or Khungai is very steep. Turning to the right from Sado, the road passes up the Panjkora Valley, the river being crossed on the fourth march from Sado at Chutiatun, whence, a few miles further along the right bank of the Dir stream, Dir itself is reached. “Here,” writes Enriquez, “situated on a low hill is the stronghold of the Khan. The fort has three towers, each surmounted with a loop-holed fighting top.... The vale of Dir is well cultivated and numbers of chenars are scattered about it, so that its greenness is refreshing after the wearying aridity of the Panjkora. The little town of Dir occupies a steep khud abreast of the fort. Its crazy huts are built one above the other, so that the roof of one forms the promenade or front garden of the one above.” Then on up the Dir Valley, via Mirga, to the Lowari Pass and Chitral. An alternative route, branching off from Sado, runs westward for some way and then, turning northward again, ascends the bed of the Jandol River to the Janbatai Pass (7212 feet); after crossing this the road leads along the Baraul Valley to Chutiatun and Dir, where it joins the first mentioned road.

The people of Dir and Bajaur are all Sunni Muhammadans, intensely bigoted, but superstitious rather than religious. Their country is very much priest-ridden, and the people are unusually susceptible to the influence of the mullahs, who are able to excite them to fanaticism more easily and to a greater degree than among other Pathans. The fighting men in Dir and Bajaur number probably not less than 80,000; they, and more particularly the men of Dir, have a very strong sense of discipline; and in the event of a general fanatical rising the combination of tribes which could be formed would be by no means one to be despised, since they would probably receive material assistance, if not indeed open and active help, from Swat, from the Utman Khels, and very possibly from the men of Buner.