13th HUSSARS.

The Charge of Squadrons B and C at Tekrit in Mesopotamia on Monday, the 5th of November, 1917.

S.S.M. F. J. TEGG.	Capt. S. O. ROBINSON.	Sergt. A. S. NEWMAN.
Sergt. JOHN GRAY.	IN UNFADING MEMORY	Pte. F. G. JASPER.
Pte. WM. THOMSON.	1914 Staff. 13224 Pte. MICHAEL MACDONNELL Served with the 6th Dragoon Guards in S. Africa, 1900-1902. (No portrait available.)	Pte. WM. FRANCOMB.

“Then the cavalry came in on the extreme left. They
went in with the point, jumped the trenches and scattered
the Turks who were fleeing in confusion after being driven
from their trenches in the assaults by the infantry. This
charge was carried through 1,000 yards beyond the trench
held by our infantry when machine-gun and field-gun fire
was encountered at close range. The cavalry wheeled
about and covered their withdrawal by dismounted action.”
The Times, 15th Nov., 1917.

Extract from a letter of one who took part in the charge:

“The most pleasant part was to hear our infantry cheering us as we cleared the trenches and galloped between them and the Turks.”

“I will conclude this short account of an incident which deserves a prominent place in the annals of the Regiment, by giving a list of the ‘immediate rewards’ which were bestowed by the Commander-in-Chief on individuals for various acts of gallantry performed on the afternoon of the 5th November. These were:—

Lieutenant	D. J. E. Norton	The Military Cross.
”	H. R. Jones
Sergt. Tetheridge		Distinguished Conduct Medal.
Sergt. Matthews		The Military Medal.
Pte. Corbyn
Pte. Mortimer

List of Casualties for the Period under Review.

Killed.

Captain S. O. Robinson	November 5, 1917.
Pte. Tunnicliffe, J.	November 3, 1917.
Sergt. Newman, A. S.	November 5, 1917.
Pte. Gray, J.	November 5, 1917.
Pte. Francomb, A. W.	November 5, 1917.

Died of Wounds.

Pte. Thomson, W.

November 5, 1917.

Missing.
Lieut. T. Williams-Taylor (Who has since been reported Prisoner of War in Turkey.)	November 5, 1917.
S.Q.M.S. (Atg. S.S.M.) Tegg, F. J.	November 5, 1917.
Pte. Jasper, F. G.	November 5, 1917.
Pte. MacDonnell, M.	November 5, 1917.

Wounded.
November 3 1917.
L.-Cpl. O’Connor, J.
Pte.	Liddle, A.
”	Pte. Miller.
Pte.	Barker, J. H.
Pte.	Beales, H. J.
November 4 1917.
Pte.	Bell.
”	Bennett, W.
November 5, 1917.
L.-Cpl. Reaves, A. E.
L.-Cpl. Lindsey, H.
Cpl.	Hudson, H.
Pte.	Stubbs, R.
”	effrey, J.
”	Pte. Halstead, C.
”	Pte. Manby, E.
”	Byrne, J.
”	Williams, D. G.
Cpl.	Leutchford, W.
Tpr.	Burder, H. A.
Pte.	Viney, A. V.
”	Taylor, C. E.
”	Delaney, C.
”	Ward, A. J. F.
”	Andrews, F.
”	Hibbett, A.
”	Wilson.
”	Stewart, H. W.

Extract from letter from Lieut.-Colonel J. J. Richardson to General Symons, C.M.G., dated 7th Cavalry Brigade, M.E.F., November 9, 1917.

“Dear Symons,—Altho’ this letter may seem to you to be rather belated you must make allowances, for we have been on trek ‘on operation scale’ continually since the 17th of last month.... By great good fortune we bivouacked at Baghdad on Balaclava Day, and I was able to get (from the E.F. canteen) a bottle of beer a man and ½ a bottle of ‘pop’ per officer.

“We have just completed, and are returning to our base from, the operations against Tekrit, where the Rgt. again distinguished itself in a mounted charge against the Turks entrenched, and enabled the complete capture of the strong position to be consummated before nightfall. Our losses, altho’ they include the loss of Bob Robinson (killed), were extraordinarily—and to me unaccountably—light, being 1 officer and 5 O.R. killed, 1 officer and 2 O.R. missing, and 16 O.R. wounded. The missing include Williams-Taylor and S.S.M. Tegg, but I have very great hopes that the former and possibly the latter will prove to be prisoners of war. Two days later I was able to collect and bury together and hold a service over the corpses of Robinson, Sgts. Gray and Newman, and Pte. Francomb. We claim to have accounted for at least 100 Turks, and Sgt. Gray’s sword was thick with blood up to the hilt.

“Please let General B.P. and as many present and past 13ths know this, and that I feel confident they will hear nothing but good of the Rgt. The men were simply splendid, and ipso facto the officers also.—Yours sincerely,

(Signed)J. J. Richardson.”

From Colonel Richardson to Sir Frederick Williams-Taylor.

“7th Cavalry Brigade, M.E.F.,
12th November 1917.

“Dear Sir Frederick,—Many thanks for your kind letter of August 27th, which has been forwarded to me from home, and reached me last night; many thanks also for your kind offer to help financially in the publication of the record of the Regiment in this War; I have noted this, although I do not—at present—anticipate that any appeal with this object will be made.

“We arrived back from the operations which resulted in the capture of Tekrit yesterday, and I was on the point of writing you an account of our share in them and of the charge in which your son Travers was wounded. The Army Commander has interested himself personally in the case of your son, and will, I have no doubt, have cabled you fully and given you the reasons why we think we are justified in thinking his fate to be no worse than that of a prisoner of war.

“Well, about 4.45 P.M. on the 5th November, the Regiment was being held in reserve, so that should an opportunity arise to assist the Infantry who had been assaulting the Turkish trenches all day, we might be put in without delay, and our Brigadier evidently thought the moment had arrived, so he ordered me to send out a squadron to find the first line of trenches and to sweep up it towards the Imam, which was the most conspicuous mark; ‘B’ Squadron was the first for duty, so I gave Captain Robinson his orders, and the squadron went out. No sooner were they started than I received orders to send a second squadron, and ‘C’ Squadron, under Lieutenant Norton, was sent out. I at once received orders to take out the remaining two squadrons in support; this I did, but the first two squadrons had got such a good start of me that what followed I had to learn from the survivors of the charge. It seems that on approaching that point of the first-line trench which had been given him as an objective, Robinson realised that it had been evacuated by the enemy, who had retired in a N.W. direction, and that the left flank of our Infantry were also approaching that point; he therefore halted his squadron, and when ‘C’ Squadron had overtaken him, he explained to Norton the situation, and his decision—which incidentally was the true soldier’s instinct, and from a military point of view quite correct—to attack the mass of the enemy, a few hundred in number, who could be seen retiring in the open about 1200 yards to his left flank. Accordingly the two squadrons wheeled to the left, and almost in line, galloped along, one on either side of a long trench, which had several strong points, at one of which Robinson was killed, shot through the back of the head; and your son was last seen pinned to the ground by his horse, which had been shot, and trying to load his automatic pistol, and surrounded by a number of Turks. The man who saw this said he also thought that Travers was wounded, but there is only his evidence on this point. When the squadrons had got back to the neighbourhood of our Infantry line they were dismounted and advanced about 200 yards, with a view to covering the escape of any of our men who had been unhorsed or slightly wounded; but it was now almost quite dark, and after allowing a reasonable time for any stragglers to rejoin, I ordered a retirement on the Brigade.

“The Turks retired during the night, and our Infantry next morning went over the ground, and buried six bodies, including Robinson’s; they were unable to identify these as the Turks had stripped them of everything, including identity discs; I however sent a party that day, Tuesday, to ascertain what was possible about our missing, and they identified the bodies of Captain Robinson, Sergts. Newman and Gray, and Pte. Francomb. Two bodies, buried by our Infantry, they were unable to find, and so remained unidentified; but I think we are more than justified in presuming, under the circumstances, that Travers was made prisoner of war by the Turks, wounded perhaps but not necessarily so, and personally I have every hope of hearing in course of time through our Red Cross and the Red Crescent Associations that he is safe and well in the hands of the Turks.

“I will say no more at present beyond expressing our universal regret at losing so popular and so capable an officer, and our great sympathy with you in the painful suspense which the uncertainty of Travers’ fate must impose upon you.—Believe me, yours sincerely,

J. J. Richardson.”

Extracts from letter from Lieutenant Guy Pedder to his Sister, 15th November 1917.

“At last we are back at rest, so I will try and give you a sort of account of our doings of late. We have been on the go now for just on 8 weeks, so you can imagine how topping it is to get back into a decent camp with a tent to yourself, &c. This morning I had a cup of tea and a biscuit when I was called, followed by a boiling-hot bath and a change of clothes—what luxury!... The mail goes out to-night....

“Our Brigade left Childari about Sept. 25th, a week after the other Brigade had gone out on the Ramadie stunt, which was a great success, the Fourteenth doing very well, but losing their C.O., and Medd Bridges is now commanding them.

“After four long marches during very hot weather (Robinson went down with heat-stroke, but rejoined a fortnight later), we took Mandali, some 100 miles N.E. of Childari up on the Persian boundary, after very little opposition and no casualties.

“We stayed there almost three weeks, during which time we had a certain amount of patrol-work, &c., to do. Then, after two long marches N.W., we took part in an affair in the right flank to kick the Turks out of a pass over the Jubal Hamrin—it was quite a relief to get among some hills, and away from miles and miles of flat desert. We had very few casualties, and kicked the Turks out more by surprise and rapidity of movement than by fighting. The last morning the Brigade covered 15 miles in 1¼ hours!!—a pretty hot and uncomfortable pace in full marching order over rough ground. We then denied Qusil Robart to the Turks for three days, and got shelled a bit; however, it was all very chusie until we were suddenly hustled back to the Tigris, viâ Bacuba, to a more central camp, so we don’t know what happened on the right flank since we left.

“We took about five days to get here, and were then told that we should be here for 21 days, the Brigade having covered some 400 miles in under five weeks. Our three weeks’ rest developed into two days, when the Division which had reassembled were hustled up N. on the right bank; we reached Samara after three very cold and unpleasant night marches, and were very weary, so we lay hidden in a nullah all the fourth day without any shade. We moved again at 7 P.M. for our fourth night march, and after covering some 27 miles found ourselves right out on the left flank [of the Infantry], who captured Daur that day, whilst we demonstrated only on the flank and got a bit shelled; however, we underwent a new experience to us, but a very old one to Londoners, as Fritz came over and dropped some bombs—very unpleasant being bombed by an aeroplane; you feel so helpless standing in an open desert holding your horse’s head. We camped just S. of Daur, and next day had to go right out on the Infantry’s left flank whilst they captured Aujah, and there we had to reconnoitre the enemy’s position at Tekrit—a long march there and back; we were shot at a good deal, but were very lucky, and had under a dozen casualties in the Rgt., and only one man actually killed. We got back late that night, and were woken up at 7 A.M. next morning by Fritz dropping bombs on our Div. camp, which he repeated again that evening, when luckily nearly all the horses were down at the river watering. The Rgt. had only three or four casualties from these bombs, but it was a horrid sensation hearing the bomb come tearing through the air, and not knowing where to expect the crash. That night we moved at 10 P.M. (another night march) for the battle of Tekrit.

“We were sent well out on the left flank, where we stayed all the morning, and from where we saw our Infantry take two lines of trenches under cover of a heavy artillery barrage, and also where we were bombed again twice. This time I actually could see the bombs leave the aeroplane, and watch them drop right up to the moment of exploding on striking the ground. About 3 P.M. we were moved right up on the Infantry’s flank, and stayed in some hidden ground. At 4.39 the Infantry attacked, and a ¼ hour later we were galloping through our Infantry, who cheered us like mad, towards the Turks. Robinson’s squadron led, followed by ‘C’; then about 1000 yards behind ‘C’ the Colonel took us—‘D’ followed by ‘A.’ ‘B’ and ‘C’ got right into the Turks and beyond, or as much into them as you can expect, considering the place was full of deep trenches (we who were some way behind ‘B’ and ‘C’ crossed four lines of trenches), and Bob was killed at the farthermost point reached by the charge—instantaneously—shot through the head. We got his body and buried it the next day after the Turks had cleared off. Williams-Taylor, also in ‘B,’ was last seen lying wounded under his dead horse. However, as his body was nowhere to be found next day, we hope, and have reason to, that he is alive and a prisoner. ‘D’ was the third squadron in the charge, and though we crossed four trenches we never actually reached the Turks, whom we saw just in front; and when the Colonel, who was leading us, saw ‘B’ and ‘C’ galloping back, he gave the order to retire and took us some way back where we got into dismounted action. My horse (not Matches, whom I was resting) was badly cut through the stifle, just as we got the order to retire—however, he just managed to get me back and out of it, altho’ he had to jump four trenches; he was a very good young horse, and I was sorry to lose him. The Rgt. was again very fortunate, as the rifle-fire, altho’ of course (why, I don’t know) not at all on the same scale as at Lajj, was quite unpleasant enough. We only had some 28 casualties and 60 horses. Personally, I don’t think the game was worth the candle, especially when you think of Bob, the best fellow in the Rgt.; but other people don’t all seem to agree with me, and the Corps Commander gave the Division great praise for our assistance all that night, and the Rgt. got it doubly from the Brigade Division. The most pleasant part was to hear our Infantry cheering us as we cleared the trenches, and galloped between them and the Turk.

THE GRAVE AT TEKRIT

Sacred To The Memory
Of The Following Officers, Men
Of The
13th Hussars
Who Fell in Action at This Spot On The
5th November 1917
Captain S. O. Robinson
N^o. 6993 Sergt. J. Gray

“Now we are back in that central position, for a few weeks’ rest, I hope, I mentioned before on the Tigris.

“We charged at 4.45 P.M. on 5th Nov., exactly three years since I left for the 11th, and didn’t get back into a camp, having collected wounded, &c., until 2 in the morning. We took six days to get back here, and the last night I had a tragedy, as the Arabs came into our camp and stole my saddle-bags, which were full of kit.

“Robinson was far and away the best fellow in the Rgt., and it’s a tremendous blow to me....

“Hind has just joined us—also two new officers with a draft.”

From Colonel Richardson, 7th Brigade,
M.E.F., 13th November 1917.

“I must just write you a short line to let you know how your brother, Captain S. O. Robinson, or Bob as we all loved to call him, died. I shall hope later on to send you a more detailed account of the action, but in the meantime an abbreviated account must suffice.

“On November 5th the Cavalry Division was co-operating with the Infantry in the attack on Tekrit, and at 4.45 or thereabouts in the afternoon, I received orders to send a squadron to charge the Turkish trenches on the left of our Infantry. Bob’s squadron, ‘B,’ was the first for duty, and I sent it, and soon afterwards sent ‘C’ Squadron in support; these two squadrons rode up to the Turkish front-line trench, found it evacuated, found the left flank of our Infantry, with a mass of Turks estimated at 3 or 4 hundred retiring in the open to the N.W. or left front. Bob at once, with the instinct of a true soldier, decided to charge these Turks, and proceeded to do so with the two squadrons.

“When they reached the big mass of Turks, a mêlée naturally occurred. Bob was seen taking on four Turks with his sword, and was shot through the head by one of them; he was killed instantaneously (incidentally his trumpeter, Maguire, from whom we gather this description, claims to have shot this particular Turk with his revolver). The squadron went on a couple of hundred yards or so, then turned, and came through the Turks again, and eventually reached our lines in safety. By this time it was dusk, and after dark the Turks retired; next day our Infantry came up, and found several bodies stripped, even of their identity discs, and buried them lightly in the trenches. We had gone back that night to bivouac some miles, but on Tuesday (6th) I sent a small party to go over the ground to ascertain what they could; this party found and identified Bob’s body and that of three others of our men, and next day, the 7th, I went myself with the C. of E. Padre, Lt. Stirling, and 5 men, collected all the bodies, buried them deep, and the Padre read the burial service over them. We could not mark the spot, but we took records of the exact position where they were buried.

“Major Twist is writing, and will see to his effects in the Regiment.

“In offering you all my deepest sympathy in your loss, I should like to add that his loss will be most keenly felt in the Regiment, and by many outside of it. If his brother officers loved him for his kindness and simplicity of character, his men adored him for the same qualities and for his justness, and I personally mourn the loss of a true friend; but he died the death of a gallant soldier fighting sword in hand against superior odds, a death that few Cavalry officers can ever hope to meet—to so few is it given,—an end that will live long in the history of the Regiment, if not in the history of the Army. R.I.P.”

Sergt. John Gray (Killed at Tekrit, 5th November 1917		Lieut. D. J. E. Norton, M.C.
	Capt. F. Norman Payne (Died of cholera in Baghdad, 14th November 1917)
Sergt. A. S. Newman (Killed at Tekrit, 5th November 1917)		Pte. Wm. Thomson (Killed at Tekrit, 5th November 1917)

From Captain Chrystall, 14th November 1917.

“I herewith send you a short account of the part of the battle of Tekrit, Nov. 5th, 1917, which deals with the Cavalry, and showing how co-operation with the Infantry can be carried out even in a flat country.

“Our troops consisted of—

1 Cav. Div. of 2 Brgds.

1 Inf. Div.

1 Inf. Brgde.

The usual division of corps artillery.

“The enemy had—

2 Inf. Div. in trenches round Tekrit.

250 sabres.

1 Inf. Div. in reserve, some 12 miles to the north.

The usual artillery and heavy guns, and 5.9’s and heavy howitzers.

“The Cav. Div. had the task of protecting the W. flank, and early in the morning of the 5th had gained touch with the whole of the enemy’s entrenched flank, a distance of some 6 miles. The Infantry, meanwhile, were marching into position for an assault on the line Z-X. Owing to the heat, and telephone wires being continually cut, this attack had not reached farther than the first line of trenches.

“However, at 4.30 P.M., Nth Div., Nth Bde. leading, attacked, under a heavy barrage by our guns, the trenches Z-X, 2nd and 3rd lines. Immediately, on Infantry’s left, was the Cav. Div.—2 Regiments of Nth Bde. at point B in position of readiness (Point B was a deep water-course, with a bluff on the N. side), and 1 Regt. slightly N.W. on the left, with the Nth Bde. to the N.

“On the right of these two Regiments was a subsection of M.G.’s, ‘R,’ and on the left one section ‘L.’ These M.G.’s were, until the Infantry attack came off, firing on enemy’s trench-line X-Y, and covering the advance of dismounted Cavalry patrols, enabling the latter to approach to within 800 yds.—1000 yds. of enemy’s trench. During the whole day the Turkish gunners were busy ranging on the Cavalry with heavy field-guns, and a number of casualties resulted both in men and horses.

“As the Infantry attacked the ‘R’ section, (sub) ‘R,’ was able to bring heavy fire in enfilade on trench at point Z, and this had the effect of completely protecting the flank of our attacking Infantry, and it was significant that during the whole advance to X-Z, no enemy fire was opened from Z flank. The Infantry remarked that this co-operation undoubtedly saved many casualties. A few moments later the Infantry had carried the 2nd line of trenches, the Hussars and a squadron of Lancers (Ind. Cav.) having been collected at Point B, emerged from cover, and proceeded to push in a mounted attack on the left of our Infantry against the enemy, who appeared to be massing (behind the 3rd and 4th lines) for a counter-attack.

“The right subsection, M.G.’s ‘R,’ was able to cover the advance of the Cavalry, until it crossed the trench-line, and a little beyond it. The two left subsections covered the left flank. Ranges from 1000 to 2000 yards.

“Another subsection, ‘T,’ followed the Hussars, mounted and wheeling to the left, came into action under very hot fire about 1500 yards from enemy’s line, and pushed forward, its guns dismounted, the horses being sent right back. This subsection was able to bring covering fire to bear on the flanks of the advancing Hussars.

“During the mêlée no fire action was feasible, owing to the large amount of dust and general compression which was inevitable.

“The whole of this action was carried out on more or less open ground, and under continuous gun and rifle fire from enemy’s rear positions. The enemy machine-gun fire was fairly heavy, and fired at extreme range, as the angle of descent testified, causing casualties behind fairly good cover to our M.G. subsections.

“No. of rounds fired, 10,500.

“Men and horses were all day without water, and did not obtain same until midnight, at which time the Infantry had taken over from the Cavalry. Please find attached sketch of position.”

Extract from letter written by Private Hugh H. Mortimer, M.M., relating to the charge at Tekrit, 5th November 1917, for which he received the M.M.

“I must have the luck of the devil, as my horse got a flesh-wound—bullet—in the leg, but is practically all right again now.

“We’ve got six honours in the Regt., my squadron leader and a Lt. in B—M.C.’s, a sergt. in my troop D.C.M., 2 M.M.’s in other sqdns., and—hold your breath—they’ve given me one—Military Medal. So I suppose you’ll have to put that in ‘The Times’ now—eh! what! It seemed to be nothing to me when I was in it. We charged about 300 Infantry on the road and in the trenches, with machine-guns and artillery behind ’em. We caught ’em weak—just about 100 of us—2 weak sqdns.—in the mist of dusk—and, my God! it seemed as if we were riding into Hades. Funny thing tho’, I didn’t have wind up then, was feeling rather elated cos we’d waited, and moved about, practically all day, for a real rut at them, and been bombed from aeroplanes, shelled and sniped, till we were just itching to get at ’em. Well, they got pukka wind up when we got in amongst ’em, and started firing wildly, some trying to use bayonets, others holding up their mitts and shouting ‘Kamerad.’ Then we got order to rally as we weren’t strong enough for pursuit. Starting to come back, I spotted a youngster badly wounded in the foot and horse shot, so I dismounted and put him up on my steed, which was too bobbery to carry the two of us. He got back O.K. Then my fun started. I had my revolver and about 14 rounds and began to think about getting back somehow myself, when I spotted a chum of mine lying about 60 yards from the trenches. Well, two of us tried to get him out of it, but he would not have it—thigh shattered, blood in spurts, mad with pain. J. Turk, seeing us retiring, heartened up again and potted at us like blazes, shrapnel, machine-guns, and every bally thing. At the finish I had to leave him, to my sorrow, altho’ we got him away afterwards. Still he suffered a hell of a lot from exposure, as the devils came out and stripped him—he’d be unconscious by then—in the dark. I hear that he’s very bad in hospital, but likely to recover.

“I haven’t got the gong yet, owing, I suppose, to Gen. Maude’s death, but they’ve made as much fuss over it as if we were—millions of V.C.’s. I’ve shaken hands with two Generals, and been in about half a dozen parades till I’m fairly fed up, and nearly said, ‘Keep the old gong and let’s have a bit of peace.’

“Well, I’ll think about drying up now. Am in the pink and quite fit; hope you are all the same, and that you, dear mother, are carrying on.”

BAGHDAD CEMETERY

CAPT. F. NORMAN PAYNE’S GRAVE IN BAGHDAD CEMETERY

Extract of letter from Colonel Richardson, dated 7th Cavalry Brigade, M.E.F., 15th November 1917.

”... We have just got back into camp for a short rest to re-equip, reclothe, and rehorse after two months of continuous trekking—we estimate that we have covered at least 500 miles since September 22nd—which culminated in a big battle on the 5th of this month, in which the Regiment again charged Turkish trenches, and two of the squadrons did very brilliant work.

“I have to report with great regret the death yesterday in Baghdad from cholera of Captain Payne, who last winter, you may remember, was in Billy’s squadron, and whose letters to his wife were of great interest.”

CHAPTER XIX.
WINTER OF 1917-18.

After the lamented death of General Maude the command of the British army in Mesopotamia devolved upon Lieut.-General Sir W. R. Marshall, K.C.B., K.C.S.I., who had been one of the two corps commanders during the advance on Baghdad.

In a despatch giving an account of the operations of the force during the winter which followed General Maude’s death, General Marshall explains in a few words the situation with which he had to deal when he took over charge. After paying a warm tribute to the work and character of his dead Chief, he writes: “When, therefore, I had the honour of being appointed as his successor, the moral of the army was magnificent, while organisation and training had reached a high level of efficiency. The Turkish army, on the contrary, was low in moral, and desertions from it were numerous and frequent; on the Tigris and Euphrates they had retreated out of rapid striking distance, and only on our right flank was there a good opportunity of hitting them.”

2nd Lieut. A. C. Barrington	Lieut. M. R. Farrer	Lieut. F. G. Lawrence
	Lieut. E. Goodman
Lieut. W. W. N. Davies	2nd Lieut. E. P. Barrett	Lieut. H. G. Keswick

General Marshall does not take up at this point the consideration of any general questions outside the immediate purview of the Mesopotamian force, but it may be observed here that the state of affairs in the various theatres of war had of late greatly altered. The collapse of Russia had made an immense difference in Europe, and also in Asia, where Great Britain was now left practically alone in face of the Turkish military power; and on the left of the great Turkish battle-line the enemy had made a notable advance, threatening the Caucasus and Northern Persia. On the other hand, it had now become fairly clear that the long strain of the war was telling on the Turks, who, it must be remembered, had entered into it when still shaken by their recent defeat at the hands of Bulgaria. The defence of the Dardanelles, too, though successful, had tried them more than the world suspected, and they had not shown themselves capable of throwing forward from their base in Asia Minor, either against General Allenby in Palestine on their right, or against General Maude on their centre, such masses of troops as some had expected. Indeed, on both these fronts, the British now seemed to be numerically superior. But to revert to the operations on the latter front.

In the circumstances presented to General Marshall he decided to attack at once, while the weather was favourable, the Turkish 13th Corps, in the country north-east of Baghdad, which had been so roughly handled earlier in the year. The attack was successful; the Turks in this part of the country were driven northwards with loss through Kara Tepe and Kifri, and the British hold on the great main road into Persia was securely established, whilst further progress was made in the Jebel Hamrin range. The Turks gave considerable trouble by flooding some tracts of land, and they, of course, resisted the British columns; but the fighting was not very severe, and it was soon over. On the 8th of December the bulk of the troops on this side were withdrawn into winter camps. It will be understood that they had now reached high rough country, where winter campaigning was not easy, and the enemy in this quarter also had got out of reach.

The winter months were spent by General Marshall in developing supply districts, in thoroughly opening up and establishing military control over the Lower Euphrates, from the neighbourhood of Baghdad to the sea, in relieving the state of famine to which the Turks had reduced some of the western provinces of Persia, and in numerous minor operations at various points of his widely extended charge. These, he writes, consisted generally of reconnaissances by Cavalry and light-armoured motor-cars, and of bombing raids by the Flying Corps. It was a winter of consistent rain in the lowlands, with snow on the higher ground, which made military movements difficult and threw a heavy strain on the lines of communication.

On the other hand, as General Marshall reports, “by the middle of December 1917 ... the military position had completely changed owing to the magnificent successes gained by General Allenby in Palestine,” and this greatly strengthened his hands. Much, therefore, was accomplished.

Finally, when the weather began to improve with the early spring, it was decided that another blow must be struck at the Turks on the left—that is, on the Upper Euphrates. In this quarter they had been reinforced, and during the months of December and January they began pushing their patrols down stream from Hit, where the bulk of their troops were concentrated. General Marshall gave orders that a column should march on Hit and drive away the Turks, and that it should be aided in doing so by a Brigade of Cavalry. Hit was occupied on the 9th of March, and the Turks fell back to a stronger position some miles up the river. Here again they were attacked, and this time with great effect. As at Ramadie, in September, the Cavalry succeeded in getting right round into the Turkish rear and cutting off their retreat. By the 30th of March the Turkish force had been completely beaten, and the remains of it had fled to a great distance, leaving over five thousand prisoners in British hands.

The Thirteenth Hussars had no share in what General Marshall calls “the magnificent work done by the Cavalry Brigade” on this occasion. After their exertions in the autumn and early winter they were given a rest, and remained from the middle of December 1917 until April of the following year at a winter camp on the Tigris forty miles above Baghdad. There they found plenty to do in training drafts and remounts and other work of the kind, for the Regiment had suffered considerable loss in men and horses and equipment; but for about four months they saw no more fighting or marching, and were able to enjoy a comparatively quiet time with some sport and amusement.

A few extracts relating to this period are given below.

Extract from letter from Lieutenant G. R. Pedder, dated 4th December 1917.

“We are very messed about again—right on the right flank, and are at [? Chai Khanna]. I am very fit. It’s pretty cold at night now on these stunts, and I shan’t be sorry when we get back to our permanent camp.

“There are lots of geese, duck, and grouse up here; but you get no time to go out shooting, but get shot at yourself most of the time.

“I expect Jeffrey is well on the way back by now. The daytime is perfect now, and it is scarcely necessary to wear a topee.”

From Captain Chrystall.

“5th December 1917.

“We have been out on operations nearly a week, after a few days’ rest in camp. As I write this we are on outpost against the Turks in the hills, and our R.H.A. is shelling their positions, and we are getting a few in R.S.V.P.! I am feeling very fit now in spite of the cold, which has been very severe the last two or three nights. We are being relieved some time this afternoon by another Brigade, and shall be back into camp and have a little more comfort. Whilst out here, miles away from Baghdad, a wireless message came for me, making an appointment at the dentist!—in Baghdad to-day, a thing I had asked for about a week ago. A great thing war is now; fancy receiving this about 120 miles out in the blue and whilst in action.”

“29th December 1917.

“I spent a very happy Xmas, and was able to arrange quite a decent dinner for the men. We are now in winter quarters, refitting and training again: it is so nice to have a comfortable tent to sleep in and on a bed. The weather has been very cold, 12 degrees of frost on 2 days last week, and snow down to the bottom of the foot-hills. The army is very well done out here now. We had frozen beef and plum-pudding and even potatoes in rations for Xmas day. We ourselves managed to secure a real live turkey from a neighbouring village. All you people at home must be far worse off for food than we are, and your experiences of air-raids cannot be any too pleasant.

“I have been playing football this afternoon for the Indian ranks of the squadron, and got a severe kick on the ankle for my pains; it will lay me up for a day or two.”

Extract from letter from Lieutenant G. R. Pedder, dated 18th December 1917.

“We have been back here about a fortnight now, and I don’t think we shall move again till after Xmas, at least I hope so, as it is frightfully cold at night now, much colder than this time last year; also, I am riding in the Baghdad Plate on the 27th and the Grand Handicap, also 7 furlongs, on the 29th, and I am showing ‘Matches’ in the Horse Show on the 30th. There’s absolutely no news whatever. Moreover, we haven’t got an English mail for over a month now. It must have been sunk.

‘A’ and ‘D’ have amalgamated messes, and it is much pleasanter than having a squadron mess.

“Fitzgibbon and Le Patourel have gone into Baghdad for a week, as only eight officers are allowed to go there for Xmas, and those eight are all competitors—Hartigan, Keswick, Self, Welstead, Stirling, Ormrod, Norton, Twist.

“I am riding ‘The Witch’ in two races, the horse my servant rode and won on during the first meeting. Box (Lieutenant Jeffrey) hasn’t got back yet.”

Extract from letter from Lieutenant G. R. Pedder, dated 19th December 1917.

“Here we are back again after what ended up in quite a mild show, although at first we all thought it was going to be a very murky business.

“It has turned frightfully cold. This morning I woke up to find a thick layer of ice on the water in my water-bucket inside the tent. Thank goodness we are back here in our standing camp, with tents galore and plenty of clothes and food to help keep out the cold. Personally I like it, although you have got to wear a thick greatcoat all day.

“The Colonel is down river, sick with an ulcer or something, so Twist is commanding.

“There is a tremendous show on in Baghdad for Xmas this year. Two days’ racing, 26th and 27th—I am entering two horses for three races,—a duck shoot, which I shall also attend, or hope to, golf tournament, cricket, footer, hockey, &c., &c. Of course, if the rain comes it will all probably be off.”

Extract from Lance-Corporal Bowie’s Diary.

“Some 12 days later, on the 30th instant, we received sudden orders to intercept a force of the enemy who were advancing through the Sakaltutan Pass. After having covered some 60 miles in that direction we came into contact with the 13th Turkish Army Corps again at about 6 P.M. on the evening of the 2nd December. We immediately deployed and attacked them, and, after having driven in their outposts, we succeeded in advancing close up to the mouth of the Pass, where the Brigade held them until about 12 noon the following day, when we were relieved by the 6th Cavalry Brigade who had been resting in bivouac some 10 miles back. Simultaneously with this action our Infantry, under Lieut.-General Egerton, had advanced up the right bank of the Diala river and had cleared the whole area south of Qarah Tappah, and were advancing to attack the Turks at the other end of the Pass. The following morning we crossed the Shatt-el-Adhaim river and advanced up the right bank as far as Abu-Ghuraib, where we threatened the Turkish right flank, after which we returned in the afternoon and relieved the 6th Cavalry Brigade, who were still holding the Pass. This Brigade were bombed in their bivouac early the next morning by two enemy airmen; this prevented them from relieving us for some hours. Meanwhile, General Egerton’s force, co-operating with us, had attacked the enemy in the rear, inflicting heavy casualties among them. The enemy thus being attacked at both ends, he succeeded in escaping over the hills (no small feat in itself), under cover of the night. The Russian force of Cossacks under Lieut.-Colonel Bicharakoff co-operated with us on the right flank throughout these operations. The total British captures were 6 Turkish officers, including a Brigadier Commander, 121 other ranks, and 2 guns.

“On the morning of the 6th we commenced our march back to Sadiyah, going into bivouac for the night after doing some 12 miles. The following morning we sent out patrols to attack and disperse some small enemy detachments who were reported to be in the vicinity by our airmen. An exceptionally bad sand-storm raged the whole of this day, during which we remained in bivouac. On our patrols returning and reporting all clear, we continued our march for some 25 miles, bivouacking for the night at Sinajah. Crossing the Tigris early the following morning, we arrived at our former camp at about 2 P.M. on the 9th instant.

“A few days later we were issued with our winter clothing, and about this time, too, the enemy airmen became very active, and bombed in turn Sammara, Akab, Baghdad, and many of our camps in between these places. They inflicted so many casualties among our troops that elaborate precautions were taken against surprise attacks. A system of trenches was connected all round the Cavalry horse lines, which enabled us in the event of attack to untie our horses from the lines, turn them about, and take cover ourselves in the trenches whilst holding them. These precautions undoubtedly saved us from a stampede when the enemy airmen paid us New Year Day’s visit and bombed us incessantly until their supplies became exhausted. They then flew merrily away in spite of all our batteries’ efforts and the 2 Archies, which were dug in down by the river bank to protect us from these raids.

“Just previous to this raid, towards the end of December, we received the good news that our Infantry had occupied Khaniquin without opposition on the 7th December, and also that our troops in Palestine, under General Allenby, had captured Jerusalem on the same date. Whilst on January 2nd we received word that our troops had occupied Qasr-i-Shirin without opposition.

“On January 15th the Fourteenth Hussars left the 6th Cavalry Brigade which was with us at the time, under the command of General Dunsterville, to operate in the neighbourhood of Baku, which is situated on the borders of the Black Sea.

“On the 19th instant the Regiment held some sports, which were the commencement of a series of sports and games, organised to help break the monotony of camp life in this country, which so depresses one’s spirit, especially at this time of the year. On this day some excellent sports were witnessed, everybody doing their utmost to be left in for the finals, which were to be held on the 27th instant, whilst in the evening our Concert Party gave a show which proved a great success. The following day our football team played the team of the monitor Mantis, which was anchored close to our camp at the time, the result of the match being 1 goal to nil in our favour. We invited the whole of the crew to dinner at our camp in the evening, every one spending a jolly time in consequence.

Capt. G. W. Rose, R.A.M.C.		Capt. E. Wordley, R.A.M.C.
	Capt. D. M. Methven (21st Lancers)
Lieut. A. C. J. Elkan		Lieut. J. Hampson

“The following day we were again visited by enemy airmen, but our batteries and Hotchkiss guns opened such a rapid and effective fire that after vainly trying to bomb us for some time they finally flew off in disgust, amidst the frantic cheers of the boys who were interested spectators.

“Soon after this we commenced our sports, in which every event was most keenly contested, and at the conclusion of the two days the results were as follows: Individual Tent-Pegging was won by our R.S.M., Mr Seekins; Skill at Arms by S.Q.M.S. Higgs; the best troop-horse was C98, ridden by Pte. Shaw; Officers Jumping went to Mr Macdonald; the Section Tent-Pegging to ‘B’ Squadron. In the dismounted events, the 100 yards was won by L.-Cpl. Carter in very good time, while the 1½ mile relay race was won rather easily by the team of ‘C’ Squadron, which included Sgt. Burgess, Sgt. Moss, L.-Cpl. Carter, L.-Cpl. Smithers, L.-Cpl. Bush, and Pte. Bowie. The tug-of-war was won by the ‘D’ Squadron team after an exceptionally fine pull, which concluded the programme. At about 8 P.M. the same evening our party gave another concert, this time to the whole Division, being assisted in their efforts by some of the crew of the monitor. This show proved a great success, every one thoroughly enjoying a good evening’s entertainment. On January 26th some Divisional races were held on a course we had made some 2 miles west of our camp, the ground here being splendidly suited for our purpose, being as flat as a billiard-table for many miles.

“On January 27th General Dunsterville’s force left Baghdad, the following officers and N.C.O.’s from our Regiment accompanying the force: Captain Annett, Lt. Cochrane, Sgt. Vernon, Sgt. Taylor, and Sgt. Saunders.

“Commencing on February 22nd, a 3-days’ race meeting was held at Akab by the 17th Infantry Division. The Regiment entered several horses, only one of which was successful—namely, Captain Blythe’s Army Pattern; while our Concert Party gave a show there on the nights of the 22nd and 23rd, which were greatly admired by all who witnessed them, the G.O.C. of that Division sending a letter of congratulation to our Colonel in having such a talented party. Shortly after this, on the 28th inst., the Cavalry Division held some athletic sports, in which several of the events were open to all comers. In this the Regiment secured several prizes—namely, 1st in the 100 yards for officers, Mr Osmond; the team of ‘C’ Squadron, L.-Cpl. Carter, L.-Cpl. Bush, Pte. Jones, and Pte. Bowie gaining 2nd prize in the Relay Race. L.-Cpl. Bush also 2nd in the Obstacle Race, while another 2nd prize was won by Pte. Bowie in the Open Mile, our tug-of-war team of ‘C’ Squadron being knocked out in the semi-final after a very game struggle. On March 4th we turned out a Rugby 15 to play the Australian Wireless Section’s 15, who had played so far an unbeaten record, and after a most exciting game the match ending in a draw, neither side being able to score.

“The following day being the anniversary of our charge at Lajj, the Regiment held a singing competition in the evening. This proved to be highly amusing, judging by the vociferous cheering which greeted the competitors’ efforts, the first prize for sentimental songs being won by Sgt. Burgess, and the first for comic by Pte. Bowie. At the conclusion of this, our Colonel made a speech in honour of our comrades who fell in the ‘Charge.’ On reading the names out the Colonel was almost overcome with emotion, and it was only with difficulty that he was able to complete.

“About this time we received the news that our forces operating on the Euphrates river had captured Hit on the 7th inst., and on the night of the 9th the enemy had evacuated Sahilijah, abandoning 2 mountain guns and much ammunition.

“On the 14th the 2nd Baghdad Race Meeting was held, also the semi-finals and finals of football, hockey, polo, golf, and boxing tournaments were contested during the week. Our football team was knocked out in the third round by the 25th Machine-gun Squadron, by one goal to nil, after a hard-fought game. The outstanding feature of this tournament was the match between the Worcesters and the Buffs, the first game they played being of 60 minutes’ duration; but as neither side was able to score extra time was allowed, and they played on for three periods of 20 minutes each, and again neither side was able to gain the advantage. The match was then postponed until the following day. On the replay, which lasted with extra time, some 2 hours and 40 minutes with still no score being registered, both teams withdrew from the tournament. The Regiment ran several horses in the racing, Lt. Ormrod’s ‘Venus’ again winning the Baghdad Cup. This time she was ridden by Frank Wootten, the famous jockey, who happened to be in Baghdad at the time.

“Some little time after this we received the news that our Column, commanded by Major-General Brooking, operating on the Euphrates river, had, on the 26th inst., attacked the 50th Turkish Division at Khan Baghdadi. The Cavalry cutting off the enemy’s retreat along the Aleppo Road, they surrendered with their Commander, the total captures being 18 Germans, including 2 officers, 212 Turkish officers, and 5236 Turkish other ranks, 12 guns, 57 machine-guns, 2 German wireless stations. During the six days’ fighting they pursued the fugitives of this force to a point some 73 miles north of Awah, destroying in this village some 300,000 rounds of gun ammunition and some 3¼ million rounds of rifle ammunition.

“On April 9th some Divisional Races were held on the racecourse near our camp, and in these several of our horses proved successful, Lt. Ormrod’s ‘Venus’ winning the ½-mile steeple-chase, and ‘Whiskers’ by the same owner was first past the post in the 6 furlongs, but on an objection being raised was disqualified later. Mr Welstead’s ‘Nightshade’ with its owner up won the sixth race, while Mr Jones’ ‘B3,’ ridden by Sgt. Holloway, won the Novices’ Flat Race.

“On the following day we received the welcome news that leave to India was granted, and a party consisting of 2 officers and 12 men left the same day en route for India to enjoy a well-earned 28 days’ furlough.

“A few days later, on April 14th, we commenced an Inter-Football Tournament. The first game was between ‘B’ and ‘D’ Squadrons; this resulted in a win for ‘B’ by 2 goals to nil. The next match was between ‘A’ and ‘C’ Squadrons, and this was a win for ‘A’ by 2 goals to 1, while the following day ‘B’ played ‘A.’ This match was very keenly contested and aroused great excitement, the result, after extra time had been allowed, being a draw of 1 goal each. Replaying again the following day, the result this time was a draw of 2 goals, and this also after extra time.”

CHAPTER XX.
THE SUMMER OF 1918—KULAWAND AND TUZ KERMATLI.

The season of military operations in the country to the north-east of Baghdad, where the British and Turks now faced each other, may be said to begin with the month of April, and in that month General Marshall’s troops were ready to move again.

Before any movements on a large scale began, however, General Marshall had to deal with two troublesome complications, one on his left and one on his right.

To the left, in the Mahomedan holy cities of Nejef and Kerbela, beyond the Euphrates, the British invasion of Mesopotamia had naturally caused some excitement, and this had been fostered by German intrigues and gold. The holy cities do not belong to the same branch of Islam as the Turks, being “Shia,” not “Sunni,” or, as one might say, Protestant, not Catholic; and having been very carefully treated by the British they had shown a friendly spirit enough. Still they were Mahomedan, and contained some fanatical elements. In the month of January British troops had been attacked near Nejef, and a few weeks later the British political officer was murdered. Some punishment had to be inflicted for these offences, and though General Marshall would not attack the sacred town, it was blockaded and called upon to deliver up the murderers. Happily the well-behaved inhabitants, under the guidance of their religious leaders, decided to accept the British terms, and the whole affair was satisfactorily settled.

S.Q.-M.S. S. B. Haines, D.C.M.		R.S.-M. (late Lieutenant) M. Churchhouse
	Sgt. S. G. Strawbridge, D.C.M.
Lieut. W. J. L. Norwood		2nd Lieut. J. H. Lucas

At the same time as this trouble arose to the westward, some Persian tribes on the east began to respond to the incitement and gold of German emissaries, and it was found necessary, as General Marshall says, to “give them a lesson.” But this trouble also proved to be short-lived. Friendly tribesmen took action against the malcontents, and with the aid of a small British column completely defeated them. They lost heavily, “and our aeroplanes turned their defeat into a rout.”

In the meantime, while these complications were being put straight, General Marshall had worked out his scheme of action against the Turks, and had decided that they should again be attacked to the north-east of Baghdad, so as to drive them farther away and make the Persian line of communication more secure. His intention was to expel them from the area about Kara Tepe, Kifri, and Tuz Kermatli, which will be found marked on the sketch-map, p. 201, and to occupy those points, thus turning and subjugating the troublesome range of Jebel Hamrin.

It was a difficult operation if the Turks fought well, and General Marshall’s scheme of action was carefully worked out. Several columns were to move from different points, and it is not easy to follow in detail the movements of each. It will suffice to say that during the latter part of April and the earlier part of May 1918, in spite of mountainous ground and torrents of rain, which caused heavy floods in the rivers and washed away temporary bridges—in spite too of some stubborn fighting on the part of the enemy—the whole area was completely cleared and the country was occupied as far north as Kirkuk, one hundred and thirty miles from the railhead and considerably more than that distance from Baghdad. The British losses were very small—only twenty-six killed and two hundred and ten wounded—while the Turks lost heavily, over three thousand in prisoners alone.

General Marshall had good reason to be satisfied with this result. “Owing,” he says, “to the distance covered by these operations, and to the bad weather which prevailed throughout, the work of the troops was very arduous, and I have nothing but admiration for the good work put in by all arms and the excellent co-operation which was maintained between them.” This co-operation included much continuous work done by the Cavalry, and on at least two occasions they had the chance of attacking the enemy as Cavalry, mounted and sword in hand.

On both these occasions the Thirteenth were well to the fore. They were no longer with their own Brigade, but had temporarily taken the place of their old comrades of the Fourteenth Hussars in the 6th Brigade, then commanded by Brigadier-General Holland Pryor. General Marshall describes the first action in the following words: “The 6th Cavalry Brigade ... after an arduous night march overtook the Turks who had ... taken up a defensive position at Kulawand.... Feigning a frontal attack, whilst gradually working round the enemy’s right flank, our Cavalry cut the enemy’s lines of retreat and then charged right through his Infantry, killing some two hundred, including two battalion commanders, and capturing 565 prisoners, a mountain-gun, and considerable booty.” This was a fine performance, and brought the Regiment much credit. It was followed up by some skilful manœuvring which induced the Turks to hold a position at Tuz Kermatli, where a day or two later there was another considerable action. Here again the Cavalry did well, and the Thirteenth got another chance. This time the actual charge was a smaller affair, confined to a couple of troops under Lieutenant Macdonald, but it was spirited and successful, the two troops galloping a nest of machine-guns, and taking a considerable number of prisoners with little loss to themselves.

On the 7th of May Kirkuk was taken, and the short campaign came to an end. “Difficulties of supply,” says General Marshall, “due to distance and state of ground, now made it imperative to stop further pursuit,” and a few days later most of the British troops were withdrawn to their summer camps. The Thirteenth returned to their old camp at Chaldari, near Baghdad, arriving on the 22nd of May, and there they remained throughout the summer months.

It proved to be an important and anxious time for the Commander of the Army, as a force under Major-General Dunsterville was sent into Persia, and eventually crossed the Caspian to Baku, where there was some severe fighting. There was much work to be done also in Mesopotamia itself, and so far as the climate permitted, military training went on steadily, a special feature being the development of schools of instruction. But owing to the extreme heat the summer was for the bulk of the troops a period of inactivity, and it was found possible to send a large number of officers and men on leave to India. They wanted all the rest they could get, for they still had some hard marching and fighting before them, and the Thirteenth, in their pleasant camp at Chaldari, thoroughly enjoyed the respite.

AFTER THE CHARGE AT KULAWAND

PRISONERS TAKEN AT KULAWAND

The following extracts refer chiefly to their doings at Kulawand and Tuz.

Extracts from narratives by Captain Gowan, enclosed in a letter from Colonel Richardson, dated 27th July 1918.

“April 26-27, 1918.—The column moved at midnight and marched till 4.45 A.M., arriving at Tel Sharif at that time. The road was difficult to find in many places, and in the numerous nullahs which were crossed the going was deep. When the position had been fixed at dawn, the column moved forward for 2 miles, and then fed at 6 a.m. After ½ an hour halt the Regiment with advance-guard of C. and C. moved to M. 27 Central, and halted till 9 A.M. At that time the Regiment was ordered to move on the Kulawund position, and with L.A.M. cars and Lewis guns and Ford vans turn it from the W. end by enfilade fire. Some difficulty was found in locating the position, and it was not till 11.30 that it was reached and found unoccupied. The L.A.M. cars and Fords had been unable to get forward owing to water-logged country and nullahs. A number of Turks with some tents were seen to be in position on the Tuz-Kifri road, close to the hills, and their numbers were estimated by an aeroplane at 250. By 12 noon the G.O.C. Brigade had moved forward, and arrangements were made for a simultaneous attack by the 3 Regiments. At about 12.20 a move forward was made, the Brigade advancing in line of column of wings, in the order 22nd, 21st, 13th from the right. I understand that both Indian Cavalry Regiments advanced in line whilst we were in column of wings: I am not sure whether the 22nd had all four squadrons or only two. The Regiment had ‘C’ and ‘D’ Squadrons in front line under Captain Godfree, ‘B’ and half ‘A’ in the second, at about 200 yards’ distance, the remaining troop of ‘A’ being left as guard to our left flank, dressing station, &c., and the H.G. guns being sent to the flanks. The leading wing on nearing the road shouldered to the right and were in a position to co-operate with the 21st Cav. when Captain Godfree received orders from the Brigade to take no further part in the attack, but to join the Headquarters near Kulawund village. While he did this the 2nd Wing, leaving a troop of ‘A’ as escort to the Regimental Aid Post, moved to the Kifri-Tuz road and scattered along it to the left or Tuz direction, and succeeded in collecting about 50 prisoners. Two or three machine-guns were in action against us until we were within 300 yards of the road, and were replied to by the H.G. troop of ‘D’ Squadron from our left flank. A number of the enemy succeeded in getting away into the ridge of hills E. of the road where Cavalry could not pursue, and after despatching the prisoners to Brigade H.Q. the wing rallied and moved to a mound at the edge of the Kulawund position. From captured officers’ statements it was clear that this Cavalry attack took the enemy entirely by surprise. The enemy troops engaged consisted of the 5th Regiment, which had received orders on the evening of the 26th to withdraw from Tuz. Expecting only an Infantry attack, on the following morning they evacuated their positions without undue haste, and after halting several hours ... were on their way to Tuz on the 27th, when they were overtaken.

“April 29.—We drew back and circled to the W. behind the battery, and were ordered to get touch with the 21st and 22nd Cav. and then attempt to get across the Tuz-Tan road to stop the enemy’s retreat. Moving W., it was found that the 22nd and 21st were held up by a nest of M. guns on a small knoll. At the time of our arrival these were not directed on us, and appeared to have left their position. Two troops of ‘B’ were accordingly pushed forward, and led off so as to leave this knoll on their right. After a short distance they came under M.G. fire, and 2nd Lt. MacDonald wheeled the two troops to the right, thus putting his own troop in front and that of Sgt. Brencher in rear. He galloped the hill and took it—the enemy, except two, escaping being sabred by putting their hands up when the men were on them. This action opened the way across the plain, and the three Regiments, 21st, 13th, 22nd from the right, moved across, meeting small bodies of the enemy, and killing or taking them prisoners.”

Letter from Colonel Richardson to Sir R. S. Baden-Powell.

“7th Cavalry Brigade, M.E.F.,
In the Field, 1st May 1918.

“My dear General,—Your note with enclosures regarding Regimental Monuments and Gravestones reached me only a few days ago, when we were already on the trek of our present stunt....

“I am sorry to say I quite forget the contents of my letter to Symons to which you refer, but I imagine it dealt with our part in the battle of Tekrit; since that time we have been almost continuously in one camp, on the Tigris, about 40 miles above Baghdad, and although for more than four months we did not have a shot fired in anger we were far from idle—i.e., when the wet weather made it possible to be otherwise. Not only were we able to put in a lot of much-needed—on account of the numerous officers and other reinforcements during the past six months—instruction in equitation and elementary and secondary drill and training, but we were able to have games and sports—both mounted and dismounted—for the men, and polo for the officers; we also had the opportunity of getting fitter than at any time since we have been in this country, and I doubt very much whether men or horses have ever been fitter physically than when we started out, ten days ago, for this stunt. Only one Brigade of Cavalry is being utilised, and it is not the one to which we properly belong, but we are taking the place of the 14th, who are scattered about on an independent mission. Our march to the rendezvous was not propitious, as we were dogged by heavy rain and thunder, which made life on operation scale, without tents, a delusion and a snare for four days, but we got through with only one case of pneumonia. Once we got started on this stunt—the object of which has been to clear the whole of our northeasterly front of the enemy—we began to get into a country of magnificent crops and glorious grazing, in which the horses have been revelling, and growing visibly bigger. The operations themselves have partaken more of the nature of South African drives, and Johnny Turk was, I think, caught napping by the largeness of the scale of the operations, and he has been so badly fed lately that he could not travel sufficiently quickly to escape us; however, he put up, as he always does, a jolly good fight when cornered, and as we were unable to close the fourth side to the square—i.e., on the north, where a steep ledge of rock, backed by hilly country, discounted our mobility—a good few got away. However, we have accounted for nearly 2000 prisoners, ten large and very many machine guns, and our casualties have been less than 250 (in the whole force), so I suppose we may reckon the operations as having been fairly successful. Of course, from the nature of things, the principal rôle fell to the Cavalry, and even the Pan-Infantry men were fain to admit that we have done it well. On the first day we came into touch with the enemy—mostly troops retiring from outside positions, from which they had been driven by the Infantry; but, covered by the garrison and guns of the aforesaid rocky ledge, the three Regiments of the Brigade galloped in two lines of wings over about 1½ miles of country towards the ledge, and swung right-handed along the foot of it, the net result being about 600 prisoners and several machine-guns. The next day there was a pause, as the main position, which was pretty well served by big guns, still remained, and we could not hope to take it without the help of the Infantry; but next morning the latter came through our outposts, and we concentrated on the left flank and began the advance, which I may fairly claim the Regiment initiated, which put the finishing touch to the operations. A good few of the enemy no doubt escaped through the hill country, and perhaps he got a gun or two away, but certainly a thousand prisoners and ten guns fell into our hands.

Capt. D. W. Godfree, M.C. (21st Lancers)	Lieut. H. Macdonald, M.C. (Murdered 14th July 1919 at Amadia by Kurdish gendarmes)	Lieut. C. A. G. McLagan (Wounded at Tus Kermatli, 21st April 1918)
Capt. B. W. D. Cochrane	Sergt. W. Matthews, M.M. (Killed at Tus Kermatli, 28th April 1918)	Lieut. L. Osmond

“When I claim that the Regiment initiated the final advance, I must explain the situation in more detail: over night 2 squadrons were on outpost duty on the left bank of the river, and two troops of a third squadron were away with the first batch of 500 prisoners; the balance of the Regiment with which I was, was on the right of the Cavalry Brigade, advancing up the right bank of the river; we were held up at dusk by the enemy in an entrenched position, and remained where we stood all night; soon after daybreak the Infantry took over our line, and the Brigadier sent me off to the left flank to try and get across the path of the retiring enemy. I found that the two Regiments of Indian Cavalry had been trying to advance with the same object for a couple of hours, but were held up by small parties of enemy entrenched on knolls and well supplied with machine-guns. I determined to advance, and put one of my few remaining sabre troops into the scouting line under MacDonald, a lad who only joined us 6 or 8 months ago. When we got about 800 yards from the nearest knoll he met very heavy machine-gun fire, but as it was apparently directed against his left flank, he at once gathered his troops to the right, and following a circular path he galloped the hill, taking the gunners in flank and reverse, and in less than five minutes had the whole party of Turks killed or marching as prisoners to the rear, and 4 machine-guns captured. He had only one man badly wounded. It was, I think, without exception the quickest and prettiest—not to say the most successful—small piece of work it has been my fortune to witness. This little episode put great heart into the Indians, and thereafter it was almost a race for the foot-hills; all opposition went like a house of cards, and it was only a question of mopping up. I, on behalf of the Regiment and MacDonald, have received congratulations on all sides, and the Brigade and Divisional Commanders have promised to support my recommendation for immediate rewards, so I hope MacDonald and his troop may get the honours they have earned so well.

“With the exception of Twist and of my Adjutant Gowan, I have no other officers with pre-war training and experience, but we have been most exceptionally lucky in our temporary officers; for this, I think, I have to thank Ronnie Brook chiefly, and he would, I am sure, be interested to see the account of the operations, should you have it copied.—With all good wishes, yours sincerely,

(Signed) J. J. Richardson.

“P.S.—The following coincidence of special interest has come to light. Among material captured by MacDonald on the knoll was a signaller’s telescope, which he gave to his signaller, Sgt. Burgess. The latter at once recognised it as the one he himself lost at Lajj on March 5th last year, when his horse was shot and he had to abandon his gun.”

Letter from Colonel Richardson, dated 7th Cavalry Brigade, M.E.F., 3rd May 1918.

“For the last fortnight we have been operating with the other Brigade in place of Col. Bridge’s Regiment, which is engaged on an independent mission....

“The Regiment has seen some smart fighting, including two charges, in the past week, and the outstanding feature of the operations, which has been very successful, and of which I am sending an account to B.P. [Sir Robert Baden-Powell], has been a gallant and brilliant charge by a troop of the 13th under MacDonald, a Scotch lad who joined us about 6 months ago.

“It is a matter of greatest pride, mingled with pleasant surprise to me, how they continue to roll up with these first-rate performances, once the opportunity presents itself, and I only hope I may never let them down.”

Extract from letter from Colonel Richardson, dated 7th Cavalry Brigade, M.E.F., 25th May 1918.

“After writing to you on the third of this month we continued our drive northwards for a matter of about 60 miles, the Turks pursuing their usual tactics—i.e., holding us up at strong positions with their big guns until dark enabled them to get away their valuable papers and other important stuff. In this way we made them evacuate the country as far north as Altum Kupri.

“I do not hesitate to give names now, as I see Reuter has published the message from Candler, the correspondent, in almost the identical words that I gave him—he was messing with us during that period—which is within striking distance, not more than 70 miles, of Mosul, the big Turkish base.

“Owing to the difficulties of transport we had been on half rations, but we got most glorious grazing for the horses in most places, so they did not suffer much until we struck the Jebel Hamrin with its brackish water and no grazing. Right up there the climate was really good, and we could work all day, though, of course, it was hottish, and on one or two nights we got wet through, for, of course, we had no tents. But in this case also, as soon as we struck the Jebel Hamrin on our return, the sun became very powerful and the sand-flies very bad.

TUZ KHARMATLI, 29TH APRIL 1918

“However, the operations were very interesting, although the Regiment had no opportunity of doing more than ordinary work, because Johnny Turk declined to come to grips; but as the Brigade put it: ‘You did just what I wanted you to, I could not ask you to do more,’ I don’t think we had any cause to grumble....

“When I wrote you from Mendali, in October, that we were short of food, I referred only to mess stores and extras; rations have always been good, especially when we were within measurable distance of the railway, when we got most excellent frozen beef. Indeed, I expect we are being much better fed than you poor people.”

Extract from Lance-Corporal Bowie’s Diary.

LT.-COL. J. J. RICHARDSON, D.S.O., AFTER A HARD DAY AT TUZ

MACHINE GUNS CAPTURED BY THE REGIMENT AT TUZ

“Fate decreed that we were not to finish this tournament, as on the following morning we were ordered out to take part in operations again. This was the 18th of April, and we had to leave camp some few hours later than ordered; owing to the extremely bad weather and the high floods having broken the pontoon bridge over the river, it was impossible to cross the Tigris till midday. Heavy rain continued to fall throughout the day, which made the going very difficult, and we finally arrived at Baqubah at about 8 P.M., where we picketed down for the night. Our transport arrived in at 9.15 P.M. Every one being so thoroughly wet through, and the weather being so bitterly cold, a rum issue was ordered, after which we were fortunately able to obtain shelter for the night in a rest-camp near by. Owing to the heavy rains which had fallen the column did not march for Abu-Jisrah until 10.30 A.M. the following morning, and after some very heavy going we made that place at about 3.30 P.M. Our transport experienced great difficulty in getting along, and did not arrive until some two hours later. The heavy rains continued throughout the night. The following morning, April 20th, it was found impossible to move in consequence of the exceedingly heavy rains, which continued till 2 P.M., and made the ground a perfect quagmire, and absolutely impossible for wheels, the men during these two days having a most uncomfortable time owing to the impossibility of erecting any sort of shelter. An incident worthy of note here was an impromptu football match, played amid a perfect sea of mud, in which the ball not infrequently became imbedded, whilst the rain poured down in torrents. All this, however, did not deter the players, who, after a most strenuous game, did obtain some little warmth from this exercise. At 11.30 A.M. on the morning of the 21st instant we continued our march to Sharaban, where we arrived about 4 P.M. Here we joined up with the 6th Cavalry Brigade, who were in bivouac there. During the next two days we remained in bivouac, whilst we endeavoured to free ourselves of some of the mud with which every one was plastered, grazing our horses meanwhile. Here also our squadrons were arranged to conform with the formation of the 6th Brigade; each squadron was to consist of three sabre troops and one Hotchkiss-gun troop. On the morning of April 24th the Regiment paraded at 9.30 A.M., but owing to heavy rain falling again we did not move off until 11 A.M., when we marched at the head of the Brigade crossing the Cutthroat and Auction Bridges; we halted at Ruz for a short time, and marching on again we crossed the Table Mountain Bridge over the Diala river at 1.30 P.M. Here we watered and fed our horses, afterwards moving off again with the 22nd Native Cavalry, commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Young. We marched on to Abu-Haiar, arriving there about 5.30 P.M., and bivouacking for the night. The following morning at 11 A.M. we marched to Ain-Lailah, which we reached at 3.30 P.M. We bivouacked that night about 1½ miles south of the Pass. The Column commenced marching through the Pass at 3 A.M. the following morning, but the Regiment being Rear Guard did not march through till 7.30 A.M., and then proceeding on to the Nahrin river, where we watered and fed our horses. Resuming our march till 11 A.M., we joined the remainder of the Column, who were in bivouac at 12.15 P.M. Here one troop proceeded to reconnoitre the road over which we were to make a night march the same night, after which they returned to bivouac at dusk. Marching again at midnight, the Column proceeded to Tel-Sharia, arriving at about 4.45 A.M. The road was very difficult to find in many places, and the nullahs which we had to cross were very deep, many being almost full of water, owing to the recent heavy rains. After our patrols had located the enemy at dawn the Column moved forward some 2 miles and halted till 6.30 A.M., when the Regiment was ordered to advance another mile and halt. At 9 A.M. we received the order to advance on to the Kulawand position: accompanied by our armoured cars and some Lewis guns mounted on Ford cars, we proceeded to attack it at the west end. We experienced great difficulty in gaining the position, not through an enemy resistance, which strangely enough was not offered, but through the water-logged condition of the country and the very deep nullahs, and owing to this our armoured cars and Ford cars were unable to continue the advance. On us eventually gaining the position we found it to be unoccupied. The enemy, having retired during the night, were located by our airmen a little later, who reported them to be holding a position on the Tuz-Kifri road, close up to the foot of the hills. Although we had no support within 20 miles of us, it was decided to attack them at once. Having worked our way up to some large Moards [? mounds] some 1¾ miles from their main position, we took cover here to give [? save] our horses. Some few minutes later we drew our swords and trotted into the plain where the 10 squadrons were formed into an extended line in the formation of a scythe. As we rode on at this pace parties of the Turks started running down the road, while other groups took up positions in the rough ground and water-cuts, or kneeling in the high corn opened fire on us. Here the Turks showed some of their old spirit in the stand they made, but the sudden flash of our swords in the sun which made a wide arc of light seemed to take the heart out of them, and their fire was wild and high, and our casualties few. Our artillery kept up a creeping barrage on the village as we attacked, and our line maintaining this pace until within some 500 yards of the enemy, when we lowered our swords and charged into them. Our aeroplanes which took part in the action flew very low and increased the enemy’s confusion with bombs and machine-gun fire. Over 150 Turks were killed and 538 prisoners were taken, also 2 mountain-guns, very few of them escaping in the hills. Meanwhile Kifri-ain-Faris and Chanan-Keurri had been occupied by our other columns without opposition, and our movements were so rapid that 2 battalions of the enemy had to take to the hills in order to escape the net we were spreading for them. We afterwards heard that this force had been robbed and disarmed by the Kurds, who never lose an opportunity of revenging themselves on the Turk, and even those who escaped us in the Kulawand charge returned and surrendered to us rather than face these tribesmen. After sending back our prisoners we moved forward to reconnoitre Tuz, and we soon came under some very heavy accurate gun-fire until about 4 P.M., when orders were received to withdraw. We then moved back some ten miles and bivouacked behind our line of outposts for the night. At 6 A.M. the following morning ‘A’ and ‘D’ Squadrons were sent to reconnoitre Tuz, the Brigade following some half an hour later, while the 21st Cavalry were despatched to find a ford over the river Aqsu at Khasradalah. ‘A’ and ‘D’ Squadrons soon came under fire from Tuz and suffered some casualties. Meanwhile the remainder moved on to Khasradalah in an endeavour to surround Tuz, but were held up by enemy machine-guns in position on the banks of the Aqsu river; and the armoured cars being unable to advance along the Kifri-Tuz road, no farther advance was possible. We halted here for the night after having crossed the river, while ‘C’ Squadron and a section of the Machine-Gun Squadron were thrown forward on each side of the track; ‘B’ Squadron, having all the horses, were some 1500 yards in rear down by the river. Intermittent firing was carried on throughout the night. At 4.30 A.M. we stood to arms and saddled up, receiving word that our 2 Infantry columns would advance at dawn, one column advancing up the right bank of the river, and the other up the left bank, the latter with the object of taking the Heights of the Naffdach, east of Tuz. The enemy had been reinforced during the night by a battalion from Tauq, and was holding a front of 7 miles, stretching from Yanhah-Buyuk to Tuz-Khurmatli, and at Tuz they held a position covering the road and extending over the hills. At daybreak the Hotchkiss-gun troop of ‘C’ Squadron opened fire from the trenches on the right bank of the river, and soon came under some pretty accurate shell-fire. Shortly after this B Battery, of the 66th Brigade R.F.A., galloped up beside them and opened up a heavy fire on the enemy’s position at about 6 A.M., the Infantry having deployed for the 2 main attacks on Tanijah from the south-west, and on Tuz from the south. We were ordered to withdraw and make a detour to the west. We circled behind the battery to join up with the 21st and 22nd Cavalry and get across the Tuz-Tauq road to cut off the Turks, who were already falling back before our Infantry, who were advancing with steadiness under machine-gun and artillery fire, right up to the guns which were in action until they were within two hundred yards of them. Meanwhile we were held up for a time by a nest of machine-guns some 1200 yards away on a small knoll. Two troops of the ‘B’ Squadron, under Lt. MacDonald, were ordered out as a scout line. They led off to the left of the knoll, and having got in line with it, wheeled sharply to the right and charged the position in the rear and the flank, all the enemy except two throwing up their hands to escape being cut down. The taking of this knoll opened the way across the plain, and we continued to advance, charging bodies of Turks here and there, either killing them or taking them prisoners. The largest body we found was between the Tauq road and the hills, and these put up some resistance for a time until charged from two sides by us and the 22nd Cavalry, the 21st Cavalry having wheeled towards Tuz to deal with other bodies, who at that time were shelling ‘A’ and ‘D’ Squadrons, commanded by Captain Godfree. A number of the enemy made their way over the hills and were harassed by our fire. Soon after this the fire of the enemy died away, and by 9.30 A.M. all opposition had collapsed, the whole position having fallen to us inside 4 hours with a very slight loss. 1200 prisoners were taken, 25 machine-guns, and 12 field-guns that were in the position. The action having passed, we rested for some time where we were, and on ‘A’ and ‘D’ Squadrons rejoining us in the afternoon we went into bivouac opposite Tuz at about 3 P.M. We remained in bivouac here for five days, during which we rested and grazed our horses. Whilst here, our Brigade Commander received the following wire from General Egerton: ‘Many congratulations to troops. Please convey my thanks to General Caley and General Hollen-Prior for their good work, and that of their officers and men. Cavalry charge must have been magnificent. Please accept my repeated appreciation of the performances of all ranks under your command.’ On the 5th May we moved off at the head of the Brigade at 8 A.M., and after crossing the bridge of the Tauq-Chai at about 5 P.M., we bivouacked for the night some 2 miles north-west of it. We moved off again at 8.30 A.M. the following morning in the direction of Taza, when shortly after our aeroplanes reported that the enemy had evacuated their position there. On receiving this information we were ordered to advance to catch the retreating enemy at the village of Taza-Kharatli. On arriving here at 11.30 A.M., after crossing the Oazah Chia on the Kirkuk road, we found the village unoccupied. Making a short halt here we moved off again at 1.45 P.M., marching on to Kirkuk. The armoured cars, after having been towed through the river, had preceded us along the Kirkuk road. At about 3.39 P.M., nearing Balban, we came under some shell-fire at long range, this we avoided by making a detour to the east. After sending out patrols, who were met by a very heavy fire, we galloped forward and dismounted for action against the enemy holding the trenches just outside Kirkuk. Finding the enemy so strongly entrenched, we were unable to advance, but hotly engaged them until dusk, when we were ordered to withdraw and form an outpost line about 3 miles from the town. This we did about 7 P.M., when a heavy storm broke out and very heavy rains continued to fall throughout the night, which, combined with the intense cold, made rest for us that night an impossibility. (The following names appeared on the Order for the day for gallantry in action: Capt. J. A. Jeffrey, Capt. A. M. Sassoon, Lt. J. J. Crystall, and R.S.M. Seekins, all being awarded the M.C.) Our outpost line was formed near Balban, on a track running east and west. The night was fairly quiet, except for several loud explosions which occurred in and near Kirkuk. The morning found the ground more or less a quagmire, and at 6.30 A.M. we received orders to advance on the town. ‘A’ Squadron moved off at 8 A.M., followed by the Regiment and the 21st Cavalry some half an hour later. No resistance was encountered, and at 10.30 A.M. the Regiment entered the town, ‘C’ and ‘D’ Squadrons, under Capt. Godfree, moving on to the high ground covering the north of the town. Several large hospitals were found here, one containing 358 patients, the population being in a starved condition. There were also several corpses of Turkish soldiers horribly mutilated. This was said to have been done by Arabs to avenge the raping of their women-folk. The whole place was in a filthy condition. At 3 P.M. the Column moved out of Kirkuk and bivouacked near Taziyan, some 3 miles down the Taza road, a heavy storm breaking over us just as we were pegging down our horses. Meanwhile ‘C’ and ‘D’ Squadrons were sent forward to some hills some 4 miles north of the town to harass the retreating enemy, and to protect our own main body from attack. These two squadrons, after successfully hastening the enemy’s retreat, reconnoitred the road to Yarvali, rejoining the Column in bivouac about 5 P.M., bringing with them 2 prisoners. The Column remained in bivouac the following day, and at 12.30 A.M. we received orders to send 2 squadrons to reconnoitre the northern road to Alton-Kupri as far as Sakizli, ‘B’ and ‘D’ Squadrons doing this commanded by Capt. Godfree. They were also accompanied by a Company of the R.E.’s for the purpose of destroying enemy shell-dumps which were known to be in the vicinity. Two such dumps were located and destroyed near the village of Daraman, and at Sakizli 7 large motor-lorries with engines destroyed were found. These contained 2 mountain-guns, 2 machine-guns, and a large quantity of shell ammunition of various sizes. At 5 P.M. orders were received by heliograph to proceed to Yarvali and search it for any documents the enemy may have left. Arriving there about 8 P.M., we discovered a number of documents, and also several aeroplane engines and drums of petrol, and a quantity of shell ammunition. It being necessary to destroy this material, the wing returned and bivouacked at 11 P.M. The Column rested, and we grazed our horses all the following day, and at 6 A.M. on the 10th May we marched on Alton-Kupri with the intention of driving the enemy over the Lesser Zab river and destroying the bridge there. We were preceded by 2 of our armoured cars, who at about 11.15 A.M. were held up by the enemy, who were in position on Guk-Tappah Hill, while the road was shelled by the enemy’s batteries in Alton-Kupri. The armoured cars succeeded in driving the enemy from Guk-Tappah, but were quite unable to advance farther owing to a deep canal which cut the road at this point. After observations had been made from Guk-Tappah, the Regiment received orders to make an encircling movement to the right, whilst the 21st Cavalry did the same to the left. The 22nd Cavalry advancing in the centre succeeded, by covered approaches, in getting within 2 miles of the village which was on the farther side of the river. The Regiment experienced considerable difficulty in advancing, owing to a considerable number of very deep nullahs, which were full of water at the time. The village was hidden from view by the high ground on this side of the river. We advanced by wings ‘A’ and ‘B’ leading in extended order. After advancing about 1 mile we were heavily shelled by mountain-guns, 14 pounders and 4.53, and considerable rifle and machine-gun fire was opened on us by enemy Infantry who were holding a series of trenches and rifle-pits on this side of the river. The Regiment immediately dismounted for action. The Hotchkiss-gun troop of ‘A’ Squadron moving forward opened a very effective fire which was well supported by our batteries. This proved too much for the enemy, who retired to their second line of defence. On this side the Hotchkiss-gun troop of ‘D’ Squadron advanced about 1000 yards with ‘C’ Hotchkiss-gun troop in support. Meanwhile ‘B’ Squadron were endeavouring to get down to the river bank, but were unsuccessful owing to the heavy rains and accurate firing of the enemy’s batteries who were dug in on the opposite bank. We continued to engage the enemy until about 6 P.M., when orders were received to withdraw to Daraman. During our retirement the enemy shelled us with increased violence, and we sustained several casualties, but luckily the number was small in comparison with the terrific fire we were subjected to. One troop of ‘A’ Squadron was left near Guk-Tappah as escort to our casualties, whilst we continued our march back till 10.45 P.M., when we bivouacked for the night. Orders were received the next morning to return to Kirkuk. We did not move off until 2 P.M., and arrived at our previous bivouac near Kirkuk at about 6 P.M. The following morning a strong patrol left bivouac at 7 A.M. to reconnoitre a vast stretch of unexplored country between Taza and Telabw-Shahanah, whilst the remainder of the Regiment, moving off some half an hour later marched to Taza, some 9 miles distant, where they went into bivouac. It was whilst here that a small, but nevertheless fierce, caste riot broke out among the Indians who had the handling of our transport. This necessitated the whole of the Regiment having to turn out fully armed before it could be quelled. At 5.30 A.M. the following morning, 13th May, the Regiment commenced to march to Cemetery, where we were to join the 7th Cavalry Brigade again. To reach the above place we now had to cross some hitherto unexplored country, and so far not having received any reports from our patrol which had left us the previous day to reconnoitre this part of the country, we had to proceed with caution. Halting at about 10 A.M. to water and feed our horses, we moved off again at 11.30 A.M. Meanwhile our patrols had completed their reconnaissance, and got into communication with us by helio, sending us a message to the effect that an enemy column were rapidly disappearing into the hills. The Regiment not being strong enough to intercept them, the patrol was recalled and we continued our march, arriving at Cemetery, and joined the 7th Cavalry Brigade at 8 P.M., after marching some 50 miles. Resting till 4 P.M. the following afternoon, we moved through the Pass to Ain Nakhailah, some 4 miles distant, bivouacking about 1 mile south of the salt springs there. The following morning we continued our march on to Daur, which was some 20 miles over a waterless desert. This proved a very trying time for us, the little water which we were able to obtain before leaving the springs being very brackish and salty, which, combined with the intense [heat?], produced a thirst which was well-nigh unendurable. These arduous marches, coming on the top of our very recent hard fighting, tested our endurance to the utmost, several of our men falling out of their saddles from sheer weakness from want of food and rest. The sight of the river Tigris had a noticeable and stimulating effect on both man and horse, and on reaching the river both were jostling each other in their frantic efforts to quench their burning thirst. On bivouacking here many of us took the opportunity of having a much-needed dip in the river. Our way now lay alongside the river, and owing to the condition of both men and horses, it was decided to finish our march by easy stages. Accordingly, at 4.30 A.M. the following morning we trekked to Samarah, a distance of 12 miles, and bivouacked some 2 miles north of the town. Moving off at the same time the following morning to avoid the intense noonday heat, we marched a farther 13 miles and bivouacked at Khan Mifraji at 10.30 A.M. We trekked on to Akab, a distance of 15 miles, the following morning, crossing the pontoon bridge over the river Adhaim, and bivouacked about a mile distant on the other side. The morning after this, commencing at 5 A.M., we did another 17 miles on to Ktuwair, and went into bivouac there at about 12 noon. From here we moved off at 4.30 A.M. and marched to Baqubah, another 16 miles distant, where we arrived at about 11.30 A.M. Trekking a farther 12 miles the following day, we bivouacked at Conningham’s Post at 10.30 A.M.; the following day, the 22nd May, we again moved off at 4.30 A.M., and covered the remaining 16 miles to our summer camp at Chaldari, where we arrived at about 11 A.M., our strength on marching in being 19 officers, 315 other ranks, and 445 horses. On the morrow the following was published in Regimental Orders: ‘The Commanding Officer wishes to take the opportunity of expressing his keen appreciation of the conduct of all ranks during the recent operations on the north-eastern front which have so successfully attained their object. During the course of these operations the Regiment has encountered, apart from the enemy, many hardships and difficulties, and it is the cheery spirit in which these hardships have been met, and the constant courage with which these difficulties have been overcome, that have elicited once more the Commanding Officer’s admiration and pride.’

GUNS CAPTURED AT TUZ

THE BRIDGE AT MOSUL AND “THE BAGHDAD”

“The same day the General ordered that our horses were to have three weeks’ rest. On the 25th May the following extract from a letter to our Commanding Officer, Lt.-Col. J. J. Richardson, from our Colonel-in-Chief, Lt.-General Sir R. S. S. Baden-Powell: ‘I was delighted to see so many of the Regiment mentioned in despatches the other day, and I want to offer my best congratulations and good wishes to Twist, Steele, Barrett, Gowan, and Williams, and also to the N.C.O.’s and men who gained distinction. It is a great delight to us all at home to know that the Regiment has done so well.’

“The following extract also appeared in the same orders. Extract from Order of the Day, No. 105, dated 18/5/18: ‘Awarded the M.C. Lt. H. MacDonald. Awarded the M.M. Sgt. J. Cunningham, L.-Cpl. Kitcher, and Pte. Owen.’ Two days later after this we received the news that Pte. Owen had died from his wounds.”

CHAPTER XXI.
THE AUTUMN OF 1918—LAST BATTLE WITH THE TURKS—CLOSE OF THE WAR IN MESOPOTAMIA.

The summer of 1918 having come to an end, the British army in Mesopotamia prepared for another advance.

The general aspect of the Great War had by that time undergone a sudden and promising change, for the Germans had failed in their fierce offensive against the Allies on the Western Front, Austria had shattered herself against their lines in Northern Italy, and Bulgaria was firmly held by the Salonika force, while in Asia the exhaustion of the Turks was now very evident. They had completely failed to stop General Allenby’s victorious advance in Palestine and Syria, and were hastily withdrawing troops from the Persian frontier and the Caucasus. In Mesopotamia they were still trying to show a bold front, but it seemed clear that they were no longer in strength sufficient to withstand a determined attack by the large and eager British army opposed to them.

“This, then,” says General Marshall, “seemed the moment to take the offensive against the Turkish 6th Army, covering the approaches to Mosul, and it was with great pleasure that on the 7th October I received orders to carry out this movement.”

The main body of the enemy’s troops, now reduced from long fighting and other causes to about 9000 men with 59 guns, held a formidable position astride the Tigris, at the Fatha Gorge—some thirty-five miles above the British railhead at Tekrit. The position had been thoroughly prepared for defence during the past eighteen months, and was of great natural strength. The Turkish right flank rested securely on two ranges of rugged hills which projected into the waterless desert, and therefore could not be turned by slow-moving Infantry. Their left extended for about five miles along the crest of the Jebel Hamrin, and was strongly entrenched.

APPROXIMATE SKETCH OF RICHARDSONS BLUFF POSITION

To attack such a position by direct advance up the Tigris was a difficult matter, and General Marshall would have preferred to move his main force by way of Kirkuk in the north-east, but this was impossible. A large part of his transport had been taken away by the operations in Northern Persia and the necessity for collecting the harvest, so that there was not enough to subsist a large body of troops at such a distance from the railway. The only available route for the main force, therefore, was the line of the Tigris, by which supplies could be pushed up, and this was perforce the one selected. Even so there was only transport enough to make mobile his Cavalry and half his Infantry.

LT.-COL. T. T. RICHARDSON, D.S.O. SEPTEMBER 1918

The plan adopted was to work up the eastern bank of the river and turn or force the enemy’s left. If that could be done, the intention was to cut his line of retreat on Mosul by means of Cavalry working round his left, and light-armoured motor-cars moving round his right through the desert. A small column was sent up towards Kirkuk under Brigadier-General Lewin to keep off any attack upon the British right.

But the reduction of the Turkish position proved to be an easier task than any one had expected. On the night of the 23rd October, when all was ready for the general attack on the Fatha Gorge, a British column pushed along the crest of the Jebel Hamrin against the enemy’s left, while the 7th Cavalry Brigade, to which the Thirteenth had now returned, moved round the north of the range. “The vigorous action of these two columns,” says General Marshall, “caused the Turks to abandon the very strong Fatha position before daylight,” and to retreat up-stream.

Then followed some days of manœuvring and fighting, the Infantry pressing steadily upon the retreating Turks in spite of great difficulties, for the enemy had destroyed the road through the hills on both banks of the river, and a Brigade of Cavalry under General Cassels trying to work round into the enemy’s rear. In this attempt the Cavalry were successful. Moving wide of the Tigris, they rode right round the enemy’s left, and on the 26th October, coming back to the river, they struck a ford opposite Hadraniya, fifteen miles above Shergat, the point where the Turks intended to make their real stand. This movement was masked by the other Brigade, the 7th, under Brigadier-General Norton, who demonstrated on the line of the Tigris.

The Hadraniya ford was a bad one, for it crossed three channels of the river, one of which was nearly five feet deep, with a strong current; but Cassels got his regiments over, and, directly he had done so, sent one of them at a gallop to seize an important gorge five miles down stream, between him and the Turks, who were retreating upon him. By the morning of the 27th October the bulk of the Brigade had taken up a strong position blocking the road to Mosul, and it had been joined by the light motor-cars, which had got round through the desert.

It was a daring move, for Cassels had only three weak regiments of Cavalry and a battery of Horse Artillery, while below him was the retreating Turkish force, and above him to the north an unknown number of Turkish reinforcements from Mosul coming down to join it. But this was the one chance of capturing the main body of the enemy, and the Brigade meant to hold its position at all costs until supported.

For the next two days, the 27th and 28th October, Cassels was in serious danger, for though to conceal his weakness he boldly attacked, he was soon attacked himself from the south by a very superior force of Infantry and guns, which made repeated attempts to break through, while the Turkish reinforcements from Mosul moved against his rear. But though hard pressed he managed to hold his ground, and on the afternoon and evening of the second day support began to arrive. First came a battalion of Infantry which had made a forced march of thirty-three miles from the eastward, and then after dark the 7th Cavalry Brigade, which after a march of forty-three miles crossed the Tigris by the difficult Hadraniya Ford. In doing so they lost several men and horses drowned, but their arrival made all the difference. Cassels was now too strong to be easily overwhelmed.

Still the position was critical, for the main body of the Turks, though retreating, had not been beaten, and the British troops were nearly worn out. The Infantry “had been marching and fighting for four days under most arduous conditions,” while Cassels and his own Cavalry Brigade had been continuously in action for seventy-two hours, and all the force now at his disposal had made long marches. But if the Turkish force was to be held, there must be no rest for the troops, in spite of exhaustion and darkness, for the enemy saw that he was trapped, and would be sure to fight desperately for freedom.

He certainly did so. During the night of the 28th he tried again and again to break out northwards, and though he did not succeed, he fought on all through the 29th, and all through the night that followed; and some of his counter-attacks against the British Infantry who were pressing him from the south were by no means easily stopped. It was a splendid defence, and rightly called forth the admiration of his assailants.

The end of the battle may best be told in General Marshall’s words:—

“Meanwhile a serious threat from Turkish reinforcements (5th Division troops) moving down from the Mosul direction developed against Cassels’ right flank. These troops established themselves with guns and machine-guns on the high bluffs near Hadraniya, but were promptly dealt with by the 7th Cavalry Brigade. The Thirteenth Hussars galloped across the open, dismounted under the bluffs, and, led by their Colonel, carried the position by assault, many Turks being accounted for with the bayonet.

“Mounted pursuit by the remainder of the 7th Cavalry Brigade cleared away further menace from the north, and resulted in the capture of 1000 prisoners, with 2 guns and 12 machine-guns.

“The enemy’s avenues of escape northwards were now effectively blocked, thanks to the skilful and resolute handling of his detachment by General Cassels, and the firm determination of his troops, who repulsed every attempt by the enemy to break through.

“Gripped as in a vice, with his men packed in ravines which were raked by our guns from across the Tigris, Ismail Hakki, the Turkish Commander, found himself in a hopeless position. All attempts to break through had failed, communication with the Turkish Commander-in-Chief at Mosul had been rendered impossible, and no relief was in sight. At dawn on October 30th, just as our troops were about to renew the attack, white flags appeared all along the Turkish lines, and later on Ismail Hakki surrendered in person.”

So ended the last battle fought in the Great War by a Turkish army. It had been gallantly contested, but the victory was as complete as a victory could be. The Turkish 6th Army had been not only defeated but captured.

Immediately after the surrender, the 7th Cavalry Brigade and armoured cars pushed rapidly along the Mosul road and made a considerable addition to the number of prisoners. The 14th (Indian) Lancers, charging with the lance, captured a convoy and 500 men, while the 13th Lancers captured a Turkish battalion. Altogether the Turks lost on the 30th October over 11,000 prisoners and 51 guns, besides great quantities of machine-guns, animals, and military material of all kinds.

By the first of November both Cavalry Brigades had got within twelve miles of Mosul, when they were met by a flag of truce informing them that an armistice had been concluded between Great Britain and Turkey. Hostilities ceased, and the long campaign in Mesopotamia had closed with a dramatic success.

At Shergat, as elsewhere, the bulk of the close fighting had of course been done by the Infantry, but General Marshall reported that “the daring and brilliant leadership of the Cavalry Brigades under Brigadier-Generals Cassels and Norton contributed largely to the final result,” and it may safely be affirmed that no Regiment in those Brigades had more right to be proud of its share in the work than the Thirteenth Hussars.

The extracts appended give details of its movements during the last period of the campaign, and especially of the affair at “Richardson’s Bluff,” as the scene of the fight at Hadraniya came to be called.

Account by General Norton, commanding 7th Brigade.

“The Brigade left Fathah at one o’clock on the night of the 27th-28th October, crossed the Lesser Zab at about 8 A.M., and reached the Hadrani-Yah Ford over the Tigris at 4.30 P.M. on the 28th, having marched about 50 miles since 1 A.M., the last 30 under a very hot sun, and about 70 miles in the last 36 hours.

“The leading Regiment (13th Lancers) immediately commenced to cross to the right bank, and got over without accident, but as the ford was a difficult one, there was considerable delay, and, by the time it came to the turn of the 13th Hussars, it was practically dark. The ford, which had been difficult in daylight, became positively dangerous after dusk, and a number of men, particularly those leading pack-horses, got into difficulties, and were carried down-stream. Hampered as they were by their ammunition and other equipment, their situation was a very precarious one, but most of them fortunately managed to scramble out on one bank or the other.

“When the roll was eventually called, it was found that three men, viz.:—

No.	8267,	Lance-Corpl. Bartlett,
	9196,	Private Donoghue,
	31571,	Private Newman,

and two horses, were missing. With the exception of Private Newman, whose dead body was found by the Infantry several days later some distance down-stream, no trace of these men has ever been found.

“In the whole Brigade, 21 men were carried away by the strong current, and drowned while crossing this ford.

“Only three squadrons of the Regiment crossed on this night, the remaining squadron (‘A’ Squadron, under Lieutenant H. C. D. FitzGibbon, M.C.) being ordered to remain on the left bank as escort to the Battery, which could not be got across in the dark.

“The Brigade, less the battery, this squadron, and the 13th D.C. Lancers, bivouacked on the river bank; the 13th Lancers, as soon as they were across, had been sent forward to support the right of the 11th Brigade, which was occupying a ridge of hills S.W. of the ford, parallel to the river, and about 3000 yards away from it.

“The night passed without incident, although there was a considerable amount of firing from the position occupied by the 11th Brigade and the 13th D.C. Lancers.

“Before daybreak on the 29th, the Brigade was moved into a covered position under the river bank, and orders were issued for the battery and the remaining squadron of the 13th Hussars to cross to the right bank as soon as there was sufficient daylight.

“The moment the squadron commenced to cross, the Turks shelled the ford heavily and accurately from 2 guns on high ground about 3000 yards to the N.W.

“The squadron managed to get across, fortunately without casualties, but it was obviously impossible for the battery to do so until the hostile fire had been subdued.

“About 7 A.M., V Battery, R.H.A., came into action on the left bank, and the Turks shortly afterwards withdrew their guns.

“About this time a squadron of the 13th D.C. Lancers, which had been ordered to push up the Mosul road at daybreak, encountered heavy shell and M.G. fire, and was compelled to fall back to the Cemetery, where it held its own with difficulty.

“It was clear now that the enemy were holding the high ground to the N.W. in considerable force, and did not consist, as reported by aero reconnaissances, of merely a few scattered groups of Infantry.

“Their position was on a range of hills approximately parallel to the river, and at about 3000 yards from it. At the southern extremity of this range was a high bluff, which will be referred to as Hadraniyah Bluff. Farther to the south again was the range held by the 11th Brigade and 13th D.C. Lancers, and between Hadraniyah Bluff and the river, and some 1000 yards to the S.E. of the former, was a fair-sized isolated hill on which was a Mahomedan cemetery.

“After a personal reconnaissance of the position, so far as was possible, the Brigadier at 8.15 A.M. issued orders for the 13th Hussars, supported by the 24th Jat Lancers, and covered by the fire of V Battery, R.H.A., from across the river, and the Vickers guns, a subsection of which was now in action on the Cemetery Hill, to gallop across the open from their covered position near the river, dismount under the Bluff, and carry the position by a dismounted attack.

“It should be explained that the contour of the hill made it obvious, that unless the Turks came out of their trenches, which were none too well sited, and advanced a short distance down the hill, there must be a considerable amount of dead ground at the foot of the slope, which would give cover to the horses, and enable the troops to form for the dismounted attack. It was hoped that the gun-fire would make it impossible for the Turks to leave their trenches for the purpose of covering this dead ground.

“On debouching from their covered position on the river bank, in accordance with the above orders, the leading squadron at once came under a hot fire from the Turkish machine-guns on the hill, and the squadron leader (Captain Evans, 21st Lancers) fell severely wounded.

“This caused the squadron to lose its direction: it inclined slightly to its left, and halted under the cover of Cemetery Hill.

“The remaining squadrons followed it, and eventually the whole Regiment was concentrated behind this hill.

“By this time, it was clear that the guns had not yet succeeded in subduing the Turkish fire, and the further prosecution of the attack was held up to allow a further artillery preparation.

“Brigade Headquarters was now on Cemetery Hill, and the F.O.O. of the Battery was also established there with his signallers.

“About this time—viz., 10 A.M.—a Field Battery, No. A/33, R.F.A., having crossed the ford, was placed at the disposal of the Brigadier, and came into action some 2000 yards to the S.E. of Cemetery Hill.

“At 12.30 P.M. the Brigadier personally gave orders to Lieut.-Colonel Richardson to renew the attack on the Bluff at 1.20 P.M., and detailed arrangements were made for the attack to be closely supported by both Batteries and all available Vickers guns.

“In accordance with these orders, the Regiment, in column of wings with extended files, debouched from under cover of Cemetery Hill, and galloped straight for the Bluff. The ground was flat and open, the only obstacle being a rather deep dry nullah about half-way, which caused a little crowding and delay. The moment the leading squadron debouched, the Turks opened a heavy fire with all their machine-guns, but the accurate fire of our two batteries and the Vickers guns made it impossible for them to leave their trenches, and the squadrons soon got into the dead ground under the Bluff.

“During this phase of the attack, although these galloping squadrons were absolutely exposed for at least 500 yards to the fire of 12 machine-guns and 1000 Infantry, at ranges from 1500 to 500 yards, not a single man was hit, and only one or two horses.

“Had the Turks put down a machine-gun barrage on some point, such as the afore-mentioned nullah, and kept it there, our casualties must have been considerable; but they were evidently disconcerted by the heavy shelling, and there appeared to be no central control, each machine-gunner firing as he pleased.

“Having reached the foot of the Bluff, the Hussars lost no time in dismounting and forming for attack. Having fixed bayonets, they swarmed up the almost precipitous hill, gallantly led by their Commanding Officer.

“All this time, both batteries, using ‘gun-fire,’ were bursting their shells with beautiful accuracy along the crest of the Hill, and the Vickers guns were also keeping up a heavy fire on the trenches.

“This barrage did not lift until the Hussars were within a few yards of the crest, and there is no doubt that the splendid accuracy and rapidity of fire of these guns was a most important factor in making the attack the success it was.

“From Brigade Headquarters on Cemetery Hill, it was clear that the Turks in the trenches, having seen the squadrons moving towards them at a gallop, and being unable to see what was happening at the foot of the hill, were becoming anxious. Individual men and small parties could be seen getting out of the advanced trenches and moving to the rear, many being caught by the barrage as they did so.

“As the barrage lifted, the Hussars, still led by their Colonel, charged over the crest, shot or bayoneted such Turks as still confronted them in the trenches, and then rapidly forming line to the right, swept along the crest to deal with the Turks who were still holding their position at the north end of the hill.

“As soon as the Hussars’ attack had gained the crest, the 13th D.C. and 14th Jat Lancers quickly mounted, and galloped round to the west and north, captured the enemy’s two guns, and cut off the retreat of the Infantry retiring before the attack of the 13th Hussars.

“Seeing their retreat entirely cut off, the whole Turkish force surrendered.

“In this successful operation, 2 mountain-guns, 12 machine-guns, and 982 unwounded prisoners were taken, and there was a considerable number of Turkish dead and wounded on the hill.

“This enemy force consisted of the whole of the 13th Regiment which had been sent from the 5th Division in Persia to reinforce the army of Haqi Bey.”

Extract from Colonel Richardson’s letter to Sir R. S. Baden-Powell.

“7th Cavalry Brigade,
In Camp outside Mosul,
4th Nov. 1918.

“My dear General,—I must send you a line to tell you of another fine performance by the Regiment—a performance which our Brigadier (Gen. Charles Norton), the Commanding Officers of the other Regiments of the Brigade, and other eye-witnesses describe to me as the finest thing they have ever seen. I myself agree that not only as a spectacle but in its complete and immediate success it is the finest performance put up by the Regiment during the war, but as a test of discipline and tenacity I would place Lajj first: there we were on the verge of annihilation, and yet managed to put up a fighting front to the enemy; here it is true we were foiled in our first attempt, but the sqdns. reached cover in perfect order, and the failure of the early morning only made them the keener to score in the afternoon. I enclose a copy of the dry sober account of the day, which I made in my note-book two days after the occurrence, so I will only give you here a brief outline of the events which led up to our being where we were, and of the few days after the 29th which led us to the occupation of Mosul.

Sergt. R. Holloway (Killed at Hadraniyeh, 29th October 1918)		L.-Sergt. Wm. Leeman (Killed at Hadraniyeh, 29th October 1918)
	S.-Sergt. J. F. Couch, D.C.M. (Died at Chaldari, 4th July 1918)
2nd Lieut. G. R. Russell (Wounded at Hadraniyeh, 29th October 1918)		Cpl. A. Vinall, D.C.M. (Died of wounds, 31st October 1918)

“Since an armistice, in the nature of a complete military surrender by Turkey, has been arranged and signed, I hardly suppose that the censor will seriously object to numbers of Brigades and Divisions being given, but I will not risk more deletion than is necessary for the tale.

“Well, the original objective was the reduction of the Fathah position—a very strong natural position formed by the passage of the Tigris through the range of hills known on the left bank as the Jebel Hamrin and on the right bank as Jebel Makhul—about thirty miles N. of Tekrit, held on both banks by some 3000 rifles and 40 guns. Two Cavalry Bgds., ours and Cassels’, had made a long turning movement over the Hamrin, and were in position to the N. and N.E. of the Turkish position by dawn of day, and our feelings were rather mixed when we learnt about 8 A.M. that Johnny Turk had evacuated the position a day or two earlier, and retired mostly along the main road to Mosul on the right bank, which ran through a series of strong natural defensive positions against which the Infantry could make only slow progress against the Turk, who is a past-master in the art of rearguard fighting: so obstinate was he in holding on to a position opposite the confluence of the Lesser Zab river with the Tigris that we were hurried one night to the Fathah Gorge, which we bridged with a pontoon, to go up the right bank and create a diversion in favour of our Infantry; on arriving at Fathah, however, the position had changed—the Turk had retired, and we were no longer required on the right bank; but in the meantime Cassels’ Bgde. had crossed the Tigris some twenty-five miles north of the Lesser Zab, and had taken up a position astride the line of retreat of the Turks, and reinforcements to the latter were said to be closing on Cassels’ rear, so after a few hours’ halt we were hurried back to the Zab and beyond it to the ford, which we reached at dusk on the 28th, having covered 40 miles since 1 A.M. that day. The ford was deep and unmarked; I was riding my biggest horse, and the water was over my knees; on many men it was up to the waist, and we were unfortunate in losing three men, of whom no trace could be found in the dark.

“The events of the 29th I have described in the attached account. The Bgde. that night (29th) bivouacked on its fighting ground, and next morning moved S.W. to a position on Cassels’ right, where about 10 a.m. we learnt that the Turks caught between the Infantry and Cassels had surrendered: we therefore turned our heads northward, and about 2.30 P.M. came up with the Turkish rearguard, who surrendered after a few rounds from the battery, and the 13th Lancers pursuing brought back a lot more, making the total captures of the Bgde. up to about 2500 for the two days.

“Next day we continued our advance northward toward Mosul, but about 11 A.M. met Turkish envoys in a car, who came to tell us that an armistice had been signed.

“We have been on half rations or less for many days, and hardly get a scrap of outside news, but these days must be fraught with intense interest and excitement at home, and these details must in comparison fade into insignificance; but, hereafter, they will be of interest to all concerned with the Regiment, so I will not labour at further excuses for writing.”

Enclosure in Colonel Richardson’s letter to Sir R. S. Baden-Powell, of the 4th November 1918.

“The Storming of the Cliff and Plateau near Hadraniyah, afterwards called (in Brigade Orders) Richardson’s Bluff, by the Thirteenth Hussars, on the 29th October 1918.

THE STORMING OF RICHARDSON’S BLUFF
29TH OCTOBER 1918

“The night of the 28th-29th passed rather cheerlessly, most of the men having got wet to the waist, and in many cases their blankets and warm coats also having been soaked in fording the river the previous evening, and before dawn we moved down under cover of the river bank, where we were practically immune from the shell-fire which was opened on us soon after daylight and continued until about 7 A.M. About this time I received orders to gallop the Regiment and get a footing on a plateau rising almost sheer from the plain, on which several emplacements could be seen. I asked for and got the co-operation of V Battery, which put a strong barrage on the plateau from 8 A.M. to 8.15 A.M., at which hour we emerged from the river bank, supported on either flank by a subsection of 18 M.G.’s, commanded respectively by Lt. Noel and Lt. Foley. The following is a rough sketch showing disposition of Regiment and ground to be covered.

“As the Regiment reached the open, the four squadrons took up a diamond formation—‘B’ Squadron under Capt. Evans, 21st Lancers, leading, ‘C’ on left flank, ‘D’ on right flank, and ‘A’ Squadron (Lt. Fitzgibbon) bringing up the rear. I rode in the centre, and on either flank were the Hotchkiss guns of two squadrons co-operating with the subsection of machine-guns—i.e., ‘B’ and ‘D’ on right, under Lt. Parkes, and ‘A’ and ‘C’ on left, under Lt. Hartigan, M.C.

“As soon as the Regiment came into sight in the open a very hot fire from M.G.’s, rifles, and camel guns (9-pounders) was opened on it, and when about 1000 yds. from its objective, Capt. Evans was very seriously wounded, and the troop leaders of the Leading Squadron led their troops to the cover of the Cemetery Hill, where the remainder of the Regiment quickly concentrated. I quite agreed with their action at the time, and looking back two days afterwards with the knowledge gained since, I am convinced that it was the right course to take. The crest of the plateau was very much more strongly held than had ever been anticipated, and sufficient time had not been allowed for the artillery barrage.

“We occupied the Cemetery Hill and tried to gain ground to the west, but the glacis was quite bare and exposed to M.G. fire from the plateau and from trenches to the west. The Brigadier visited us about 11.30 A.M., and I suggested to him that we should try again to get the hill if the artillery would plaster the plateau and the known trenches until we had gained a footing on the crest. This they did with great effect at intervals until 1.30 P.M., at which time I led the Regiment from the cover of Cemetery Hill in two waves, ‘A’ and ‘D’ Squadrons (Mr Fitzgibbon and Capt. Jeffrey, M.C.) in the first, and ‘C’ (Mr Norton) and ‘B’ (Capt. Howey) in the second under Capt. Godfree.

“The first wave reached the foot of the bluff with only one casualty, a man whose horse fell in jumping a deepish nullah which lay across part of our course—dismounted to climb the almost precipitous cliff-side, the footing on which was made the worse by the loose rolling gravel surface; how the men scaled that cliff carrying their Hotchkiss guns and ammunition-bags will always remain a marvel to me.

“Meantime the second wave had reached the hill, also without casualties, and taken position on the right of the first. As we appeared on the crest fire broke on us from all sides, but the moral of the Turks had been so severely shaken by the Artillery that our casualties were very slight, and by bringing our right forward we were soon able to bring enfilade fire on the trenches to our front, and about 1.45 the first white flag was hoisted. The other trenches did not take long to follow their example, and in less than half an hour after leaving Cemetery Hill we were in complete possession of the plateau, and prisoners, whose numbers eventually mounted to 722, were being marched in batches from every side to a central spot. A few undoubtedly escaped, but the Indian Cavalry Regiments took up the pursuit and brought back 200 or 300 and a camel gun. The booty in arms was very large, at least 20 machine-guns and several thousands of rounds being taken.

“Our casualties were one, Sergt. Holloway, killed, and the following N.C.O.’s and men wounded—viz., Sergt. Barnard, Cpls. Vinall and Hill, Ptes. Little, Patrick, and Tranter (Cpl. Vinall has since died of wounds).

“Sergt. Leeman had been killed with the following wounded whilst we were on Cemetery Hill: 2nd Lt. Russell, Ptes. Powell, Gerrard, and Winter.

“Pte. Harvey was wounded by shell-fire at the ford early in the morning, and the following were drowned whilst crossing the river on the previous evening—viz., L.-Cpl. Bartlett, Ptes. Newman and Donoghue.

“It transpired later that the Turkish troops opposed to us on the Bluff were the three Battns. of the 13th Regiment who had recently come down from Lake Urmia to reinforce the troops on the Fathah position, and that they were preparing to attack the ford at 4 P.M. that afternoon, when our assault destroyed their plans.

“The fight was short and sharp and the victory complete; we owed our almost complete immunity from loss to the excellent shooting of V Battery and A 337, and it was, I must admit, some consolation to know that the troops which brought off the coup were all British.”

Letter from Colonel Richardson to Sir R. S. Baden-Powell, dated Mosul, 12th November 1918.

“My dear General,—Herewith the sketch (from memory) of the position assaulted by the Regiment on October 29th and the numbers of the Regiment taking part in the assault; these were omitted from my letter of last week; I hope before we leave these parts to get a proper surveyed sketch of the position,—for the purposes of history.

“We heard to-day that the Armistice with the Huns had been signed and commenced yesterday, as we take it that this is tantamount to a surrender which is practically unconditional on their part. I hope it may not be long before we say good-bye to this God-forgotten country.—Yours sincerely,

(Signed) J. J. Richardson.

“The numbers of the squadrons:—

	Officers.	N.C.O.’s and Men.	Hotchkiss guns.
A	4	64	4
B	3	52	4
C	6[60]	63	4
D	4	60	4
	17	239	16”

Letter from Colonel Richardson to Sir R. S. Baden-Powell, dated Zacho, 75 miles N. of Mosul, 30th November 1918.

“My dear General,—Just a line in continuation of my letter of the 12th to tell you that we have been given the following Immediate Rewards in recognition of our work on the 29th October, viz.:—

Myself	a bar to the	D.S.O.
Capt. D. W. Godfree		M.C.
Lieut. G. H. Parkes		M.C.
Corporal Vinall (since died of wounds)		D.C.M.
Corporal Raynor		D.C.M.
Lance-Corporal Viner		M.M.
Corporal Aukett		M.M.
Corporal Whitington		M.M.
Private Humphrey		M.M.

“A batch of honours of which any Regiment may well be proud, as I think you will agree; and indeed we are all very proud of them, and myself not the least proud!

“We were pushed off here with 2 guns of V Battery and a subsection of M.G. at short notice on Monday last to stop reported rioting by retiring Turks and to see them over the border, which is only some 7 or 8 miles from here, and we did the 75 miles in 31 hours. The Turks had heard of our coming and quitted—very wisely; we are well in the hills here in a pretty valley, and snow-covered hills are less than 50 miles away. Rather a change from the Baghdad temperature of July!

“On the 26th we heard that the M.M. had been awarded to Sergt. W. H. Burgess and L.-Cpl. Lomas: these I gather are the outcome of the last despatch.—With all good wishes, yours sincerely,

(Signed) J. J. Richardson.”

Letter from Lance-Corporal George Costello (56799) of 15th Squadron M.G.C., 7th Cavalry Brigade, to Mr and Mrs Wallace—parents of James Wallace.

M.E.F.,
14th November 1918.

“Dear Mr and Mrs Wallace,—It is with a sad heart, and with the deepest sympathy, that I write to you of Jim’s presumed death. Jim and I were staunch friends together ever since we were in France, and shared one another’s hardships and joys all the way through. Some time back ‘A’ Section was split up; Jim went to ‘C’ and I to ‘B,’ so at the actual time of crossing the river (Tigris) we were apart, as my section was about one hundred yards in front. From 12 midnight the night previous to crossing, we had been marching, and crossed at 6.30 P.M. the following evening, and during that period we had covered a distance of 57 miles, which was a pretty stiff march, and men and horses were feeling a bit done up. When we got in the water some of the horses were restless and started plunging and rearing. This is what happened to Jim: I learnt it from men who were near him at the time. His horse reared and Jim came off. The current of the river was very swift at the time, and it was also dark. We have lost four men in the squadron in the same way, and nothing has been heard of any of them since. The next morning we got into action! The 13th Hussars formed line and charged up a hill at the Turks. The hill was too steep to get up, so when they got half-way up they did a dismounted action, and within a quarter of an hour the Turks on the top of the hill showed the white flag, and over one thousand surrendered; by late in the afternoon the 7th Cavalry Brigade had beat the whole of that force, capturing nearly three thousand prisoners. The finest piece of work the Brigade has done during the war. I am sure poor Jim would have delighted in it. We then proceeded on towards Mosul, and came in contact with, and captured, two hundred and fifty reinforcements with 7 machine-guns and some big guns. Towards the evening, with one Regiment of Indians (14th Lancers) and one section of 16th Squadron M.G.C., we overtook and captured between two and three miles of convoy and thirteen hundred prisoners. We are now in Mosul. When about 20 miles from Mosul an aeroplane dropped a message which said that the Turks had surrendered Mosul, and that hostilities with Turkey had ceased. Jim has left behind him a memory which one can never forget. Loved and respected by all who knew him, as he was always ready to offer his help and sympathy to any one in trouble. And you have cause to be proud of having had a son who kept up the traditions of a Britisher to its highest level, and was a true and noble soldier to the core. You might please write to Mr Justice Eve and let him know, as I am sure that Jim would wish it, as he held his late squadron leader, Capt. Eve, 13th Hussars, in the highest esteem, and I know that a short time ago Jim wrote to Mr Justice Eve thanking him for the photo. I hope that Jim’s brother who was wounded has quite recovered by now. Well, bear up, and try and look on it for the best, as I know that all your trouble has come in a heap lately. I unfortunately lost my mother in an air-raid since I have been out here.—From Jim’s old Chum, 56799, George Costello.

“P.S.—If I should gather any information I will write and let you know at once.

“56799 L.-Cpl. Costello,
15th Squadron M.G.C.,
7th Cav. Brigade,
Mesopotamia.”

Extracts from letter from Private E. Cleary (6759 “B” Squadron) to Miss E. FitzPatrick of Accrington, Lancashire.

“Mesopotamia,
25th November 1918.

“Dear Lizzie,—I don’t know how to start answering your letters—I have received that many from you for the last 4 days; they all came of a rush, the reason of it was they were in the country, and could not reach us on account of the shortage of transport....

“Well, we had some hard fighting for about a fortnight, but we managed to get round them and capture the lot; we were very lucky, for they nearly captured us instead, but we managed to get a good mounted charge in on them, and that was the turning-point of our last battle out here. Our Regt. alone captured 1300 prisoners, but it was a good job they did surrender to us, for they could have wiped out every man of us if we fought on, because our Regt. was not near up to strength: we lost a good many. It was hard lines on them, for it was our last fight; they surrendered Mosul to us the next day, and a good job too, for we were about done; we went 2 and 3 days at a time with no rations except a pound of dry flour per man, and you may know what a big feed one can get out of a pound of flour (I don’t think), and that flour was ground barley. You would laugh to see us cooking it: we used to get a bit of tin, make a fire under it, then mix the flour up with some water into a dough, then roll it out into little flat cakes and put it on a tin and bake it, so you may know what nice bread it was (I don’t think), but still I was glad of it; they kept us going all right, and even now, although we are in Mosul, all we are living on is what we buy off the inhabitants, but of course everything will come right again as soon as we get settled down a bit. We were within 15 miles of Mosul when word came through that they had surrendered the place, so we stopped where we were until next day, and then news came through that Turkey had packed up altogether; it was taken very quietly, every one was that fed up, not even a cheer was given. Then we marched into the City and took over all that was there: they had plenty of stuff—food, guns, and men: it seemed so strange we were fighting them a few hours before, and then all that was to be seen was our officers and their officers shaking hands and making much of one another; but it wasn’t so in the case of the men—if our fellows had their way they would have been scrapping them, for we haven’t forgotten some of the tricks they done to our fellows; but still, thank God! it is all over. Well, we had been in Mosul for about a week when the news came through of Germany packing up: even that was taken very quietly, for it was raining as hard as it could, and we didn’t have a bit of shelter, so the only remarks that were passed was, it’s a bloody good job it’s over; so that is how we enjoyed the good news: of course every one was delighted but didn’t show it. Well, Lizzie, you will think I have gone mad on the war, so I will change the subject. I don’t know if you have heard much about Mosul or not; well, it is supposed to be one of the great Sacred Cities out here—they say it’s mentioned several times in the Bible (but as I don’t know much about the Bible I cannot say); it is much the same as Baghdad, but a little more up to date: there is a couple of Catholic Chapels here; of course all Armenians are Catholics, and besides, there is some French here too, but give me one corner of Accrington and they can keep all this country. Just outside Mosul is the ruins of Ninevah, the great city in olden days that was swallowed up by the great earthquake: it is a big mound now, but there is big holes made in it that a man can crawl through, and you can see the ruins of the City beneath: I have been in them many a time, for we find Guards on it every day; so that is how we pass the time away going through it. If you ask one of the Priests they may be able to tell you about it (but I shall be glad to see the back of it). The climate up here is just like England—in fact it feels colder to me: it has rained ever since we’ve been here, and I can tell you it’s none too comfortable, for all we’ve got is one blanket and no other shelter of any kind. Well, Lizzie, it’s time now I came to thank you for all the trouble I have put you to; first of all, I don’t know how to thank you for getting me that Roll of Honour, as you say it is a nice thing, but the reason I wanted it mostly was because I had a good few mates who were on there. God rest them! Mr Rolfe was my Troop Officer, he led us in the charge, and the Turk that killed him was also killed by one of our fellows, so that was one consolation; if you look on there you will see Private Stones’ name; he came from Whally. Pte. M‘Nulty came from Birkenhead, Pte. Cole from Halifax, and Tpr. Spicer from Dublin: he was only about 18 years old. I shall tell you all about them when I go to see you at No. 41. It was very kind of Mr Eve for writing such a nice letter; his son was a nice fellow and a fine leader. I seen him get killed, he was shot right through the head. It was good of you getting them framed. Again I thank you from the bottom of my heart. Now I must thank you for sending Xmas card, and above all, I was most delighted at getting poor Dan’s Memory Card. God rest his soul. It’s the only thing that grieves me, is he did not live so as to have the pleasure of meeting him again. I was always looking forward to having a good time with him if both of us had the luck, but as you say God knows best.”

Extracts from letter from Captain H. C. D. FitzGibbon, Thirteenth Hussars.

“Field.

“My dear Olive,—Well, my goodness, a lot of things have happened since my last letter to you. Peace! what an extraordinary word: it is hard to believe the whole thing is over. I will try and tell you all since my last letter.

“The Brigade was in its summer camp, just a few miles north of Baghdad, when I got back from leave. You remember I sent you a word saying we were going out once more. The idea was to take the Fahta position. The Turkish forces were then holding the gorge where the Tigris runs through the Jebel Hamrin. It was supposed, and is, a very strong position, with a desert on one side and a range of hills on the other. He, however, did not hold all the passes, enabling us (the Cavalry) to get over and behind his position. We night-marched round, and at dawn attacked, but to find he did not like the look of the thing and had gone in the night. We next met him on a rather strong position he had taken up on the Lesser Zab. He held us up there for about three days, and started to retreat on Mosul. We, or rather Cassels and his Brigade (with the 7th Hussars) were rather too quick for him, and had got between him and Mosul, dug themselves in, and held them up. A most gallant performance. We were then hurried up to reinforce him as he was not strong enough for the job, and would undoubtedly have failed had we not come up. Two days after we had the lot prisoners, about 10,000. My Regiment had rather a fine chance. About 900 Turks were holding a fairly strong position on some hills with a very large field of fire in front of them. We got Archies to clear up that position. The only way to do it was mounted at the gallop over the open and dismount under the crest of the hills. We formed up in two lines, Jeffrey’s and my squadrons in the first line and the other two in the rear, and off we went. Those who saw it said it was as fine a show as they had ever seen. The line was as good as on parade. We crossed the open at full gallop, dismounted under the crest, fixed bayonets, and before you could say knife had a good footing on the crest. The whole thing was so quick that the Turk was rather taken unawares, and we had cleared up the whole position and taken the lot in no time. My squadron at the time, the same as the others, was only sixty strong—that is to say, about 40 dismounted men. The Colonel led the first line himself, and got a bar to his D.S.O. for it—not bad!!!

“After that we were hurried up the Mosul road. We took another 1800 prisoners, reached a place called Hammam Ali about 15 miles south of Mosul, and for the first time heard of the Turkish Armistice. I then had a rather interesting time, as I went into Mosul with General Cassels to interview the Turkish Commander. It was rather a unique experience, the whole thing in French. To cut a long story short, they were obliged by the terms to evacuate the Mosul Villayat. We marched into the town, a very dirty but rather interesting place. A lot of people speak French. We were camped outside with very few tents and a very wet and cold climate, and no warm clothes to put on. The Regiment was then detailed to send a squadron up to a place on the border called Zakho, about 80 miles north of Mosul, to keep order, and here I am Lord and Master of my little Kingdom.

“It is rather funny being so far away from everybody, but rather nice in a way. I have got two officers with me, Stirling and Hartigan. The first you know of, and the other, also, is one of the best. We are living for the first time for 2½ years in a house, not a bad one at all, and even my men have got them into a large building, so on the whole we are rather comfy. It is very pretty; the village is in a beautifully fertile valley, with high snow-capped mountains in front of me. Plenty to eat and lovely water to drink, and so good for one!!! and I am the Lord and Master of the district. We are well out of Mesopot, and well into Kurdistan. Kurdish is an extraordinary language, but quite a lot of people speak French. Their dress is quite pretty, in a way rather like the Dutch with big trousers. The day before I left Mosul, news came in that Germany had thrown in. It was early in the morning, we were in a very small tent; I was shaving at the time: it was received with great calm and indifference. News came in later the same day that owing to the rain carts could not get up to us, and we were put on half rations. Less indifference was shown to this bit of news.

“I can’t send this letter for a day or two, so will go on with it to-morrow. Me voila encore une fois!...

“It is extraordinary to think war is over! though I am afraid it will be a long time before they let us all go. What a lot of mothers and wives must be thankful. I suppose the sights at home must have been wonderful.

“I had a very interesting time yesterday. The mine only just started is full of coal, and if worked with method I should say worth any amount of money. The tribes in the hills are the most extraordinary thing in the world: they know no law, and obey no master but the chief of their tribe. Every man is armed with a rifle, and a modern one at that. Their villages are in such places that only a goat can get at them, so they can laugh at the whole world in general. The chief I had lunch with is a well-known brigand who robs everybody who passes anywhere near him.

“I had rather a funny complaint last night: A man came round most beautifully dressed, started off with a long-winded speech about the British and how just they were, &c., ending up by saying that the headman’s servants had found his wife in the bazaar and soundly beaten her, and did the British allow that sort of thing?”

The Thirteenth Hussars’ Charge at Hadraniyah, by an Eye-Witness.

“It can be given to few to watch from a vantage-point, in near vicinity, a spirited cavalry charge. All cavalrymen live for the day when they may take part in this most exhilarating of all the movements of war, and next to being a participator is the privilege of seeing a charge take place.

“At midday on October 29th, 1918, the situation near Hadraniyah was critical—to the south, Cassels’ Brigade was still engaged delaying the retreat of Haqui Bey’s Army; linked with him 2½ miles to the north, Norton’s Brigade had, since dawn, been opposing the advance of the reinforcements that were hurrying to the Turkish Commander’s assistance.

“Almost due west of Hadraniyah Ford, in crossing which at nightfall on the 28th the Brigade had lost twenty men drowned, stands ‘Richardson’s Bluff.’ This Bluff is the culminating point of the ridge which forms the old bank of the Tigris; it lies some 2000 yards from the present river bank, and rises almost precipitously from the plain to the height of some 150 feet. Just to the south of the Bluff there is a re-entrant in the ridge, sweeping round which the latter continues to the south, at first at a lower elevation, but gradually rising till it reaches Huwaish Gorge, along the edge of which was Cassels’ position. The plain between the Bluff and the river is as flat as the palm of the hand, save for two mounds to the south and south-east, on the nearer of which, some 900 yards distant, is a Mahommedan cemetery. At dawn the reconnoitring squadron of the 13th Lancers had been driven back by gun and machine-gun fire from the Bluff, and had taken cover on Cemetery Hill.

“At 8.15 A.M. the Thirteenth Hussars had endeavoured to gallop the Bluff, but owing to the leading Squadron Commander, Captain Evans, having fallen severely wounded, his squadron had lost direction and, inclining to the left, had arrived at Cemetery Hill and relieved the squadron of the 13th Lancers, and there it was joined by the remainder of the Regiment.

“Shortly after this the left was prolonged by the 14th Lancers, who were disposed so as to intercept a junction between the enemy that were opposing the 7th Brigade and those that were engaged with Cassels.

“In support, in rear of the centre of our position, the 13th Lancers were placed, while on the farther bank of the river, 3000 yards to the east, was V Battery, R.H.A., in action against the enemy guns. At 10 A.M., having forded the river, 337 A Battery, R.F.A., came into action in our support, from about 2000 yards to the south of Cemetery Hill. The combined fire of the two batteries soon silenced the enemy guns, and General Norton, realising that the Bluff was the vital point, decided to make a further attempt to wrest it from the enemy.

“It was evident by this time that the hostile force on the Bluff was considerably stronger than had been previously reported. Our position on the lower ground was very precarious, and a successful decisive attack by the Turks would have driven us into the open, rolled up Cassels’ flank, and taken him in the rear. The terrain prevented an accurate reconnaissance of the enemy’s position being made. It remained for General Norton to take the responsibility of ordering a direct attack to be made on the Bluff, supported by the guns.

“Orders were issued, the Thirteenth Hussars concentrated on their right, while both batteries heavily shelled the enemy’s position.

“The concentration of the Thirteenth Hussars was evidently seen by the enemy, and occasioned a heavy outburst of fire, which revealed the fact that they were in possession of more machine-guns than up to then had been calculated. In consequence of this General Norton ordered the attack to be postponed while further artillery preparation took place.

“At 12.45 P.M. the General decided that further delay would be dangerous, and that the effort must be made. Our helio winked a message to the batteries that the Thirteenth Hussars were to attack at 1.20 P.M.; and that they were to increase their rates of fire. Both batteries redoubled their efforts—admirably directed by Lt. Sutton (V Battery, R.H.A.), both ranging and fuses being beautifully accurate; they plastered the Bluff with H.E. and shrapnel. A slight delay in the arrangements made it impossible for the attack to take place till 1.30 P.M. In the interval the Thirteenth Hussars quietly formed up in column of wings under cover of Cemetery Hill.

“As the zero time approached urgent messages came from Major Greenshields, commanding V Battery, that his ammunition was running low. It was an anxious moment: on the crest of Cemetery Hill the Brigade Headquarters Staff lay, taking what cover they could behind the gravestones—down below the Hussars were quietly falling in, resolute but serious, as all knew that much depended on the coming assault, while its result was in the hands of the gods—on our left the 13th and 14th Lancers were ready to ‘Mount’ and ‘Pursue,’ if the attack was successful, or extricate their comrades if it was a reverse.

“On the Bluff was a veritable inferno—the H.E. bursting in black clouds, the shrapnel in fleece-like puffs, both hurling death on the doomed Turks—one continuous and awful roar swept the threatened area.

“Deafened by the noise and rendered dizzy by the concussion, Turks in the advanced trenches on the crest of the hill could be seen getting up and running in a drunken manner to the rear; some caught by bullets while en route, fell; others disappeared in the burst of an H.E. shell, and nothing remained when the black cloud cleared away.

“And then the Hussars advanced; it was a glorious sight—the first line led by their gallant Colonel, in perfect order, as if one on a drill parade, swept round the edge of Cemetery Hill—the pace increased—on they went with a loud inspiring cheer. Then equally steady followed the second line.

“The enemy’s machine-guns rattled furiously—ours replied viciously—on, on went the Hussars—then to our horror we saw a check, and we realised that, straight across the front of the Hussars, between them and the Bluff, ran a nullah.

“What is going to happen? Is it too wide? Can they cross it? Another Omdurman or Shabkadr? were among the agonising thoughts that flashed through our minds.

“A little crowding—a horse down—then a cheer rose to our lips as we saw the Colonel thread his way across, and then, on his heels, scrambling, hustling, thrusting, scarcely checking, the first line crossed and went on.

“By this time the onlookers on the Cemetery Hill were mad with excitement, and quite oblivious of the bullets still whistling over them, they were standing up wildly cheering on the gallant Hussars. Now they had reached the foot of the Bluff—so close was it to us that we could distinguish individuals.

“Off they get—fix bayonets—up the hill they scrambled, with their Colonel still at their head; the barrage lifts beautifully in time—and the Hussars clear the crest and, spreading like a fan, on they go. A machine-gun is rushed—then a Hussar was seen to fall—bayonet work begins....

“‘By God, they are counter-attacking!’ bursts from the Brigade Major’s lips, as a party of Turks drive back a troop of the Hussars; but, steady as rocks, the Hussars meet the new attack—a few shots, and then the bayonet. On our left there is a thunder of hoofs—a host of lance-pennons dotted o’er the countryside shows the 13th and 14th Lancers are hurrying forward in support, lance in rest ready for the pursuit. This is the final act in the drama, and then all sobriety is forgotten; our helmets fly in the air as we cheer and cheer again, as on all sides white flags of surrender are raised by the defeated Turks.

“From every direction, in a few minutes, small bodies of the enemy, marshalled by the gallant Hussars, can be seen marching in—and the affair was over.

“It was with a choke in the throat that, a few minutes later, we shook hands with the gallant ‘Jimmy,’ and congratulated him on his splendid success, and ourselves on having been privileged to watch and in some way partake of it.”

Transport fording the Tigris, 1918. Major A. Cooke, Q.M.

“On October 31st, the transport, which had been left at Huwaish on the left bank of the river Tigris, received orders to march at 6 A.M. and join the Brigade at Quayirah.

“After marching about 4 miles the ford was reached—apparently the one described in Lieutenant-General Sir W. R. Marshall’s despatch of 11th April 1919, by which the 11th Cavalry Brigade, under Br.-General R. A. Cassels, C.B., D.S.O., had crossed.

“Two channels of the river had to be crossed before reaching the main stream. Entering the latter, the ford followed a narrow ledge in mid-river (the water here was about 4½ feet deep) which ran for a distance of about 500 yards up-stream; it then turned to the left through fairly shallow water to the right bank. To the right of the ledge the water was at least 5½ feet deep, to the left flowed the rapid and deep main stream of the Tigris.

“If a vehicle got off the ledge into the deeper water on the right, it was extremely difficult to get the animals to start again; but if they got off to the left there was little or no hope of recovery.

“The crossing was commenced, taking about 15 yards interval between vehicles. Soon there came a check; the animals of one waggon, tired of pulling against the rush of ice-cold water, came to a standstill. The next waggon tried to pass to the right, but got into the deeper water, and stayed there until extra animals could be hitched in—this, in itself, proving a most difficult task.

“The column was again got moving, but several similar stops occurred, until a limbered waggon and a water-cart of the 14th Lancers got off the ledge to the left and were lost, two of the four drivers and all the mules being drowned.

“All the transport of the Regiment, except the mess-carts, crossed without trouble; these, being very light, had great difficulty in stemming the swift current, and one was carried off the ledge and swept down-stream.

“The driver of this cart was Pte. Harding, a good old soldier who was mentioned in despatches during the South African War for great gallantry (‘Regimental History,’ volume ii. pp. 129 and 207). He was accompanied in the cart by an Indian cook.

“Every one who saw them carried away thought they were certainly lost. Harding, however, kept his head, and, whilst being floated down the river at a great pace, sat and handled his reins as though he were driving along a hard road. The horse swam with the stream, the well-laden cart floated evenly on the water, and the whole lot went down-stream for about 800 yards before coming to a standstill. While in deep water, Harding gradually steered towards the bank, and at length guided the horse to where he could just scrape his feet along the shingly bottom, and come to a halt, standing.

“The horse was dead-beat, and it was feared that they would again be carried away by the rush of water, when an Indian Artillery driver rode into the river and reached the cart-horse’s head. By seizing the rein and assisting and encouraging the horse, he eventually got it to shallower water, where aid was forthcoming to get the cart ashore.

“It was a most daring and gallant feat on the part of the Indian driver, and his conduct was brought to the notice of the Army Commander. Private Harding received the cheers and congratulations of all assembled there, and was recommended for a reward.

“This may not appear very exciting in print, but when it is remembered that the Tigris is about 300 yards wide, with such a volume of water rushing down that no communication by shouting is possible, except at very short distances, and that men and animals were struggling and drowning at the time, the writer thinks that all who read this account will agree that fording the Tigris with the transport afforded not the least of the many thrilling incidents of the closing days of the war.”

CHAPTER XXII.
SCOPE AND MEANING OF THE MESOPOTAMIAN CAMPAIGN. THE SHARE IN IT OF THE THIRTEENTH HUSSARS.

The bearing of the campaign in Mesopotamia upon the issues of the Great War has already been examined in the course of the narrative; but at the risk of some repetition it seems desirable to sum up here the achievements of the British in this part of the world, and to see what effect they had upon the general situation.

No one was in a better position to give a correct view of the subject in a few words than the Commander who had the thoroughly deserved good fortune to complete the overthrow of the Turks and the conquest of the country. General Marshall, in his despatch of the 1st February 1919, writes as follows:—

“The campaign in Mesopotamia has lasted just four years. From small beginnings, when Fort Fao was captured on November 6th, 1914, the ration strength of the force when Mosul was occupied had grown to some 420,000, including labour battalions.

“The area of territory of the Turkish Empire which has been conquered and occupied amounts to 114,000 square miles. The sphere of operations has included Trans-Caucasia and Trans-Caspia, and detachments furnished by the force are being employed over territory extending from Deir-as-Zor on the Euphrates, 330 miles north-west of Baghdad, to Merv in Trans-Caspia, some 1450 miles north-east of Baghdad.

“Actual captures since the beginning of the campaign amount to 45,500 prisoners and 250 guns, together with vast quantities of war material of all descriptions.

“These results have been achieved in a country destitute of shade in summer, and impassable owing to floods in wet weather, and are a lasting record of the gallantry and endurance of the officers and men, both British and Indian, who have fought uncomplainingly in spite of heat, thirst, rain, and discomfort, for four years in Mesopotamia.”

This no doubt is a true and in some respects a striking presentment of the case; but it is a modest one, and more might have been said without exaggeration.

Mention has been made in earlier chapters of the scheme of world dominion conceived by the Germans, and of the part which Turkey was to play in it. Germany aimed not only at becoming the Paramount Power in Europe, but at the supreme control of the East. The two things were parts, and equally important parts, of the great conspiracy. They were, so to speak, the twin pillars upon which the whole vast superstructure of German dominion was to rest. For the Eastern part of the scheme Turkey was essential. Upon the geographical situation and the military power of Turkey, supported by German gold and German military science, supported also by the Sultan’s influence as the spiritual head of Islam, everything depended. Through their vassal Turkey, the Germans were to strike down their most formidable enemy—England, whose fleet stood between them and the dominion of the world. This is not mere surmise. Germany made little secret of her intentions, or of the means by which they were to be fulfilled.

When Turkey proceeded to declare war against the Allies and to carry out her part in the German scheme, she was very soon able, after beating off an attack on the Dardanelles, to throw her whole weight into Asia. From the nature of things her military effort then resolved itself into an advance upon three fronts. On her left she struck at the Russians in the Caucasus, in the centre she struck at both Russians and English in Persia, and hoped to work through Persia upon Afghanistan and India. On her right she struck at England in Egypt. All these countries—the Caucasus, Persia, Afghanistan, the Indian Frontier, Egypt—were mainly or largely Mahomedan, and the Koran was to give weight to the blows of the Turkish sword.

Before very long Russia broke up, and England stood practically alone, so that in Western Asia it became a duel between her and Turkey. The struggle was fought out on all three of the Turkish fronts, but mainly in the centre and on the Turkish right. On both these fronts England, though dangerously weak at first, grew stronger and stronger as time went on, until eventually she overwhelmed her enemy. Instead of being attacked and beaten in Egypt, she advanced from Egypt and crushed the Turkish armies in Palestine and Syria. Instead of being attacked and beaten in Persia and India, she advanced into Mesopotamia, and planted the British flag upon the citadels of Baghdad and Mosul. Under these tremendous blows the Turkish military power collapsed, and with it collapsed the Eastern part of the German world-scheme. Perhaps more than this might be said; for the fall of Turkey was no doubt a heavy shock and discouragement to Turkey’s masters, struggling hard themselves to carry out their conquest of Europe. But it is enough to know that the British armies in Mesopotamia and Palestine brought Turkey to her knees.

It is not necessary to inquire which of the two had the leading share in this great feat of arms. They were portions of one Imperial Army, and though fighting hundreds of miles apart, with a vast desert between them, they were enabled, through England’s command of the sea, to afford each other some support. The Mesopotamian Army more than once sent large forces round by sea to join the army in Palestine, and Allenby’s victories in Palestine reacted with immense effect upon the situation in Mesopotamia. It was a signal instance of the influence of sea power in war, for it did much to neutralise the great advantage given to Turkey by her central position against her widely-parted enemies. The two of them, striking separately, yet in a sense together, from their common base, the sea, overthrew and ruined her.

It was the same sea power that enabled England to make each of them efficient in itself. Not only did the sea bring them their hundreds of thousands of fighting men, but the sea brought them everything needed to let their men fight with success. As to the Mesopotamian campaign, it was, as its very name implies, a river campaign, and the utilisation of the Turkish rivers, especially the Tigris, was the first essential of success. Nothing was so remarkable in all the history of the campaign as the way in which the Tigris was broken in and transformed from an almost insuperable obstacle into a great military highway. By a hard and sustained effort, impossible for any nation but the mistress of the seas, the turbulent undisciplined river was tamed and enlisted in the service of the invaders, and its carrying power was increased nearly a thousandfold. When Maude began his advance, its surface was swarming with steamboats that had found their way, thanks to the daring and skill of British seamen, from the Hughli and the Irawadi and the Thames, until they were numerous enough to carry a large army into the heart of the Turkish Empire, and to keep it supplied with all the multitudinous necessities of modern war.

The river steamers were supported by rapidly constructed railways and roads, and all manner of engineering works; new irrigation channels were made or ancient channels reopened; many of the wild Arab tribes were gradually brought to see the advantages of order and service; crops were raised and gathered; altogether the activities of our people were innumerable, and the conquest of a country almost as large as the United Kingdom went hand-in-hand with the measures necessary for making it prosperous and contented.

What its future will be no one can say. To take over such a country, with its turbulent population and unsettled frontiers and outlying responsibilities of many kinds, is a formidable task; but in any case the conquest of it, from such an enemy as the Turk, was no small contribution to the work done by the British Empire in the Great War. It was performed at a distance from England, among scenes unfamiliar to Englishmen, and, partly owing to Press restrictions, it did not greatly appeal to the country’s attention, which was naturally enough fixed upon the progress of the conflict in Europe; but it was none the less a great achievement, and one of which all concerned in it may well be proud.

Among those concerned in it was the Regiment whose history forms the subject of this book, and there remains to be considered now the part which the Regiment played in the campaign.

The Thirteenth were perhaps fortunate in that they did not come to Mesopotamia until 1916, when the first half, and the most trying half, of the Mesopotamian Campaign was over. They had no part in the earlier fighting, when the British force was small and ill-found, and its difficulties great. They were spared the troubles and sufferings endured by the troops who conquered the lower part of the country; they did not march up with Townshend to the bloody field of Ctesiphon, or share in the desperate efforts to break through to his relief when he was shut up in Kut. When they landed at Basra all that was over. Horrified at the losses and sufferings entailed by its attempt—one of its customary attempts—to make a small force do the work of a large one, the nation had suddenly woken up to the needs of Mesopotamia; and, blaming every one but those chiefly to blame, itself and its statesmen, was now pouring in without stint Regiments and guns and river steamers and every kind of war material. It could not bring back to life the thousands of men sacrificed, or undo the injustice done to some of its best soldiers, but it was determined that the Mesopotamian force should for the future fight with reasonable chances of success; and though its attention was soon diverted again, it certainly made a fine effort, the result of which was to endure. The Thirteenth came in on the turn of the tide, and though they had before them two years of hard work and hard fighting, they were never to know the bitterness of defeat.

Nevertheless the work was severe, and the issue of the fighting was often doubtful for a time. That it uniformly ended in success, and eventually in complete triumph, was proof of very high qualities in the men who led and the men who followed. For the Turk is a stubborn enemy. He was once acknowledged, by general consent, as the best soldier in Europe; and if time has deprived him of some of his reputation, it still stands deservedly high.

As in the Palestine campaign, so in Mesopotamia, the Cavalry found its chance. There, as in all modern war, it was no doubt the Infantry and guns which mainly decided the fate of battles; but the Cavalry had much to do for the armies both before and after battle, in reconnaissance, in sweeping the country for supplies, in pursuit, and in the turning movements which at times brought about the enemy’s ruin. Even in the actual shock of battle they were not wholly excluded from a share of fighting and honour. Some tributes to the value of their services in Mesopotamia have already been recorded in earlier chapters. There is one service which perhaps has not been sufficiently brought out. The whole plan of General Maude’s attack upon the Turkish army which faced him on the north bank of the Tigris, when he began his advance in December 1916, was to push up the south bank, and keep threatening their rear from that side until they had so extended the line held by their troops that they were no longer strong enough to hold it all securely—to prevent his forcing a passage at some point and getting in behind their main body. As he put it in a letter to General Symons: “The Turks were very sticky and would not go for a long time, but we gradually stretched them and stretched them till owing to their casualties they were much weakened, and then we struck boldly at their tail across the Tigris. I had been hammering at this for two months, and the fact that they would not give up Sannaiyat, and consequently placed themselves in the dangerous position of having a line of communication in prolongation of their battle front, was their undoing.”

And the Cavalry had much to do with this stretching process. In his despatch giving an account of the whole advance to Baghdad, General Maude writes:—

“The work of the Cavalry had been difficult. The flat terrain intersected with nalas obstructed movement without providing cover, and the state of the country after heavy rains made progress even for short distances laborious. The absence of water, too, away from the river, limited its radius of action. Nevertheless its reconnaissance work and the blows delivered against the enemy’s communications helped in no small way to bring about that dissipation of his forces which was so essential to our success, and the pressure applied after the passage of the Tigris to the retreating enemy was instrumental in completing his final rout.”

The Thirteenth, working from their camp on the Hai river, did their full share of the Cavalry work so described.

During the subsequent march on Baghdad, to quote again General Maude’s letter to General Symons: “Your old Regiment did splendidly,” and in the course of it, at Lajj, they had their first chance, while pressing the pursuit, of delivering a real Cavalry charge, mounted and sword in hand.

This charge, “a brilliant charge,” as General Maude called it, was the first of several which have been described in earlier chapters. At Tekrit, at Kulawand, and at Tuz Kermatli the Regiment got in with the sword; and if the final onslaught at Hadraniya was made on foot with the bayonet, it was none the less a hand-to-hand attack, after a gallop across the open to the foot of the bluff on which were the Turkish trenches. Nor is an assault with the bayonet less creditable than a mounted charge. Naturally a Cavalry Regiment will always long for that, and rejoice in it if it comes; but, as many leading soldiers have now recognised, Cavalry under present conditions, to be thoroughly efficient, must be able to fight on foot as well as on horseback. Ever since the American Civil War this has become clearer and clearer. The Thirteenth in Mesopotamia, as other Cavalry Regiments in this war, have in a measure reverted to their old rôle as Dragoons, to whom the firearm of the Infantry is as familiar as the sword.

Far from lessening the honour due to them, the fact that both at Lajj and at Hadraniya the Thirteenth showed they could fight either way, is very much to their credit. There was no lack of the Cavalry spirit. Their whole inclination was to charge on horseback, sword in hand. But, if necessary, they could do something more.

To conclude, perhaps the most valuable singly of all the services rendered by the Cavalry during the campaign, was the one of which the Hadraniya charge was only a part—namely, the long march round into the enemy’s rear and the closing of his line of retreat, which led to the surrender of his whole force. The credit of this daring feat is due in the first place to Cassels and his own 11th Brigade, but the 7th Brigade too deserved much credit, for it may be doubted whether without their timely help Cassels and his men could have held their own against the repeated and desperate attacks of an enemy so superior in numbers.

Altogether, the Thirteenth Hussars did their duty well from the beginning to the end of their stay in Mesopotamia, which lasted for two years and a half. During that time they gained much honour at a heavy cost. Of their officers, eight were killed in action or died on service, two were disabled and taken prisoners, and fourteen were wounded. In other ranks the numbers were 90, 2, and 176. It is an honourable record.

CHAPTER XXIII.
RETURN TO ENGLAND—CONCLUSION.

The Thirteenth remained in and about Mosul throughout the months of November and December 1918; but early in January 1919 they were ordered to return to Baghdad, and marching on the 11th of the month, arrived in Baghdad on the 29th.

There they remained in camp for some weeks, when the welcome order was received to embark for England. On the 10th March, the Regiment went on board a river steamer, and started on their journey down the Tigris. It was a large vessel, and with them were their old comrades of the Fourteenth Hussars. Trans-shipping at Basra to the Etna, and at Bombay to the City of Sparta, they arrived on the 29th April in the Mersey, and on the following day went ashore at Liverpool. On the 5th May they marched into the Cavalry Barracks at Aldershot, where they were to be quartered.

Here this History of ‘The Thirteenth Hussars in the Great War’ naturally comes to an end, for though the war was not formally concluded, the Regiment was now in England again, and its share in the military operations was over.

But so much has been written and spoken during the last few years regarding the value of Cavalry in modern war that, as remarked in the introductory chapter, it seems desirable, before leaving the subject of the services performed by the Regiment, to say a few words upon this question. It is one about which professional soldiers only can have an opinion of any value, and I therefore confine myself to quoting the opinion of professional soldiers.

ON THE WAY HOME
THE “CITY OF SPARTA” PASSING A JAPANESE DESTROYER IN THE SUEZ CANAL

The authorities whose views have been most definitely stated are Lord Haig, Lord Allenby, and the two Generals who commanded in Mesopotamia, Maude and Marshall.[61] The last two have been already quoted as to the Cavalry work in the advance to Baghdad, and beyond. General Allenby has written as follows regarding the operations in Palestine:—

“The Desert Mounted Corps took some 46,000 prisoners during the operations. The complete destruction of the VIIth and VIIIth Turkish armies depended mainly on the rapidity with which their communications were reached, and on quick decision in dealing with the enemy’s columns as they attempted to escape. The vigorous handling of the Cavalry by its leaders, and the rapidity of its movement, overcame all attempts to delay its progress. The enemy’s columns, after they had out-distanced the pursuing Infantry, were given no time to reorganise and fight their way through.”

Of course, the Cavalry did not effect their work alone. General Allenby says that the breaking of the enemy’s entrenched lines by the Infantry enabled the Cavalry to accomplish its mission. But this is no detraction from the merit of either. Both arms did their duty, and the result, in Palestine as in Mesopotamia, was what Henderson calls the most important operation of grand tactics—the surrounding and destruction of an enemy’s army.

General Haig is perhaps the most important witness of all, not only because of the greatness of his command, but because the Western Front, with its immense system of trenches, stretching from end to end of the theatre of war, was the one where Cavalry was at special disadvantage. In his final despatch, summing up the features of the war, he deliberately takes up the question, and gives his answer. I quote the following words:—

“The Value of Cavalry in Modern War.

“17. From time to time, as the war of position dragged on, and the enemy’s trench systems remained unbroken, while questions of man-power and the shortage of shipping became acute, the wisdom or necessity of maintaining any large force of mounted men was freely discussed. In the light of the full experience of the War, the decision to preserve the Cavalry Corps has been fully justified. It has been proved that Cavalry, whether used for shock effect under suitable conditions, or as mobile Infantry, have still an indispensable part to play in modern war. Moreover, it cannot safely be assumed that in all future wars, the flanks of the opposing forces will rest on neutral states or impassable obstacles. Whenever such a condition does not obtain, opportunities for the use of Cavalry must arise frequently.”

General Haig proceeds to justify his opinion by examples, and concludes with a reference to the position of the British Cavalry on the morning of the Armistice which closed the war. “There is no doubt that, had the advance of the Cavalry been allowed to continue, the enemy’s disorganised retreat would have been turned into a rout.” In fact, the Armistice deprived the British Cavalry of the certainty of striking, in the last and greatest of all wars hitherto fought, and in that theatre of the war where they were at special disadvantage, the most stupendous blow ever struck by a body of armed horsemen since the history of the world began.

The British Cavalry consisted of Regiments similar to the Thirteenth Hussars. The story of such a Regiment is not therefore, as some think, the story of one unit of an arm which is now useless in war—as useless, it has been said, as bows and arrows. On the contrary, Cavalry has proved its usefulness up till now, and we may be sure that in the near future at all events, whether used on horseback for battle-shock, or as mobile Infantry, or in any other way of duty, it will still do good service to its country, as it has done in the past. The Cavalry spirit, please God, will never die in our people so long as war endures in the world, nor is there any reason to fear that we shall soon see the last of the famous squadrons in which that spirit is so gloriously embodied.

A GROUP OF OFFICERS OF THE REGIMENT TAKEN IN OCTOBER 1920 BY ELLIOTT & FRY

Back Row (Left to Right)—Lieut. A. H. Wood, 2nd Lieut. H.R.H. Prince Henry, Lieut. W. P. Madgin, Lieut. M. C. Kennedy, Lieut. W. W. N. Davies, Lieut. A. C. Harrington, Lieut. C. F. Collins, Lieut, C. E. C. Bovey.

Sitting (First Row)—Major and Quartermaster A. Cooke, Bt. Major H. Ll. Jones, D.S.O., Major E. H. Stocker, Bt. Lt.-Col E. F. Twist, Lt.-Col. J. J. Richardson, D.S.O., Bt. Lt.-Col. T. H. S. Marchant, D.S.O., Capt. J. H. Hind, Capt. J. G. Oakes, Capt. S. V. Kennedy, M.C.

Sitting (Second Row)—Lieut. E. V. Dunbar, Australian Forces; Lieut. W. H. Hilless, Australian Forces.

13th HUSSARS.

CHAPTER XIX.WINTER OF 1917-18.

CHAPTER XX.THE SUMMER OF 1918—KULAWAND AND TUZ KERMATLI.

CHAPTER XXI.THE AUTUMN OF 1918—LAST BATTLE WITH THE TURKS—CLOSE OF THE WAR IN MESOPOTAMIA.

CHAPTER XXII.SCOPE AND MEANING OF THE MESOPOTAMIAN CAMPAIGN. THE SHARE IN IT OF THE THIRTEENTH HUSSARS.

CHAPTER XXIII.RETURN TO ENGLAND—CONCLUSION.

CHAPTER XIX.
WINTER OF 1917-18.

CHAPTER XX.
THE SUMMER OF 1918—KULAWAND AND TUZ KERMATLI.

CHAPTER XXI.
THE AUTUMN OF 1918—LAST BATTLE WITH THE TURKS—CLOSE OF THE WAR IN MESOPOTAMIA.

CHAPTER XXII.
SCOPE AND MEANING OF THE MESOPOTAMIAN CAMPAIGN. THE SHARE IN IT OF THE THIRTEENTH HUSSARS.

CHAPTER XXIII.
RETURN TO ENGLAND—CONCLUSION.