VII
The army of Osman consisted entirely of volunteer horsemen, who were called akindjis. They wore no specified uniform. But they were superb riders and moved together ‘like a wall’—an expression that has come down to the present day in Ottoman military drills.[153] When Osman planned a campaign, he sent criers into the villages to proclaim that ‘whoever wanted to fight’ should be at a certain place on a certain day.
Orkhan was the organizer of the Ottoman army. He and his successor Murad laid the foundations of a military power which was without rival for two centuries. Although there is no ground for the claim of many historians that the Osmanlis were a hundred years ahead of Europe in organizing a standing army,[154] they were certainly pioneers in the complete organization of an army on a permanent war footing. Orkhan understood well the principle qui se laisse payer se laisse commander thirty years before Charles V of France.
His irregular infantry (azabs) were placed in the front when battle was engaged.[155] It made little difference how many of these were killed, or whether they made a good show. They served to draw the first fire of the enemy. When the enemy’s energy was exhausted or when he was led to pursue the fleeing azabs, thinking the victory his, he came upon the second line, which consisted of paid, disciplined troops. These were accustomed to fighting together, were acquainted with their leaders’ commands and strategy, and had a tremendous advantage over the usual mercenaries of the period in that they served a cause to which their lives were devoted and a sovereign whose interests were identical with their own. Whether this were due to training begun in the days of adolescence, or to the knowledge that bravery would be rewarded not by booty alone (always an uncertain quantity which the ordinary mercenary invariably begins to think of securing before his fighting work is really accomplished), but by promotion in the service and substantial gifts of land, the result was the same.
The corps of salaried soldiers were called Kapu-Kali Odjaks, and their service was centred in the person of their sovereign. They were supposed to be continually ‘at the door of the Sultan’s tent’. The Sultan paid them regularly and personally. They served him regularly and personally. When they went into the field with a commander other than the Sultan, the commander was regarded, during the term of his commission, as in the place of the Sultan.[156] There came to be seven of these odjaks: the janissaries, the adjami-oghlular (novices), the topjis (field-artillerymen), the djebedjis (smiths), the toparabadjis (artillery and munition drivers), the khumbaradjis (siege-artillerymen), and the sakkas (water-carriers).[157] It is impossible to state just when these distinctive corps arose, but they are the logical development of Orkhan’s Eulufeli, the year-in and year-out soldiery who followed arms as a definite profession and enjoyed a regular salary fixed by law.
The akindjis, cavalry scouts and yet more than that, served as an advance-guard, and opened up the country to be conquered. The greatest dangers and the richest rewards fell to them. They were recruited from among the holders of military fiefs (timarets). Guides (tchaousches) and regular paid corps of cavalry (spahis) completed the organization.
It may be that Orkhan had learned a valuable lesson from his observation of the Catalans and of the early Turkish invaders in Europe. For he arranged his organization in such a way that the army would depend directly upon him, and not upon subordinates who might be led to put their personal interests above those of their chief. With the exception of the akindjis, whose loyalty was secured by their fiefs, there were no irregular bands raised and led by adventurers. Unity was the first striking characteristic of the Ottoman army.
The second characteristic was readiness. We have already seen how Andronicus III ‘gathered in haste’ the army which he tried to oppose to the Osmanlis. Lack of time for preparation is the excuse for many a Byzantine disaster. An early and competent traveller wrote that the Osmanlis knew beforehand just when the Christian armies were coming and where they could be met to the best advantage. For they were always on a war footing, and their tchaousches and spies knew how and where to lead. ‘They can start suddenly, and a hundred Christian soldiers would make more noise than ten thousand Osmanlis. When the drum is sounded they put themselves immediately in march, never breaking step, never stopping till the word is given. Lightly armed, in one night they travel as far as their Christian adversaries in three days.’[158]