FOOTNOTES:
[52] Sir H. Erskine.
[53] Yet the Jews were but a seventh part so great fools as the Quakers.
[54] He had been met by Governor Lyttelton, who was taken in the Blandford by the French.
[55] Lord Egmont.
[CHAPTER VI.]
Tax on Plate debated in the Commons—Tranquillity restored in Ireland—Hessian and Hanoverian Troops taken into our pay—Private Bill for a new Road from the Metropolis—The French attack Minorca—Vote of Credit—Debates on the Prussian Treaty—Speeches of Pitt and Murray—Militia Bill in the Lords—Troops raised by Individuals—Violation of Public Faith—The Prince of Wales attains his Majority—History of Lord Bute—Scheme of taking the Prince from his Mother.
March 3rd.—On the report from the Committee for the tax on plate, it was a day of total ignorance: Fox, Hume Campbell, and Pitt all showed how little they understood the subject. The shrewdness of the first, the assertions of the second, the diction of the latter, were ridiculously employed on a topic that required only common sense, and a little knowledge of business. Legge alone shone: he entered, beyond his usual brevity, into a detail of the nature of coin, exchange, gold, silver, premiums, and the mistaken or real advantages of those manufactures. He observed, that plate was not luxury, but a national way of hoarding; that this tax was to cease where luxury began; for the greatest Lords were not to pay beyond 2000 ounces. That it would all go abroad, unless the proportions of gold and silver were regulated. That Mr. Locke’s first treatise on that subject had been written to serve a purpose: he had afterwards understood the matter better. That while we overvalued gold in proportion to silver, the French were taking the contrary extreme, in order to draw silver into their country, and to encourage the manufacture of plate, which proved a beneficial article of their trade, and of which we were discharging ourselves. Of all dead stock, plate was the most valuable. Louis the Fourteenth and Charles the First had made great use of the resource of plate. When employed, it comes out with its whole value about it. The reputation of a stock of it has its weight. Would you in the outset of a war produce your last stake? Would you, while increasing your paper substance by borrowing on the Sinking Fund, diminish your real treasure? Many other taxes would produce above 30,000l.
On the second reading of the Bill, Legge argued against it with more warmth: if gathered loosely, it would produce a trifle; if strictly, three times as much as granted for. France would think us bankrupt; no nation had done this but in sieges and civil wars. He condemned it as a register of so much personal estate; and as this knowledge would assist the housebreaker in his campaign; and as it would go to the destruction of one of the most flourishing manufactures in Europe, producing clear for the labour alone 32,000l. a year. Our silversmiths would now go to France, and the plate would meet them there to be worked. Sir George Lyttelton remarked that Legge’s arguments went against all inland duties in general; and that as little wealth ought to lie dead as possible. That on laying the coach-tax, the coach-makers came to the Treasury and complained they should be ruined; yet their trade had increased since. If we took a galleon, would it be advisable to lay up the treasure against a day of calamity? He defended the method of collecting this duty by Excisemen; did not find that Excise was now so terrible: Sir Francis Dashwood had proposed an Excise on meat, and he had not perceived that it had much shocked the House—in fact, no powers, he said, were more gently exercised than those of Excise. No complaint had been made on the coach-tax: this was to be under the same regulation. Our trade would not bear more customs; nor could we support the war, but by a despotic mortgage of the whole Sinking Fund. His chief partiality to the plate-tax arose from the poor being exempt from it.
George Grenville spoke well, chiefly censuring this as a tax to be paid on honour—had the coach-tax been honourably paid? The land-tax at the Revolution was laid on honour—did honour tax itself fairly? Here only middling persons were to be rated; the poor and the rich were equally exempted. This would be a sort of don gratuit, or benevolence; the worst sort of tax. The Parliament of Paris was copying our best times—from what were we copying? Murray pleaded that by leaving the most magnificent sort of plate, which is only where there is above 2000 ounces, untaxed, no discouragement would be given to the manufacture. Dr. Hay saying that this tax was unlike that on coaches, for they, if not used, did not pay; Doddington replied, that he hoped Dr. Hay would not wish the taxes postponed, till such could be found as all men would approve. He did profess himself unequal to speak to what many did know they were unequal to hear; but could not comprehend how men, who had so long gone on losing so much interest by a stock of plate, should now declare they would eat on trenchers, because it was to be taxed at a halfpenny an ounce. He observed how contradictory the objections were: in the same breath complaints were made that this tax subjected us to excise, and was a tax upon honour. The only unanswerable objection he had heard was, that we were over-taxed already. He wished we had been as scrupulous in former wars, yet this was the only war he remembered, purely English.
The new duty was carried by 245 to 142. Yet if Fox would have yielded to it, the Duke of Newcastle would have given up the tax. It produced at last but 18,000l.
Let us turn our eyes for a moment to Ireland, where tranquillity was at last restored by the prudence of Mr. Conway, and by the venality of the patriots. Mr. Conway was armed with all the powers and all the qualities that could compose the animosities of a factious people, inflamed by mercenary chiefs; for he had authority to satisfy their demands, his virtue gave no hold to abuse, his temper kept him impartial, and his good sense kept the Duke of Devonshire so. The patriots dismissed the woes of their country, for which they had no longer occasion; Mr. Boyle was first restored to the Chancellorship of the Exchequer; Carter was made Secretary of State; and Malone, King’s Counsel: pensions, with arrears, were restored to the sufferers, and sprinkled on others; and, at the conclusion of the Session, Mr. Boyle, for an Earldom and a pension, resigned the Chair to Mr. Ponsonby, brother-in-law of the Lord Lieutenant; Malone consented to accept a lucrative employment; and Sir Arthur Gore a Peerage; but the late Speaker being burnt in effigy by the mob, and Malone being insulted at his own door, the latter was terrified, and declined from fear what he could not resist from virtue: Sir Arthur Gore, too, waved his Peerage for the present. On the departure of the Duke of Devonshire, the Chancellor, Lord Kildare, and Lord Besborough, were appointed Lords Justices. The Primate, enraged at this arrangement, quarrelled with his friend the new Speaker, who was so far qualified to succeed Mr. Boyle, that he made as little scruple to sacrifice his connexions, to promote himself. The Primate had tried to make him Speaker; Lord Kildare had opposed it: the Primate was now dropped; and Lord Kildare and Mr. Ponsonby’s father divided the Government between them; for the Chancellor was in a languishing state, came over to England, and died soon after.[57]
England began to be alarmed with an invasion from France; the Ministry had already made a requisition of the troops which Holland ought by treaty to furnish us. Fox, Lord Granville, and Lord Anson, had foretold that they would be refused; Newcastle and the Chancellor insisted they would be sent; demanded them, and were refused. On this a message was delivered to both Houses to notify his Majesty’s having sent for the Hessians in his pay: it was received with some murmurs, but not opposed. Lord George Sackville, either to throw difficulties on the Duke of Newcastle, with whom he was angry on Irish accounts, or to pay court to the Throne, hinted a preference to Hanoverians, whose behaviour as soldiers he much commended. This thought was embraced—if it had not been concerted; and on the 29th of April, he proposed, in form, to address the King to send for his Electoral troops, after stating the weakness of the country, the vast extent of unguarded coast, and the opinion of officers in favour of the utility and good service of those foreigners.
The Tories owned they preferred Hanoverians to Hessians; but Pitt, who came down ill, and affirming that nothing but the importance of the question should have drawn him out of his bed, spoke long against the measure; pleaded his respect for the King as the cause of his opposition, as he feared we should advise his Majesty’s involving another country of his in equal or worse peril than our own. That this would be offering him our advice in his Electoral capacity: that in no period of his life he had spoken against the Hanoverians as bad troops: that against what force the French could land we had certainly sufficient defence: that in 1690, when France had beaten our fleet at Beachy-head, and had an Army in Ireland, yet we had surmounted all that danger. That, in the Dutch war, even with a suspected King, we had coped with Holland and France. De Witte, the greatest man since Plutarch, had proposed an invasion to D’Estrades, but he treated it as a chimeric attempt. Burnet says, the Wirtemberghers were cruel friends: he should be for sending these Hanoverians to Ireland: he would vote for raising any number of new troops: the last unfortunate war had formed many great officers; he would not interpose these foreigners to the promotion of those gallant men; nor would force a vote upon the King, when he might send for his troops without. Lord George replied with great spirit and sense; and the Motion was agreed to by 259 to 92. The next day this resolution was communicated at a conference to the Lords, who agreed to it, after a severe speech from Lord Winchelsea against the new patriots.[58]
The consideration of this danger, and of the measure of bringing over foreigners, always obnoxious, at least as a precedent, was often interrupted by one of those trifling affairs with which the wisdom of this grave nation is so apt to be occupied. A new road towards the eastern counties, by which the disagreeable passage through the city would be avoided, had been proposed to be made on the back of London. The Duke of Grafton had estates there, which, by future buildings likely to accompany such an improvement, would be greatly increased. Part of this road was to pass over grounds of the Duke of Bedford, but in so small proportion as he thought would not indemnify him for the desertion of other buildings, which he had to a great amount in worse parts of the town. He consequently took this up with great heat. The Duke of Grafton, old and indolent, was indifferent about it. The Duke of Argyle, who did not love[59] the Duke of Bedford, and others who now wished to thwart him and his faction, privately spurred up the Duke of Grafton to make a point of this. Fox embraced the occasion as a trial for power with Newcastle. Rigby, who had endeavoured to soften the Duke of Bedford, now to humour Fox, adopted his master’s warmth, and added all his own violence, treating the name of the Duke of Grafton (who was much respected) with the greatest licentiousness in the House of Commons. The Duke of Newcastle was frightened, and wished to avoid the decision; but the Duke of Bedford, who had received all manner of encouragement from the Chancellor and his friends, pushed on the determination, was betrayed, was beaten, was enraged,—in less than a year he proposed to the Duke of Grafton’s friends to extend the plan of the road.
April 30th.—The estimate of the charge of the Hessian troops being laid before the House, Pitt made a bitter speech on the Ministers, as bubbling the nation, or being bubbled in this extravagant bargain, which would cost 400,000l. more than a like number of British troops. But we were going to be undone: he should be undone with a clear conscience and untainted honour. Those who supported such measures would bear the marks on their foreheads. We could not carry on the American war, from our extravagance. God could not bless a country with resources enough to resist such profusion. He admired the finesse of the Hessians, who from the hungry allowance of Germany had raised their pay to British.
A few days afterwards, the Hanoverian estimate being brought, and Lord Barrington commending it preferably to the Hessian (which had been voted, and was past danger), Pitt, with great dexterity of irony, commended it too, and lashed Lord Barrington for the extravagance of the former, asking whether he or that Secretary at War had been more severe on the Hessian account; on that subsidiary juggle,—for the Hanoverian, no man could find fault with it—one was the bargain of the Ministers, the other the simple measure of his Majesty: there one saw the distinction! nothing but good flowed from the King; nothing but ruin from his servants. “I choose,” said he, “that they should fall by a friendly hand, and that the condemnation of his patrons and friends should come from the noble Lord. But must we engage mercenaries because France does? She has not blood enough in her own veins for the purposes of universal Monarchy. This waste on Hessians would have conquered America, or saved Minorca, which he despaired of. Why did not the House inquire why we had been so neglected? if so weak, why stayed till now? whence else Minorca likely to be lost? what poor conduct! They waited till some private man (Lord G. S.) dared to ask for foreign troops. Had we been secured here, the fleet might have gone safely to Minorca. The neglect looked wilful, and as if they hoped that trade would call out for peace, and that Minorca to be regained would be a screen for compounding for America,—but,” continued he, “I don’t call this an Administration, it is so unsteady. One is at the head of the Treasury; one, Chancellor; one, head of the Navy; one great person, of the Army—yet, is that an Administration? They shift and shuffle the charge from one to another: says one, I am not General; the Treasury says, I am not Admiral; the Admiralty says, I am not Minister. From such an unaccording assemblage of separate and distinct powers with no system, a nullity results. One, two, three, four, five Lords meet;—if they cannot agree,—oh! we will meet again on Saturday;—oh! but says one of them, I am to go out of town,—alas! said he, when no parties remain, what aggravation of the crimes of the Ministry that no good comes from such unanimity.”
Fox answered seriously, that nobody could be glad of or receive advantage from the loss of Minorca; and he asked if Mr. Pitt wished to see a sole Minister.
Pitt replied, that he did not wish to see a single Minister, but a system and decision; that the loss of Minorca must be caused by infatuation or design, for that miners for the defence of Fort St. Philip were only raising then. Indeed, were Mr. Fox sole Minister, there would be decision enough.
Lord George Sackville said, he had moved for Hanoverians from the consideration of our unprovided state, and as a temporary Militia; and because the fleet sent into the Mediterranean was not superior to the French, and might be beaten; the French might follow their blow and come hither. He was glad it had been mentioned, because everybody was struck at Minorca being left as in time of profound peace; it would become Ministers to prove that neglect, necessity.
It was known now, that after great preparations at Toulon,[60] of which we had long been advertised, Marshal Richelieu was sailed with considerable force to attack Minorca, where we had but four regiments, in Fort St. Philip, under General Blakeney, the Deputy-Governor, a stout soldier, but too old. Lord Tyrawley, the Governor, was in England, so were his chief officers, members of Parliament. Admiral Byng was sent, but too late, and with only ten ships, and those in ill condition, and worse manned. The only hope was in Fort St. Philip, for in an island of that importance all was left to a hope. The late Duke of Argyle had begun a fort on the other side of the harbour, which would have been inpregnable; but Lord Cadogan, out of hatred to him, destroyed it, and built this, less secure, at an enormous expense. On the 5th, came notice of the French being landed on the island.
In the meantime passed through the Commons that distant and forlorn succedaneum, the Militia Bill. A few persons had sat till near six in the morning fabricating and fashioning it. Mr. Pitt recommended it in another fine dissertation, and it was voted without a division.
May 11th.—Mr. Fox delivered a message from the Crown, desiring to be enabled against any emergency, and to make good the new treaty with Prussia. The next day Sir George Lyttelton moved a vote of credit for a million. It was much censured. Northey said he did not oppose it, nor meaned to disturb an unanimity which had been constant for two years in granting supplies. Now was not the time, but a day would come for inquiring how they had been misapplied. This vote of credit, he supposed, like that of last year, would be perverted to German treaties. We were told last year that the King had entered into engagements, and that we must not make him break his word. Beckford said, six millions three hundred thousand pounds were already given—what had been done for such a sum? who could trust Ministers any further? We were all united; we wanted nothing but an able head. The person at the head of the Treasury is always so of the Administration; if he is not an able man, how can we go on? The city said, Minorca was betrayed—I tell them, said he, they don’t know the disability of the Administration. When we seized the ships of France, did we imagine they would not revenge themselves? Are we more secure in America for this neglect of the Mediterranean? No. In the month of May you have prepared but two regiments, and they are not gone. The French have sent two thousand five hundred men to the West Indies;—twelve sail would have saved Minorca.
To all these objections Sir George Lyttelton replied, that this money would be restricted and subjected to account. Was Government not to be supported on the first misfortune that happened? When one happens would you not prevent another? if while we guarded Minorca, our own coasts had been neglected, the Ministry would indeed be blameable. Nothing had raised the supplies but the security of our coasts. When the foreign troops should arrive, our fleets would be more at liberty. Our spirit and activity had been admired by all Europe; and it was more difficult to defend our spirit than our neglect. This answer was not particular enough to satisfy Nugent; he added his usual panegyric on the honesty of the Duke of Newcastle.
Pitt made a fine lamentation on the calamitous situation of affairs, and on the incapacity of the Ministers; begging them, if they knew, to disclose the purposes for which this vote of credit was intended. Was it to raise more men? we had 40,000 national, and 14,000 foreign troops. Was it to make marine treaties? he would joyfully assent. If Sir George could not say for what it was designed, would he at least peremptorily say for what it was not designed? Still he was of so compounding a temper, he would assent, though votes of credit had been so much abused. The Ministers bragged of unanimity, of activity, of spirit—what had all this harmony of councils and talents operated? safety? are we safe? damage to the enemy? let them show when and where. With this universal ay, all our outlying parts are exposed. But he, alas! had no particular joy on being so strong on this question: he did not want to load unhappy men who had undone their country; men most unhappy, if they did not feel it. We were told that there was no option but between this country and America and the Mediterranean—so this great country could neither provide for defence nor offence! yet our activity was admired? Philosophers, indeed, had a term, vis inertiæ, the inactivity of action—was it by that we were to be saved? His charge, he said, was, that we had provoked before we could defend, and neglected after provocation; that we were left inferior to France in every quarter; that the vote of credit had been misapplied to secure the Electorate; and that we had bought a treaty with Prussia by sacrificing our rights. He would not have signed it for the five great places of those who had signed it. They had left us unprovided, as a gap for German troops; and so German troops at last became an English measure! The deceased gentleman (Mr. Pelham) had meant economy, and was dragged into foreign measures by one who had now got the Treasury. Could he every day arraign, and yet continue to trust? and while new foreign measures were in embryo?—yet if this treaty was restrained to the defence of the King’s dominions, he should not know how to oppose it. He had no resentment; nobody had injured him: of their measures and incapacity indeed he thought ill. If he saw a child (Duke of Newcastle) driving a go-cart on a precipice, with that precious freight of an Old King and his family, sure he was bound to take the reins out of such hands. He prayed to God that his Majesty might not have Minorca, like Calais, written on his heart! He concluded with proposing to take the very words of the last vote of credit.
Sir George Lyttelton answered with great modesty, that the Administration had not suffered by Mr. Pelham’s death, except by his advancement. Let it be considered who was at the head of the Treasury, of the Admiralty, of the Chancery, &c. Could it be said that we had done nothing, when we had taken 8000 French seamen? Here he would rest the whole; no one calamity had happened yet.
George Grenville observed, that in December last the Fleet consisted of 150 sail, of which 78 were of the line; of 42,700 seamen, of which 36,000 had been mustered: the marines had been voted since—was this inability to send fourteen ships to the Mediterranean? In January, there were sixty-two ships at home capable of being employed. Fourteen ships had sufficed to keep the Brest and Rochfort squadrons in their harbours. He commended Lord Anson, and said, he had heard of representations being made from the Admiralty for sending force to the Mediterranean. In the last war, he remembered that the Admiralty was restrained from meddling with the Mediterranean service, which was reserved to the Secretary of State (Duke of Newcastle); if that restriction continued, the Admiralty was not to blame. In America, Braddock had been defeated in July; not a man was sent thither till within the last fortnight. Fox replied, that he knew of no representation from the Admiralty. The Fleet could not have been prepared so soon as Mr. Grenville alleged: it is no neglect if things are preparing. Dates, he knew, might save from punishment, but events only would save from blame. Some merit he thought there was in the Prussian treaty, of which the contrary, a breach, had been so much foretold. The question before the House was not so diffuse as that of last year, because the augmentation was made, and consequently not necessary now. He wished the incapacity was in the Administration, not in the country itself.
Pitt took little notice of Fox, only rising again to lash Sir George Lyttelton, who had called it an opposal of epithets; very little proper to come from him, said he, whose character is a composition of epithets. But what! did we meet as an academy of compliments? but Lyttelton had mistaken the day; for himself, he said, had used no epithets that day. If Lyttelton would say, we had no more resources, he would tell him he was incapable; and when he disclaimed having had any hand in drawing the words of the question, he saw Sir George was not at liberty to change them.
Lyttelton, much hurt, but firm, cried, he says I am a thing made up of epithets—was not this the language of Billingsgate? The world complained that the House was converted into a bear-garden—he should not envy Mr. Pitt the glory of being the Figg or Broughton of it—yet if he assumed fewer airs of superiority, it would do him more honour.
Pitt, redoubling contempt, said with a sneer, we once lived in a road of epithets together—hard! that my friend, with whom I have taken sweet council of epithets, should now reproach me with using them! Lyttelton, he said, was a pretty poetical genius: with his pen in his hand, nobody respected him more: but what! were not Billingsgate and Broughton epithets? He at once described Lyttelton as an innocent, and would have fixed the use of invectives on him. Sir George terminated the altercation and debate, by protesting it was not his fault if he did not still live in friendship with Mr. Pitt.
May 14th.—The Prussian treaty was opened to the House by Sir George Lyttelton. It stipulated that the King of Prussia should pay 61,000l. due on the Silesian loan; but admitted that 20,000l. was due to him, which the Parliament was desired to grant. Pitt took the convention to pieces, interpreting it as a design in the King of Prussia of returning indignity for indignity; and as derogatory to the sovereignty of England, which was now giving 20,000l. to a Monarch, represented as intimidated, for unjust claims, examined and pronounced so, and now allowed by a commission of review, as unheard of as that exercised at Berlin; and founded on admission of damages, by what kind of liquidation could not be guessed. Had that King made a demand, or had this compensation been offered to him? But he saw he said, that all the Powers of Europe were setting up a new jurisprudence, and that we were no longer to enjoy the empire of the ocean. For himself, he should affect no superiority but what was common to him with twelve millions, innocence of his country’s ruin, the superiority of the undone over the undoers. If he could but be told that even by a protest we had secured the rights of our Courts of Admiralty, he would acquiesce; and should be glad, as it would bring the long sufferers on the Silesian loan into their money. Yet he had rather vote them the 60,000l.: we did not want such a sum; the necessary thing to us was the acknowledgment of the right. So thought the King of Prussia, and said, I will take nothing, to show I set my foot on your neck, and how I am intimidated.—He hoped the Committee would at least couple with the vote the assertion of our rights.
Murray answered in a long discussion, pleading like a lawyer for the King of Prussia, though formerly, when consulted as a lawyer, he had nobly confuted him like a statesman. He said, free ships make free goods, and that a Prince whose property is taken must judge by his own courts. That we did not allow that decision—if his friendship were bought by allowing it, the purchase would be too dear. That the single question was, whether the convention did or did not give up our rights. That the King of Prussia had not been alienated by our fault, but by his own interest, and that breach had been kept up by his fear. That, under the name of reprisals, he had paid himself, having the Silesian loan in his power. That he had tried to list the powers of the Baltic, by the captivating maxim of free ships make free goods. That he did not demand one sixpence for goods of strangers taken on board Prussian ships, and therefore could not demand satisfaction, as no injury was done to him. He had made no reply to our memorial, nor ever negotiated with us in defence of his principles; but retained the Silesian loan. There had been thoughts of making war on him—but how? if by the Queen of Hungary, then France would have taken part, and a general war had ensued. As we detained his ships, he might demand to appeal—very difficult to grant that, or to refuse it.
He then enlarged on the King of Prussia’s right and power of appeal—urged the long time elapsed, the money dispersed, the danger of a single-handed war with France; the advantage of reconciliation with Prussia, who, by giving up the whole Silesian debt, gave up at once his whole commission of revision. He had only said, “Save my credit, give me something.” Who would have held off for 20,000l.? We did make that sort of amende to him; we did save his credit. Just so, the French seized the smuggler Mandrin in the territory of Savoy, and hanged him—but when we sent a fleet to America, and France wanted allies, she asked pardon of the King of Sardinia. The same was our case with Spain on the convention of 1739: they agreed to pay us for captures they had made, and to liquidate with the South Sea Company. Nobody thought that by that accommodation they gave up their principles of searching. In the whole treaty we had not allowed the King of Prussia’s principles; nor did it appear whether his goods had been condemned as an enemy’s, or as contraband. Very uncertain what is contraband when not expressed in any treaty. Spain calls tobacco so, because they think it makes the English fight better. If we did not allow the Northern Powers to carry some contraband goods, they could have no trade. We had desired from the Prussian Minister a plan of a treaty: he took a Swedish treaty for his model, in which it was expressly stipulated that “free ships do not make free goods.” To have had it expressed now would have weakened it—a subtilty which justifies my saying that he argued as Counsel for Prussia. Pitt taxing him with it, he pretended not to have said, that it was stipulated so in the Swedish treaty, but understood so in it.
The Committee, by a majority of 210 to 55, voted the money; and four days afterwards war was proclaimed with France.
The same day (18th) the Militia Bill was read in the House of Lords for the second time. The Duke of Bedford, thinking the Duke of Newcastle would oppose or let it be dropped for want of time, supported it strongly. Newcastle did oppose it, but faintly, with Lord Granville and Lord Sandys, and suffered it to be committed.
Lord Halifax supported it well in the Committee; Lord Temple dared the Ministers to throw it out. Lord Granville immediately attacked it warmly, but it went through without a division.
On the 24th, Lord Stanhope spoke well on its behalf. Lord Granville again opposed it as absurd, unjust, and oppressive. He would not amend it, he said, for he disliked it; he would not be for it, because it was unamended. He would not be influenced by its having passed the Commons, or by its being popular—yet it was not popular, for often it had not been attended in the Commons by above fifteen persons; consequently had been voted in not a legal House. Lord Granville always strongly asserted the dignity of his own House of Parliament against the other.
The Duke of Bedford argued for the Bill, and affirmed that the people had only submitted to foreign forces on the promise of a Militia Bill. The Chancellor declared against it on the impracticability,—and (those who love liberty will love him for it) on its omitting the declaration of the power of the Militia being in the Crown, which had been asserted by Lord Clarendon and Lord Southampton on the Restoration. Himself, he said, had never been reckoned a prerogative lawyer, yet he would never let the prerogative be lessened with his consent.
If I have here marked out Lord Hardwicke’s memory to the indignation of free men, he might pardon me:—there are always numbers ready to admire the advocates of prerogative—Laud had his adorers; Jefferies hardly escaped them.
Lord Bath spoke for the Bill; the Duke of Newcastle against it; and it was rejected by 59 to 23.
On the 27th, the Parliament was prorogued. Old Horace Walpole was at last declared a Peer, with Mr. Villiers and Sir Dudley Rider; but the latter being taken ill on the very day he was to have kissed hands, and dying the next, the Peerage was, with much hardship, withheld from his son.
I did not mention in its place, because it falls in more properly here, that on an apprehension of an invasion in the winter, the Marquis of Rockingham, Lord Northumberland, Lord Downe and others, had offered to raise troops of Light Horse, which had been accepted; but Lord Gower proposing to the King, that instead of this scheme, the great Lords should go into their counties, and raise recruits for the Army, this plan was better liked, if not suggested, by the Duke, and carried into execution with good success. Lord Gower raised 400 men by his personal interest in Staffordshire: Lord Ilchester and his nephew, Lord Digby, were as successful in Somersetshire, enlisting the sons of many wealthy farmers, upon promise that they should not serve out of England. However, on a resolution of sending the force at Gibraltar to Mahon, it was determined to replace them with this Somersetshire regiment. Such a violation of public faith (for the recruits at least could not conceive that the brother and nephew of a Secretary of State had not authority for their assurances), created the greatest clamour; and the men were driven by force on board the transports. The consequence was very pernicious, as might have been foreseen, and will be showed. I will mention another instance of the injustice and cruelty of such breach of covenant. In the late Rebellion, some recruits had been raised under a positive engagement of dismission at the end of three years. When the term was expired, they thought themselves at liberty, and some of them quitted the corps in which they had been regimented. The Duke ordered them to be tried as deserters; and not having received a legal discharge, they were condemned. Nothing could mollify him; two were executed.
June 4th.—The Prince of Wales attained the age prescribed for his majority; by which the Regency Bill remains only a dangerous precedent of power to posterity—no longer so to us, for whose subjection it was artfully, though, by the grace of God, vainly calculated! This epoch, however, brought to light the secrets of a Court, where hitherto everything had been transacted with mysterious decency. The Princess had conducted herself with great respect to the King, with appearance of impartiality to Ministers and factions. If she was not cordial to the Duke, or was averse to his friends, it had been imputed less to any hatred adopted from her husband’s prejudices, than to jealousy of the government of her son: if the world should choose to ascribe her attention for him to maternal affection, they were at liberty; she courted and watched him neither more nor less for their conjectures. It now at last appeared that paternal tenderness or ambition were not the sole passions that engrossed their thoughts. It had already been whispered that the assiduity of Lord Bute at Leicester House, and his still more frequent attendance in the gardens at Kew and Carlton House, were less addressed to the Prince of Wales than to his mother. The eagerness of the Pages of the Back-stairs to let her know whenever Lord Bute arrived [and some other symptoms] contributed to dispel the ideas that had been conceived of the rigour of her widowhood. On the other hand, the favoured personage, naturally ostentatious of his person, and of haughty carriage, seemed by no means desirous of concealing his conquest. His bows grew more theatric, his graces contracted some meaning, and the beauty of his leg was constantly displayed in the eyes of the poor captivated Princess. Indeed, the nice observers of the Court-thermometer, who often foresee a change of weather before it actually happens, had long thought that her Royal Highness was likely to choose younger Ministers than that formal piece of empty mystery, Cresset; or the matron-like decorum of Sir George Lee. * * * * * * Her simple husband, when he took up the character of the Regent’s gallantry, had forced an air of intrigue even upon his wife. When he affected to retire into gloomy allées with Lady Middlesex, he used to bid the Princess walk with Lord Bute. As soon as the Prince was dead, they walked more and more, in honour of his memory.
The favour of Lord Bute was scarce sooner known, than the connexions of Pitt and Legge with him. The mystery of Pitt’s breach with Fox was at once unravelled; and a Court secret of that nature was not likely long to escape the penetration of Legge, who wormed himself into every intrigue where his industry and subservience could recommend him—yet Legge had not more application to power, than Newcastle’s jealousy of it. Such an entrenchment round the successor alarmed him. It was determined in his little council that the moment the Prince of Wales should be of age, he should be taken from his mother; but the secret evaporating, intimations by various channels were conveyed to the Duke of Newcastle and to the Chancellor, how much the Prince would resent any such advice being given to the King, and that it would not be easy to carry it into execution. The Prince lived shut up with his mother and Lord Bute; and must have thrown them under some difficulties: their connexion was not easily reconcileable to the devotion which they had infused into the Prince; the Princess could not wish him always present, and yet dreaded his being out of her sight. His brother Edward, who received a thousand mortifications, was seldom suffered to be with him; and Lady Augusta, now a woman, was, to facilitate some privacy for the Princess, dismissed from supping with her mother, and sent back to cheese-cakes, with her little sister Elizabeth, on pretence that meat at night would fatten her too much.
The Ministers, too apt to yield when in the right, were now obstinate in the wrong place; and without knowing how to draw the King out of the difficulty into which they were pushing him, advised this extraordinary step. On May 31st, Lord Waldegrave, as the last act of his office of Governor, was sent with letters of the same tenour to the Prince and to his mother, to acquaint them that the Prince, being now of age, the King, who had ever shown the greatest kindness and affection for him, had determined to give him 40,000l. a-year, would settle an establishment for him, of the particulars of which he should be informed, and that his Majesty had ordered the apartments of the late Prince at Kensington and of the Queen at St. James’s to be fitted up for him: that the King would take Prince Edward too, and give him an allowance of 5000l. a-year.
After a little consult in their small Cabinet, both Prince and Princess sent answers in writing, drawn up, as was believed, by Legge, and so artfully worded, that the supposition was probable. The Prince described himself as penetrated by the goodness of his Majesty, and receiving with the greatest gratitude what his Majesty in his parental affection was pleased to settle on him; but he entreated his Majesty not to divide him from his mother, which would be a most sensible affliction to both. The answer of the Princess marked, that she had observed with the greatest satisfaction the impression which his Majesty’s consideration of the Prince had made on him; and she expressed much sensibility of all the King’s kindness to her. On the article of the separation she said not a word.
What now was the King to do? The Prince had accepted the allowance as given; and had refused to leave his mother, which had not been made a condition of the gift. Was the gift to be revoked, because the Prince had natural affection? Was the whole message to be carried into execution, and a young man, of age by Act of Parliament, to be taken by force, and detained a prisoner in the palace? What law would justify such violence? Who would be the agents of such violence? His Majesty himself, and the late Prince of Wales, had furnished the Prince with precedents of mutinying against the Crown with impunity. How little the Ministers, who had planned the first step, knew what to advise for the second, was plain, from their giving no further advice for above a month; and from the advice which they did give then, and from the perplexity in which they remained for two months more, and from the ignominious result of the whole transaction, both to the King and to themselves at last. But we must first proceed to other occurrences.