INDEX

‘Absolute’ and ‘Relative’ Ethics, [18] note 2, [177] note 1
‘Act,’ meaning of, [200] note 3, [201], [202]
Action, ultimate end of, [3], [4], etc.;
motive to, may be non-rational, [5];
instinctive, [24], [61];
deliberate, [24], [61];
deliberate and impulsive, [61]
Acuteness, [236]
Æsthetic Intuitionism, [228], [392];
implicit reference to Ultimate Good in, [392], [393]
Æsthetic sensibility, theories of, [189]
Affections, Duties of the, [345-349]
Affections, social and domestic, [138], [153], [156], [157], [433], [434]
‘Altruism,’ [439]
ἀνδρεία, [456]
‘Apathy’ as ideal of happiness, [125]
Aristotle, [59] note 1, [92], [92] note 2, [98-99], [99] note 1, [121-122], [180], [180] note 1, [181] note 1, [215], [224], [231] note 1, [264] note 2, [281], [375] note 1, [376], [403], [456]
Art, Definition of, [4]
‘Art of conduct,’ [4]
Austin, [300] note 1
Aversion, [42], [43], [46], [145]
Axioms, [215], [338-343], [379-389] passim;
must (a) have the terms clear and precise, [338], [339];
(b) be really self-evident, [339-341];
(c) not conflict with any other accepted proposition, [341];
(d) be supported by consensus of experts, [341], [342]
Axiom—of Justice or Equity, and Rational Benevolence, [387];
of Prudence, the logical basis of Egoism, [386];
of Rational Benevolence, the logical basis of Utilitarianism, [387], [388];
-s of Impartiality, [379-383], [496], [497]
Bacon, [338]
Bain, [43] note 2, Note [54-56], Note [87-88], [125], [126], [127], [477] note 1;
(The Emotions and the Will) [54], [55] Note, [126] note 1;
(Mental and Moral Science) [127] notes 1-3, [177] note 1
Bastiat, [278] note 1
Beauty, [114]
Benevolence, [238-263] passim, [391], [393];
comprehensiveness and supremacy of, [238], [238] note 2;
common maxim of, [238-239];
axiom of, [382], [385], [387], [496];
prescribes promotion of others’ Happiness rather than Perfection, [240], [241];
principles of its distribution, [241], [242], [261], [262], [263];
and Justice, spheres of, [242], [243], [268];
virtue of, [244], [253];
duty of, [252], [253], [253] note 1, [258];
Kant’s view of the duty of, [239], [240];
intellectual versus emotional excellence of, [244] note 1;
conflicting claims to, [246];
duties of, classified, [248];
rational, cf. [Rational Benevolence];
Intuitional and Utilitarian notions of, reconciled, [430-431]
Benevolent—emotion, [239];
disposition, [239]
Bentham, [10], [41], [41] note 1, [84], [85], [86], Note [87-88], [92], [94], [119], [124] note 1, [143], [164], [203], [292], [364], [414], [417], [423] note 2, [424];
(Memoirs) [10] notes 2 and 3,
(Deontology, Works, Bowring’s edition) [87], [88] Note,
(Principles of Morals and Legislation) [26] note 1,
(Constitutional Code) [41] note 2
Bequest, change of view respecting, [246], [247]
Berkeley, Bishop, [120]
Blackstone, Introduction, [302] note 1
Bouillier, [180] note 2
Butler, [7], [39], [44], [44] note 2, [81], [86], [93], [94], [119], [133] note 2, [136], [172], [200], [222], [366], [366] note 3, [371], [372], [378], [386], [401], [405], [501];
(Analogy) [378];
(Dissertation Of the Nature of Virtue) [86] note 2, [176] note 1, [327] note 1;
(Sermons on Human Nature) [7] note 1, [86] note 2, [93] note 2, [120] note 1, [200] note 2, [323] note 1
Candour, [355]
Cardinal Virtues, [375]
Carelessness, Culpability of, [60], [292]
Casuistry, [99]
Categorical Imperative, [7], [8], [15], [35], [36], [37], [209], [209] note 1
Caution, [236], [236] note 1, [237]
Celibacy, [487], [488]
Charity (Philanthropy), [222], [239], [430], [431], [434]
Chastity and Purity, [223], [329-331], [329] note 2
‘Chief Good’ (Summum Bonum), [134], [407] note 1
Chivalry, [326]
Chrysippus, [376]
Cicero, [376];
De Finibus, [125] note 1
Clarke, [86], [104], [120], [120] note 2, [384], [384] notes 3 and 4, [385];
Boyle Lectures, [120] note 2, [385] notes 1 and 2
Classification of Duties, [312-315]
‘Cognition,’ use of, [34] note 2
“Common good of all Rationals,” Cumberland’s ultimate end, [104], [423]
Common Morality, [215-216]; (cf. [Morality of Common Sense])
Common Sense aversion to admit Happiness as sole ultimate Good, explanation of, [402-406]
Compassion, [262], [371]
Conditional prescriptions (Hypothetical Imperatives), [6], [7]
Conjugal relation, the duties relating to it, [254], [255], [256], [255] notes 1 and 2, [347], [348], [348] note 1
Conscience, popular view of, [99];
jural view of, [100-101]
Conscience (Moral Faculty) and Benevolence, Butler’s view of the relation between, [86], [86] note 2;
and Self-love, Butler’s view of relation between, [119], [120], [200], [200] note 2, [327] note 1, [366]
Conscious Utilitarianism rather the adult than the germinal form of morality, [455-457]
Consciousness not normally without pleasure or pain, [125]
Consequences of actions, ulterior, [96], [97];
may be judged desirable without reference to pleasure or pain, [97]
Contract, claims arising from, [269];
and Freedom, [276], [276] note 1
Courage, [332-334];
defined, [332];
Greek view of, [456];
and Fortitude, are subordinate duties, [332], [333];
Moral, [333] note 3;
Virtue of, [313], [333], [334];
and Foolhardiness, distinguished by Utilitarian considerations, [334], [355]
Courtesy, [253]
Cudworth, [103] Note
Culture, [157], etc.
Cumberland, [86], [86] note 1, [104];
and Utilitarianism, [423], [423] note 1
Custom, alterations in, [247]
Decision, [236], [237]
Deductive Hedonism, [176-195]
Descartes, [338], [339]
Desert—Good, how determined, [284-290];
Ill, how determined, [291-292];
requital of, as principle of Ideal Justice, [280], [281], [283], [294], [349];
and Freedom, [280], [287];
and Right of Property, [280], [280] note 1;
and Determinism, [284], [285];
Utilitarian interpretation of, [284] note 1;
and Free Will, [71], [72], [284], [291]
‘Desirable,’ confusion in Mill’s use of, [388] note 2
Desirable consciousness is either happiness or certain objective relations of the conscious mind, [398-400]
Desire, [43], [45-47];
non-rational, [23-24];
irrational, [23], [24];
and Pleasure, relation between, [39-56] passim
Determinism and Free Will, [57] seq.;
Aristotelian, [59] note 1;
and Materialism, [62];
arguments for, [62-65];
argument against, [65], [66]
Determinist meaning of ‘desert,’ etc., [71], [72], [284] note 1
Development as ethical aim, [90] seq., [192] seq., [473]
‘Dictates,’ how used, [96] note 1
δικαιοσύνη, two meanings of, [264] note 2
‘Disinterested action,’ [57]
Distribution, Principle of Equality a prima facie reasonable Principle of, [417]
Divine penalties, [31]
‘Doing good,’ ambiguity of, [239], [240]
Dualism of the Practical (or Moral) Reason, [200], [205], [206], [366], [404], [404] note 1;
need of harmonising, [507-509]
Dumont, [180] note 2
‘Duties to God’ and ‘duty to man,’ [218]
Duties, division of, into Self-regarding and Social, [163], [312], [313]
‘Duties to oneself,’ [7]
‘Duty’—meaning and use of, [78], [217], [218], [220] note 3, [239], [504-505];
and ‘right conduct’ distinguished, [217]
Duty relativity of, [218], [219];
and Happiness of agent, [36], [162-175] passim, [495] seq.;
implies conflict of impulses, [81];
of self-preservation, [356];
of promoting others’ happiness, Kant’s arguments for, [389-390];
most of the received maxims of, involve reference to Ultimate Good, [391], [392]
‘Egoism,’ [11], [80] note 1, [89] seq.;
ordinary use, and ambiguity of, [89];
indefiniteness of, [95];
and Greek ethical controversy, [91-92]
Egoism, cf. [Egoistic Hedonism]
Egoism—meaning of, [120-121];
and Self-love, [36], [89-95] passim;
Principle and Method of, [119-122];
precepts of, not clear and precise, [199-200];
rationality of, [119-120], [199], [200] note 1;
sense of ignobility of, [199-200], [200] note 1 (cf. [402] seq.), [501];
= Pure (or Quantitative) Egoistic Hedonism, [95];
and Utilitarianism, relation between, [497] seq.;
and Utilitarian sanctions, [499-503]
‘Egoist,’ meaning of, [121]
Egoistic End—and Positive Religion, [121];
and Natural Religion, [121]
Egoistic Hedonism designated as Egoism or as Epicureanism, [11], [84], [95]
Egoistic Hedonism, [42], [119-121];
End of, [93];
Pure or Quantitative, defined, [95];
Fundamental Principle of, [93], [120], [121];
Empirical-reflective Method of, [121], [122], [131] seq.;
and Conscience, [161] note 1;
Fundamental Paradox of, [48], [130], [136], [137], [173-174], [194]
Empirical Hedonism, [123-150];
fundamental assumption of, [123], [131], [146];
objections to, [460];
Method of, takes advantage of traditional experience and of special knowledge, [477], [479]
Empirical Quantitative Hedonism, [146]
Empiricism, [104]
‘End,’ ethical use of the term, [134]
End, Interdependence of Method and, [8], [83], [84];
adoption of any, as paramount, a phenomenon distinct from Desire, [39]
Ends accepted as rational by Common Sense, [8], [9]
Energy, [237]
Epicureanism, [11], [84]
Epicurus, [158]
‘Equal return,’ ambiguity of, [261] (cf. [288] seq.)
‘Equality of Happiness,’ as Social End, [284] note 2
Ethical—judgment, [23-38], [77];
Principles and Methods, [77-88] passim;
Method, three principal species of, [83] seq.;
controversy, ancient and modern, [105], [106], [392];
Hedonism, fundamental proposition of, [129];
and Psychological Hedonism, [40-42], [412], [412] note 1;
and Physical Science, structure of, compared, [509]
Ethics—boundaries of, [1];
Study or Science? [1], [2];
forms of the problem of, [2], [3], [391];
and man’s ‘True Good,’ [3];
definition of, [4], [15];
Absolute and Relative, [18] note 2, [177] note 1;
and geometry, analogy between, [18-19];
and astronomy, analogy between, [19];
concerned with Duty under present conditions, [19];
aim of, [40], [77];
and Rational or Natural Theology, [504-506];
mutual relations of the three Methods of, [496-509]
Ethics and Politics (cf. [Law]), [15-22] passim, [266], [457];
distinguished from Positive sciences, [1], [2];
Utilitarian, [457] (cf. [274], 298);
in an ideal society, [18] seq.
εὐδαιμονία (= Well-being = the Good attainable in human life), [91], [92];
misunderstanding of Aristotle’s use of, [92] note 2
Excellence (cf. [Perfection])
‘Excellence’ and ‘Perfection,’ [10] note 3
Excellence beyond strict duty, Utilitarian attitude towards, [492], [493]
Explanation essentially different from Justification, [2]
Fame, [9], [155], [157], [159], [368], (Posthumous) [156] note 1
Feeling—preferableness of, other than pleasantness, dependent on objective relations of the feeling mind, [127], [128], [399];
quâ feeling, can only be judged by the person who feels, [128], [129], [398]
Fidelity (cf. [Good Faith]), [258], [259]
Firmness, [235], [236]
Fitness and Desert, [350]
‘Formal’ and ‘Material’ Rightness, [206-207], [206] note 1
Fortitude defined, [332]
Free choice as virtuous, [504] note 1
Freedom—sentiment of, [39];
as absolute end of ideal law, [274] seq., [293], [297], [350-351];
sphere of, must be limited, [275];
ambiguity of, [275], [276], [293];
and Contract, [276], [276] note 1;
and Property, [276], [277];
Civil and Constitutional, [298], [351]
Free Will—controversy, [57-76] passim, [59], [61-62], [65] note 1, [74], [75];
conception of, applied (a) in judging the conduct of others, [63] note 1, [66], [67], (b) in forecasting our own future, [64];
partial illusoriness of the belief in, [64], [65];
and Happiness, [68];
and Perfection (or Excellence), [68], [68] note 2;
and Moral government of the world, [69], [69] note 2, [70];
and Determinism, practical unimportance of issue between, [67], [68], [72-76], [285];
and Justice, [71], [72], [284], [291];
and Desert (or Merit), [68] note 2, [285], [291];
and Duty, [78];
(or Freedom of Will)—two senses of, [57-59];
and Moral responsibility, [58];
conception of, involved in ordinary meaning of ‘responsibility,’ ‘desert,’ etc., [71];
metaphysical—ethical import of, as regards (a) choice between rational and irrational alternatives, [67], [68], [70-71], (b) view of what is rational, [68], [69], (c) forecasts of future action, [69], [70], [70] note 1
Friendship and its duties, [257-259], [257] note 1, [437]
‘General Good,’ [392]
Generosity, [219], [326]
Gentleness, [253], [321]
God’s Will—conformity to, [79];
as ultimate reason for action, [79], [80]
‘Golden Rule,’ the, unpreciseness of, [379-380]
‘Good,’ [105-115] passim;
indefiniteness of, [91-92];
use and force of the term, [86] note 1, [105], [107] seq., [112], [113];
and not ‘Right’ the fundamental notion in Greek ethics, [105];
has not the same connotation as ‘pleasant,’ [107], [108], [109], [110];
implies reference to an universally valid standard, [108-109], [114];
adjective, and ‘Good’ substantive, [109];
notion of, distinct from ‘Pleasure’ and ‘the Pleasant,’ and = ‘what ought to be desired,’ [109] seq.
Good, The, [3], [92], [106];
(human) or Well-being, its relation to Happiness and to Duty, [3];
(human) is either (a) Happiness or (b) Perfection or Excellence of human existence, [114], [115];
the absolute and unconditional, in Kant’s view, [222];
in English ethical thought, [423] note 1
Good conduct, [106], [107], [112-113];
standard of, needed, [113];
Greek conception of, [107] note 1, [404-405], [405] note 1
Good Faith, [224], [303-311] passim, [352-354], [355];
stringency of the duty of, [304-305];
obligation of, affected by (a) fraud or force, [305-306], [306] note 1, (b) material change of circumstances, [306-308], (c) misapprehension, [309], (d) use of a prescribed formula, [309], [310]
Good Taste, [108]
Good humour, [321]
Goodness, implies relation to consciousness or feeling, [113-114], [113] note 2;
(Moral) and Beauty, [107-108], [107] note 1, [228]
Government—by Consent of Subjects, [297], [351];
Aristocratic and Democratic Principles of, [299];
established, difficulty of identifying, [300], [301]
Governmental Authority, conflicting claims to, [296], [297], [299-301];
ideal, [297-299]
Grant Allen, [187];
Physiological Æsthetics, [187] note 1
Gratitude, [259-261], [437-438];
universalised, furnishes the principle ‘that desert ought to be requited,’ [279], [279] note 1, [280];
Kant on, [223], [223] note 1
‘Greatest Happinesss,’ meaning of, [121], [413];
Utilitarian notion of, its extent, [414];
total and average, distinguished, [415], [416]
‘Greatest Pleasure,’ explanation of, [44] note 3
Greek ethical thought, the problem of, [106];
tautological maxims of, [375-376]
Green, T. H., [132] seq., [134] note 3, [135] note 3;
(Introduction to Hume’s Treatise on Human Nature) [132] note 2, [133] note 3;
(Prolegomena to Ethics) [93] note 1, [133] note 1, [134] notes 1 and 2, [135] notes 1 and 2, [363] note 1
Grote, J., An Examination of the Utilitarian Philosophy, [432] note 1
Gurney, E., [123], [184]; (Tertium Quid) [123] note 1;
(Power of Sound) [184] note 1
Hallam, [423] note 1
Hamilton, [139], [180-182];
(Lectures on Metaphysics) [180] note 3
Happiness—as End, [7], [8], [78];
and Duty, connexion between, [162-175] passim;
and Duty, are they coincident? [162], [163], [165], [176];
and Duty, Plato’s view of relation between, [171-172];
and Virtue, [174-175], [459];
and Virtue, connexion of, in Aristotle’s view, [121-122];
determination and measurement of, an inevitable problem for Ethics, [176];
production of, [176-177];
relation of, to mental concentration and dissipation, [193];
and Self-development, [192-193];
rejection of, as end, leaves us unable to frame a coherent account of Ultimate Good, [406];
an objection to, as Ultimate Good, considered, [407] note 1;
principle of distribution of, required, [416], [417];
universal, as divine end, [503-505];
Christian view of, [120], [138];
Sources of, [151] seq.
‘Happiness,’ [41] note 1, [92], [92] note 2, [93] note 1;
ambiguity of, [92];
precise meaning of, [120]
Harm, [292], [293]
Harmony as cause of Pleasure, [189]
Health, [153], [154], [159]
‘Hedonism,’ meaning of, [93]
Hedonism (Ethical), the two Methods of, are Universalistic and Egoistic, [11];
connexion between the two Methods of, [84], [497] seq.;
objections to, stated and considered:—(a) that the calculation required by the Empirical-reflective method is too complex for practice, [131], [132];
(b) that “pleasure as feeling cannot be conceived,” [132], [133];
(c) that “a sum of pleasures is intrinsically unmeaning,” [133], [134];
(d) that transient pleasures are unsatisfying, [135];
(e) that the pursuit of pleasure tends to defeat its own end, [136] seq.;
(f) that the habit of introspective comparison of pleasures is unfavourable to pleasure, [138-140];
(g) that any quantitative comparison of pleasures is vague and uncertain, [140-150];
Deductive, [176-195] passim;
deductive, Spencer’s view of, [177] note 1;
Method of, must be empirical, [195];
Empirical, method of, [460];
and Intuitionism, [461];
and Pessimism, [131] Note
Hedonistic Zero (or neutral feeling), [124], [125]
Helvetius, [88]
Highest Good, the (cf. [The Good] and [Ultimate Good]), [106]
Hobbes, [44] note 1, [56], [86], [89], [103], [109], [300] note 1, [423], [476];
(Leviathan) [89] note 1
Holmes, O. W., jun., The Common Law, [281] note 1
Honour, Code of, [30], [31], [168], [340]
Hume, [23], [86], [104], [220], [384], [419], [423], [424], [423] notes 1 and 2, [426], [440], [441], [493];
(Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals) [44] note 2, [220] note 2, [424]
Humility, [334-336] passim, [355], [356] note 1, [429]
Hunger, [45], [46]
Hutcheson, [44] note 2, [50], [86], [86] note 2, [104], [366];
(System of Moral Philosophy) [366] note 1
Hypothetical Imperatives imply an ulterior end, [6], [7], [37]
Ideal and Actual, relation between, [79];
connected (a) in the conception of “God’s Will,” [79], (b) in the notion of “Nature,” [80-83]
Ideal—Government, no consensus as to what kind is legitimate, [299] seq.;
and Traditional Authority, [296];
Society, ethics of, how far useful, [22-24], [465]
“Idols of the Cave” and “Idols of the Tribe,” [152]
Impulse to do acts quâ recognised as right (= Moral Motive), [77]
Impulses, extra-regarding and self-regarding may conflict, [51], [52], [136]
Indifference (Neutrality) of feeling, cf. [Hedonistic Zero]
Individualistic—Ideal, [286-287];
and Socialistic Ideals, [293], [294], [444-445]
Inequality, Reasonable, [268] seq.
Ingenuity, [236]
Intention, [60] note 1, [202], [202] note 1
Interest, meaning of, [7], [120];
ethical character of, in Butler’s view, [176] note 1
‘Internal acts,’ [204]
Instinctive impulses regarded as inherited experience, [193], [194]
Intrinsic value, how determined, [288], [289]
Intuition of rightness of acts, excludes consideration of (a) ulterior consequences, [96], [97], (b) “induction from experience” of pleasures, [97], [98] (cf. [102] note 1)
Intuitional—Method, cf. [Intuitionism];
moralists, English, may be broadly classified as Dogmatic and Philosophical, [103], [104]
‘Intuitional’—sense in which used, [96], [97], [98];
wider and narrower senses of, [97], [102] note 1, [201]
Intuitionism, [3], [8], [17], [20], [96-104] passim, [199-216] passim;
differences of its method due to two causes, [103];
its method issues in Universalistic Hedonism (Utilitarianism), [406-407];
chronological development of the method of, in England, [103-104];
and Utilitarianism, [85-86], [388-389], [423-457] passim, [496-497];
Philosophical, [102-104], [373-389] passim;
Perceptional, [98-100], [102];
Dogmatic, [100-101] (cf. [Intuitionism], [Intuitive Morality], [Positive Morality], [Morality of Common Sense]);
Dogmatic, fundamental assumption of, [101], [200], [201];
three phases of, [102], [103];
a variety of, constituted by substituting for ‘right’ the notion ‘good,’ [105-107];
Æsthetic, [228], [392];
Jural or Rational, [228-229]
‘Intuitive’ or ‘a priori’ Morality generally used to mean Dogmatic Intuitionism or Morality of Common Sense, [101-102]
Irrational choice—sometimes conscious and deliberate, [36], [37-38], [41-42], [58], [59], [110];
Socratic and Aristotelian view compared with modern view of, [59] note 1
Jural method of Ethics, [100-101]
Just claims—arising from contract, [269];
arising from natural and normal expectations, [269], [270], [270] note 1
‘Justice,’ ‘justify,’ etc., uses of, [264] note 2, [270], [286], 442
Justice, [20], [99], [264-294] passim, [349-352], [355], [440-448] passim;
or Equity, essence of, [496];
specially difficult to define, [264];
intuitional view of the definition of, [264];
involves notion of distribution, [265], [266], [268], [271];
and Law, connexion between, [265], [266], [267] note 1;
distinct from Order (or Law-observance), [265];
and Equality, [266], [267], [267] note 1, [268], [268] note 1, [279], [285] note 1;
and taxation, [266], [266] note 1;
Conservative and Ideal, [272-273], [273] note 1, [274], [293], [294];
Ideal, [273], [274], [293], [294], [444], [445];
Ideal, and Natural Eights, [274], [275];
Ideal, and Freedom, [278], [279];
Corrective, [281];
Reparative, [281], [282], [281] note 1, [282] note 1, [293];
Reparative and Retributive, distinguished, [282-283], [282] note 2;
and Free Will, [71], [72], [284], [285];
and ‘Equity’ or ‘Fairness,’ [285], [286];
Hume’s treatment of, [440]
Kant, [6], [7], [11] note 1, [36], [58], [58] note 1, [209], [210], [210] note 1, [222], [223], [239], [240], [315], [327] note 1, [366], [385], [386], [386] note 1, [389-390] Note, [486], Appendix [510];
(Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten) [209] note 1, [389-390] Note;
(Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Tugendlehre) [223] note 1, [327] note 1, [366] note 3, [386] note 2, [389] Note;
(Kritik der reinen Vernunft) [366] note 3
Kant’s Fundamental Moral Rule or Categorical Imperative as criterion of rightness, [209-210], [209] note 1, [210] note 1, [339] note 1, [386], [389] Note, [486]
Knowledge—as an End, [114], [399], [401];
and Feeling (= Cognition and Pleasure or Pain), relation between, [139], [140];
and Feeling, Hamilton’s view of the relation between, [139]
Laisser faire and economic production, [445] note 2
Law, [295-303]; and Morality, relation between, [29], [457];
and Positive Morality, [164];
Austin’s definition of, [300] note 1
Laws—just, characteristics of, [266], [267], [271-272];
that ought to be obeyed, are laid down by rightful authority, [296]
Law-observance (or Order), [295-303] passim, [352], [440], [441];
and Good Faith, [295], [303];
in regard to mala prohibita, [302] note 1
Lecky, History of European Morals, [50] note 1, [399] note 1, [427] note 1
Legal obligation and punishment, [29]
Liberality, [324-326], [325] note 1, [355]
Libertarian position, [58], [64-65], [66]
Liberty, Sentiment of, [58]
Locke, (Essay) [205], [280] note 1, [503];
ethical view of, [205], [206]
Love, [50], [244], [245], [367], [368];
common sense estimate of, [245], [258], [258] note 1
Loyalty, [223], [244], [254]
Mackenzie, J. S., [47], [48]
Maine, Sir H., (Ancient Law) [461] note 2
Malevolence—character of, as motive, [364];
sometimes sweepingly condemned, [321], [324];
sometimes partially approved on Utilitarian grounds, [322], [323], [324]
Malevolent affections natural and normal, [320], [321]
Marcus Aurelius, [376] note 1
‘Market value,’ [286] seq.
Marriage, Plato’s ideal of, [358-359] (cf. [348] note 1)
Martineau, [366], [367], [369], [370], [371], [372];
(Types of Ethical Theory) [367] note 1, [369] note 1
Maxims—of Virtue, dependence or independence of, [313];
of Justice, Prudence and Benevolence, self-evident element in, [380-382]
‘Maximum Happiness’ as criterion of conduct, [134]
Meanness, notion of, examined, [325], [326]
Meekness, [321]
Mercy, [321]
Merit, [68] note 2, [284] seq.;
(cf. [Desert])
Method of Ethics, definition of, [1];
only one rational, [6], [12];
more than one natural, [6]
Methods of Ethics, The, purpose of, [11-14], [78]
Mildness, [321]
Mill, J. S., [44], [85], [87], [94], [121], [177] note 1, [412] notes 1 and 2, [414], [418], [440], [478], [504];
(Utilitarianism) [93] note 1, [461] note 1, [499] note 1;
(On Liberty) [478] notes 1 and 2
Mind, [87] Note, [477] note 1
Modern ethical thought quasi-jural in character, [106]
Moral Faculty—a function of Reason, [23-38] passim;
why subject of ethical discussion, [4], [5];
Utilitarian theory of origin of, [461], [462], [497]
Moral Judgment, [23-38];
object of, [60], [61], [201-202], [202] note 1, [222], [362], [364];
(or Practical) Reason, [33-34], [34] notes 1, 2, 3; [39], [40], [100] seq.;
Sense, [34];
Reasoning, the most natural type of, [6], [12] seq., [102-103], [493-494];
Sentiment, [26-28], [77];
Sentiments, (a) difficulties of admitting or rejecting them as motives, [365-367], (b) theory of their derivation from experiences of pleasure and pain, [461], [462];
and Quasi-moral Sentiments, [28], [173], [174];
Motive, [77], [204] seq., [223];
Motive, varying forms of:—(a) Reverence for Authority, (b) Religious Sentiment, (c) Self-respect, (d) sentiment of Freedom, (e) Admiration or Aspiration, [39-40];
instincts and crude Utilitarian reasonings—discrepancy between, [466], [467];
Intuitions, [211-216] passim;
Intuitions, existence of, [211], [212], [337];
Intuitions, connexion between (a) Existence and Origin of, [211], [212], (b) Origin and Validity of, [34] note 1, [212-213], [212] note 2, [214];
Intuitions, Particular and General, [99-102], [214-216];
Rules, imperative and indicative forms of, [101] note 1;
Rules and Axioms, importance of, [229];
Axioms, abstract but significant, [379-384], [505];
Axioms, Kant’s view of, [385-386], [386] notes 1 and 2;
Maxims, [337-361] passim;
Maxims which are, and which are not, directly self-evident, distinction between, [383];
Responsibility, [59-60];
Obligation, [217];
and non-moral excellence distinguished, [426], [427]
‘Moral’ (in narrower sense) and ‘Prudential’ distinguished, [25-26]
Moral Courage, [333] note 3
Moral Philosophy, some problems of modern, [374]
Morality—‘inductive’ and ‘intuitive,’ double ambiguity of antithesis between, [97-99];
a priori and a posteriori (or inductive and intuitive), [97];
and growth of Sympathy, [455-456], [455] note 1
Morality of Common Sense (Intuitionism), [85], [102], [229], [263] Note, [337-361] passim;
and Positive Morality, [215];
and Egoism, [498-499] (cf. [Happiness and Duty]);
development of, not perfectly Utilitarian, [455-456];
axiomatic character of its maxims questioned, [338], [342], [343];
furnishes valuable practical rules but not ultimate axioms, [360], [361];
and Utilitarianism, [361] note 1, [423-457] passim, [461], [498], [499];
first principles of, as “middle axioms” of Utilitarianism, [461];
Mill’s view of, [461] note 1;
not to be accepted by Utilitarianism without modification, [461] seq., [467]
Motive meaning of, [202], [362], [363];
and Intention, [202], [203], [203] note 1;
-s, different views of Right, [204-207];
and Desire, Green’s view of, [363] note 1;
and Disposition, Utilitarian estimate of, [493], [494]
Motives to action, [23];
as subjects of moral judgment, [362-372];
as affecting morality of actions, [60-61], [224];
regarded as better and worse rather than good and bad, [363-364];
‘seductive,’ [364];
(“Springs of action”) Dr. Martineau’s table of (369) ethically estimated, [371], [372];
‘higher’ not always to be preferred to ‘lower,’ [369], [370], [371];
moral regulation of, [370]
Natural, The—Interpretation of, [80] seq.;
gives no definite practical criterion of right conduct, [82]
Natural—Selection, effect of, on impulses, [194];
and normal claims, indefiniteness of, [270], [271], [272], [272] note 1;
expectations, ambiguity of, [272], [273], [352];
Rights—difficulty of determining, [298];
Good, [477]
Nature—Life according to, [79] seq., [377], [378];
conformity to, [80];
Stoic use of, [377], [378] note 1;
Butler’s use of, [378]
Neighbourhood and Nationality, duties of, [250], [251], [252]
Neutral excitements, [186] note 1 (cf. [Hedonistic Zero])
‘Objective’ and ‘subjective,’ ethical application of, [207], [207] note 1, [208] notes 1 and 2, [208], [209], [210], [344] note 2, [394], [395], [429], [430]
Objective Hedonism, meaning of, [151];
and Common Sense, [151-161];
advantages of, [151];
defects of, [151] seq., [458], [459]
Objective relations of conscious mind, how far desirable, [400], [401]
Objectivity of Moral Judgment, [27], [33]
Order, cf. [Law-observance]
Origin of Moral Intuitions, ethical importance of, [383], [384], [384] note 1
‘Ought,’ [23-38] passim;
relative and unconditional uses of, [6], [7], [39];
implies reasonableness, [25];
and ‘right’ imply the same notion, [1] note 1, [23], [25];
does not refer to matters of fact, [25];
implies objectivity, [27], [33];
does not merely signify (a) appropriateness of means to ends, [26], (b) an emotion of the person judging, [26-28], nor (c) bound under penalties, [29] seq.;
an elementary and irresolvable notion, [32-33];
narrower and wider sense of, [33], [34], [34] note 4;
carries with it an impulse to action, [34];
implies possible conflict with reason (thus distinguishable from ‘right’), [34], [35], [217];
determinist sense of, [78];
loose meaning of, [508]
Owen, Robert, 291
Pain—definition of, [42-43] note 1, [180], [191];
the negative quantity of pleasure, [124], [125];
physical concomitant of, [183] seq.;
Aristotle’s and Hamilton’s theory of, [180] seq., [180] note 1, [181] note 1;
Mr. Stout’s theory of, [182], [188], etc.;
Mr. Spencer’s theory of, [183] seq.;
Grant Allen’s view of, [187];
biological theory of, [190] seq.
Paley, [86], [121]
Parents and children, duties of, [243], [243] note 1, [248-250], [248] note 1, [346], [347]
Patriotism, [223], [244], [245];
duties of, [251], [252], [252] note 1
‘Perception,’ ethical use of, by Dugald Stewart, [103] Note
Perfection or Excellence as End, [10], [11], [10] notes 3 and 4, [20] note 1, [78], [114], [115];
and Intuitionism, [11], [83], [84], [97];
Kant’s treatment of, [386] note 2
Perfectionists, view of, [97]
Philosophical Intuitionism, its relation to Common Sense Morality, [373]
φρόνησις, [231] note 1
Pity or Compassion, [262]
Placability, [321]
Plato, (Republic) [21], [171], [172];
[140], [145], [148], [171], [172], [281], [345], [348] note 1, [358], [375] note 1, [376];
(Gorgias) [405] note 1; [441]
Pleasure—definitions of, [42], [43], [43] note 1, [125], [127] seq., [131], [190];
ambiguities of, [43], [44], [93] seq.;
forecast of, must take account of moral or quasi-moral pleasures, [40], [173];
the less sometimes chosen in preference to the greater, [41], [42], [42] note 1, [136];
of Virtue, its ‘disinterestedness’ not abnormal, [50], [51];
as aim of unconscious action, [52], [53];
as ‘original’ aim of action, [53], [54];
application of the term, [93];
has only quantitative differences, [94], [95], [121];
maximum, deductive methods of determining, [121], [122];
rational as opposed to impulsive pursuit of, [124] note 1;
‘quality’ of, [94], [95], [121], [128-129], [128] note 1;
as Feeling, conceivableness of, [132], [133];
permanent sources of, [135], [136], [153];
how estimated, [141] seq. (cf. [127], [128], 398);
from others’ pain, various modes of, [321] note 1;
and Appetite, identified by Hobbes, [44] note 1;
and Desire, controversy as to relation between, [39-56];
Aristotle’s and Hamilton’s theory of, [180] seq., [180] note 1, [181] note 1;
Mr. Stout’s theory of, [182], [188], etc.;
Mr. Spencer’s theory of, [183] seq.;
Grant Allen’s view of, [187];
biological theory of, [190] seq.;
and Desire, (a) Mill’s view of, [43-44], (b) Butler’s view of, [44], (c) Bain’s view of, [54-56];
effect of desire on estimate of, [144], [145];
and Preservation, [190], etc.;
(Hobbes’ view of) [89];
and Perfection or Reality, (Self-development), Spinoza’s view of, [90];
and ‘quantity of life,’ [192];
‘pure’ [143];
of pursuit, [46] seq., [47] note 1, [55-56];
of attainment, [47];
of business, [49];
intellectual and æsthetic, [107-108], [153], [157], [472];
benevolent and sympathetic, [49], [50];
of virtue, [153], [170], [171], [174], [175];
-s, of the animal life, [154], [157], [159];
of wealth and greatness, Adam Smith’s view of, [155] note 1—(cf. [Health], [Wealth], etc.);
Stoic view of, [129];
Green’s view of, [132] seq.;
Plato’s view of its illusoriness, [140];
Spencer and Grant Allen’s ‘Intermittence’ theory of, [187]
Pleasures and Pains, Moral, [170] seq., [171] note 1;
of Sympathy, [49], [50], [499-502], [499] note 1;
scale of, involves assumption of a Hedonistic zero, [124], [125];
commensurability of, [123-125], [124] note 1, [128] note 1, [131], [132], [140-150];
difficulties of a clear, definite and consistent evaluation of, [140-150];
incommensurable intensity of, doubtful, [123], [124];
intensity of, commensurable with duration, [124];
Bentham’s four dimensions of, [124] note 1;
volitional efficacy of, [125-127];
their relation to normal activities, [185], etc.;
Aristotle’s and Hamilton’s theory of, [180] seq.;
Stout’s theory of, [182];
Wundt’s theory of, [184];
Spencer’s biological theory of, [190] seq.
Plutarch, [376]
Politeness (Good Breeding, Fashion, Etiquette), [253];
Code of, [30], [340], [341]
Political order, Rousseau’s view of an ideally just, [298]
Politics—and Ethics, [15-22];
definition of, [1] note 1, [15] (cf. [Law])
Positive Morality—and Morality of Common Sense, [215];
relation of, to preservation and to happiness, [464], [465];
alteration of, [164], [480]
Power, [156], [157], [159]
Practical efficacy and speculative truth, relation between, [507] note 1
Practical Empirical Hedonism, an assumption of, [131]
Practical (or Moral) Judgment, [23] seq.
Practical (or Moral) Reason, [23-38] passim;
its relation to Interest and to non-rational and irrational desires, [36];
and Nature, [81];
a postulate of, [6], [12];
Dualism of, [404] note 1, [366], [200], [205-206], [499], [507-509] (cf. [Happiness and Duty])
Praise, common sense award of, explained by utility, [428], [429]
Priestley, [88] Note
Promise, [303-311] passim;
conditions and meaning of, [304];
conditions of bindingness of a, [311]
Proof of a first principle, how possible, [419], [420]
Proof—of Egoism may be demanded, [418], [419];
of ordinary moral rules is often required and given, [419]
Proof of Utilitarianism, [418-422] passim;
clear demand of common sense for, [418], [419];
addressed to Egoism, [420], [421], [497-498];
addressed to Intuitionism, twofold character of, [421], [422]
“Proof” of Utilitarian principle, Mill’s, [387], [388]
Property and Right of Bequest, [277]
Prudence (or Forethought), [7], [36], [96], [391];
common sense view of, [327], [328];
Kant’s and Butler’s views of, [327] note 1;
self-evident maxim of impartiality educible from the rule of, [381];
and Benevolence, subordination of other virtues to, [496-497]
‘Prudential’ and ‘Moral,’ [25-26]
Psychological Hedonism, [40] seq.;
of Bentham, [85];
ethical import of, [41], [205]
Public Opinion, Code of, [30]
Public and private virtue, Utilitarian and Intuitionist estimates of, [495]
Punishment, [281], [290] seq., [290] note 1, [291] note 1;
preventive and retributory views of, [71-72]
Purity, [223], [329-331], [329] note 2, [357-359]
Quantitative Hedonism, [129]
Quasi-moral Sentiment, [27-28], [173-174]
Quasi-moral Sentiments and Rational Self-love, [173-174]
Rank of Motives, difficulties of estimating, [365-367], [369];
conflicting estimates of, by moralists, [366];
difficulty due to complexity of motive, [368]
Rational action, not to be identified with (a) disinterested or (b) free action, [57];
Spinoza’s view of the principle of, [89-90]
Rational Benevolence, [96];
may be self-limiting, [385];
Kant’s treatment of, [385-386] Note, [389-390]
Rational Self-love (Rational Egoism, Prudence)—and Conscience, [172], [200], [200] note 2, [366];
and Rational Benevolence, [386] note 4, [498] seq.
Reason—and Ultimate Ends, [9], [77], [77] note 1;
relation of, to Will and Desire, [23] seq.;
reference of moral judgments to, signifies merely their objectivity, [33];
conflict with, implied in the terms dictate, precept, imperative, ought, duty, moral obligation, [34], [35];
dictate or precept of, is a rule which may be deviated from, [41];
dictates or imperatives of, [34], [36], [77];
and the Divine Will, [79], [80];
dictate of, implied by right, rightness, and their equivalents, [105];
and instinct, [193-195];
may be self-limiting, [345];
dictates and dictation of, [345], [395], [404]
Reason for doing what is seen to be right, why men demand a, [5-6]
Reasonableness of Self-love, Butler’s view of, [119], [120];
Clarke’s view of, [120];
Christian view of, [120];
common sense view of, [120]
Rebellion, when justifiable?, [299], [300], [301], [352]
Reciprocity, principle of, [167], [168]
Religious deception, [316], [316] note 2
Renan quoted, [108] note 1
Reputation, [155]
Resentment, instinctive and deliberate, [322], [323];
deliberate, Butler’s view of, [323] note 1, [371];
universalised the principle of retributive (criminal) justice, [281];
evaluation of, [449]
Resolutions, [37];
general, may be contradicted by particular volitions, [37-38]
Respect, tokens of, [336], [336] note 1
Reverence for Authority, [39]
‘Right’—notion involved in, is unique, [25];
and ‘good,’ [3], [4];
and ‘ought,’ distinction between, [34], [35];
conduct and ‘good’ conduct, [106], [113]
Right Conflict and Ultimate Good, [3]
Rights, [274], etc.
Rightful authority, how known?, [296];
what are its limits?, [301], [302]
Rousseau, [298];
his political ideal, difficulty of realising, [298], [299]
‘Rule of Equity,’ Clarke’s, [384-385]
‘Rule of Love or Benevolence,’ Clarke’s, [385]
‘Rules of Righteousness,’ Clarke’s, [384], [384] note 4, [385]
Rules prescribing actions as good or right open to Utilitarian interpretation, [430]
Sagacity, [236]
Sanctions, [164-175] passim, [498], [499], [500] seq., [502], [505], [507-508];
conflict of, [164], [165];
legal, and happiness, [165], [166], [165] note 1;
social, and happiness, [166], [167];
social, and extra-legal duty, [167], [168];
internal, and happiness, [170], [170] note 1, [171], [171] note 1, [172], [173], [501-502]
Scottish School of Ethical Thought, [104]
Self-control, [235-237], [331], [344], [345], [356]
Self-development (Self-realisation), indefiniteness of the notion, [90], [91];
as ethical aim, [192], [193];
understood as = yielding to instinctive impulses, [193-194]
Self-evidence, difficulty of discerning real, [339], [340], [341]
Self-interest, [25], [26]
Self-love, ordinary use and ambiguity of, [89];
and certain elevated impulses, [137-138];
Butler’s view of, [93];
and benevolence and affection, [138], [403], [502]
Self-preservation, [89]
Self-realisation, [80], [90], [95]
Self-regarding virtues, [327-331]
Self-sacrifice, [109] note 1, [138], [431], [432]
Self-satisfaction, Green’s view of, [133], [135], [135] note 3
Selfishness, [499]
Services, comparative worth of, how determined, [286], [287];
reward of, how determined, [290]
Shaftesbury, [86], [86] notes 1 and 2, [138], [423], [423] note 1, [433], [501]
Sidgwick, Principles of Political Economy, [267] note, [445] note 2, [446] note 1
Sincerity, [355]
Smith, Adam, [424], [461], (Wealth of Nations, Theory of Moral Sentiments) [155] note 1
Social Contract, [17], [297-298], [303], [351]
Social rank and status, [153], [155]
Socialistic ideal, [289], [293-294]
Sociology—scope and subject of, [2];
present condition of, [472], [473]
Socrates, [59] note 1, [98-99], [215], [231] note 1, [299]
Socratic Induction, [98-99]
Socratic principle of “Government by experts,” [299]
σοφία, σοφός, [231], [231] note 1
Sources of Happiness, [135], [136], [153] seq.;
judgments of common sense respecting them, only roughly trustworthy, [158-160];
common sense estimates of (a) at best are only true for ordinary persons, (b) are vitiated by mal-observation, (c) confuse between objects of natural desire and sources of experienced pleasure, [151], [152], (d) mix moral and æsthetic preferences with hedonistic, [153], (e) are found to be full of inconsistencies, [153-158]
Sovereign power, Hobbist and Austinian views of, [300] note 1
Special moral codes, [30], [31], [168], [169], [340], [341]
Special need, duties arising out of, [261], [262]
Spencer, H., [125-126], [177] note 1, [183] seq., [194] note 1, [470], [471], [470] notes 1 and 2, [473];
(Social Statics), [18] note 2, [194] note 1;
(Data of Ethics), [18] note 2, [177] note 1, [194] note 1, [470] note 1
“Sphere of individual option” determined by Utilitarian calculation, [477-479]
Spinoza, [90]
Stephen, Leslie, [319] Note, [471], [471] note 2, [472], [473];
(Science of Ethics), [42] note 1, [471]
Stewart, Dugald, [454], [455];
(Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers), [92] note 2, [454] note 1
Stoic system, its place in the development of ethical thought, [106];
ethics, circular reasonings of, [376], [377]
Stoicism, later compared with earlier, [376] note 1
Stoics, [92], [105], [129]
Stout, G. F., [180] note 2, [182], [186];
(Analytic Psychology), [182] note 1
Subjective, cf. [Objective]
Suggestio falsi, [317]
Suicide prohibited by Common Sense, [327], [331], [356]
Sully, Pessimism, [136] note 1, [186] note 1
Suppressio veri, [317]
Sympathy—and Moral Sensibility, relation between, [170] note 1, [500-501];
with impulses prompting to action, [463], [463] note 2;
limitations and perversions of, [464];
twofold operation of, on moral impulses, [483];
confusion in Mill’s view of, [499] note 1;
and happiness of agent, [170] note 1, [499] note 1, [499-503]
Systematic Morality, explanation of indifference or hostility to, [99-100]
Tautological propositions offered as ethical axioms, [374] seq.
Temperance, [224], [328], [329], [344] note 1, [356]
Torquemada, [226] note 1
‘True Good,’ [3] (cf. [Good], [Ultimate Good])
Truth, Cartesian Criterion of, [339]
Ultimate End, for the individual and for the whole, [404], [497-498]
Ultimate Good, My, [109] seq., [109] note 1, [497-498]
Ultimate Good, The (the Good), [3], [106] seq., [391-407] passim
Ultimate reasonableness, different views of, implicit in ordinary thought, [6]
Ultimate reasons for conduct, [78], [79];
differences in, correspond to different aspects of human existence, [78] (cf. [79])
‘Ultra-intuitional,’ [100]
‘Unconscious Utilitarianism’ of Common Sense Morality, [453] seq., [489], etc.
Universal Happiness as standard and motive, [413]
Universalistic and Egoistic Hedonism, connexion between (a) in Bentham’s view, [87] Note;
(b) in Paley’s view, [121]
Unveracity, common, [316] seq., [486]
Utilitarian—formula of distribution not really at variance with Common Sense, [432], [433];
justification of special affections, [433], [434];
ideal code, difficulties of constructing such, for present human beings, [467-470];
rectification of Common Sense Morality must proceed by empirical method, [476-480];
innovation, negative and destructive, probable effects of (a) on the agent, [481], [482-483], (b) on others, [482], [483];
innovation, positive and supplementary, as affecting the agent and others, [483], [484];
innovation in relation to degree of publicity and generality of acceptance, [489-490], [489] note 1;
reform, consists largely in enforcing old rules, [484];
exceptions to current morality (a) may generally be stated as fresh rules, [485], [489], (b) special and rare cases of, [486-487];
Duty and Religious Sanction, [503-506];
Sanction, [500] seq.
Utilitarianism, [8], [11], [119];
(= Universalistic or Benthamite Hedonism), [84], [119], [411];
Proof of, [418-422];
Principle of, [87], (Mill’s view of) [387], [388];
Method of, [460-495];
meaning of, [411-417] passim;
to be distinguished from (a) Egoistic Hedonism, [411], [412], (b) any psychogonical theory of the Moral Sentiments, [412-413];
motive and standard of, to be discriminated, [413];
contradictory objections to, [87];
and Intuitionism, relation between, [85-86], [386] seq., [496-497];
and Intuitionism, history of relation between, in English ethical thought, [86], [423], [424];
and Egoism, relation between, [497], [498];
and Egoism, harmony of, (a) not empirically demonstrable, [503], (b) required by Reason, [506];
and Common Sense Morality, [8], [423-457] passim, [468], [469], [475], [476], [480] seq., [498], [499];
justifies the unequal distribution which Common Sense approves, [432] seq.;
more rigid than Common Sense, [499], [504];
function of, as arbiter to Common Sense, [454], [455];
reasonable attitude of, to Common Sense Morality, [473-474], [475-476];
aims at remedying imperfections of Common Sense Morality, [476];
and Axiom of Benevolence, [387], [388], [496-497], [498];
and Conjugal and Parental Duties, [435], [436];
and Duties of Special Need, [436], [437];
and Gratitude, [437], [438];
and benevolent Duties, [435] seq.;
and Law-observance, [440], [441];
and Impartiality, [441], [442], [447], [447] note 1;
and Normal Expectations, [442-443];
and Good Faith, [443], [444], [443] note 3;
and Freedom, [444], [445];
and distribution according to Desert, [445-447];
and Justice, [440] seq., [447];
and Veracity, [448], [449], [483];
and Malevolence, [449];
and Self-regarding virtues, [450];
and Purity, [449-450];
and Sympathy, [500] seq.;
and Christianity, [504]
‘Utility,’ Hume’s and Bentham’s uses of, [423] note 2
Veracity, [97], [224], [313], [314-319] passim, [355], [448], [449];
and Good Faith, [303], [304], [313], [314]
Virtue (Moral Perfection or Excellence), [10], [14], [78], [106], [219], [219] note 1, [220], [220] note 3, [221], [222], [226], [227];
or Right Action, its relation to the Good, [106];
and Happiness, [119], [120], [174-175], [461];
Plato’s and Aristotle’s accounts of, [376];
involves reference to an Ultimate Good which is not Virtue, [393], [394], [395];
and Duty, [217-230] passim;
and emotion, [222-223], [226];
voluntariness of, [220], [227];
and motive, [223-224];
and habit, [227];
and moral effort, relation between, [224], [225], [429];
intellectual conditions of, [225];
is Knowledge, Socratic doctrine that, [227] note 1;
felicific character of, [424], [425]
Virtues, intellectual, [231-237] passim;
self-regarding, [327-331] passim
Virtuous conduct, commonly regarded as disinterested, [77], [78]
Virtuous motives, admitted by some moralists, [365], [366];
Dr. Martineau’s rejection of, [367]
Vivisection controversy, [402], [406] note 1
Volition, analysis of, [61], [62];
Determinist view of, [62] note 1;
conception of, how far inevitably Libertarian, [67], [71];
causes muscular contractions, [73];
affects thought and feeling, [73], [74];
acting through resolutions alters men’s tendencies to action, [74], [75], [75] note 1;
its emotional antecedents of secondary ethical importance, [77]
Voluntary action, definition of, [59]
Voluntary choice and irresistible impulse, [67] note 3
Wayland, Elements of Moral Science, [256] note 2
Wealth, [153], [154], [155]
Well-being (the Good attainable in human life), [92], [92] note 1;
Stoic view of, [92];
Aristotle’s view of, [92], [92] note 2;
not = mere promise of future being, [396], [397]
Whewell, [58], [86];
(Elements of Morality), [58] note 2, [317] note 1, [329] note 1
Will—Subjective Rightness of, and Ultimate Good, [394], [395];
divorced from Objective Rightness is fanaticism, [395]
Wisdom, [230], [231-236] passim, [344], [345], [393], [430];
meaning and use of term, [231];
Greek view of, [231];
common sense definition of, [233];
refers to ends as well as means, [231-233];
in selection of ends and means, how far voluntary, [233-235];
in adoption of selected ends, [235];
comprehensiveness of, [238];
and Temperance and Justice, tautological maxims of, [375];
and Caution and Decision, do not furnish independent rules, [237] Note
Wundt, [184] note 3
Zeal or Moral Ardour, [237], [392]
Zeno, [376]

THE END

Printed by R. & R. Clark, Limited, Edinburgh.