Was General Thomas Slow at Nashville? / With a Description of the Greatest Cavalry Movement of the War and General James H. Wilson's Cavalry Operations in Tennessee, Alabama, and Georgia

by Henry V. Boynton

THOMAS TURNS ON HIS NAGGERS.

There was one thing in which General Thomas was slow. He was not swift to give expression to indignation over wrong treatment. To this latter, as the culmination of the series, he at last responded with this crushing statement:

“General Hood’s army is being pursued as rapidly and as vigorously as it is possible for one army to pursue another. We cannot control the elements, and you must remember that to resist Hood’s advance into Tennessee I had to reorganize and almost thoroughly equip the force now under my command. I fought the battles of the 15th and 16th inst. with the troops but partially equipped, and notwithstanding the inclemency of the weather and the partial equipment, have been enabled to drive the enemy beyond Duck River, crossing the two streams with my troops, and driving the enemy from position to position, without the aid of pontoons, and with but little transportation to bring up supplies and ammunition.

“I am doing all in my power to crush Hood’s army, and, if it be possible, will destroy it, but pursuing an enemy through an exhausted country, over mud roads, completely sogged with heavy rains, is no child’s play, and cannot be accomplished as quickly as thought of. I hope, in urging me to push the enemy, the department remembers that General Sherman took with him the complete organizations of the Military Division of the Mississippi, well equipped in every respect as regards ammunition, supplies, and transportation, leaving me only two corps—partially stripped of their transportation to accommodate the force taken with him—to oppose the advance into Tennessee of that army which had resisted the advance of the army of the Military Division of the Mississippi on Atlanta from the commencement of the campaign until its close, and which is now, in addition, aided by Forrest’s cavalry. Although my progress may appear slow, I feel assured that Hood’s army can be driven from Tennessee, and eventually driven to the wall, by the force under my command, but too much must not be expected of troops which have to be reorganized, especially when they have the task of destroying a force in a winter campaign which was able to make an obstinate resistance to twice its numbers in spring and summer. In conclusion, I can safely state that this army is willing to submit to any sacrifice to oust Hood’s army, or to strike any other blow which would contribute to the destruction of the rebellion.”

The next day Stanton thus again extended his steady support:

“I have seen to-day General Halleck’s dispatch of yesterday and your reply. It is proper for me to assure you that this department has the most unbounded confidence in your skill, vigor, and determination to employ to the best advantage all the means in your power to pursue and destroy the enemy. No department could be inspired with more profound admiration and thankfulness for the great deeds you have already performed, or more confiding faith that human effort could accomplish no more than will be done by you and the gallant officers and soldiers of your command.”

To this Thomas responded in terms which show his deep appreciation of the only unqualifiedly friendly voice that had reached his ear from those in high authority:

“I am profoundly thankful for the hearty expression of your confidence in my determination and desire to do all in my power to destroy the enemy and put down the rebellion.”

As pertinent to this history it is well to recall two facts: First, Sherman reached Savannah, having avoided all fortified places, had encountered no enemy in force during his march, sat down before the city, and awoke one morning to find that Hardee with his 10,000 men had slipped out of the city over the river and escaped.

Second, the Army of the Potomac, which had 87,000 present for duty equipped, and which was not obliged to depend upon quartermasters’ employees, citizens, and convalescents for its reserves, remained quietly in its camps in front of City Point and in sight of the enemy from November to April, giving plenty of leisure for complaining that the Army of the Cumberland did not attack at the dropping of a handkerchief.

With the dispersion of Hood’s army General Thomas set about preparing for a spring campaign which should open at the earliest possible day. His plan contemplated the assembling and putting in thorough condition an army of cavalry to penetrate the South under his trusted commander, General James H. Wilson.