FOOTNOTES
[1] Dardanelles Commission; First Report, par. 46.
[2] Speech in Foreign Office Debate, July 10, 1914. The whole question of Germany’s relations to Turkey is discussed with his usual knowledge by Mr. H. N. Brailsford in A League of Nations, chap. v.
[3] Sir Edward Grey, in the House of Commons, October 14, 1915; Foreign Office Statement, November 1, 1914. On the authority of the Kaiser, in conversation with M. Theotokis, Greek Minister in Berlin, it now appears that Germany had already concluded an alliance with Turkey on August 4, 1914. (See Greek White Book, published August 24, 1917.)
[4] See Turkey, Greece, and the Great Powers, by G. F. Abbott (1917), pp. 167–200.
[5] Changing their religion with their sky, the Goeben and Breslau became the Jawuz Sultan Selim and the Midilli in the Turkish Navy. See Two War Years in Constantinople, by Dr. Harry Stürmer, p. 113. In an action at the entrance to the Dardanelles, January 20, 1918, the Breslau was sunk, and the Goeben had to be beached at Nagara Point. We lost the monitor Lord Raglan.
[6] Dardanelles Commission; First Report, par. 45 (omitted in first publication, but inserted shortly afterwards).
[7] The subject was fully discussed with the present writer by M. Skouloudis, at that time Premier in Athens (November 9, 1915). That veteran statesman was apparently honest in his belief both in the King’s military genius and in the King’s good faith towards the Allies—a belief unfounded in both cases.
[8] Dardanelles Commission; First Report, pars. 47, 48.
[9] Dardanelles Commission; First Report, pars. 50–52.
[10] Speech in the House of Commons upon the Dardanelles Commission’s First Report, March 20, 1917 (Hansard, 1743).
[11] Dardanelles Commission; First Report, par. 9.
[12] Speech in the House of Commons, March 20, 1917 (Hansard, 1746).
[13] Ibid.
[14] Mr. Asquith, Speech in the House of Commons, March 20, 1917. Cf. Sir James Wolfe Murray: “Lord Kitchener acted very much as his own Chief of the Staff.” Dardanelles Commission; First Report, par. 18.
[15] “I suppose that upon no man in our history has a heavier burden fallen than fell upon him, and nothing in connection with this Report—it may be no imputation upon anybody connected with the Report itself—has filled me with more indignation and disgust than that the publication of the criticisms made in it of Lord Kitchener’s conduct and capacity should have been taken advantage of by those who only two years ago were in a posture of almost slavish adulation to belittle his character, and, so far as they can, to defile his memory. Lord Kitchener’s memory is in no danger. It lives, and will live, in the gratitude and admiration of the British people and of the whole Empire.”—Mr. Asquith, Speech in the House of Commons, March 20, 1917 (Hansard, 1748).
[16] See his speech in the House of Commons on Woman Suffrage, March 28, 1917.
[17] Dardanelles Commission; First Report, par. 16.
[18] Speech at Dundee, June 5, 1915.
[19] Dardanelles Commission; First Report, par. 53.
[20] Ibid., pars. 54, 55.
[21] This War Staff Group took the place of the Board of Admiralty in strategical matters, the Second, Third, and Fourth Sea Lords being thus released for their special functions of manning, shipbuilding, and transport. Its other members were the First Lord, the Chief of the Staff (Sir Henry Oliver), the Secretary of the Board (Sir Graham Greene), and the Naval Secretary (Commodore de Bartolomé).—See “The Dardanelles Report,” by Mr. Archibald Hurd (Fortnightly Review, April 1917), where the whole subject is discussed with the writer’s well-known knowledge of naval affairs.
[22] Ἐχθίστη δὲ ὀδύνη ἐστὶ τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποισι αὕτη, πολλὰ φρονέοντα μηδενὸς κρατέειν.—Herodotus, ix. 16.
[23] Dardanelles Commission; First Report, pars. 19, 87; minutes 1 and 2.
[24] Ibid., par. 20.
[25] Dardanelles Commission; First Report, par. 26.
[26] Ibid., par. 22.
[27] Speech of March 20, 1917 (Hansard, 1744).
[28] Dardanelles Commission; First Report, Mr. Roch’s Minute, par. 16.
[29] Ibid., Majority Report, par. 68.
[30] Ibid., Mr. Roch’s Minute, par. 11. The reference is to the brief bombardment of November 3.
[31] Ibid., pars. 7–12.
[32] Dardanelles Commission; First Report, par. 56.
[33] Ibid., Majority Report, par. 57; Mr. Roch’s Minute, par. 14. Admiral Jackson’s view as to the unenviable position of a fleet bottled up off Constantinople without commanding the line of retreat was probably influenced by the record of Admiral Duckworth’s risk when in a similar position (1807), and Admiral Hornby’s hesitation about entering the Straits in 1877.—See Nelson’s History of the War, by John Buchan, vol. vi. pp. 130–36.
[34] Dardanelles Commission; First Report, par. 43.
[35] Speech in House of Commons, March 20, 1917 (Hansard, 1780).
[36] Dardanelles Commission; Mr. Roch’s Minute, par. 16.
[37] Ibid., par. 20; Majority Report, pars. 60–62.
[38] Lord Fisher had himself suggested the use of the Queen Elizabeth to Admiral Oliver the day before. Mr. Roch’s Minute, par. 17.
[39] Majority Report, par. 69. Mr. Roch’s Minute, par. 18.
[40] Majority Report, par. 94.
[41] Dardanelles Commission; First Report, par. 68.
[42] Ibid., par. 83.
[43] Mr. Roch’s Minute, par. 22.
[44] Dardanelles Commission; First Report, par. 88.
[45] M. Augagneur, Minister of Marine, had visited London after the decision of January 13. He approved the subsequent plan, pronouncing it “prudent et prévoyant.” Mr. Roch’s Minute, par. 29.
[46] Majority Report, pars. 86, 87; Mr. Roch’s Minute, pars. 25, 26.
[47] Mr. Roch’s Minute, pars. 11 and 22.
[48] Speech in House of Commons, March 20, 1917 (Hansard, 1783, 1784).
[49] Mr. Roch’s Minute, par. 28.
[50] Majority Report, pars. 89–93; Mr. Roch’s Minute, pars. 28, 29.
[51] Dardanelles Commission; First Report, par. 92.
[52] Speech in the House of Commons, March 20, 1917.
[53] Mr. Archibald Hurd (“The Dardanelles Report,” Fortnightly Review, April 1917, pp. 587, 591) considers that a military force “was apparently a part of the original scheme.” But the whole evidence of the Report and of Mr. Churchill’s speech of March 20, 1917, appears to be against him.
[54] Speech in House of Commons, March 20, 1917 (Hansard, 1789). Cf. Majority Report, par. 94, and Mr. Roch’s Minute, pars. 29, 32.
[55] Majority Report, par. 95.
[56] Majority Report, par. 96; Mr. Roch’s Minute, pars. 32, 33.
[57] Mr. Asquith in the House of Commons, March 20, 1917 (Hansard, 1752).
[58] Majority Report, pars. 100–103; Mr. Roch’s Minute, par. 38.
“Nor was his name unheard or unadored
In ancient Greece; and in Ausonian land
Men call’d him Mulciber; and how he fell
From heaven they fabled, thrown by angry Jove
Sheer o’er the crystal battlements: from morn
To noon he fell, from noon to dewy eve,
A summer’s day; and with the setting sun
Dropt from the zenith like a falling star,
On Lemnos, the Ægean isle.”
Paradise Lost, Book I.
[60] With the Fleet in the Dardanelles, by William Harold Price, sometime Chaplain of the Triumph.
[61] “Manchester Guardian” History of the War.
[62] The Immortal Gamble, by A. T. Stewart and C. J. E. Peshall of the Cornwallis, p. 10.
[63] Dardanelles Commission; Majority Report, par. 97.
[64] Ibid., pars. 78–82.
[65] With the Fleet in the Dardanelles, pp. 38–40.
[66] Dardanelles Commission; First Report, par. 97.
[67] With the Fleet in the Dardanelles, p. 66; the Triumph was one of ships detailed for this operation.
[68] Dardanelles Commission; Mr. Roch’s Minute, par. 43.
[69] It appears to have been on this occasion that the King, yielding to the representations of M. Venizelos in favour of actively sharing in the Dardanelles enterprise, exclaimed, “So be it then, for the love of God!” See M. Venizelos’ speech to the Chamber in Athens, August 26, 1917 (The Times, August 31).
[70] Mr. Roch’s Minute, par. 43; Mr. Churchill’s speech on March 20, 1917 (Hansard, 1793). Unhappily, M. Venizelos resigned on March 6, 1915, owing to Constantine’s renewed opposition to a combination with the Allies.
[71] Dardanelles Commission; Majority Report, par. 109.
[72] Dardanelles Commission; Majority Report, par. 111.
[73] In What of the Dardanelles? Mr. Martin Fortescue, an American correspondent, gives a brief but interesting criticism of this unfortunate action from the Turkish-German point of view (pp. 27–47). As seen from the Cornwallis the action is described in The Immortal Gamble, pp. 45–53.
[74] The total British casualties during the whole naval enterprise were 350; on March 18 they were 61.
[75] Dardanelles Commission; First Report, par. 119. Speaking of this naval attack, Dr. Stürmer writes: “To their great astonishment the gallant defenders of the coast forts found that the attack had suddenly ceased. Dozens of the German naval gunners who were manning the batteries of Chanak on that memorable day told me later that they had quite made up their minds the fleet would ultimately win, and that they themselves could not have held out much longer.”—Two War Years in Constantinople, p. 84.
[76] Dardanelles Commission; First Report, pars. 115, 119.
[77] With the Twenty-ninth Division in Gallipoli, by Chaplain D. Creighton, p. 23.
[78] Dardanelles Commission; First Report, pars. 107, 108.
[79] See Sir Ian Hamilton’s first dispatch.
[80] The formation and subsequent exploits of this peculiar body are described by Colonel Patterson himself in With the Zionists in Gallipoli.
[81] For the history of the Australians in Egypt and Gallipoli, see Australia in Arms, by Phillip Schuler, the fine young correspondent of The Age, Melbourne. To the deep regret of all who knew him, he was afterwards killed by a chance shell while teaching cookery to some men in France. Everything written by Captain Bean and Mr. Malcolm Ross, the authorised correspondents for Australia and New Zealand respectively, is also invaluable for history.
[82] One of these transports, the Manitou, had a narrow escape upon the voyage from Egypt. She was attacked by a Turkish destroyer, whose captain courteously gave an opportunity for removing the men in their boats. In the hurry two of the boats were overturned and fifty-one men drowned. The enemy destroyer, apprehending the approach of British ships, then drew in close, and fired three torpedoes, all of which passed under the transport, the range being too short to allow a torpedo to rise after its plunge. The destroyer was afterwards driven ashore in Asia by two of our destroyers and broken up.—See The Immortal Gamble, p. 67.
[83] See also Charles Lister, by Lord Ribblesdale, p. 164. Charles Lister himself was one of the young men of brilliant promise whose death was due to the Gallipoli campaign. After gallant service in the Hood Battalion of the Royal Naval Division at Helles, he died of his third wound, August 28, 1915.
[84] Thucydides, vi. 32; Diodorus, xiii. 3. From Athens herself only about 3000 of the troops for the Sicilian expedition started. It is curious to remember that Plato was a boy in Ægina at the time, and probably watched the race.
[85] The Immortal Gamble, pp. 72–82 and 98–104 (account by Captain Davidson, who went ashore himself).
[86] Besides the names here mentioned, Vice-Admiral de Robeck in his dispatch especially noticed Able Seaman William Williams (killed), Seaman George M‘Kenzie Samson (dangerously wounded), Lieutenant John A. V. Morse, R.N., and Surgeon P. B. Kelly, R.N., as rendering great and perilous service at this landing.
[87] For this incident and others at V Beach, see The Immortal Gamble, pp. 81–92, besides Sir Ian Hamilton’s and Admiral de Robeck’s dispatches.
[88] Sir Ian Hamilton’s first dispatch, “The Gallipoli Landing.”
[89] See Mr. Ashmead Bartlett’s dispatches, “Seddel Bahr Landing,” p. 92. Mr. Bartlett was not present, being at the Anzac landing, and Sir Ian’s dispatch mentions only the company at the foot of Cape Tekke on the left.
[90] Excellent personal accounts of W Beach landing by three 1st Lancashire officers are given in With the Twenty-ninth Division, pp. 57–63. It is hard to choose between the three; but I give some sentences from Major Adams, who had been twenty-five years in the regiment, and was killed a few days later, as were the other two: “As the boats touched the shore a very heavy and brisk fire was poured into us, several officers and men being killed and wounded in the entanglements, through which we were trying to cut a way. Several of my company were with me under the wire, one of my subalterns was killed next to me, and also the wire-cutter who was lying the other side of me. I seized his cutter and cut a small lane myself, through which a few of us broke and lined up under the only available cover procurable—a small sand ridge covered with bluffs of grass. I then ordered fire to be opened on the crests; but owing to submersion in the water and dragging rifles through the sand, the breech mechanism was clogged, thereby rendering the rifles ineffective. The only thing left to do was to fix bayonets and charge up the crests, which was done in a very gallant manner, though we suffered greatly in doing so. However, this had the effect of driving the enemy from his trenches, which we immediately occupied.... In my company alone I had 95 casualties out of 205 men.”
A still more detailed account of the Lancashire landing, specially describing the services of Major Frankland (killed while trying to take assistance to V Beach about 8.30 a.m.) and of Captains Willis, Shaw, Cunliffe, and Haworth, is given in an additional chapter by Major Farmar (Lancashire Fusiliers) at the end of the same book, pp. 175–191.
[91] Beside Sir Ian’s dispatch, see Colonel Newenham’s own account in With the Twenty-ninth Division, pp. 55–57.
[92] Authorities differ widely as to the number of boats to each tow, but four appears to be right, though six was more usual.
[93] During the Anzac landing, Mr. Ashmead Bartlett was in the London, and his account was unusually brilliant, even for that brilliant writer. Besides that and Sir Ian’s dispatch, the best published account is in Australia in Arms, pp. 94–114. Mr. Schuler was not present, but he had the advantage of going over the ground and discussing the action thoroughly. I had the same advantages, especially owing to the generous assistance of the Anzac correspondents, Captain Bean and Mr. Malcolm Ross.
[94] Uncensored Letter from the Dardanelles, by a French Medical Officer, pp. 44–74.
[95] The Immortal Gamble, p. 147.
[96] Australia in Arms, p. 122.
[97] Having held it with skill and resolution for a month, Major Quinn was himself killed there in a furious attempt which the Turks made to mine and break through the position (May 29).
[98] From an account privately written by a friend who knew Doughty-Wylie intimately, I may quote the following sentences: “As the result of many wounds, he had suffered in health and had transferred from the army to the Consular Service, and had spent some years in Asia Minor. I arrived in Adana after the massacres in 1909, just before he left for Abyssinia, and stayed at the Consulate, learning much from him about those terrible days of the preceding April. My memories are permeated with a sense of his oneness with all the warring sects in that fanatical province. He was the emblem of what they needed: unity—greatness of heart and mind—an entire absence of self-seeking or pride.... An Armenian girl described the scene to me: ‘We were all in a church, hundreds of us huddled together, and the Turks set light to it. But he came, the Consul Anglais. He forced his way through the mob, and we saw his face. “Come, my children,” he called to us, and we followed him out. Like frightened sheep we were, but he calmed us and led us to safety.’ ... ‘The oppressor is often in the right, and the oppressed always,’ he used playfully to quote to me.” A permanent monument to Doughty-Wylie and Walford was erected in Seddel Bahr.
[99] With the Twenty-ninth Division, p. 191.
[100] The battalions in the brigades were: 125th Brigade, the 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th Lancashire Fusiliers; 126th Brigade, the 4th and 5th East Lancashire, and the 9th and 10th Manchester; the 127th Brigade, the 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th Manchester.
[101] In Australia in Arms, pp. 136–139, Phillip Schuler gives a detailed account, obviously derived from officers who were present.
[102] Sir Ian’s dispatch; and Australia in Arms, pp. 139–142.
[103] With the Twenty-ninth Division, p. 189. The one surviving officer of the Dublin Fusiliers was Lieutenant O’Hara, afterwards mortally wounded at Suvla Bay.
[104] The Immortal Gamble, p. 145.
[105] Abdul Hamid died at last in Constantinople, February 1918.
[106] The submarine campaign began with E2, 11, 14, and 15; four or five were subsequently added. Some were lost. On May 25 the E11 also torpedoed the transport Stamboul inside the Golden Horn, causing great panic. On April 30 the Australian AE2 had been lost at the entrance of Marmora. Her crew were taken prisoner.
[107] For the state of Constantinople at this time, see Inside Constantinople, by Lewis Einstein, special agent at the American Embassy, and Two War Years in Constantinople, by Dr. Harry Stürmer, correspondent of the Kölnische Zeitung, but a writer of decidedly pro-Entente sympathies.
[108] In this attack Mr. Asquith’s son Arthur (Hood Battalion), and Lieutenant-Commander Josiah Wedgwood, M.P., who had come out with the machine-gun section, were wounded.
[109] Compare Ashmead Bartlett’s Dispatches from the Dardanelles, p. 118.
[110] John Masefield’s account of the soldier’s mind in this battle is a fine instance of imaginative sympathy. Gallipoli, pp. 72–81.
[111] This 2nd French Division was composed as follows: 3rd Brigade Metropolitaine (C.O. Colonel Ruef), comprising the 176ème Régiment d’Infanterie (Commandant Costemalle), and the 2ème Régiment de Marche d’Afrique (Lieut.-Colonel Hautville); Brigade Coloniale (C.O. Général de Brigade Simonin, who afterwards commanded the division), comprising the 7ème Régiment Colonial (Lieut.-Colonel Bordeaux), partly Senegalese, and the 8ème Régiment Colonial (Lieut.-Colonel d’Adhémar), also partly Senegalese. The Division had six batteries of “75’s” and two of mountain guns. The Corps of the two Divisions had two regiments of Chasseurs d’Afrique, four 120 mm. guns, four 155 mm. guns (long), six 155 mm. guns (short), besides detachments of engineers, supply, army service, and ambulance.
[112] The brigade consisted of the Wellington Battalion (Lieut.-Colonel W. G. Malone, a splendid soldier and man, afterwards killed at Anzac), the Auckland (Lieut.-Colonel A. Plugge), the Canterbury (Lieut.-Colonel D. M. Stewart), and the Otago (Lieut.-Colonel T. W. M‘Donald).
[113] The 2nd Australian Brigade consisted of the 5th Victoria Battalion (Lieut.-Colonel Wanliss), the 6th (Lieut.-Colonel M‘Nicol), the 7th (Lieut.-Colonel Garside), and the 8th (Lieut.-Colonel Bolton).
[114] See Australia in Arms, pp. 143–156.
[115] With the Twenty-ninth Division, p. 94.
[116] Ibid., p. 112.
[117] Australia in Arms, p. 158.
[118] Australia in Arms, p. 166.
[119] The Immortal Gamble, pp. 167–174. Lieutenant Cather, R.N., went down with the Goliath, but was kept afloat by a safety waistcoat. This he gave to a sailor much exhausted. Ultimately he was himself rescued, and for some months commanded on the River Clyde. It is impossible to mention all such heroic actions, but hard to omit the deeds of personal friends. One midshipman, also protected by a safety waistcoat, was found floating about two days and nights after the disaster, but was too exhausted to live.
[120] Our casualties by the end of May were 38,600.
[121] “We went on board the Implacable on the way back, where I met Ashmead Bartlett, the official newspaper correspondent, who was most pessimistic. ‘The best thing we could do was to evacuate the place. This was developing into a major operation, and we had not the troops for it. Achi Baba was untakable, except after months of siege warfare’” (Diary for May 13, by the Rev. O. Creighton, With the Twenty-ninth Division in Gallipoli, p. 90). After his fortunate escape from the Majestic as she sank, Mr. Ashmead Bartlett returned to London for a short time, and a memorandum by him, strongly criticising Sir Ian’s positions, and advising an attack on Bulair, was considered by the “Dardanelles Committee” (Second Dardanelles Report, p. 26).
[122] Such as Col. Crauford Stewart of the Hood (wounded) and Col. Roberts, R.A. (Egyptian Army), of the Anson (killed).
[123] The original Collingwood, with the Hawke and Benbow Battalions, crossed the Dutch frontier in retiring from Antwerp, and were interned. The new battalions were left to complete their training in England, when the R.N.D. sailed. Thus the Collingwood (Commander Spearman, R.N.) was now for the first time under fire. The brother of Lieut.-Commander Freyberg (see p. 120) was killed on this occasion. The Collingwood relics and the Benbow were incorporated soon after this battle with the Hood, Howe, and Anson Battalions as the 2nd Naval Brigade—an arrangement resented on both sides, but inevitable owing to reduction of men.
[124] Notes of the battle from hour to hour were taken by a French medical officer (Uncensored Letters from the Dardanelles, pp. 121–125).
[125] This fine officer was killed in the battle of July 13.
[126] One brigade of the R.N.D. alone lost 60 officers.
[127] “The worst was that the wounded had not been got back, but lay between ours and the Turks’ firing line. It was impossible to get at some of them. The men said they could see them move. The firing went on without ceasing.... The General had suggested putting up a white flag, and some one going out to the wounded. They tried this later, but it failed” (With the Twenty-ninth Division, pp. 122, 123). Who the General was is left uncertain. The passage is from a diary of June 5.
[128] With the Twenty-ninth Division, pp. 122–129. Of original officers in this famous division, the South Wales Borderers now had the most left. They had eight.
[129] The loss, unhappily, included Colonel Giraudon, Chief of the Staff, who had been rashly put to command the 2nd Colonial Brigade of the 1st Division on this occasion—a serious, brave, and intellectual soldier. He was dangerously wounded, as was Colonel Noguès, commanding the 6th Colonial Regiment in that brigade, who with his regiment had distinguished himself greatly in the attack upon Kum Kali and elsewhere (see Uncensored Letters from the Dardanelles, p. 137). Colonel Giraudon returned to his position in the Dardanelles, and survived to do excellent work in France, where he was, however, ultimately killed in action.
[130] Account by Mr. Compton Mackenzie, who acted as authorised correspondent for the London papers during Mr. Ashmead Bartlett’s temporary absence.
[131] The division consisted of the 155th Brigade (Brig.-General J. F. Erskine, succeeded by Lieut.-Colonel Pollok-M‘Call), containing the 4th and 5th Battalions Royal Scottish Fusiliers, and the 4th and 5th Battalions K.O.S.B.; the 156th Brigade (Brig.-General Scott-Moncrieff, killed on June 28; then Brig.-General H. G. Casson, succeeded by Brig.-General L. C. Koe), containing the 4th and 7th Royal Scots, and the 7th and 8th Scottish Rifles; and the 157th Brigade (Brig.-General R. W. Hendry, succeeded by Brig.-General H. G. Casson), containing the 5th, 6th, and 7th Highland Light Infantry, and the 5th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders.
[132] Now (spring, 1918) Commander-in-Chief in Mesopotamia in succession to Sir Stanley Maude, who commanded the 13th Division during the later part of the Dardanelles campaign.
[133] “Scenes of desperate fighting are plainly visible all around our front line. On a small rise a little to the left (i.e. of our advanced position up the Gully) lie half a dozen of our men killed in the final advance, whom it had been impossible to get at and bury. Right in front a line of khaki figures lie in perfect order only a few yards away, yet the sniping is so heavy that even at night it is almost impossible to bring them in. Farther up the ravine are heaps of Turkish dead, piled together, who have fallen in the big counter-attack. In a gorse patch farther to the left lie a further large number of the enemy, mixed up with some of our men, for there seems to have been a general mêlée in the open at dawn on the 29th, when our men issued from their trenches and hunted the enemy out of the gorse, killing large numbers of them.”—Dispatches from the Dardanelles, by E. Ashmead Bartlett, p. 152 (July 4).
[134] Uncensored Letters, pp. 144–146.
[135] Australia in Arms, pp. 205–210.
[136] “A rough estimate of their number (Turkish troops) since mobilisation is as follows: At the Dardanelles, 130,000; in Thrace, 30,000; at Constantinople and Chitaldja, 20,000; on the Bosphorus, 20,000; in the Caucasus, 60,000; at Bagdad and the Persian Gulf, 20,000; Syria, 30,000; Aleppo and Mersine, 30,000; Smyrna district, 30,000; gendarmerie, 30,000; at the depôts, 50,000; scattered, 30,000” (Inside Constantinople, p. 125). This makes a total of 480,000, and the writer estimates that Turkey had by that time (June 18, 1915) lost 260,000, including 100,000 on Gallipoli. But these statistics are probably of little more than Turkish value.
As to the neglect to supply the Dardanelles Expedition with guns and shells, it must, of course, be remembered that they were then short on all fronts, and it was only in the beginning of June that Mr. Lloyd George was appointed to a Ministry of Munitions.
[137] This destruction of a signal and telegraph station was probably the incident referred to at the end of Sir Ian’s second dispatch. He tells how Corporal G. A. Walker, R.E., although much shaken, repaired the damage, collected men, and within 39 minutes reopened communication by apologising for the incident and saying he required no assistance. Twelve were killed or wounded, beside the officer on duty, killed.
[138] This was the German General Weber, commanding the “Southern Group” on the Peninsula. He was superseded by Vehib Pasha, “a grim and fanatical Turk,” the change causing great discontent among the Germans. “In this case, the Turkish point of view prevailed, for General Liman von Sanders, Commander-in-Chief of the Gallipoli Army, was determined not to lose his post, and agreed slavishly with all that Enver Pasha ordained” (Two War Years in Constantinople, p. 46).
[139] See note on p. 223.
[140] The Aragon was torpedoed in the Mediterranean, January 1918.
[141] First Dardanelles Commission Report, par. 14, note. It seems to have been a section of the “War Committee” established by the Coalition Government of May 19.
[142] This estimate does not include the French casualties, which are not published.
[143] The 13th Division consisted of the following brigades:
38th (Brigadier-General Baldwin)—
6th Royal Lancashire, 6th East Lancashire, 6th South Lancashire, and 6th North Lancashire.
39th (Brigadier-General W. de S. Cayley)—
9th Royal Warwick, 7th Gloucester, 9th Worcester, and 7th North Stafford.
40th (Brigadier-General J. H. du B. Travers)—
4th South Wales Borderers, 8th Royal Welsh Fusiliers, 8th Cheshire, and 5th Wilts.
The 8th Welsh Regiment were Divisional Pioneers.
[144] The 11th Division consisted of the following brigades:
32nd (Brigadier-General H. Haggard)—
9th West York, 6th Yorkshire, 8th West Riding, and 6th York and Lancaster.
33rd (Brigadier-General R. P. Maxwell)—
6th Lincolnshire, 6th Border, 7th South Stafford, and 9th Sherwood Foresters.
34th (Brigadier-General W. H. Sitwell)—
8th Northumberland Fusiliers, 9th Lancashire Fusiliers, 5th Dorset, and 11th Manchester.
The 6th East Yorkshire were Divisional Pioneers.
[145] The 10th Division consisted of the following brigades:
29th (Brigadier-General R. J. Cooper)—
10th Hampshire, 6th Royal Irish Rifles, 5th Connaught Rangers, and 6th Leinster.
30th (Brigadier-General L. L. Nicol)—
6th and 7th Royal Munster Fusiliers, 6th and 7th Royal Dublin Fusiliers.
31st (Brigadier-General F. F. Hill)—
5th and 6th Inniskilling Fusiliers, 5th and 6th Royal Irish Fusiliers.
The 5th Royal Irish Regiment were Divisional Pioneers. Only about 60 per cent. of the men in these battalions were Irish, the rest being chiefly North-country miners and Somerset. For the complete list of the battalions in this Division, the Artillery, Engineers, etc., see The Tenth (Irish) Division in Gallipoli, by Major Bryan Cooper, pp. 2 and 3.
[146] I am unable to give the exact formations of these Divisions. The battalions were changed shortly before they left England. From dispatches and other sources, however, one can make the following list:
53rd (Welsh) Division:
158th Brigade (Brigadier-General E. A. Cowans)—
5th, 6th, and 7th Royal Welsh Fusiliers, and the 1/1st Herefordshire.
159th Brigade (Brigadier-General F. C. Lloyd)—
4th and 7th Cheshires, and the 4th and 5th Welsh.
160th Brigade (Brigadier-General J. J. F. Hume)—
4th Queen’s (Royal West Surrey), 4th Royal Sussex, a composite Kent Battalion, and the 10th Middlesex.
54th (East Anglian) Division:
161st Brigade (Brigadier-General C. M. Brunton)—
4th, 5th, 6th, and 7th Essex.
162nd Brigade (Brigadier-General C. de Winton)—
10th and 11th London, 5th Bedfordshire, and 4th Northants.
163rd Brigade (Brigadier-General Brunker, later under F. F. W. Daniell)—
4th and 5th Norfolks, 5th Suffolks, and 8th Hants.
[147] Uncensored Letters, p. 170. There were 10 French planes.
[148] Our estimates of the enemy’s forces for the days of fighting in August were:
| Date. | Suvla. | Anzac. | Helles. | Reserve. |
| August 6–7 | 3,000 | 25,000 | 33,000 | 39,000 |
| „ 8 | 5,000 | 31,000 | 33,000 | 20,000[A] |
| „ 9 | 7,000 | 38,000 | 33,000 | 20,000[B] |
| „ 10 | 9,000 | 38,000 | 33,000 | 25,000 |
| „ 11 | 13,000 | 38,000 | 33,000 | 25,000 |
| „ 15 | 20,000 | 47,000 | 15,000 | 12,000 |
| „ 22 | 26,000 | 41,000 | 15,000 | 12,000 |
[A] 11,000 marching south. [B] 2000 marching south.
[149] Part of this small and undisciplined body actually landed, but meeting with opposition rapidly withdrew to the ship in characteristic disorder, assuming their object to be accomplished.
“Special Order.
“General Headquarters,
Mediterranean Expeditionary Force,
August 5, 1915.
“Soldiers of the Old Army and the New.—Some of you have already won imperishable renown at our first landing, or have since built up our footholds upon the Peninsula, yard by yard, with deeds of heroism and endurance. Others have arrived just in time to take part in our next great fight against Germany and Turkey, the would-be oppressors of the rest of the human race.
“You, veterans, are about to add fresh lustre to your arms. Happen what may, so much at least is certain.
“As to you, soldiers of the new formations, you are privileged indeed to have the chance vouchsafed you of playing a decisive part in events which may herald the birth of a new and happier world. You stand for the great cause of freedom. In the hour of trial remember this, and the faith that is in you will bring you victoriously through.
“Ian Hamilton, General.”
[151] Here, as in other places, it is impossible to record individual acts of courage, but the service of Lieut. W. T. Forshaw (9th Manchesters) became almost a legend on the Peninsula. On the night 7th-8th, he was holding a northern corner of the vineyard with half a company when he was attacked by a swarm of Turks converging down three trenches. “He held his own, not only directing his men and encouraging them by exposing himself with the utmost disregard of danger, but personally throwing bombs continuously for forty-one hours. When his detachment was relieved, after twenty-four hours, he volunteered to continue the direction of operations. Three times during the night of August 8–9 he was again heavily attacked, and once the Turks got over the barricade; but after shooting three with his revolver he led his men forward and recaptured it. When he rejoined his battalion he was choked and sickened by bomb fumes, badly bruised by a fragment of shrapnel, and could barely lift his arm from continuous bomb throwing.”—Official Report for his V.C.
[152] Sir Ian’s Suvla dispatch; and Australia in Arms, pp. 221–223.
[153] The name was due to a repeated saying of Colonel J. L. Johnston (11th West Australian Battalion), that if only he could bring howitzers instead of field-guns to bear on it, he would have “a jolly good time there.”—Australia in Arms, p. 188.
[154] Australia in Arms, p. 225. The author, Phillip Schuler, was present, but it is noticeable that Captain C. E. W. Bean, who was also present, does not directly mention this underground line.
[155] Of this eagerness, Capt. Bean, the Australian correspondent, gives an example: “‘Is there any room up there?’ I heard a man in the trench ask of those who were crouching under the parapet. One of the men on the fire-step looked down. ‘I dare say we could make room for one,’ he said. ‘Shift along, you blokes—we can squeeze in a little one.’ The man in the trench was clearly relieved. ‘I want to get up here along with Jim,’ he said. ‘Him and me are mates.’”—See the Australian newspapers, October 17, 1915.
[156] As to these seventy prisoners (who were caught and disarmed in one tunnel) and the Turkish wounded, Major-General Walker, commanding the division, and my old schoolfellow at Shrewsbury, told me shortly afterwards as we stood on the spot that, until they could be brought safely across the open, they were carefully placed lying down in line under the shelter of that white loopholed parapet as the most secure place the Australians could find for their comfort.
[157] Australia in Arms, p. 238.
[158] Captain C. E. W. Bean, in the Australian papers, October 4, 1915.
[159] Captain C. E. W. Bean’s account in Australian papers of October 4, 1915. Phillip Schuler (Australia in Arms, p. 241) says his words were: “Men, you have ten minutes to live,” and “Three minutes, men.” But this is an unlikely utterance from so good an officer.
[160] Captain C. E. W. Bean in the Australian papers of November 2, 1915.
[161] The arrangement of these forces is given in Sir Ian’s dispatch.
[162] Captain Bean, Australian papers, October 14, 1915.
[163] See “From Quinn’s to Rhododendron,” in the Chronicles of the N.Z.E.F., August 8, 1917.
[164] It was either on this position or upon a neighbouring knoll known as Destroyer Hill that the following peculiar event occurred, as narrated by Captain Bean (Australian papers, October 25, 1915): “The Otago Battalion, which was clearing out the small trenches ahead of it as its head wormed up the Chailak Ravine, swung up the slopes of this hill. The battalion had just reached the shelf below the Table Top, and was pushing up its line for the final rush over the hill when there arose a strange uproar on the top above them. There was the sound of the piling of arms, followed by vociferous cheering and wild rounds of applause and hand-clapping. It was the Turks on the top of the hill who had decided to surrender, and who did not want any mistake to be made as to their intention.” The Otagos alone are said to have taken 250 prisoners that night (Australia in Arms, p. 253).
[165] Captain Bean, Australian papers, October 25. He adds: “I believe that fifteen men actually managed to reach the Turkish trench on the summit. They never came back.”
[166] Captain Bean’s account in Australian papers, October 25, 1915.
[167] Fortunately for the brigade, the Turks had withdrawn their guns during the night (7th and 8th) owing to the Suvla landing, and had not yet brought them back to W Hill.
[168] Sir Ian’s dispatch quotes the order.
[169] Phillip Schuler definitely says: “Mistaking the target, the destroyers dropped 6-inch high-explosive shells amongst the Indian troops” (Australia in Arms, p. 261). But, accurate though he generally was, I believe he is here mistaken. I never heard the destroyers mentioned at the time, and I doubt if their guns could have shelled a reverse slope. Further on (p. 263) he says that during the Turkish counter-attack next day the Anzac guns shelled “the reverse slope.” If that was possible, another explanation besides the one I suggest above may be considered.
[170] Apparently, it was mainly to this incident that Dr. Stürmer referred in the following passage: “In those September” (he means August) “days I had already had some experience of Turkish politics and their defiance of the laws of humanity, and my sympathies were all for those thousands of fine Colonial troops—such men as one seldom sees—sacrificing their lives in one last colossal attack, which if it had been prolonged even for another hour might have sealed the fate of the Straits and would have meant the first decisive step towards the overthrow of our forces; for the capture of Constantinople would have been the beginning of the end.”—Two War Years in Constantinople, p. 86.
[171] Sir Ian’s dispatch.
[172] The Story of the Anzacs (Messrs. Ingram & Son, Melbourne), p. 87.
[173] Sir Ian’s dispatch.
[174] For a detailed account of the four battalions in the 29th Brigade during this action see The Tenth (Irish) Division in Gallipoli, pp. 62–120. Two companies of the 5th Connaught Rangers (Colonel Jourdain) went up to the Farm on the evening of the 10th after the other troops had been withdrawn, and brought in many wounded whom they found lying there in great need of water and attention.
[175] Phillip Schuler put them at 18,000 (Australia in Arms, p. 270).
[176] Australia in Arms, p. 271.
[177] Sir Ian’s dispatch twice mentions these batteries as the sole land artillery. All three belonged to the 11th Division. Other batteries of field-guns and howitzers arrived later, but we are speaking of the Suvla first landing—the really critical time.
[178] Sir Ian in his dispatch reckons twelve 18-pounder guns and eight mountain-guns as starting. Only the mountain-guns and four of the 18-pounders were in action by August 8, but the 59th Brigade, R.F.A., and the 4th Highland Mountain Brigade, R.G.A., were attached to the 11th Division. On the 9th, two field batteries were on Lala Baba. On August 13 to 15 the 58th Brigade also arrived at Suvla, and was attached to the 10th Division. On the 19th a battery of the 4th Howitzer Lowland Brigade, R.F.A., was placed in position on Lala Baba.
[179] Sir Ian’s dispatch gives a full account of the warships, lighters, and trawlers sent with the landing-force, together with details about the water-supply provided. He does not mention the large transport Minneapolis, which I think must have taken the place of the sloop Aster, for we certainly had batteries of mountain-guns with their teams on board. She was a liner, taken over with all her staff; and as instances of petrifying routine I remember that, as I hoped to land at 4 a.m., I asked if one could get a cup of tea then, and was haughtily informed, “On this ship breakfast is always at 8.30”; and later in the morning, when the fighting was at crisis, the “stewards” were sweeping out the gangways with vacuum-cleaners as they had swept for years. Habits of routine were, however, fatally disturbed in the following spring when the Minneapolis was torpedoed between Egypt and Salonika.
[180] The Tenth (Irish) Division in Gallipoli, p. 142.
[181] These fires appear to have arisen near the true Hill 10, which was taken about this time by a mixed force of Northumberland Fusiliers, Dorsets, and West Yorks, after a severe struggle against a redoubt there.
[182] Sir Ian’s dispatch says the naval authorities were unwilling to land them at A Beach “for some reason not specified.” Considering what misfortune had already happened there, the above explanation appears to me at least sufficient. But A East and A West had been discovered by the navy before the unfortunate landing at B Beach began.
[183] The Tenth (Irish) Division at Gallipoli, pp. 125 and 140.
[184] So Major Bryan Cooper in The Tenth (Irish) Division, p. 129. My impression at the time was of no rush, but a calm though laborious trudge. Major Cooper, however, continues: “The 7th Dublins in particular were much encouraged by the example of their Colonel.... While every one else was dashing swiftly across the neck, or keeping close under cover, it is recorded that Colonel Downing—a man of unusual height and girth—stood in the centre of the bullet-swept zone, quietly twisting his stick.” “Dashing swiftly across” that sand would, I think, be impossible under any impulse, and cover did not exist; at least I never found it, though I toiled over that spit many dozen times, and it always remained exposed to shell-fire from W Hill.
[185] The movements of Hill’s battalions, and their relation to Sitwell’s are difficult to follow, chiefly owing to the changes of command and intention. After speaking of these changes, Sir Ian in his dispatch continues: “I have failed in my endeavours to get some live human detail about the fighting which followed.” The detail has now been largely supplied by Major Bryan Cooper in The Tenth (Irish) Division in Gallipoli, pp. 127–135. In the main, I have followed his account, the chief outstanding difficulty being the presence of the 6th Lincoln and 6th Border Battalions, which did not belong to Sitwell’s or Haggard’s Brigades, but to Maxwell’s (the 33rd). Major Cooper says two battalions of the 11th Division reinforced Hill’s column, and Sir Ian mentions those two as distinguished at the taking of the hill. But how they came to be under Sitwell’s command, or under Hill’s, is not yet clear. I can only suppose that, as Sitwell’s force could not or did not move, General Hammersley ordered Maxwell to send them over from Lala Baba. After Brigadier-General Haggard was wounded, Colonel J. O‘B. Minogue (9th W. Yorks) took temporary command of the 32nd Brigade.
[186] Sir Ian’s dispatch.
[187] For an account of the thirst, see Sir Ian’s dispatch and The Tenth (Irish) Division, pp. 137, 145, 148, 157–158. Also Suvla Bay and After, by Juvenis, pp. 37, 40–43, where the services of the destroyer to the 10th Division are mentioned.
[188] Sir Ian’s dispatch.
[189] The water question was much disputed at the time, and many contradictory versions were given. I have here followed the account given me in recent (1917) conversation by a naval officer who was closely connected with the superintendence of the landing. The real causes of the thirst, in any case, were the want of receptacles and the distance from the firing line. As to the failure at A Beach, it must of course be remembered that the naval chart was old and useless, and no survey had been possible without betraying the point chosen for landing.
[190] Sir Ian’s dispatch.
[191] So as not to interrupt the narrative, one is obliged to mention only in a note the remarkable achievement of our submarines on this critical and unfortunate day. In order to help E14, which was already in the Sea of Marmora, E11 had forced her way through the nets in the Straits, and on the 8th torpedoed a Turkish warship coming down towards Maidos with reinforcements.
[192] Turkish information has since shown that Liman von Sanders had brought up two divisions (7th and 12th) by forced marches from Xeros.
[193] The Tenth (Irish) Division, pp. 158–161.
[194] One of these was called A East, the other A West. Between them was Kangaroo Beach, where the Australian Bridging Train built a landing-stage. They also built a very useful little pier close to the “cut” into the Salt Lake, chiefly for the service of the wounded being taken off to hospital ships. Of the Suvla beaches A West was the most generally used, though a small harbour was afterwards blasted out of the rocks at the extreme point.
[195] The “Times” History of the War, chap. cxii. p. 198.
[196] A detailed account of this small but gallant action is given in The Tenth (Irish) Division in Gallipoli, pp. 161–180.
[197] The daring of the Turkish snipers, who crept across our lines at night and perched in the small trees, was proved when, on September 8, General Inglefield’s horse was shot under him as he rode along the beach from Anzac.
[198] Sir Ian’s dispatch.
[199] Ibid.
[200] In the spring of 1916, General Peyton commanded the successful expedition against the Senussi, west of Egypt.
[201] The brigades were composed as follows:
(1) 1st South Midland (Brigadier-General Wiggin)—
Warwickshire and Worcestershire Yeomanry, Gloucestershire Hussars.
(2) 2nd South Midland (Brigadier-General Lord Longford)—
Bucks Hussars, Berks and Dorset Yeomanry.
(3) North Midland (Brigadier-General F. A. Kenna, V.C.)—
Derbyshire Yeomanry, Sherwood Rangers, South Notts Hussars.
(4) London Brigade (Brigadier-General Scatters Wilson)—
City of London Roughriders, 1st County of London Middlesex Hussars, 3rd County of London Sharpshooters.
Divisional Cavalry—
Westminster Dragoons, Herts Yeomanry.
[202] The two brigades (30th and 31st) of the 10th Division, at Suvla, having lost nearly three-quarters of their officers and half the men, were withdrawn to rest near Suvla Beach on August 17, and on August 22 General F. F. Hill, the trusted Brigadier of the 31st, was invalided away with dysentery. As previously noticed, he was succeeded in command by Brigadier-General J. G. King-King, General Staff Officer (1).—The Tenth (Irish) Division, p. 208.
[203] The “Times” History of the War, Part 84, p. 205.
[204] It was unfortunate that, standing beside a machine-gun at the front parapet of Chocolate Hill, I was just at that moment struck on the head by shrapnel, and so was unable to witness the confused advance which led to the failure. By the time I returned to my position at 4.15, the mistake had been made. It may, perhaps, be medically interesting that for the previous forty-eight hours I had been suffering from high fever, but the violent rush of blood from the wound appeared to reduce the temperature, and at night I walked to the dressing-station at Suvla Point in perfect health, except for mere pain and exhaustion.
[205] Sir Ian’s dispatch. In a Supplementary Dispatch the 9th Sherwood Foresters and 6th Borders were also specially mentioned.
[206] Sir Ian’s dispatch.
[207] As usual throughout this history, I have found it impossible to record the countless instances of individual bravery, but I may mention the case of Captain O’Sullivan (1st Inniskilling Fusiliers). Early in July, describing one of the actions at Helles, Sir Ian had written: “A young fellow called O’Sullivan, in the Inniskilling Fusiliers, led a bombing party into one end of an enemy trench, and cleared it of the enemy. The Turks counter-attacked with bombs, and drove him and his men out with a good deal of loss. Again he cleared the trench, filling his pockets and belt with bombs. Again he was driven back. A third time he led the attack, and this time the trench was held and remains in our possession. Within an hour of this last feat of arms, a trench was lost to the right in prolongation of the Inniskilling Fusiliers. This same young fellow, who had already gone through enough to shake the nerves of the most veteran soldiers, led his company down into the trench himself, running along a few yards ahead of them out on the parapet, exposed to a tremendous musketry fire, chucking bombs into the trench just in front of the leading files, so as to clear the way for them. There is a limit to luck, and this time he was wounded, but I hope he may pull through.” He pulled through, and on August 21 twice led his company up against the Turkish trenches on Scimitar Hill, and twice was driven back. Collecting the men in a little hollow of the ground, he said, “Now I depend on you, my lads, and we’ll just have one more charge for the honour of the regiment.” He led them all by a clear 20 yards up the hill, leapt into the trench, and there died.
[208] Brigadier-General R. S. Vandeleur succeeded to the command of this brigade on September 22.
[209] The Tenth (Irish) Division, pp. 188–192. Until that volume appeared, the Connaught Rangers had not received the public credit due to this serviceable exploit, though in Gallipoli they were spoken of with the highest praise.
[210] During the night Captain Gilleson, the Presbyterian chaplain of the 14th Australian (Victoria) Battalion, worked incessantly at bringing the wounded back to safety. After daylight next morning, still hearing cries from the exposed slope over the crest of the ridge, he crept out and found a British soldier (probably Hants or Connaught Rangers) wounded and tormented by ants. With help of two others (one also a Presbyterian chaplain) he had dragged the man about a yard when he fell mortally wounded. The man, I believe, was also killed; the Presbyterian was wounded. Later on (August 28) Captain Grant, a New Zealand padre (the form of religion was not mentioned to me at the time) went searching for a wounded friend along a trench filled with dead and wounded Turks. To the wounded he attended on his way; but hearing conversation farther on, he thought he recognised his friend’s voice. Turning a sharp corner of a traverse, he came face to face with the Turks, and was instantly killed.
Both Captain C. E. W. Bean (Australian papers, Oct. 28, 1915) and Phillip Schuler (Australia in Arms, p. 275) mention these incidents, which were described to me on the spot a few days after they happened. Taken with Sir Ian’s dispatch, these two authorities give a clear idea of the confused fighting around Hill 60. For the action of the Connaught Rangers, The Tenth (Irish) Division in Gallipoli should be read, as mentioned above. For myself, I had the great advantage of going over the ground with General A. H. Russell a day or two after the final action of August 29.
[211] Lieut.-Colonel C. W. Gwynn was Chief of Staff. The Division consisted of:
5th Australian Brigade (Brigadier-General W. Holmes)—
17th, 18th, 19th, and 20th Battalions.
6th Australian Brigade (Colonel R. S. Browne)—
21st, 22nd, 23rd, and 24th Battalions.
7th Australian Brigade (Colonel J. Burston)—
25th, 26th, 27th, and 28th Battalions.
[212] The Tenth (Irish) Division, p. 197.
[213] The Tenth (Irish) Division, p. 199.
[214] One of the transports (the Southland), conveying a battalion of the 2nd Australian Division, was torpedoed on September 2, thirty-one miles from Mudros. The firemen took to the boats, but the engineers kept sufficient head of steam to work the pumps and electric light. Finding she was filling only slowly, they called for soldier volunteers to help with the stoking, and in an hour got steam up to the blowing-off point. The destroyer Racoon, which had come alongside, was then able to supply practised stokers, and they, with the engineers, stoked the boilers into Mudros harbour.
[215] “It was not entirely an easy matter to assimilate these reinforcements. As a rule, a draft is a comparatively small body of men which easily adopts the character of the unit in which it is merged. In Gallipoli, however, units had been so much reduced in strength that in some cases the draft was stronger than the battalion that it joined, while it almost invariably increased the strength of what was left of the original unit to half as much again. As a result, after two or three drafts had arrived, the old battalions had been swamped.”—The Tenth (Irish) Division, p. 235.
[216] The Tenth (Irish) Division, p. 229. The 54th Brigade remained in Egypt.
[217] During this period of comparative inaction, it was announced that Flight-Lieutenant Edmonds in a seaplane sank a Turkish transport full of reinforcements with a heavy bomb, and that a submarine sank a transport of 11-inch guns in the Sea of Marmora (September 7).—The “Times” History of the War, Part 84, p. 211.
[218] The full speech is quoted in Nelson’s History of the War, by Colonel John Buchan, vol. xi. p. 18.
[219] See Sir Charles Monro’s dispatch on the Dardanelles evacuation.
[220] The further history of the 10th Division (which I visited once more among the mountains beyond Lake Doiran), as well as of the whole Salonika campaign up to summer 1917, is told in The Story of the Salonika Army, by my colleague, Mr. G. Ward Price.
[221] Colonel John Buchan puts the number at 13,000 (Nelson’s History of the War, xi. 26).
[222] See the speech of Venizelos to the Athenian Chamber, August 26, 1917.
[223] Belgrade fell to Mackensen on October 9; the Bulgarians crossed the Serbian frontier on the 11th, occupied Uskub on the 22nd, and Nish on November 5, thus opening direct railway communication between the Central Powers and Constantinople through Sofia. Monastir fell on December 2, and by the middle of that month the Serbian army and the Allies had been entirely driven out of Serbian territory.
[224] Sir Ian’s dispatch, last section but two.
[225] Sir Ian’s dispatch.
[226] Sir Charles Monro’s dispatch (March 6, 1916).
[227] Sir Charles Monro’s dispatch (March 6, 1916).
[228] Speech in the House of Commons, November 2, 1915.
[229] See The “Times” History of the War, Part 84, p. 213. It is worth noticing that on November 18, Lord Ribblesdale in the House of Lords declared that it was common knowledge that Sir Charles Monro had “reported in favour of withdrawal from the Dardanelles, and adversely to the continuance of winter operations there.” One can only suppose that, in saying this, Lord Ribblesdale deliberately intended to mislead the enemy, who could hardly believe so rash a betrayal of intention could be made with impunity, if the statement were true.
[230] Lord Kitchener’s original objection to evacuation may perhaps be supported by a passage in an article by Dr. E. J. Dillon (Fortnightly Review, February 1918): “The evacuation of Gallipoli was not warranted in the light of all the elements of the problem, because from the point of view of the Coalition it meant the asphyxiation of Russia and her ultimate disappearance as a belligerent, and to ward off this calamity the sacrifice of several warships would not have been excessive.”
[231] See Australia in Arms, pp. 284, 285. The fate of those suffocated by fumes perhaps caused the rumour that the Turks used poison gas. I never heard an authentic case of this, though at one time we were all ordered to carry gas-masks.
[232] That little animosity existed on the Turkish side either is shown by the following note which I made early in December, though I cannot date the incident precisely: “The community of human nature between men who are out to kill each other was lately shown here by an interval of friendliness, as often in France. It began with the wagging of a Turkish periscope over the sandbags. One of the Australians (it was at Anzac) wagged his periscope in answer. Then Turkish hands were held up, moving the fingers together in the Turkish sign of amity. Presently heads appeared on both sides, the few words that could be understood were said, cigarettes and fruit were thrown from one side to the other, and a note, written in bad French, was thrown to the Australians, saying, ‘We don’t want to fight you. We want to go home. But we are driven on by the people you know about.’ I presume that meant the Germans. Then signs were made that an officer was approaching. The heads disappeared, and bombs were thrown from trench to trench in place of fruit.”
[233] The figures for Suvla, as given me by the Staff at the time, were 44,000 men; 90 guns of all calibre, including one anti-aircraft gun; 3000 mules; 400 horses; 30 donkeys; 1800 carts; 4000 to 5000 cartloads of stores.
[234] The account of the Suvla evacuation is founded on notes I made at the time and on an article of mine which passed the Military Censor two days after the event, but was not published in full till I received General Birdwood’s permission in the following spring. It is perhaps worth while here contradicting the report that the Turks were bribed to allow the army to withdraw without opposition. That malignant depreciation of a most skilful enterprise was a libel both on the enemy and on our own officers and men. There was not a vestige of truth in it.
[235] The following rough estimate of the Turkish forces was made by the General Staff about a week before the evacuation:
| Place. | Regiment. | Number. |
| Suvla Lines— | ||
| Kiretch Tepe | 126th | 2100 |
| At foot of Kiretch Tepe | 127th | 3000 |
| Farther in plain | 33rd | 3000 |
| Anafarta plain | 79th | Uncertain |
| Farther south | 35th | Uncertain |
| Still farther south | 34th | 1800 |
| Near Scimitar Hill | 66th | Uncertain |
| Foot of W Hill | 25th | 2400 |
| Opposite Hetman Chair | 66th | Uncertain |
| Anzac Lines— | ||
| Opposite Kabak Kuyu | 17th | 1600 |
| Opposite Hill 60 | 16th | 1200 |
| Upper Asma Dere | 20th | 1800 |
| Abdel Rahman Bair | 19th | 2300 |
| Koja Chemen Tepe | 24th | 2000 |
| The Farm | 22nd | 1800 |
| Battleship Hill | 48th | 2000 |
| Opposite Russell’s Top | 72nd | 2000 |
| In reserve there | 48th | Uncertain |
| Opposite Quinn’s | 27th | 2000 |
| German Officers’ and Johnston’s Jolly | 57th | 2000 |
| Lone Pine | 125th | 1600 |
| South of Lone Pine | 47th | 1800 |
| Leane’s Trench | 36th | 1000 |
| Extreme south to Gaba Tepe | 77th | 2700 |
Three regiments were in reserve at Suvla, and three at Anzac. The Army Headquarters were just south of Koja Dere; Corps Headquarters in the north behind Anafarta Sagir; in the south at Koja Dere. There were large camps at Ejelmer Bay and Turchen Keui (a few miles inland from the bay) in the north, and at Koja Dere in the south.
At Helles the numbers were then uncertain or not available, but the following regiments were posted opposite our lines from our left to right:
| Place. | Regiment. |
| West of Gully Ravine | 70th |
| East of Gully Ravine | 71st |
| West of Krithia Nullah | 124th |
| East of Krithia Nullah | 38th |
| On Achi Baba Nullah | 45th |
| Between that and Kerevez Dere | 56th |
| In Kerevez Dere | 55th |
| Opposite Fort Gouez | 42nd |
| Overlooking the Strait | 41st |
Taking an average of 2000 per regiment, this gives a total of 18,000, apart from reserves; but it is a low estimate. The Headquarters were at Ali Bey Farm.
[236] The 11th Division (Major-General Fanshawe) now held the Xeros shore and the Kiretch Tepe Sirt. On the broad and deeply ravined undercliff below Jephson’s Post, and even beyond it, the 32nd Brigade (9th West Yorks, 6th Yorkshire, 8th West Riding, and 6th York and Lancaster) had elaborately entrenched and fortified positions which they called the “Green Knoll” and “The Boot.” Brigadier-General Dallas was justifiably proud of the work and of his Yorkshire Brigade. After going round the complicated trenches with me on December 11, he whispered sorrowfully, “Pity to leave them! Pity to leave them!” And to the last he went from man to man, adjuring one to shave, another to wash his shirt, and all to keep smart whatever happened. To such temper the difficult operation owed its success.
[237] The management of their mules by the Indians was remarkable. They controlled those incalculable animals as though they were trained dogs. It was pathetic that the Indians mistook the name of their destination (Mudros) for Madras. “Do you want to go to India so much, then?” an officer asked. “Does a man want to go to heaven?” was the reply.
[238] Beside my personal observation during visits from Suvla in the final days, my chief authorities upon the Anzac evacuation are Phillip Schuler’s Australia in Arms, an officer’s diary in the “Manchester Guardian’s” History of the War, Part 43, p. 187; Sir Charles Monro’s dispatch; and conversation with men who were present. A German correspondent with the Turks on the night of the evacuation wrote in the Vossische Zeitung of January 21, 1916: “So long as wars exist, the British evacuation of the Ari Burnu and Anafarta fronts will stand before the eyes of all strategists of retreat as a hitherto quite unattained masterpiece.”
[239] A dilatory and whispering 6-inch shell, thrown from a black-powder battery north of Troy, was called “Creeping Caroline” by our men. Similarly the French called one particular shell “Marie pressée”—no doubt a “high velocity.”
[240] On December 30 Sir Charles Monro handed over his command to General Sir Archibald Murray and left Mudros for Alexandria on his way back to France.
[241] Shortly before it left, a deed of singular heroism added honour to the 42nd Division. On December 22, in front of Krithia, Second Lieut. Alfred Victor Smith (5th East Lancashire, 126th Brigade), only son of the Chief Constable of Burnley, was throwing a grenade when it slipped from his hand and fell to the bottom of the trench, close to several officers and men. He shouted a warning, and jumped clear into safety. But seeing that the others were unable to get into cover, and knowing the grenade was due to explode, he returned without hesitation and flung himself down on it. He was instantly killed by the explosion. See the London Gazette announcing that the Victoria Cross had been conferred on him after death.