CLOSE CO-OPERATION BY MACHINE GUNS WITH THE FRONT LINES OF ATTACKING INFANTRY.
Very little information has been given on this subject, but co-operation seems to have been very poor; but this co-operation is made very difficult in many cases by:—
1. Inability of the M.G. sections to keep pace with the attacking infantry.
2. The visibility of the methods employed of carrying the gun. This leads to many casualties.
3. Lack of tactical knowledge on the part of many of the more junior M.G.Os.
4. Lack of definite plans as to the role of the M.Gs. before the action commences.
The two following examples serve to illustrate some of the above:—
1. In a recent attack, owing to lack of any previous understanding between M.G.Os., eight M.Gs. converged into one small section of a captured trench. Owing to lack of space only two of these guns were able to come into action.
2. In another instance during an attack, six guns converged into one small house. Owing to lack of space, etc., only two of these guns were able to come into action.
Before an attack a certain M.G. Officer was told to await orders from his Commanding Officer. He was forgotten and left behind.
In this case, as soon as the Officer realized that he had been forgotten, he should have used his own initiative.
All these point to the fact that some arrangements for concerted action should be made.
N. B.—See “Guns Brigaded in Action.”