CHAPTER III.

The March to Zerghun Shahr—Proclamation to the People of Cabul—The Composition of the “Avenging Army”—March to Sufed Sang—Transport Difficulties—Hostility of Villagers—March to Charasia—Cavalry Reconnaissance—The Battle of Charasia—Defeat of the Afghans.

Zerghun Shahr, 2nd October.

The camp at Kushi was all astir early this morning, for it was our first day’s march, and the capacity of our baggage animals had yet to be tested. It is true we had only to march eight miles to Zerghun Shahr, where General Massy had been in camp for some days; but still there were large quantities of stores and ammunition to be moved. General Baker’s Brigade was the first to move, and at eight o’clock they followed in the wake of the 5th Punjab Cavalry, which was ordered to cover their front and flanks. The greatest anxiety was regarding the baggage, but the arrangements were well made by the transport officers, and as the animals had an easy road to follow the march was a very satisfactory one.

With one or two exceptions the line was well kept, and the baggage reached its destination pretty rapidly. The 5th P.C. advanced as if in a country swarming with enemies, the advance guard being thrown out a mile in front, and flankers working on either hand over the stony hills which traversed the plain. Following the cavalry were F-A, R.H.A., a small party of signallers, the 23rd Pioneers, the 72nd Highlanders, No. 2 Mountain Battery, 5th P.I., one company Sappers and Miners, Baggage, Field Hospital, Engineer Park, 5th Ghoorkas (as rear-guard), and a few troopers of the 5th P.C. All the troops looked very fit, and they marched with an élan that could not be mistaken. The road taken was over the stony plain which extends for two or three miles on either hand, and the march was absolutely without incident. Zerghun Shahr was reached before noon, the troops halting for half an hour about four miles out, and the regiments filed off to their camping grounds on the open plain. The village lies a few hundred yards to the west of the road, and is of very small dimensions. A running stream supplies the camp with water, the principle of the karez (the sinking of a continuous line of wells, connected by an underground channel, carrying the water to a lower level) having been largely applied. With the exception of the fruit trees in the village there is no vegetation anywhere to be seen, and the country is nearly a repetition of that previously passed over; bare hills looking down upon stony plains which do nothing but reflect the sun’s rays upon unlucky travellers. The desolate aspect of everything is most distressing, but we are hoping for better things after another march.

To return to the march from Kushi: General Macpherson’s Brigade left at ten o’clock, Sir Frederick Roberts and staff starting about an hour later. With them was the Amir and his Sirdars, who could not fail to be impressed with the compactness and fitness for any kind of work of the soldiers before him. Every effort was made, too, to keep the baggage animals well together under strong escorts, so as to show His Highness that our army was not careless on the march, and would not lay itself open to surprise. When such grand regiments as the 67th, 72nd, and 92nd are on the move, it is not likely there will be any slackness, for the men are of the old stamp, and know what discipline and smartness mean. The Amir upon arriving here was shown to his encamping ground, which is well away from that of Wali Mahomed, meeting between the two at the present juncture being studiously avoided. The camp is overrun with wild-looking Afghans, generally galloping at headlong speed without any special object in view, and but for the sturdiness of our sentries these mangy horsemen would invade the privacy of even head-quarters and brigade camps. Our soldiers bear them no goodwill, and usually return their look of insolent braggadocio with a frown which expresses a good deal. Tommy Atkins is on the whole a very honest sort of fellow, and his ire is now roused against these swaggering cowards, who were in Cabul when our Embassy was attacked, and would not raise a finger to aid the handful of men who perished. Poor old Daoud Shah is perhaps entitled to some little respect; but for the others contempt is almost too good. The Amir is our guest—a guest perhaps upon whom a friendly watch is kept as a matter of precaution—and we cannot therefore give expression to our feelings very frankly, but if the Camp were canvassed the general opinion would be one of rather a strong kind as regards his vacillation and cowardice on the 3rd of September. However, he is now in the midst of an army which will soon be at the gates of his capital, and then he will have to sit down quietly until our policy is duly shaped—this time simply in accordance with our own aims, and utterly regardless of his protestations. He is now profuse in his thanks for the proclamation which is to go before us to Cabul; at the same time he is doubtful of its effect upon the mutineers. His tone might change, perhaps, if he could see any way out of his present difficulties other than that to be made by our bayonets.

The proclamation alluded to was dated October 2nd, and was sent off to-day to Cabul. It is as follows:—

“Proclamation to the People of Cabul.

“Be it known to all that the British army is advancing on Cabul to take possession of the city. If it be allowed to do so peacefully, well and good; if not, the city will be seized by force. Therefore all well-disposed persons who have taken no part in the dastardly murder of the British Embassy or in the plunder of the Residency are warned, that if they are unable to prevent resistance being offered to the entrance of the British army and to the authority of His Highness the Amir, they should make immediate arrangements for their own safety, either by coming into the British Camp or by such other measures as may seem fit to them. And as the British Government does not make war on women and children, warning is given that all women and children should be removed from the city beyond the reach of harm. The British Government desires to treat all classes with justice, and to respect their religion, feelings, and customs, while exacting full retribution from offenders. Every effort will therefore be made to prevent the innocent suffering with the guilty. But it is necessary that the utmost precaution should be taken against useless opposition. Therefore, after the receipt of this proclamation, all persons found armed in or about Cabul will be treated as the enemies of the British Government; and further, it must be clearly understood that if the entry of the British force is resisted, I cannot hold myself responsible for any accidental mischief which may be done to persons and property, even of well-disposed people who may have neglected this warning.

“Signed, &c., F. Roberts.”

Two sowars belonging to the 12th Bengal Cavalry, who were spending their furlough at Cabul, arrived here to-day, and report that the mutineers mean to fight. We have just heard of an unsuccessful attack upon the Shutargardan by Mangals and Ghilzais.[[8]]

The force is now concentrated, for the first time, for the march onward to Cabul. It is made up as follows:—

Cabul Field Force, October 1879.
British
Officers.		Other Ranks.
British.Native.
Divisional and Brigade Staff60- -
F-A, R.H.A.7118-
G-3, R.A.7137-
No. 2 Mountain Battery3- 223
9th Lancers4118-
5th Punjab Cavalry7- 325
12th Bengal Cavalry6- 328
14th Bengal Lancers7- 407
67th Regiment18686-
72nd Highlanders23746-
92nd Highlanders17717-
5th Punjab Infantry8- 610
23rd Pioneers6- 671
28th Punjab Infantry8- 636
5th Ghoorkas7- 574
7th Company Sappers and Miners3293
Two Gatling guns134-
Total1922,5583,867

There are about 6,000 “followers” and some 3,500 baggage animals. Fourteen days’ supplies are being carried, with tea and sugar for two months. Lieutenant-Colonel B. L. Gordon, R.H.A., commands the artillery (twelve 9-pounder and six 7-pounder guns, with two Gatlings); and Lieutenant-Colonel Æ. Perkins, R.E., is in command of the Engineers. The Cavalry Brigade is of course commanded by General Massy; while the Infantry are brigaded as follows:—1st Brigade (General Macpherson), 67th, 92nd Highlanders, and 28th P.I.; 2nd Brigade (General Baker), 72nd Highlanders, 5th Ghoorkas, and 5th P.I. The 23rd Pioneers are not attached to any particular brigade.

Sufed Sang, Zahidabad, 4th October.

Yesterday the march was continued, and Macpherson’s Brigade with the cavalry reached Sufed Sang in the evening, after a march of nearly fifteen miles. The same open plain was traversed, but there were more signs of cultivation as the Logar River, which was hidden from sight at Zerghun Shahr by a range of hills, was neared. Along its banks are villages scattered at short intervals, and the orchards of these form a very pleasant relief to the bare barrenness of the Ghilzai Hills on our right. The Logar River is spanned by a narrow bridge near Zahidabad village, but it was found impossible to get wheeled guns across it, and the ford adjacent to the bridge was not so shallow as it should have been, the villagers having turned a large volume of water into the stream from a neighbouring irrigation channel. This was the first sign of the latent hostility of the people in the Logar Valley, but as the maliks (headmen) of Zahidabad and the near village of Sufed Sang came in and paid their respects, we could do nothing in the way of punishment. The troops forded the river, the baggage being sent by way of the bridge. Some of the men were swept off their feet by the force of the current, but as the stream was only fifty or sixty yards in width, no lives were lost. The Prince of Bokhara, who is a refugee at the Amir’s Court, met General Roberts at Zahidabad. He had followed Yakub Khan’s example, and had fled from Cabul in the night. He reported that the troops were being incited to fight by certain disloyal Sirdars, but that no general rising of the people had taken place: the flight of the Amir had prevented any great tribal combination so far.

Our camping ground is in the midst of cultivation, and we are halted here to-day awaiting the arrival of General Baker’s Brigade. Yesterday it was found that the carriage of the force was quite inadequate to carry all the stores and ammunition, now that the whole army had been concentrated, and accordingly General Baker was ordered to halt his brigade at Zerghun Shahr for the night and guard the Commissariat supplies and the Ordnance park. This he did by forming a rude sort of laager, within which the transport animals were placed. He was not molested during the night. The call upon the Transport of the Force to do double work was answered with great alacrity by Lieutenant-Colonel Mark Heathcote and the officers working under him. After the heavy march of fifteen miles the beasts were well fed and given a few hours’ rest; but at one o’clock in the morning all the strongest camels were paraded and marched off to Zerghun Shahr. There they were loaded up, and with as little delay as possible began the return journey to Sufed Sang—forty-five miles in thirty-six hours.[[9]] On the previous evening some shots had been fired near the Logar Bridge, but no mischief was done; and we took but little notice of this expression of enmity, except to station strong picquets and warn the sentries to show extra vigilance. This evening, however, a determined attack was made upon the rear-guard, the villagers of Kuti Kheyl and other hamlets creeping up, under cover of darkness, and hiding themselves in nullahs and behind orchard walls. Fortunately they were badly armed, and although they kept up a desultory fire at close quarters, Major Stockwell of the 72nd Highlanders drove them off by firing volleys and by throwing skirmishers out to protect his left flank. As the rear-guard crossed the river the villagers grew bolder and followed them up pretty closely, but no baggage was lost; and a few companies being sent from camp to hold the bridge the firing died away, and now (10 P.M.) all is again quiet. The halt to-day has been of service in enabling us to get in a few supplies, but the transport difficulty is a serious one, as it is now clear only one infantry brigade can march daily, and the baggage animals must he sent back day by day to bring up the stores and reserve ammunition. To-morrow General Baker’s brigade will move on to Charasia, and the 92nd Highlanders will probably be added to the regiments composing it. There is news to-day from Cabul to the effect that the mutinous regiments have not yet left, but are busy looting the arsenal in the Bala Hissar, wherein are stored many hundred rifles, and an enormous quantity of small-arm ammunition.

Camp Charasia, 5th October.

The village of Kuti Kheyl was chiefly responsible for the attack upon General Baker’s rear-guard last night, and we have now a number of prisoners in our hands who were captured in that neighbourhood, and who are said to have been concerned in the skirmish. This morning (Sunday), before striking camp, a small force was sent out with two mountain guns. A squadron of cavalry surrounded Kuti Kheyl, and upon the 9th Lancers finally going in, several men showed fight. Three were run through, one just as he was levelling his piece at an officer, and five were captured; two of whom were wounded on the head with lance-butts. The maliks of the village were also brought in, but were released after receiving a warning as to their future behaviour. The five prisoners were sent on with the advanced guard here, and were tried this afternoon by drum-head court-martial. One of them was a sepoy of the Amir’s, and he, with two others, was sentenced to death for being in unlawful rebellion against his sovereign. The other two were released, no doubt much to their astonishment.

As the march to Charasia was only a short one of six miles from Sufed Sang, we did not start until ten o’clock. Early in the afternoon the encamping ground was reached, and tents were pitched on the fallow fields which stretch to the foot of the hills on either side. The road followed a due northerly direction, through a cultivated tract of country, for about three miles, to some very low hills which traverse it at right angles, and near which is the village of Childukhteran.[[10]] On crossing these hills, a long valley lay stretched before us in the shape of a parallelogram; and at the farther extremity could be seen the village of Charasia, with its orchards stretching in front of it, with clumps of trees dotted farther to the west. Beyond was the mass of hills which shut in Cabul, and hinder any view of the city from the valley. The hills to east and west also close in; and the valley cannot be much more than two miles across. It is all under cultivation by means of irrigation channels. The hills overlooking Charasia are, first, a low range of a light-coloured slaty character, then a higher series of rocky heights, and in the immediate rear, forming the sky-line, is a precipitous range with four or five peaks standing out in bold relief. This range runs sharply down, on the east, to the road which leads direct to the old Cabul camping ground and the Bala Hissar, and, with another high range sloping similarly down on the other side of the road, forms the Sang-i-Nawishta defile, which, if held in strength, would be very difficult to force. Through this defile the Logar River passes into the Cabul Valley. Our encamping ground is south of the village, the head-quarters of Sir F. Roberts being a mile or more from the orchards. The ranges of hills east and west of us are very high and steep; but directly to our left front is only a gradual slope, over which lies the beautiful Chardeh Valley, filled with orchards, and apparently rich in cultivation. A road skirting the hills leads through the valley into Cabul. There is a third road among the hills immediately in rear of Charasia.

A cavalry reconnaissance to-day did not cause any of the enemy to show themselves; but perhaps to-morrow, when more ground is covered, there may be a different result. Emissaries from Cabul are said to have been in the Charasia village yesterday, and the difficulty we have had in getting supplies this afternoon is a proof of their efforts to influence the villagers against us. However, only a few shots have been fired at our cavalry, and we are resting in camp, which is protected by strong outlying picquets. To-morrow morning 1,500 baggage animals go back to Sufed Sang to bring up the rest of the stores, and this delay will cause us to halt here a day. General Macpherson, with the 67th Foot, 28th N.I., three guns, and a squadron of cavalry, has been left behind to take charge of to-morrow’s convoy. He will draw in his camp as much as possible, as the affair at Kuti Kheyl has shown how badly disposed the villagers are towards us.

The Amir and Wali Mahomed have come in with us, but the former does not seem to have—or will not exercise—control over the villagers we have to deal with. There is plainly much trimming of sails among them as to their immediate attitude, but we are wide-awake enough not to trust them in any way. In case of any check, there cannot be the least doubt that the groups which now watch us marching past would shoulder their jhezails and turn out to harass us on all sides. The men with us who know the local character best are strong in their assertion that until we have occupied Cabul we shall be annoyed by these tribesmen, who are loth to let long strings of baggage animals pass through their midst without trying to loot some of the riches they carry. Even to-day a kahar in charge of a mule-load of baggage was cut up. He had wandered from the road, and had made no sign when the rear-guard passed. Half a dozen men watched their opportunity, and when the coast was clear they killed the kahar and walked off with the mule and its burden.

The news that the regiments in Cabul looted the arsenal yesterday would seem to indicate that they mean fighting, and this intelligence is the best that we have had for a long time. The only way in which they can be punished lies in resistance when we advance; for, if they run away, it will be difficult to chase them all over Afghanistan, even if we were disposed to do so. The health of the troops is excellent, although the sun has laid up a number of men with fever. It is of the mildest kind and soon passes off.

Camp Beni Hissar, 7th October.

We are now encamped within a few miles of the Bala Hissar and the city of Cabul, the mutinous troops having yesterday been defeated and driven from the heights above Charasia, which they had occupied with the idea of barring our further advance. The details of the action are as follows:—At daybreak yesterday morning (October 6th) a strong working party was sent out to improve the road through the Sang-i-Nawishta defile, but before they had gone two miles from camp the cavalry patrol in advance reported that the enemy were in great strength on the hills, and had guns in position commanding the road. The working party consisted of the 23rd Pioneers, under escort of a wing of the 92nd Highlanders and two guns of No. 2 (Swinley’s) Mountain Battery; and upon the cavalry patrols being fired at and falling back, this party received orders to halt and act on the defensive. As the morning advanced it was seen that not only was the Sang-i-Nawishta held in force, but the hills beyond Charasia, from the Chardeh Valley to the Logar River, were crowned with armed men. It was plain that our farther progress towards Cabul was barred, and as there was only one brigade available for the attack the position was not an encouraging one. Fortunately the 92nd Highlanders had been detached from General Macpherson’s brigade for the time being, and this gave us another British regiment to fall back upon. Sir Frederick Roberts deemed it wise to attack without delay, as to remain inactive before the mutinous regiments now facing him would probably encourage a general tribal rising, and instead of 10,000 we should have 50,000 men to deal with. Already the hills to right and left of the camp had a few white-clad men upon them, plainly sentinels sent from the near village to watch the progress of the fight and aid in the pursuit if our army were driven back. General Macpherson had to make his way from Sufed Sang to Charasia, and as his baggage train was seen stretching along the valley, the tribesmen grew bolder and opened a desultory fire upon the escort. This was the signal for many men to join the sentinels I have spoken of, on the hills, and so numerous did the gathering become that a squadron of cavalry was sent back to reinforce General Macpherson, who was further ordered to make all possible haste to Charasia.

In the meantime the camp was astir with preparations for the attack upon the enemy in front, and the men were full of enthusiasm at the prospect of meeting face to face the regiments which had brought about Cavagnari’s murder. The following troops, under the command of Brigadier-General Baker, marched out of camp towards the village of Charasia about eleven o’clock[o’clock]:—

Four guns of No. 2 Mountain Battery, under Captain G. Swinley, R.A.

Two Gatling guns, under Captain A. Broadfoot.

7th Company of Sappers and Miners, under Lieutenant C. Nugent, R.A.

72nd Highlanders, under Lieutenant-Colonel W. H. J. Clarke.

Six companies of the 5th Ghoorkas, under Major A. Fitz-Hugh.

200 of the 5th Punjab Infantry, under Captain C. McK. Hall.

This force was strengthened by 450 of the 23rd Pioneers, withdrawn from the road leading to the Sang-i-Nawishta defile;[[11]] while at the same time our right attack was also modified. Major White, of the 92nd Highlanders, assumed command in this direction, the troops entrusted to his charge being:—

Three guns, G-3, R.A., under Major S. Parry, R.A.

Two squadrons of cavalry, made up of detachments of the 9th Lancers, 5th Punjab Cavalry, and 12th Bengal Cavalry, commanded by Major Hammond, 5th P.C.

A wing of the 92nd Highlanders, under Major Hay.

100 men of the 23rd Pioneers, under Captain H. Paterson.

This force was to keep the enemy in play at the Sang-i-Nawishta by rapid artillery fire, and so to distract their attention that they would give time for our main attack to be delivered on their right, where they had no guns in position, and had not a narrow gorge to defend. The old tactics of turning their flank and taking their main line in reverse were to be followed; and knowing the Afghan inability, as a rule, to make a counter-attack, General Roberts weakened his right, so as to concentrate a strong infantry force for the outflanking movement over the hills overlooking the Chardeh Valley. Sirdar Nek Mahomed Khan (son of Dost Mahomed), who was in command of the Afghan troops, seemed to think we should make a determined effort to force the Sang-i-Nawishta Pass, and he had accordingly posted on the heights overlooking the road twelve guns, while three or four Armstrong-pattern breech-loaders were on the plain below. The enemy’s disposition seemed to indicate that if we tried to force the Pass their guns would have held us in check, while their right was swung round to take us in flank, the series of ridges which they covered offering a good manœuvring ground for such a movement, while the undulating plain below, with its belt of trees round about Charasia, would have given excellent cover. The accompanying map will show the relative positions, and also make clear the strength of the defending force which was able to cover so much ground.

Plan of Engagement on Heights near Kabul, 6th October, 1879.

After leaving the camp, General Baker made for the village of Charasia, which consisted of a number of detached walled enclosures such as are common all over the country. There were numerous orchards and gardens adjoining these, so that his first movements were well concealed from the enemy, whose attention up to this point was directed chiefly to Major White’s movements on the Cabul Road. Seeing how greatly he was outnumbered, General Baker took the precaution of occupying a strong walled enclosure on the outskirts of Charasia, and here he placed his reserve ammunition and his field hospital. The temper of the villagers was so uncertain that he telegraphed to General Roberts for another regiment of infantry to strengthen his reserves, and 100 men of the 5th Punjab Infantry hurried out at once and joined the hospital and reserve ammunition guard. The remainder of the regiment were sent out soon after, although this left the camp very weakly guarded, only 1,000 cavalry and infantry with six 9-pounder guns being left at head-quarters. However, as General Macpherson was coming up with his brigade, the risk was well worth running, as failure on General Baker’s part might have meant disaster to the whole army. The 72nd Highlanders led the way out of Charasia, and bullets soon began to drop among their ranks while the enemy’s picquets were seen to be retiring up the ridges. As the brigade pushed forward with the intention of outflanking the main line of hills lying between Chardeh and the Sang-i-Nawishta, their progress was checked by a strong position on their left front on which the Afghans had raised sungars, and from which they began to open a heavy musketry fire. Two mountain guns replied to this, and the 72nd extended in skirmishing order, one company under Captain Brooke-Hunt turning off to the left, while the main body of the regiment worked away to the front, the ground affording but slight cover. Captain Hunt’s company scaled a hill 500 or 600 feet high, climbing over difficult rocks, which hindered their rapid advance. The enemy were exceedingly numerous on their extreme right, another and steeper hill enabling them to pour a heavy fire upon the company. Two more mountain guns and the Gatlings were ordered to open fire upon this hill, and upon such bodies of men as were visible on the near ridges; but the Gatlings were in such bad order, owing to their defective make, that after a few rounds the drum “jammed” and they had to be taken out of action. Our true attack had now been recognized by Nek Mahomed and he hastened to reinforce his right; a stream of men was seen pouring along the rearmost ridges from the direction of the Sang-i-Nawishta, and standards borne by Ghazis began to thicken on our left. General Baker lost no time in pushing forward part of his reserves, in order to force their first position before it could be strongly reinforced. The 5th Ghoorkas, and 200 men of the 5th Punjab Infantry, doubled forward, while the enemy’s fire increased in intensity. Captain Hunt’s company was strengthened by two companies of the 5th Ghoorkas, under Captain John Cook, V.C.; while two more companies of Ghoorkas and 200 of the 5th P.I. joined the advanced skirmishers of the 72nd in the main attack. The skirmishing line was thus extended so as to outflank the left of the ridge, which the Afghans still clung to with great obstinacy, as it was the key of the position on their right flank. This was at 1.30 P.M., when our troops had been engaged for an hour and a half without having made much impression upon the enemy. With the strengthening of our advance success was soon declared: the hill on the extreme left, from which a flanking fire had been directed on our skirmishers, was carried in splendid style by the company of the 72nd and the two companies of the 5th Ghoorkas, while the other companies of the two regiments, by a series of gallant rushes, turned the enemy’s left. At two o’clock our advanced line was enabled to direct a cross fire upon the 2,000 men who held the ridge, and who now showed symptoms of wavering. A general advance was ordered, and the 72nd, 5th Ghoorkas, and 5th P.I. were in a few minutes in possession of the Afghan’s first line. But not without loss, for the enemy were chiefly armed with Snider and Enfield rifles, and their fire was rapid and continuous. Fortunately they had so little knowledge of the principles of musketry that their bullets mostly passed over our men’s heads as the rush uphill was made. The 72nd Highlanders bore the brunt of the fighting, and their casualties amounted to thirty-six. They had on several occasions to cross open ground, and in spite of the exposure they rushed forward with an élan that could not have been surpassed. Private MacMahon, one of their number, particularly distinguished himself on the left. Almost single-handed he scaled a hill on the crest of which was a sungar filled with men: loading and firing as he went, his coolness incited four or five Ghoorkas to follow him; and when he finally leaped into the sungar its defenders took to flight and were shot down as they ran. MacMahon is to be recommended by General Baker for the Victoria Cross, his gallantry having been observed by the General and his Staff as well as by the officers engaged in the attack. It was such incidents as these which caused General Baker to express his great satisfaction with the behaviour of the troops under his command.

After their first position had fallen into our hands, the enemy rallied on some low hills 600 yards in rear and re-opened fire, to which our mountain guns replied, while our men were resting on their arms. A company of the 23rd Pioneers, under Lieutenant Chesney, was thrown forward on the right, while two companies of the 92nd, under Captain Oxley, which Major White had detached to hold in check any flanking movement the enemy might attempt on General Baker’s right, also came into action. The enemy’s second position was attacked by the 72nd Highlanders and the 5th Ghoorkas, aided by the three companies just mentioned, and at three o’clock the Afghan right had been broken up, and their regiments were flying towards the village of Indikee. The mountain guns fired shrapnel into their midst, and the Gatling guns, for the few moments they were able to work, also did some execution, while volleys from the 72nd at long ranges caused the fugitives to hasten their flight. Major Stockwell, with a wing of the 72nd, followed them rapidly until he reached the open ground leading down into the Chardeh Valley, when his further advance was stopped by General Baker, as the turning movement along the ridge towards the Sang-i-Nawishta had to be made. The want of cavalry was here painfully apparent, as the retreating masses of the Afghans could easily have been overtaken, the sloping ground between Indikee and the hills being admirably suited for a pursuit. While Major Stockwell had thus been completing the defeat of the enemy’s right, two companies of the 23rd Pioneers had gained a footing on the main ridge itself, whence the enemy were rapidly retiring as they recognized that their line would in a few minutes be taken in reverse. General Baker swung round his left, ordered a general advance, and at 3.45 P.M. the ridge was in our hands without any serious opposition having been met with. Not that they had not shown great determination before, for bands of ghazis had made good their footing behind the sungars until our bayonets had forced them down. The 5th Ghoorkas were charged by a number of these madmen, but they met the rush by a counter bayonet charge and cleared all before them.

Leaving General Baker with the main body of his force sweeping over the high ridge in the direction of the Sang-i-Nawishta Gorge, I must now turn to Major White’s movements on our right, where had been done one of the most gallant feats of the day. The feint in this direction had been turned into a successful attack, resulting in the capture of twenty guns, although our infantry numbered only a few hundreds, and our cavalry were unable to act. Skirting the east of Charasia, Major White found the enemy scattered about among the trees, and also holding the hills to right and left of the defile. The three guns of G-3 were soon in action, and a few shells well placed, with the fire of skirmishers thrown out among the trees and gardens, drove back the more venturesome of the enemy to the shelter of the sungars in the hills, and behind some boulders in the bed of the Pass. Our guns were then moved forward and made beautiful practice, the answering fire from the enemy’s artillery being quite harmless. One of our shells struck an Afghan field-piece, dismounted it, and killed two of the horses standing near, while another struck a standard in a cluster of men. In fact, the 103 rounds fired by G-3 were of the greatest value in preparing the way for the infantry attack. This attack was led personally by Major White, who at the head of only fifty Highlanders charged the first hill on the right, where several hundred Afghans were posted. Our men went up with a rush under a severe musketry fire, and the enemy waited as if to receive them at the point of the bayonet. With such odds in their favour, and a sungar to aid them, European troops would have swept back the handful of men attacking with scarcely an effort; but Afghan courage and steadiness are very limited. When the Highlanders were within five or six yards of the sungar the enemy turned and fled, and were shot in the back as they made for the next hill. The success thus gained was mainly due to Major White’s personal gallantry, one striking instance of which may be quoted. Not caring to expose his men in a particularly steep bit of ground, which was enfiladed by a few Afghans well placed in rear of some rocks, he took a loaded rifle from one of the Highlanders and “stalked” the enemy single-handed. By cautious climbing he reached the rocks behind which they were concealed, and as he showed himself they jumped up and ran, no doubt in the full belief that the single figure they saw was only the leader of a number of others. One man stayed to fire, but missed his aim, and as he turned Major White shot him through the head. Unfortunately, he had no more cartridges with him, or some of the others would have fallen. This hill is to be called “White’s Hill” in memory of his gallantry. The capture of this point enabled the guns to be advanced still further towards the entrance of the Pass, but Major White was not content. Having given his men breathing time, and being reinforced by another fifty men from below, he again went forward and captured two lower hills on the right, in the same grand style, and with only trifling loss. It was by these movements that he was able to send Captain Oxley with two companies well to the left, to co-operate with General Baker’s Brigade. Six Armstrong guns fell into Major White’s hands on the open ground below the hills; and when our turning movement in the Chardeh direction had been completed, and the enemy began to evacuate the main ridge, the cavalry were sent forward, and the infantry occupied the hills commanding the Sang-i-Nawishta Pass on the left. Here twelve more guns were captured in position, while the cavalry found two more abandoned on the road. The twenty guns brought out from Sherpur, therefore, to fortify the Pass have all fallen into our hands. Upon Major White gaining the ridge to the left he could see no further sign of the enemy, who had stampeded to the Bala Hissar. The cavalry could not follow as the Pass narrows, and the narrow paths beyond are not adapted for a body of horse charging. Our information was to the contrary, it being stated that the road opened into a plain, and our cavalry being accordingly sent to the right to cut off the retreat of the enemy when driven towards Cabul by General Baker. As events occurred, the two squadrons would have been invaluable if they had accompanied the General. The progress of the brigade along the main ridge was very slow, as the ground was rugged and difficult; and it was not until nightfall that a junction was effected with Major White. The 23rd Pioneers and the 5th P.I. moved down into an open bit of ground beyond the Pass, while the 72nd Highlanders, the Ghoorkas, and mountain guns remained above, throwing out strong picquets over the range of hills. Major White’s force bivouacked on the ground they had occupied when their last movement was made.

It is worth mentioning that two elephants, three camels, and 200 mules carrying stores, &c., were safely piloted over the precipitous hills which were taken, and the men were thus able to bivouac in comfort. Not the least important arrangement of the day was that of signalling. Captain Straton had parties of men with General Baker and Major White, and a third batch of signallers was sent to a high hill to watch the Chardeh Valley, and the movements of large bodies of tribesmen, who lined the crests of the range overlooking the camp from the west. Heliograms were exchanged between these points and the head-quarters camp, and General Roberts was kept fully informed of all that was happening in these directions. This focussing of all information upon a common centre enabled the General to make his dispositions with accuracy and effect: without the signallers dangerous delays might have occurred. The heliographing was so thoroughly well done that Sir F. Roberts complimented Captain Straton personally on the success of his arrangements. The only drawback was a succession of small sand storms, which swept across the camp and blotted out everything for the time being.

The attitude of the tribesmen in our immediate neighbourhood, i.e., on the ranges of hills east and west of the camp, was one of expectancy modified by an earnest desire to harass our picquets by spasmodic firing. Their ill-will was first shown by firing upon the signallers on the hill, and the party had eventually to be withdrawn. Two guns were sent down and a few shells pitched upwards, which caused these guerillas to withdraw to a safe distance. The convoy from our last camp at Sufed Sang, Zahidabad, was also fired upon, and General Macpherson had to throw out skirmishers to protect his baggage animals. At least some hundred men appeared on a high peak to the east of the camp, and fired upon a picquet of the 92nd who were on a lower level. A brisk fire was kept up for some time, and the enemy driven off to higher ground.[[12]] As they re-opened fire the R.H.A. were ordered to try a shot at the peak. The first shell dropped a little short, but the second burst on the point occupied, and the next instant it was quite clear, its late occupants running in disorder into the valley beyond. There were several of the Amir’s soldiers among them, still wearing his uniform. The camp after this was left undisturbed: tents were struck at sunset in readiness for the early morning march which it had been decided to make to Beni-Hissar, just beyond the Sang-i-Nawishta Pass.

The enemy are believed, in this action, to have had 9,000 or 10,000 men on the ridges, including thirteen regiments of regulars. They left 300 dead on the field, but their total loss in killed and wounded must have been much greater. Our loss was twenty killed and sixty-seven[[13]] wounded, among the latter being Lieutenant Fergusson, 72nd Highlanders, bullet contusion, left leg, slight; Dr. Duncan, 23rd Pioneers, bullet wound in the chest, severe; and Captain Young, 5th Punjab Infantry, bullet wound in the left thigh, severe. Of the British Infantry regiments the 72nd lost three killed and thirty-four wounded; and the 92nd three killed and six wounded. Among our camp followers five dhoolie-bearers were killed and four wounded, returns which show that the kahars were well under fire in carrying off the injured.