CHAPTER XII.
Winter Supplies—The Forage Difficulty—Lack of Civilized Appliances and Inventions—Compressed Hay—The Sick Convoy for India—Alleged Atrocities—The Inquiry into Dr. Bourke’s Statement—An Exaggerated Description of the Charasia Battlefield—General Macpherson’s Excursion to Tagao—Attitude of the Safis—Shere Ali’s Military Road along the Northern Bank of the Cabul River—The Skirmish at Doaba—Narrow Escape of Captain Poole’s Company—Defeat of the Safis.
Sherpur, 14th November.
The fall of sleet on the evening of the 11th led us to believe that severe weather might be setting in; but, to our surprise, the same genial days which delighted us before have returned; and after three sharp nights, in which a cheerful fire in a walled building would have been very welcome, we are hoping that winter will spare us further inclemency at least for two or three weeks. The Ghazni expedition may, I think, be looked upon as abandoned; and we are trusting to local sirdars to bring us in the large supplies of forage which we were going out to seek. Advances in hard cash are made to these men, so that they may go out with the practical evidence of our willingness to buy up all the bhoosa in the country, and from Daoud Shah downwards they promise us great things in the way of supplies. As I said in a late letter, the question of forage is the most pressing, as, once the ground is covered with snow, the scanty supply of grass which now comes in will be entirely cut off. From Kohistan, the Logar and Chardeh Valleys, and the villages in the Cabul plain eastwards to Butkhak, we have drawn some thousands of maunds;[[24]] but with the horses of the 9th Lancers, three native regiments, and two batteries of Artillery, as well as the mules of two mountain batteries, to be kept in good condition, and all the transport animals to be fed, the consumption is enormous. Pressed hay would he worth its weight in silver if we could only get it here; but, of course, we might as well long for sea-coal fires. One sees much written of what ought to be done by armies advancing from India into Afghanistan, and the slowness of our marches is sometimes criticized very rabidly; but the critics seem to forget that we have no railways upon our lines of communication, and that we are asked to make war in almost as rude a way as the barbaric hordes which swept to and from India centuries ago. Barring our weapons and ammunition—and even here we have been served with Gatling guns that will not work—we have but the old means of advance: the camels, mules, and ponies, which have been time-honoured carriers since the days of Alexander; and we have them in such small numbers, that the loss of even 100 is a serious matter. We feed them as the old warriors fed their beasts of burden—on such corn and forage as we can get; but whereas they appropriated every maund that was to be found, and asked no questions, we pay exorbitant prices, dealing as traders, and not as conquerors, with the people. Civilization has done this much, that it has shown there are ways by which forage for a month can be carried in so small a compass that it is but little encumbrance; but we reap no benefit from the discovery, and are thrown into a by-no-means fertile country to do as best we can with such supplies as may be forthcoming. The very hackeries which ply along the road from Jhelum to Jumrood groan out reproaches against the civilization which permits them to linger out their lives; and every grass-cutter’s pony, half hidden by his huge bundle of worthless straw, or burnt-up grass, kicks against the absurd pricks which force him to do as his ancestors did—fetch and carry bulky loads of which he himself eats nearly half. We could do mighty deeds, and march mighty distances, were it not that our transport equipment is usually x—an unknown quantity, which can never be relied upon. In the morning x may equal the equivalent of 10,000 camels; in the evening it may be 9,500; after six months’ campaigning it may be 500. We have not merely to forage for the chargers of our fighting men—we have to feed the very animals which carry the forage, and carry it often in its bulkiest form. If we had merely to do the latter, we might trust to the country, especially where the local baggage animals are used for carriage. A Cavalry Brigade that could carry its own forage—and such a brigade could be created if advantage were taken of the principle which reduces bulk to one-twentieth or even less—would be so powerful an aid to an advancing force, that delays would be almost unknown. There would be no question, as there is now, of sending back regiments to pasturing-grounds; there would be the means of sustaining them always at hand. A pony that now carries a load which a horse can eat in a day, could carry food for twenty days. A trooper could strap his forage to his saddle as he now does his gram-bag. We might take many a hint from the nomads of Central Asia—perhaps the horsemen who can travel long distances, and keep their horses always equal to the work, better than any other race in the world. The Turcoman carries with him, in the ingenious shape of small balls of food, such concentrated nourishment, that his horse never flags in a sixty-mile ride; and if he can do this in his own rude way, and be independent of passing supplies, we, with elaborate hay-presses and chemical processes, might surely put ourselves at least on his level. I have been led into this dissertation chiefly by reason of the proposed splitting up of our cavalry brigade. It is said that the 12th Bengal Cavalry will probably remain for the winter in the Jellalabad Valley, where forage is fairly plentiful; and it is also possible that another cavalry regiment will be sent from our camp here to join them. We all regret that the cavalry which has been with us during the march upon Cabul should have to be sent back even for three or four months; and yet what can be done? 150,000 maunds of bhoosa (chopped straw) is the estimate made by the Commissariat Department of the quantity of forage required from the 1st of November to the end of March, and we have only gathered in between 15,000 and 20,000 maunds. The deficiency is so great that, unless the sirdars we are now employing as purchasing agents keep their pledges, our cavalry must starve or be sent back. Besides, we have been busy in providing the army with several hundred yaboos as transport animals. These yaboos will have to be fed during the winter, in addition to the mules and camels we brought up with us from Ali Kheyl: there were not many certainly, for we did wonders in the way of removing with little carriage. It may seem trifling, with passing events, to grow eloquent upon so dry a subject as hay; but in warfare, such as we are engaged in, cavalry are so indispensable, that their position should be fairly represented. We hear of hay-presses being made for the Candahar Force, but we do not want to be encumbered with these. Could not the forage, ready compressed, be sent to us without further trouble?
The convoy of sick and wounded, which left Sherpur to-day, was made up of fifty-two Europeans, seventy-two native soldiers and followers, and eight officers. There were also a number of time-expired men, and a sufficient escort was sent to take care of the convoy as far as Butkhak, whence the 12th Bengal Cavalry and the 28th Native Infantry will be detailed to see them through the mountainous country lying between the Cabul plain and the Jellalabad Valley. All the elephants here have also been sent away to General Bright’s force, as we are not likely to want them until the spring, and they would have probably died off when the snow came. The convoy will do the distance to Peshawur by easy marches, and every precaution will be taken against possible attacks in the Passes that have to be gone through. The sick have not been sent away a day too soon, as the cold nights here are very trying to weakly men. The hospital quarters in the barracks are now ready, and are very comfortable. Such invalids as are only suffering from slight ailments are now in the rooms, the strong mud walls of which set at defiance the cold which penetrated so easily the thin canvas of the tents.
Further examination of the Luttabund route has shown that a good road can be made with very little trouble, the difficult bits near the Kotal being avoided by a slight diversion. Scarcely any blasting will be needed, and as this kind of skilled labour is generally very protracted and tiresome, the saving of much valuable time is a great consideration. The Pioneers will be enabled to return to Sherpur to finish their lines and to carry out such defensive works on the Bemaru Heights as may be thought necessary. These works will probably be on a large scale, so far as the general design goes; but the immediate work to be done will be the building of block-houses, or towers, where the picquets can be posted under shelter from the cold wind which sweeps across the ridge. Three or four tents are now pitched on the heights; but it is very trying, especially for native troops, to do sentry-go in such an exposed spot. An enemy would scarcely venture to attack the Camp from the north, as they would have to cross a level, grassy plain, on which the cavalry would have them at their mercy. The long, shallow Wazirabad lake, bordered by marshy ground, shuts in this plain to the north, a spur from the Pughman range again bounding the lake still further to the north. The maidan is now used as a polo-ground, or for giving our horses a gallop; while the lake affords wild-fowl shooting for sportsmen lucky enough to have guns and cartridges.
There has not been much to excite us in Camp lately, except two slight shocks of earthquake yesterday; and as the executions have for the present ceased, there seems falling upon us that fatal period of inactivity which always follows successful movements against an enemy who runs away after the first brush. But one unpleasant incident has occurred, and it has been made the most of. We have had a Court of Inquiry, and the subject thereof has been nothing less than “atrocities.” In a letter from the correspondent of the Civil and Military Gazette appeared a paragraph in which “a noble corps” was said to have disgraced itself by burning alive the wounded Afghans left behind by their friends on the Charasia Heights. The paragraph implied, from the context, that the 72nd Highlanders had been guilty of this cruelty; but, on inquiry being made, Dr. Bourke, the correspondent of the Lahore paper, said that, although he had not named the regiment, it was the men of the 5th Ghoorkas who had burned the Afghan wounded. This was the first General Roberts had heard of any such occurrence, as Dr. Bourke had made no report on the subject, although he had drawn a highly-coloured picture of the scene in his letters. The General at once ordered a court to assemble and to take evidence, not merely to clear the good name of the 72nd, but to investigate the charge against the Ghoorkas. The President of the Court was Major Pratt, of the 5th Punjab Infantry. Being a closed court, it has not, of course, transpired what evidence was taken; but I believe the following are the facts of the cases of cruelty said to have taken place. When the heights were cleared by the general rush of General Baker’s troops, the Afghans left their dead on the ground as well as several men wounded at close quarters. A Ghoorka was seen stooping near one of the latter; and when Dr. Bourke, with the ambulance, came up, it was found that the Afghan, who had been shot through the breast and almost disembowelled by a bayonet thrust or slash from a kookrie, had had his clothes set on fire. A box of matches was lying near the body. The man was in extremis, and was said to be insensible; and by Dr. Bourke’s orders a European soldier shot him through the head. Another Afghan lying near had also his white clothing smouldering, and he was shot in a similar way. This seems to be the plain truth about the affair, which has been exaggerated into the wholesale burning alive of wounded men. The Ghoorkas know the superstitious dread among Mussulmans of any part of their body being destroyed after death; and, on the face of it, there is the probability of a lighted match having been applied to the clothes of men seemingly dead, in order to send their souls to perdition. The passions of the Ghoorkas have also been highly inflamed by a story which reached Ali Kheyl from Cabul, that a Ghoorka, with the Guides’ escort, was led through the city streets with his face blackened, was horribly tortured, and afterwards burned alive. They believed fervently in this story, and, as I have said, they may have thought to kill the Afghans in the next world as well as this. No one in the force would seek to be an apologist for such cruel acts as burning alive, deliberately and systematically, the wounded men of an enemy even so cruel as are the Afghans; but the reflections cast upon the 72nd Highlanders and upon General Roberts himself, as letting such acts go unpunished, are as unjust as they are absurd. The General knew nothing whatever of the incident until his attention was called to it in the newspapers, and his action then was prompt enough. I understand that he has now called upon Dr. Bourke to give his reasons for not reporting the matter officially.
16th November.
Yesterday Sir Frederick Roberts and Brigadier-General Baker rode over to Butkhak, where Brigadier-General Macpherson is encamped after his late excursion in the Tagao country. There have been so many movements of troops in the Cabul plain lately, that the only escort the General thought it necessary to take with him was six sowars of the 5th Punjab Cavalry. Since the first brigade marched to Butkhak on the 1st instant, the villagers in the plain and in the lower Logar Valley, which runs down from the Sang-i-Nawishta defile, have seen small parties of cavalry constantly on the move backwards and forwards, and within the last few days have watched the 23rd Pioneers encamped on the banks of the Logar and the long convoy of sick and wounded march along on the way to India. There have been so many evidences of our presence, that any unruly tribesmen or disbanded sepoys have wisely kept very quiet. The road may be considered safe, even for a solitary traveller; the telegraph wire has hitherto been scrupulously respected; and our foraging parties have never been molested.
We were, of course, anxious to learn some particulars of the late skirmish, in which a company of the 67th had come to close quarters with the Safis; and, leaving the invalid camp, we passed up to the head-quarters of the 1st Brigade near the village walls. Sir Frederick Roberts heard the details of the affair from General Macpherson as well as an account of the work done by the Brigade in opening up communication with the Khyber Force. I may here incidentally state that Sir F. Roberts has now received the local rank of Lieutenant-General, and commands all the troops in Eastern Afghanistan, Jumrood being the point in the Peshawur direction to which his power of control extends. Some severe strictures have been passed upon those who have hitherto had the supreme control of the force operating from Peshawur, and the answer given to these is that General Bright’s advanced Brigade was a “flying column.” If that were so, how was it that it took twenty-four days to “fly” from Jellalabad to Kata Sung, a distance of about sixty miles? Surely its wings must have been clipped by Transport or Commissariat scissors, in which case it would cease to be a flying column at all, and would drop down to the lower level of a sedate brigade moving two and a half miles a day, sleeping comfortably in tents, and living on the fat of the land. But in that case there should have been supplies sufficient to have justified the stay of the troops at Kata Sung, and so to have secured the road. General Macpherson had of course no supplies with his force, as everything is being gathered into Sherpur for the winter; and he could not stay at Kata Sung, but had to try and find food north of the Cabul river. Here accordingly came in the story of the reconnaissance northward into Tagao and of the collision with the Safis. The bed of the Cabul river lies about ten miles north of Kata Sung, Sei Baba, and the Luttabund Kotal, its direction being due east and west. From the vast pile of mountains which shut out the Cabul plain from Gundamak high spurs run down towards the river, and among these the Tezin stream, with two or three small tributaries, finds its way. When General Macpherson found that the force he had come to meet at Kata Sung had withdrawn, he turned off to the north, and proceeding down the bed of the Tezin stream for six or seven miles, reached the banks of the Cabul. He encamped at Sirobi, and on the 8th, resolved to cross the river to the village of Naghloo, on the opposite bank, two miles higher up. The natives had reported that a good road was in existence on the northern side of the Cabul from that point, and that it had been regularly used as the military convoy route between Cabul and Jellalabad. General Macpherson found, without much difficulty, a ford over the Cabul, which is here a stream with a strong current travelling very rapidly on account of the descent of 4,000 feet, which the river makes from Cabul to Jellalabad. Like all fords, however, in the Cabul river, this crossing-place was found to have its dangers, the least divergence from the narrow roadway—if the word can be used where there is no dry land—plunging men and horses into deep water. The fatal experience of the 10th Hussars at Jellalabad last spring was remembered, and ropes were stretched across the stream by which the men were guided. This marked the road to be taken and minimized the danger. On the evening of the 8th half the force had crossed to Naghloo without any accident, except that Lieutenants Forbes and Macgregor, of the 92nd Highlanders, acting as orderly officers to the General, were swept away by the current. By a little hard swimming they managed to reach the bank again. The troops bivouacked without tents. On the following day a reconnaissance was made from Naghloo eastwards, towards the Lughman country, Lieutenant Manners Smith, Assistant Quartermaster-General, going out with a few cavalry to examine the district. The orders given to the troops were not to fire upon any of the local tribesmen, unless the latter first opened fire; and this order was rigorously carried out. Working down on the left bank of the Cabul, a kotal was gained eight or ten miles from Camp, from which a splendid view of the Lughman Valley was obtained. There was a track right through this, and this was undoubtedly the road used by the late Shere Ali for his military convoys. It seemed to traverse an almost level country; and except that to use it would involve two bridges—one near Naghloo and the other at Jellalabad,—there can be no question that it would he far easier than viâ Jugdulluck, Gundamak, and Futtehabad. The country, however, north of the Cabul is known to be inhabited by Safis—converted Kafirs, whose fanaticism exceeds that of almost any other Mahomedans. Tagao, in which they live, boasts of several fertile valleys, watered by the Panjshir, Tagao, and Uzbin rivers, and might furnish supplies if the people could be reduced to obedience. Their chief is one Usman Khan,[[25]] a noted robber; and of the temper of his followers we have already had an example. When the reconnoitring party were looking into the Lughman Valley, some seventy Safis, all armed with jhezails and swords, appeared a few hundred yards off, and threatened to attack the troops if they proceeded further into their country. As they did not open fire, no notice was taken of their threats, and Lieutenant Smith returned to Naghloo in peace. On the next day, the 10th, a foraging party of one company of the 67th Foot, under Captain Poole, was ordered to march up the Cabul river to a village some six or seven miles to the west of Naghloo. This village is in close proximity to Doaba, at the junction of the Panjshir and Cabul rivers. The villagers near the Cabul are not Safis; and as they had expressed their willingness to sell grain and forage, only a small party of men were sent out in charge of about 100 camels and mules. The road taken was found to be rather difficult, a narrow defile close to the river having to be passed through, four miles from Naghloo. After passing through this, the narrow camel-track passed over a small semicircular piece of open ground, the hills falling away to the north. At the western end was a second defile, with a high ridge running up to the right and shutting out from view the village beyond. When Captain Poole was crossing the open with thirty men, some distance in front of the baggage animals, he met a number of villagers hastening along with their household goods and cattle. They were evidently panic-stricken and shouted wildly to Captain Poole, but as he did not understand their language he pushed on to the second defile. It appears that what they really said was that the Safis were in force over the defile, had attacked their village, burned their houses, and murdered some of the inhabitants. Upon getting through the second defile, Captain Poole saw on the slope below some 800 or 1,000 armed men, who immediately opened fire. The thirty men of the 67th returned the fire and checked the enemy, who had tried to rush forward. It was important to keep them back until the baggage animals with their small guard of twenty-four men could retrace their steps through the first defile. After firing for some time, our men observed 300 or 400 Safis creeping round over the hill to the north, with the evident intention of getting into the open plain and cutting off all retreat. The position of the handful of men then became so hazardous, that Captain Poole ordered them to fall back, and for an hour and a half he faced towards the Safis, who advanced to within 40 yards. It was in the open that our men began to drop, although one had been shot dead in the defile. Cover was taken under the river bank, which was three or four feet above the level of the stream; and though the enemy opened fire from the southern bank, they could not do much mischief. The steadiness of the soldiers, who used their Martinis with good effect, was remarkable throughout, one or two incidents being worth recording. The crack shot of the regiment, Corporal Woolley, was with the company, and his practice was wonderfully good. He was unfortunately shot through, the leg, but still continued firing. One of his comrades, on being shot down, fell into the river, and struggled hard to gain the bank. Two Safis ran down to cut him up; and these men Corporal Woolley shot before they could make their way to the wounded man. The latter was so exhausted by his efforts that he fell back, and was drowned in the stream. Corporal Woolley also brought down two standard-bearers. The fighting was so close that Captain Poole could not carry off his dead (two others were killed in the open besides the men in the defile); and the Safis mutilated them in a horrible way. Their eyes were gouged out, and faces cut to pieces by sharp knives, so that the bodies could scarcely be identified. While fighting across the open, Captain Poole was struck by a bullet in the calf of the leg, and four other soldiers were wounded. One, who was too badly hit to be able to walk, was put upon a camel, and carried safely away. Lieutenant Carnegy kept the men together after his Captain had been hit; and although eight men and an officer out of fifty-six had been either killed or wounded, the others never wavered. A sowar had galloped back to Naghloo for assistance, and General Macpherson sent out at once a squadron of the 12th Bengal Cavalry and four mountain guns; 150 of the 67th, and a company of the 28th Punjab Native Infantry following. The cavalry arrived at the trot, but the defile was so blocked by the baggage animals, that to get through was impossible. The sowars dismounted and went up the hill to use their carbines, and the guns, also arriving, went up the crest under escort of the 28th and one company of the 67th, under Major Baker, and opened fire at 1,000 yards into the mass of the Safis below. The shells had a wholesome effect upon the enemy, and volleys[volleys] from the Martinis and Sniders were also fired at long ranges. One man of the 28th was killed by a stray bullet. The other company of the 67th, under Lieutenant Atkinson, went along the river bed, and the enemy then retreated behind a sungar on the ridge to the north of the second defile, and covering their right flank. The mountain guns came into action again at 1,700 yards, having been brought down into the plain, and Major Baker marched over the hills to take the sungar in flank. Lieutenant Atkinson advancing at the same time, the Safis fled towards the Doaba, the cavalry pursuing them for six miles. Their loss must have been heavy, as they left many of their dead behind; seven bodies were found in one nullah. The mutilated bodies of three men of the 67th were recovered: the fourth had been swept down the river. The whole affair proves how great a risk small foraging parties run in an unexplored country, where the temper of the inhabitants is uncertain. It is true no resistance was expected; but the fanaticism of the Safis is so well known, that extra precautions should have been taken. The difficult ground to be traversed also put a small body of infantry, encumbered with baggage animals, at a great disadvantage. That one-sixth of Captain Poole’s company was put out of action is too significant to be lightly regarded.