CHAPTER XXXIII.
GROWTH OF FOREIGN COMPETITION FOR TRADE—NEED FOR NEW MARKETS—INDIA AND CHINA AS MARKETS—NECESSITY FOR CHEAP COMMUNICATIONS—ACTION TAKEN BY MR COLQUHOUN AND MYSELF—PROBABLE EFFECTS OF THE INDO-SIAM-CHINA RAILWAY—INDO-BURMESE CONNECTION IN COURSE OF CONSTRUCTION—REASONS FOR CHOOSING MAULMAIN AS TERMINUS FOR CONNECTION WITH CHINA—SIAMESE SECTION NOW UNDER SURVEY—EFFECTS OF CONNECTING MAULMAIN WITH SIAMESE RAILWAY—COST OF CONNECTION—PROSPECTIVE ADVANTAGES—CARAVAN-ROUTES FROM MAULMAIN TO RAHENG—ESTIMATE FOR BRANCH TO OUR FRONTIER—APPROXIMATE ESTIMATE FOR CONTINUING THE BRANCH TO RAHENG—COMPARISON BETWEEN PROPOSED BRITISH AND RUSSIAN RAILWAYS—BRITISH INTERESTS IN SIAM—MR SATOW’S LETTER—SIR ARTHUR PHAYRE’S OPINION ON OUR DUTY TO PROTECT SIAM—CONNECTION OF BURMAH AND SIAM BY RAILWAY THE BEST FORM OF SUPPORT—CANNOT ALLOW SIAM TO BE ABSORBED BY FRANCE—EFFECT OF SUCH ABSORPTION UPON BURMAH—OPINIONS OF SIR CHARLES BERNARD—CANNOT AFFORD TO HAND OVER OUR MARKETS TO FRANCE—OPINION OF SIR HENRY YULE—PAYING PROSPECTS OF THE BRANCH TO THE FRONTIER—SIR RICHARD TEMPLE’S OPINION—THE MOST PROMISING OF ALL FUTURE RAILWAY LINES—EFFECT OF PROPOSED LINES—SIR CHARLES BERNARD’S PROJECT—COMPARISON BETWEEN MAULMAIN AND BHAMO ROUTES—TAKAW ROUTE—KUN LÔN FERRY ROUTES—THE MAULMAIN ROUTE OR NOTHING—IMPORTANCE OF THE QUESTION.
In these days of commercial rivalry, when foreign nations are competing with us in every neutral market in the world, when Europe and North America are being closed against our goods by prohibitive tariffs, and the Royal Commission appointed on the late depression of trade has placed on record its opinion that over-production has been one of the prominent features in the course of trade of recent years, and has urged us to display greater activity in searching for and developing new markets, we cannot afford to neglect any advantage we possess for the extension of our trade.
The seaboard and navigable rivers of the world give access to only limited areas for commerce. To open up new markets, we must penetrate the great and populous but landlocked interiors of the unopened continents of Asia and Africa, and our vast colonial possessions, with railways thus providing cheap means of communication in the extensive areas that are now shut off from our commerce by the prohibitive cost of carriage.
India and China, the largest and most densely populated markets yet undeveloped, contain together 700,000,000 inhabitants—one-half the population of the earth. These consist of civilised people, with their commerce uncramped at their ports by prohibitive tariffs, who would gladly become our customers if by cheapening the cost of carriage we could place our machine-made goods at their doors at a less price than they can acquire local hand-made manufactures.
Since 1881 my friend Mr Colquhoun and I have been striving our utmost to interest the public in the great and yet undeveloped markets of the East. We have tried to impress upon Government and the mercantile and manufacturing community, that Great Britain is in possession of certain advantages which render her the envy of competing nations. She is in possession of India and Burmah, and is thus the next-door neighbour to the landlocked half of the great and populous empire of China.
We have endeavoured to awaken, and have awakened, an intelligent interest in the subject of the importance of connecting India with China by a railway; and by exploration have proved to the satisfaction of every one who has studied the question, that a practical route between these two great empires exists, and that along that route a railway can be constructed at a reasonable cost, which would tend greatly to enhance the commerce of Great Britain and India with its Eastern neighbours—Siam and its Shan States, and the western half of China.
When this railway is constructed, its inland terminus at Ssumao will assuredly form the nucleus of a system of Chinese railways which will spread through the western, central, and southern provinces of China. One of these lines would be made to join our terminus at Ssumao with Pakhoi, the southern treaty-port in the China Sea, and thus complete a through line from the Persian Gulf to the China Sea by a railway extending solely through British, Siamese, and Chinese territories. This line would pass through and develop the richest part of Asia, foil the designs of the French, who are hoping and endeavouring to oust our trade from Southern China and Central Indo-China, and give us vast markets for the future expansion of British and British-Indian commerce.
Our project divides itself into two portions—the Indo-Burmese and Burmo-Chinese railways. The first involves the connection of the Indian and Burmese systems of railways by a line joining the railways in Northern Assam, viâ Mogoung, with the Rangoon and Mandalay line, together with an extension of that railway from Rangoon to Maulmain. The connection of Rangoon with Maulmain by railway has since been advocated by Sir Charles Crosthwaite, the present chief commissioner of Burmah, so far as proposing that its first section should be surveyed and put in hand by the Government of India.
The connection of the Indian and Burmese railways viâ the Patkoi pass met with unreasonable opposition; but actual exploration, carried out by the Government, has lately proved that, as we have averred all along, the route is the easiest, cheapest, and most feasible that exists for the connection of these two systems of railways. The section of the line from Sagain—a town opposite Mandalay—to Mogoung, is already sanctioned, and about to be commenced; and the other portion of the railway will doubtless be taken in hand as soon as the first section is completed.
The second portion of our project is the connection of Burmah with Siam and China by railway. Our study of previous explorations, followed by exploration-surveys conducted by myself in Siam and its Shan States, and by my colleague Mr Colquhoun through Southern China and by the Bhamo route into Northern Burmah, afforded positive proof that the path for a railway from Burmah to China should have its western terminus at Maulmain. By starting from that seaport, the following advantages would be gained:—
1. The difficult country lying between the Irawadi and Salween rivers in Upper Burmah would be entirely avoided, because Maulmain is situated near the mouth of the Salween, and on its eastern bank.
2. By proceeding eastwards from Maulmain, you cross the hill-ranges by the best route, as can be seen by comparing the Bhamo route, which trends eastwards over an alpine country from Bhamo at the navigation head of the Irawadi river, with the Takaw route, lying 230 miles to the south of the Bhamo route, and with the Maulmain route, which lies 350 miles farther to the south. It is evident that the farther you go to the north, the more difficult do the routes leading from Burmah to China become.
3. The line from Maulmain, owing to the easy country through which it passes, could be constructed at a fraction of the cost of any line projected from Upper Burmah, and would have the advantage of easier gradients throughout, and would be the shortest possible route for connecting Burmah with the capital of the Chinese province of Yunnan.
4. The line from Maulmain, from its shortness, would possess great advantages in competing with the lines projected by the French from their Tonquin seaboard, and would thus enable us to carry our goods from Maulmain to Ssumao, the frontier-post of South-western China, for £3 a ton, or about one-twentieth of the average tariff now charged upon our goods by the French customs in Tonquin.
5. The line from Maulmain would likewise connect with the projected system of Siamese railways, and thus tend greatly to the advantage of Burmah, and to the development of British trade throughout Central Indo-China.
6. The Siamese system of railways projected by us, and now being surveyed and estimated for the King of Siam by English engineers, if joined on with Maulmain by our projected branch to the frontier, would connect our seaport of Maulmain with Bangkok, the capital and chief seaport of Siam, thus affording us more rapid mail communication with China and Australasia, and would complete more than two-thirds of our projected railway to China. The remaining 230 miles could be cheaply constructed, and would open up the British States lying to the east of the Salween throughout their length, and thus give us an easy control of the country.
The branch line which we propose for the connection of our seaport of Maulmain with the Siamese system of railways at Raheng, as I shall proceed to explain, would probably cost less than one and a half million sterling,[[24]] the cost of fifteen average miles of English railway. Half of this line lies in Siamese territory, and the other half in the Indian province of Burmah; and approximately half of the cost would have to be defrayed by the King of Siam, leaving only three-quarters of a million sterling as the charge to the Indian Government.
This branch alone would open out to our seaport of Maulmain the nine million inhabitants of Siam and its Shan States, and would, together with the Siamese line to Kiang Hsen, greatly decrease the cost of carriage to our British Shan States lying to the east of the Salween, which are believed to contain about one and a half million inhabitants. It would likewise greatly decrease the cost of carriage to the Chinese province of Yunnan, and thus, by lowering the prices, tend greatly to increase the number of our customers. The journey from Maulmain to our frontier at Myawadi, on the Thoungyeen river, is performed by porters in four days, and by cattle caravans in about eight days.
In referring to the route from Myawadi to Raheng, the ‘British Burmah Gazetteer’ states that “the route between them, being much frequented, is clear and open, and the journey can thus be performed in two days.”
The hills between the Thoungyeen and Raheng were surveyed for the King of Siam some years before my visit; and the copy of the survey, which was lent me by the governor of Raheng, showed no less than eleven distinct caravan-routes crossing the hills: the passes crossed are said to be low, the greatest height attained by Mr Ross on his journey from Maulmain viâ Myawadi to Raheng did not exceed 2400 feet above sea-level; and I was informed by some of our leading foresters who worked the forests in these hills, that the routes traversing them were quite as easy as those crossing the range which separates Maulmain from our frontier at Myawadi.
Myawadi lies 60 miles east of Maulmain, 40 miles west of Raheng, and 630 feet above the level of the sea. It is separated from Maulmain by a range of hills over which the caravans clamber by a pass having its summit 1600 feet above sea-level, or 800 feet lower than the pass between Myawadi and Raheng. The ascent, however, from Myawadi to the crest of the Raheng pass is reduced by 630 feet—the height that Myawadi lies above the sea; and the descent to Raheng by 400 feet—its height above the sea-level.
Sir Charles Bernard, when chief commissioner of Burmah, estimated the cost of connecting Maulmain with our frontier station of Myawadi by railway at 105 lakhs of rupees, which, at the present rate of exchange, 1s. 4¼d., is equivalent to £710,938, or less than three-quarters of a million sterling; and he informed me that he had received a letter from Mr Satow, our consul-general in Siam, giving his opinion that “Siam would be ready to carry out its part of the Burmah-Siam railway if the Government of India expressed its willingness to connect the two countries by railway at the frontier.”
As Myawadi is one-third less distant from Raheng than from Maulmain, and the country to be crossed is barely more difficult than to Maulmain, it is not likely that the cost of the section from Myawadi to Raheng would exceed that of the portion from Maulmain to Myawadi: therefore the expense of joining the terminus of our section at Myawadi with the Siamese main line at Raheng would not exceed three-quarters of a million sterling; and the whole of the branch, from the main line to Maulmain, would not cost more than one and a half million sterling.
Unlike the projected and partially completed Russian line across Asia, which passes through the great deserts and wastes neighbouring the north of the Chinese dominions, our line would traverse the richest part of Asia. It would, as already stated, foil the designs of the French, who are striving to oust our trade from Southern China and Central Indo-China, and would give us vast markets for the future expansion of British and British-Indian commerce.[[25]]
The British stake in Siam already exceeds that of any other nation. According to Mr Satow, our fellow-subjects trading and working in that country comprise about ten thousand souls; and in his letter to Earl Granville, dated Bangkok, May 7, 1885, he stated that “nine-elevenths of the total export trade [of Siam], valued at nearly £1,650,000, is with Hong Kong and Singapore, and must contribute greatly to the prosperity of those two colonies. Of the imports, about £340,000 represents English manufactures; £200,000 products of British India; while Hong Kong sends goods, partly of British, partly of Chinese origin, to about the same value. From the Straits Settlements produce is imported to the value of £22,000, making in all £762,000, or over three-quarters of a million sterling.
“The imports from the continent of Europe are valued at £164,000, and from the United States £50,000. If we suppose the imports from Hong Kong to be equally divided between goods of British and Chinese origin, the result will be, articles produced in Great Britain and British possessions to the value of £640,000, against £314,000 from the continent of Europe, the United States, and China combined.
“The commercial interests of Great Britain in Siam, as compared with the rest of the world, are consequently—In fixed capital, as 2 to 1; in steamers, as 8 to 1; in exports, as 9 to 2; in imports, as 2 to 1.
“It is further to be noted that the import duties are only 3 per cent ad valorem. If Siam proper were to pass into the hands of any European Power with protectionist tendencies, it cannot be doubted that the tariff would be greatly increased; and it is by no means improbable, if we are to judge by what has been proposed with regard to the trade of Tonquin, that differential duties would be imposed to the disadvantage of British trade.”
After reading this report, it is not surprising to find the late Sir Arthur Phayre, who had been for many years chief commissioner of Burmah, writing to the ‘Times,’ in his letter dated October 12, 1885, that “I beg to add that British interests appear also to require that the King of Siam, so long the friend and ally of the United Kingdom, should be assured of support in the conservation of his independence and of the integrity of his dominions.” No better assurance of support could have been given by us to the King of Siam than the promise of co-operation in the junction of the two countries, Burmah and Siam, by railway. Our trade with Siam would in that case vastly and rapidly expand, our fixed capital in the country would increase, and our railway route to China, which would pass through Northern Siam and its Shan States, would never be allowed to pass into French hands, and the French, knowing this, would cease all thought of further encroaching on the king’s territories.
The strengthening of the French hands in Indo-China by the absorption of Siam would render France a more formidable antagonist, for it would keep a larger army in Indo-China and have a larger recruiting-field for its native auxiliaries. The absorption of Siam by France would place the French frontier within sixty miles of Maulmain; would render the country to the south of Burmah, between it and our Straits Settlements, French territory; would destroy our trade in Siam and its Shan States; stop the recruitment of cattle[[26]] and elephants from those countries, which are the breeding-grounds for Burmah; would ruin our pedlars, foresters, timber-traders, and other fellow-subjects in Siam; and would block for ever our connection with China by railway.
There seemed to be every reason for making arrangements with Siam for connecting it with Burmah, and continuing the proposed railway to China; and if Sir Arthur Phayre had been still chief commissioner of Burmah, doubtless the advisability of pushing on the railway would have been strongly urged upon the Government. Unfortunately for the extension of our trade in the East, the reins of the province were in the grasp of an official of a different school. In a letter which I have leave to quote, Sir Charles Bernard gave me his reasons, in a very straightforward manner, for opposing the connection of Burmah with Siam by railway. He said: “I demur to the correctness of any statement that I ‘had set my face against our being linked on to Siam.’ I have distinctly and repeatedly said that I would gladly see a railway from Maulmain viâ Raheng to Bangkok and the Yunnan border. And I have repeatedly said that such a railway would do great good to that part of British Burmah, and especially to the port of Maulmain. But I have at the same time said that in my judgment that railway would be too dearly purchased if it involved a guarantee from India to Siam against French aggression. And I have also said that in my belief the railway from Maulmain to Raheng would not pay for many years; also, that there are other railways in Burmah and in India on which money from the Indian Treasury would be more usefully spent than on the Maulmain-Raheng line. If you or any one else can get British Burmah linked by railway to Siam, I shall regard you as benefactors to British Burmah. But, as you are aware, benefits can be bought at too high a price.”
We have seen in Mr Satow’s letter to Earl Granville that the interests of Great Britain in Siam are greater than those of any other nation—and, indeed, than those of the rest of the world combined. We have been warned by him that if Siam is allowed to pass into the hands of any European Power with protectionist tendencies, it would be the death-blow to our commerce in the country. We have seen that the late Sir Arthur Phayre considered British interests in Siam already sufficient to require us to assure the King of Siam of support in his independence, and of the integrity of his dominions.
The connection of Siam with Burmah by railway would certainly increase our stake in Siam by developing British and Indo-Siamese trade; but I fail to see how it would increase the responsibilities of the Government of India. Our trade is not in such a position as to allow us to hand over markets to the French. The Siamese dominions are at present nearly exclusively British markets, and it cannot be expected that the British nation will calmly stand by and see its goods turned out of those markets by our French rivals.
I was glad to find during the discussion of the paper in which I gave an account of my explorations before the Royal Geographical Society, that the India Council, as represented by Colonel (now Sir Henry) Yule, the most eminent authority on Indo-China, did not consider the French bugbear a sufficient reason for blocking the Burmah-Siam-China Railway, and with it, the extension of our commerce in South-eastern Asia. He said: “As to the projects themselves, described in the paper, I cannot now say much, for what I have to say will probably have to be said elsewhere [in the India Council]. I feel the difficulties that beset them—not engineering difficulties, but of quite another kind. Still, I cannot but hope that events which are even now [November 1885] upon the wing [the annexation of Upper Burmah and its Shan States] may help to clear the way for the execution of the projects which Mr Colquhoun had at heart, and on which he and Mr Hallett have expended an amount of thought and energy which I cannot believe will be in vain.”
As to the statement by Sir Charles Bernard, that in his “belief the railway from Maulmain to Raheng would not pay for many years,” that is merely a matter of opinion, and estimates based upon opinions as to the prospective trade that would accrue to projected railways in Burmah have always proved below the mark. The paying prospect of railways in Burmah was officially allowed by the Government of India, in its despatch to the Secretary of State in January 1881, where it stated that—“The great financial success of the Rangoon-Prome Railway (a success almost unprecedented in railway construction in India) has demonstrated that railways in Burmah will, on account of the enterprising character of the people, and the great undeveloped wealth of the country, not only give large indirect returns in land, customs, and forest revenue, but will pay, within a very short period after being opened to traffic, a fair percentage of net income on their capital cost.”
The line to our frontier, besides opening out and developing the country through which it passed, would have the advantage of conveying the traffic to and from the Siamese lines with which it would be connected; and when the line is extended to China, a vast increase of traffic would be ensured. There is not the slightest reason to doubt that when the Siamese railways are constructed, this branch line to our seaport would be the most profitable line in our Indian dominions. It would not be undertaken until the connection between Raheng and Bangkok is completed; and if opened up at the same time as the Siamese section of the branch, it is certain that it would in the first year far more than recoup the Government for the interest upon the outlay for its construction.
Sir Richard Temple, who has administered some of the largest provinces in India, in writing of our proposed line to China, gave his opinion that—“By all the accounts of exploration, also on a consideration of the commercial and political geography, this is the most promising of all the future railway lines that can be devised.” And in comparing our north-western frontier of India with our north-eastern or Burmese frontier, Sir Richard says: “The ways across the north-western frontier, from the British side, lead to nothing profitable for British interests. On the other hand, the ways across the north-eastern frontier lead to regions full of prospective advantage for British commerce and for British expansion in every way.... On our north-western frontier the railways are mainly for strategic or political objects, and only in part for commercial objects. But on this our north-eastern or Indo-Chinese frontier, the railways will be mainly for commerce, for the opening of new markets, for the spread of cultivation and habitation, for material development in every way.” Our system of railways would act like arteries, developing the resources, mineral and agricultural, of all the regions they traversed, and would enable us to throw British goods right into the interior, and bring back in return the produce of Siam and China for shipment at Maulmain.
Let us compare this project with that which is favoured by Sir Charles Bernard. In his address to the Scottish Geographical Society in November 1887, some months before Sir Andrew Clarke had arranged with the King of Siam for the surveying of the Siamese system of railways, he said: “A railway is now being made, and will be open within eighteen months, to Mandalay. That line will doubtless be continued to Bhamo, 700 miles from the sea, and 35 miles from the border of China. The ancient route of traffic between Burmah and China was by Bhamo and the Irawadi valley. We ought to make the most of that route, and exhaust its possibilities, before we committed ourselves to creating another and a wholly new route. No doubt the lofty passes on the old path between Bhamo and Yunnan-fu are most serious obstacles to a railway on that route. But it might be possible to find much easier gradients if the Shweli valley and other valleys leading towards Sunning-fu, instead of to Tali-fu, were examined. A thorough examination of the country would take one or two seasons.”
We have seen that the branch line for connecting Maulmain and Raheng will probably cost about 1½ million sterling. Mr Archer, our vice-consul at Zimmé, reported in 1887 upon the portion of our proposed railway from Raheng to China that lies in Siam and its Shan States, as follows:—
“Best Route for Railway through Northern Siam.—If the railroad were made to pass through Zimmé, the great mass of mountains between the city and Kiang Hai would probably prove a serious difficulty. But if it were to follow the valleys of the Meh Nam and Meh Wang as far as Lakon (our route), there would appear to be no great natural difficulties to overcome, and thence north-eastward to Muang Ngow the road would lie over easy undulating country. From Muang Ngow to Penyow the watershed of the Meh Nam and Meh Kong must be crossed; but it is of no great elevation (merely undulating ground), and I believe would not present any serious difficulties. Once this range is passed, the whole way to Kiang Hsen, and some distance farther northward, is on almost quite level ground, apparently highly suitable for a railway. This route I think preferable, not only because it offers greater natural facilities, but because a large portion of the country traversed is capable of great development, and it is evident that the advantages of a railway to these States are based, not on the actual wealth, but on the consequent development, of the country.”
To learn the character of the country along our route between Kiang Hsen and Kiang Hung, we can turn to Garnier’s account of the part of his journey skirting the river from Kiang Hsen to Sop Yong, a place half-way between Kiang Hsen and Kiang Hung. There were no serious physical difficulties noted by him on this part of his journey, and his party turned inland at Sop Yong simply because it was the rainy season, and the plains neighbouring the river were swampy. The only other European observer who has traversed any portion of our route between Kiang Hsen and Kiang Hung is Mr Archer, who, in his journey back from Kiang Tung in 1887, struck it at Muang Len (Lim, a place 35 miles to the north of Kiang Hsen). In the account of his journey he reports that “Muang Len has a more prosperous appearance than any Chiengtung (Kiang Tung) district I had yet seen. The valley is broad, and there are numerous villages with extensive rice-fields. These settlements are comparatively new, for, after the destruction of Chiengsen (Kiang Hsen) in 1803, Chiengmai (Zimmé) advanced up the valley of the Meh Kong and took off captives all the inhabitants they could find. The junction of the Meh Len with the Meh Kong is about a day’s journey from the village where we encamped. From Muang Len to Huapong, also a prosperous-looking district, is a day’s journey on a good road, mostly through bamboo forest; and the next day, May 31st, we passed through Hong Luk, crossed the Meh Sai, and reached Ban Tham in Chiengsen, about 10 miles below the Siamese fort. Hong Luk is a populous and well-cultivated district. In passing through Wieng Phan, just south of the Meh Sai, and close to the Siamese fort, I saw a settlement just being made in the jungle by Chiengtung people, who were busy putting up their houses.”
From all information gained by explorers, it is evident that from Raheng northwards to Kiang Hung, a distance of 470 miles, the line for our proposed railway is exceptionally free from physical difficulties. Kiang Hung lies 2000 feet above sea-level. Near this important town the Meh Kong or Cambodia river will have to be crossed; and after crossing the river, an ascent of 2520 feet will have to be made by the railway along the slope of the Yunnan plateau to Ssumao, the frontier-post of China. The total length of this line from Maulmain to Ssumao is estimated at 700 miles.
Mr Colborne Baber’s survey and levels along the Bhamo route, which proceeds from Bhamo—a town 700 miles from a seaport, situated at the head of the steamer navigation on the Irawadi—through Tali-fu to Yunnan-fu, the capital of the Chinese province of Yunnan, showed that the country traversed by the route was of an alpine character, and exceedingly difficult. The passes over the series of mountains between Bhamo and Tali-fu have their summit at a greater altitude than that of any of the passes over the Alps, with the exception of the Stelvio, which lies 800 feet above the level of perpetual snow. The Bernina, the next highest to the Stelvio, only rises 7658 feet above sea-level, whereas the pass between Bhamo and the Salween river lies at an altitude of 8730 feet; that between the Salween and the Meh Kong at 8166 feet; that between the Meh Kong and Chutung at 8510 feet; that between Chutung and the Shan-Pi river at 8410 feet; and that between the Shan-Pi and Tali-fu at 8090 feet.
To connect Bhamo with Yunnan-fu, the chief town of the Chinese province of Yunnan, would require a railway at least 967 miles in length. The stupendous cost of such a line can be judged from the report of Mr Colborne Baber, who surveyed and levelled the portion of the route lying between Momein and Yunnan-fu. He says—“The trade-route from Yunnan-fu to Teng-yuch (or Momein, the frontier-post of China with the Chinese Shan States) is the worst possible route with the least conceivable trade.” Again he says—“I do not mean that it is absolutely impossible to construct a railway. By piercing half-a-dozen Mont Cenis tunnels and erecting a few Menai bridges, the road from Burmah to Yunnan-fu could doubtless be much improved.”
The advocates of the Bhamo route assume that because the crow-line distance from Bhamo to Yunnan-fu is only 375 miles in length, these two places can be easily and cheaply connected by railway.[[27]] They seem not to have studied, or if they have studied, are unable to comprehend Mr Baber’s report, maps, and sections, which were made by him when accompanying the Grosvenor Mission from Yunnan. These have been issued both by the Royal Geographical Society and as a Parliamentary Blue-book (China, No. 3, 1878), and are therefore easily accessible.
In the Blue-book the maps are drawn to a large scale, 3 miles to the inch, and the levels of the route above sea-level are written upon it, and given separately in a table on pp. 30 and 31 of the report. The country passed over by the caravan-route is clearly delineated on these maps. The track is seen traversing high passes, between great hills, towering up thousands of feet above the crest of the passes, and crossing deep ravines and steep valleys, not in a level crow-line (that would necessitate viaducts many thousand feet high, at an expense in comparison with which the cost of the Panama Canal would be as nothing), but zigzagging up and down the valleys and ravines, and following the general contortions of the passes. Thus the crow-line of 375 miles is developed into 489½ miles for caravan traffic, so as to enable mules and human beings to clamber over the mountain-passes between the two places. To any competent engineer who studied the maps, it would be evident that the length of a railway with a ruling gradient of 100 feet to a mile, carried from Bhamo to Yunnan-fu, would be at least 967 miles.
Some of the ravines are so steep, that if the crow-line were adhered to, mules, or even goats, could not crawl up them. Let us take, for instance, the descent from the crest of the pass lying to the west of the Salween to the bridge over that river. The dead drop in a crow-line of one mile is 6300 feet, and a zigzag seven miles in length has had to be made up the face of the ravine to enable mules to ascend and descend it. Railway trains are neither flies, nor crows, nor mules, and therefore can neither crawl up precipices, follow a crow-line through the air, nor proceed up a mule-track. To ascend this ravine, this crow-line distance of one mile, the railway track, if straight, would have to be at least 63 miles long, in order to allow a locomotive to haul up a load equal to six times its own weight in addition to itself. The 100–feet-to-the-mile gradient up on the straight portions would have to be flattened at every curve of the zigzags: this means additional length, which, together with the necessary level-lengths which are required to give runaway trains a chance of being again brought under control, would add three or four miles on to the 63 miles mentioned above. It will be rather within than without the mark to allow 66 miles for the alignment of a railway over this single crow-mile of country.
The difficulties, so well described by Mr Baber, lie in Chinese territory, and it is not reasonable to expect that the Chinese would ever consent to undertake such a costly railway through such a poor and sparsely populated hilly region as is traversed by the Bhamo route.
The only other route from Upper Burmah to Yunnan that has been followed by Europeans is that from Hlinedet (Hlaingdet), a station about 80 miles to the south of Mandalay, viâ Kiang Tung and Kiang Hung, to Ssumao. In 1872 Dr Cushing ascended the Hlinedet pass to Poayhla, 4160 feet above the sea, and proceeded to Moné or Mong Nai, crossing four hill-ranges. From Moné he passed over three ranges of hills, and descended to the Takaw ferry, where he crossed the Salween. Between the Salween and Kiang Tung three or four ranges of hills, as well as four or five spurs, making eight ascents and descents, occur on the route, one of the passes rising to 6400 feet above the level of the sea, and another to 5500 feet. The country between Kiang Tung and Kiang Hung is equally difficult, the route crossing five mountains before reaching the Meh Kong river at Kiang Hung.
The Salween river might be reached from Poayhla by another route, swaying slightly to the north, if it is found possible to carry a railway across the Nattit pass, 4800 feet above sea-level. This pass, however, is so difficult, that it is feared it will prove an insurmountable obstacle. Anyhow, a railway from Hlinedet to the Salween will prove a most expensive undertaking; and the country to the east of the ferry, between it and the Meh Kong, although much easier than on the Bhamo route, is so difficult that it is in the uttermost degree unlikely that it will ever be traversed from west to east by a railway.
Two other routes—the ones that are at present apparently favoured by the Government for the connection of Burmah and China—converge on the Salween at the Kun Lôn ferry. One starts from Mandalay and proceeds eastward through Theebaw and Thoungze to the ferry; and the other, after ascending the Shan plateau by the pass leading from Hlinedet to Poayhla, takes a north-easterly direction to the ferry. Some of the difficulties on the first route are evidenced by the report of the Government surveyors on the portion of the route lying between Mandalay and Thoungze. From this it appears that the cart-road to Maymyo (Pyinulwin), a place 24 miles to the east of Mandalay, has had to be contoured to 44 miles, and ascends in this distance 3300 feet. The descent to Thoungze from Maymyo is given by our surveyors at 1600 feet, and the greater part of the ascent from the plain of the Irawadi is said to be very steep. Thoungze lies on the route to Theinni, and is only 40 miles in an air-line from Mandalay, or about one-fourth of the air-line distance from Mandalay to the Kun Lôn ferry, where the route would cross the Salween. The difficulties of the route, according to people who have traversed it, are said to be still greater beyond Thoungze. The great gash in the country, between 1100 and 1200 feet deep, called the Goteik defile, has to be descended by steps cut in the face of the rock for 800 feet to a natural bridge across the ravine, and, having crossed it, the precipice on the other bank has to be ascended in the same manner. The banks of the ravine are 3600 feet above the level of the sea. Between Thoungze and Theebaw, besides this ravine one descent of 800 feet and another of 1600 feet have to be made, as well as ascents of 1500 feet, 800 feet, and 900 feet. Even on reaching Theebaw you are only half-way to the Salween, and have not crossed the high range which divides the drainage of the Irawadi from that of the Salween.
I have no information as to the level of the country beyond Theebaw, but I find in the accounts of a journey from Theinni to the Kun Lôn ferry, that 20 miles out of the 52 miles is very difficult. Looking at these particulars, it will be seen that the ascent from Mandalay to the summit of the plateau at Maymyo is nearly double as great as the ascent from our frontier to the crest of the pass on the Maulmain-Raheng route, and the descent to Thoungze is nearly equal to that to Raheng. It is therefore evident that the difficulties to be encountered within 40 miles of Mandalay by a railway from Mandalay to the Salween must be considerably greater than those which would be met by the Burmah-SiamChina Railway between our frontier and Raheng, and probably greater than those on the whole of the line from our frontier to Kiang Hung.
The second route starts from Hlinedet, and clambers the steep western flank of the Shan plateau to Poayhla, from which place the Kun Lôn ferry across the Salween can be reached by caravans by various routes, all of which are difficult. The northerly route over the Nattit hill is believed to be impracticable for a railway. Another, proceeding eastwards, crosses four ranges of hills before it reaches Mong Nai. It thence proceeds northwards to the ferry, crossing a very difficult range of hills before reaching the Salween. The portion of this route between Hlinedet and Poayhla, and between Poayhla and Mong Nai, presents serious obstructions to the construction of a railway. To avoid one of the hills between Poayhla and Mong Nai, and to cross the others by easier passes, Mr Scott, the assistant superintendent of the Shan States, proposes that the railway, after leaving Poayhla, shall take a great sweep southwards to Mong Hpai, and from Mong Hpai proceed in a north-easterly direction to Mong Nai. This will involve a railway distance between Rangoon and Mong Nai of about 525 miles, and, according to him, Mong Nai is distant 200 miles from the Kun Lôn ferry across the Salween. The distance from Rangoon to the Kun Lôn ferry would therefore be at least 725 miles, or a greater distance than Maulmain is from the Chinese frontier at Ssumao. The most serious obstacle between Mong Hpai and Mong Nai, according to Mr Scott, is “the deep gash in the hills made by the rapid waters of the Nam Pwon,” and it is not yet known whether that “deep gash” can be avoided. Anyhow, the avoidance of the gash might add considerably to the length of the railway.
I have previously shown how difficult the country east of the Salween, along the Bhamo and Takaw routes, is—one line lying to the north of the Kun Lôn ferry route, and the other south. There is every reason to believe that the difficulties to be encountered on the Kun Lôn ferry route, although perhaps less than on the Bhamo route, will be greater than on the Takaw route.
The Bhamo and Kun Lôn ferry routes, which seemingly are the only ones finding any favour with Government, deal only with the country west of the Salween, are purely local routes, and can never be anything else, as their termini would still be on the western or Burmah side of the enormous physical barriers crossed by the caravan-routes from Upper Burmah to Yunnan. To talk of either Bhamo or the Kun Lôn ferry as on the Chinese frontier for the purposes of trade, is altogether misleading, as both these places are separated from the fertile and populous regions of Southern China by alpine country, over which the Chinese would never consent to carry a railway.
The more the subject is examined, the more evident does it become that the only possible railway connection between Burmah and China must be by the Maulmain route projected by us. It is a case of that or nothing.
The enterprise which we propose is big with promise, not only for the present but for future generations. Our policy, political as well as commercial, should be to develop by every means in our power our intercourse and intercommunication between India and China—between British manufacturers and millions of Chinese, Siamese, and Shan customers. A prudent and yet resolute readiness to undertake reasonable responsibilities, inseparable from the duties of a great commercial nation, should be the key-note of our national policy, and should be the badge of no particular party. It is for the commercial community and working classes to see that such a policy is undertaken and adhered to.
We are a nation of shopkeepers, and it is by trade that we live. Every nerve should be strained by the manufacturer and working man to gain for British commerce the great market existing in Western China. The French are already in the field to snatch it from us; surveyors and engineers are at work surveying and estimating for the railways from the Tonquin seaboard. The race in this case is to the swift, and it still remains to be seen whether French or British enterprise will win the much-coveted prize.
It will be strange indeed if, with the advantage we now possess by the annexation of Upper Burmah and its Shan States, the press, the mercantile community, the manufacturers, and working classes of this kingdom, cannot induce the Government to make or guarantee the sections of our railway to China which lie in British territory, and thus throw open for British commerce the most magnificent, unopened, and available market in the world.