12. Luther’s views on lies
That Luther believed in the permissibility of “lies of convenience” is fairly evident. (Cp. above, vol. iv., p. 108 ff.) The “mendacium officiosum” is an “honestum et pium mendacium”; it is useful and wholesome; “si hoc peccatum esset, ut non puto, etc.” In “Opp. lat. exeg.,” 6, p. 289, speaking of Isaac’s statement that Rebecca was his sister, he says: “non est peccatum, sed est officiosum mendacium.” But, if it be no sin, then, presumably, it is allowed.
It is true that Luther speaks of Isaac’s untruth as an “infirmitas,” but, by this, he does not mean a “venial sin,” rather he is alluding to the “infirmitas fidei,” which, in Isaac’s case was the cause of his untruth. Hence Isaac’s untruth, according to Luther, comes under the category of the
“mendacium officiosum, quo saluti, famæ corporis [corpori?] vel animæ consulitur; e contra perniciosum (mendacium) petit ista omnia, sicut officiosum defendit [quod est] pulcherrima defensio contra periculum animæ, corporis, rerum.”
Hence the “mendacium officiosum,” far from being a sin, is an “officium caritatis,” i.e. to tell one is “servare, non transgredi, præcepta Dei.” (Ib., p. 288 sq.)
Even another text which has been quoted to the opposite effect must mean much the same. Luther says:
“quod non offendatur Deus, sive constanter confitearis, id quod heroicum est, sive infirmus sis; dissimulat enim et connivet. Atque ex eo perspicimus nos habere propitium Deum, qui potest ignoscere et connivere ad infirmitates nostras, remittere peccata, tantum non perniciose mentiamur … nec proprie sed æquivoce et abusive mendacium dicitur quia est pulcherrima defensio contra periculum animæ corporis et rerum.” (Ib., p. 288.)
Here the word “peccata” cannot well include such untruths since he distinctly affirms that such “infirmities” “do not offend God.”
Moreover, since, as we know, Luther admits no distinction between mortal and venial sins, holds that all sins “ex natura et substantia peccati” are equal, and makes no allowance for “parvitas materiæ,” it follows that, even if such untruths as those of Isaac, the Egyptian midwife, etc., are “infirmities,” yet, since they are not mortal, they are not sins at all.
In “Opp. lat. exeg.,” 3, pp. 140-143, Luther distinguishes the “iocosum mendacium”—which is merely a “grammaticum peccatum”—and the “officiosum mendacium”—such as was Christ’s on the road to Emaus—from the true lie: “Revera unum tantum mendacii genus est, quod nocet proximo.”
That Luther himself quite realised the novelty of his teaching, comes out clearly enough in the fragmentary notes of a sermon preached on Jan. 5, 1528, i.e. on the eve of the feast of the Three Kings. The reporter’s notes are as usual partly in Latin partly in the vernacular.
“Hujusmodi officiosa mendacia, charitable lies, in which I lie for someone else’s sake, non incommodat, but rather does him a service. Sic filia Saul.… Illi [magi] mentiuntur, quia sciunt eius object to be murderous, et tamen non est mendacium, quia quando aliquid loquor ex bono corde, non est.… Ergo mendacium [est] quando my heart is bad and false erga proximum.… Si etiam seduxissem [misled others], how I should rejoice over my trickery, si ita ad salutem seducerem homines.… Monachi in totum volunt dici veritatem. Sed audistis, etc.” (Weim. ed., 27, p. 12.)
Hence, as the concluding words show, Luther was of opinion that the “monks” went too far in insisting on the truth everywhere.
Elsewhere Luther is disposed to follow the teaching of his Nominalist masters and to see in certain apparent lies (e.g. in that told by Abraham about his “sister” Sara) the result of divine inspiration. (Cp. “Opp. lat. exeg.,” 3, p. 142 sq.) “Hoc ipsum consilium ex fide firmissima et ex Spiritu Sancto fuisse profectum iudicem.” Abraham was moved by the Holy Ghost to take steps to save his person and thus ensure the fulfilment of the Divine promises made to his posterity. “Quæ fiunt ad gloriam Dei et verbum eius ornandum et commendandum, hæc recte fiunt et merito laudantur.”
Gabriel Biel, a representative Nominalist, admits that a sort of inspiration may sometimes make lawful what God has forbidden: He says, e.g.:
“Nam lex [non mentiendi] quantum ad id, ubi concurrit familiare consilium Spiritus Sancti, per ipsum Spiritus Sancti consilium revocatur, et ita non erit contra conclusionem et, ubicunque cum mendacio, secundo modo accepto, concurrit consilium Spiritus Sancti, ibi excusatur a peccato; et per hoc multa mendacia excusari possent.” (In III Sent. dist. 38, q. unica.)
Biel appeals to St. Augustine’s excuse of Jacob’s lie to his father Isaac, and then proceeds to justify it on Nominalist grounds; the “potentia Dei absoluta” can make lies lawful; by virtue of this “potentia” the Holy Ghost, in such inspired cases, can suspend for the while the prohibition. Biel himself had only the Old Testament instances in view, but the theory was a dangerous one.