CHAPTER XXVII.

General Ross at Sydabad—Skirmishes with the Enemy—Junction of the Cabul and Candahar Forces—Sir Donald Stewart assumes Command in Northern Afghanistan—Mr. Lepel Griffin and the Kohistani Chiefs—A British Mission sent to Abdur Rahman Khan at Kunduz—Sir Donald Stewart’s March from Candahar to Ghazni—Attitude of the Tribes en route—The Hazara Contingent—Scarcity of Supplies—The Battle of Ahmed Khel—General Stewart’s Formation of Attack—Strength of the Afghan Force—Attack by Ghazis—Defeat and Dispersion of the Enemy—The Afghan Loss—The March to Nani—Capture of Ghazni—Action of Urzoo—A Second Victory—Mushk-i-Alam’s Plans.

May 2nd, 1880.

General Ross had to clear the hills about his camp at Sydabad on two occasions prior to General Sir Donald Stewart’s force arriving from Ghazni, but there were scarcely any casualties on our side. It would seem that 1,500 or 2,000 men gathered on the hills to the west of the camp at Sydabad on the 25th, and built sungars on several ridges, as if with the intention of holding their position to the last. To clear these hills a strong body of our troops, made up from the 9th Foot, 2nd Ghoorkas, and 24th Punjabees, with some of the mountain guns, were sent out, and they soon drove the enemy from the ridges. The sungars were first shelled, and then a rush made up the hills. The Afghans had a few ghazis among their number, as is usually the case, and these stood to their post and were shot down; but the main body fled in confusion. The Ghoorkas killed sixteen men in a nullah, and altogether forty bodies were counted on the ridges. Our loss was one Ghoorka killed and two wounded. On the following day, Monday the 26th, the enemy again showed on the hills, and again our men had to chase them away, two companies of the 23rd Pioneers sharing this time in the climbing. Again the enemy fled in confusion from ridge to ridge, losing ten or twelve killed. Much to the disgust of our men, the Afghans would not wait to come under the fire of our Martinis and Sniders at 200 or 300 yards; the shells from the mountain guns being effective in scattering any groups which for a few moments held together. After this the overt resistance on the part of the moollah, Abdul Gaffur, was at an end, and Mahomed Jan and Hasan Khan were no longer heard of. A force visited Lungar, and destroyed the moollah’s forts, obtaining some small amount of loot in the shape of books and china. Sir Donald Stewart’s force left Ghazni on April 25th, having had a second action with the enemy at Urzoo, seven miles from Ghazni. On the 29th of April General Ross started for Maidan with his force, which had been joined by the heavy battery of 40-pounders belonging to the Candahar column. Sir Donald Stewart, with Colonel Chapman, Chief of his Staff, accompanied General Ross. Yesterday (May 1st) the force marched to Kila Gholam Hyder, on the Cabul side of Argandeh. The Candahar column turned off from Sheikhabad into Logar, where it will probably stay, collecting revenue and supplies for the next few weeks. As it is over 6,000 strong, it is not likely to meet with much opposition; and, indeed, it is stated that the chief Logari maliks have already made their submission. To-day General Ross marched to Sherpur; the elephant battery is located in Sherpur, while General Gough’s Brigade is again encamped on Siah Sung. General Sir Donald Stewart arrived at about ten o’clock. Sir F. Roberts and Staff and Mr. Lepel Griffin rode out a few miles to meet him, and he was received at the head-quarters gate by a guard of honour of the 92nd Highlanders. A salute of fifteen guns is to be fired in his honour to-morrow morning. To-day he has taken over the command from Sir F. Roberts, a divisional order announcing that he commands the whole of the troops in Northern Afghanistan.

In regard to political matters here, we seem to have come to the end of our negotiations with tribesmen pure and simple, for the hundred Kohistani maliks who have been staying in Cabul were dismissed to their homes on Saturday by Mr. Lepel Griffin. The text of his speech in Durbar was as follows:—

“Your paper of requests has been carefully considered, and until some decision is given by the Government it is your duty, and it will be to your advantage, to remain quiet in your villages. Do not vainly imagine you will obtain anything by clamour and opposition. You have seen that the people of Ghazni, Logar, Maidan and Wardak have not been able to withstand for a moment the British arms, and have been punished for their hostility. The only fruit of their opposition is that they have to pay every penny; their revenue would otherwise have been remitted. You will tell those of your leaders who are not now present that the British Government will not tolerate disturbances, and collections of armed men in the neighbourhood of Cabul. All now assembled must disperse at once home. If they do not attend to this advice any misfortune they suffer will be their own fault. Two Sirdars of position are now being sent by the Government through Kohistan, and you will ensure their safety. The hostages sent by Mir Butcha as a guarantee of their security I do not require; the British army is itself to be sufficient guarantee for the observance of promises made by you. Your professions of friendship are accredited, and you may rest assured that while the Government will at once punish any hostile action, its chief desire is to be and remain friends with you.”

Two maliks, Mir Agha Sahibzada and Mir Gholam Hyder, were especially mentioned as having done good service during their stay, and three other minor chiefs were singled out as deserving credit for aiding the British Government in the current negotiations. The most important feature in the Durbar was the announcement that the chiefs had guaranteed the safe-conduct of two Sirdars on Mr. Griffin’s staff through Kohistan. These are Ibrahim Khan, Khan Bahadur, of the Punjab Police, and Wazirzada Afzul Khan, Ressaldar of the Bengal Cavalry: and their mission is to visit Abdur Rahman at Kunduz. What their instructions are I cannot say; but if the Kohistani chiefs, Surwar Khan and Mir Butcha, have promised to ensure their personal safety, it seems probable that we are at last on the eve of direct negotiation with Abdur Rahman, who has unquestionably won the goodwill of the Kohistanis. We can punish any breach of faith easily with the force now in Cabul; and this being known to the chiefs at Baba Kuch Kar, the dispersion of bands of men such as are now scattered about Koh-Daman is probably only a question of a few days.

5th May.

There is, of course, great difficulty in describing an action from hearsay, and in making at all vivid an account of severe fighting one has not seen; but it is the privilege of even the humblest historians to deal with important events almost as confidently as the coolest eye-witness, and I meekly claim that privilege in regard to the late action south of Ghazni. There will, almost of necessity, be errors in the story of the fight, but they are only such as will arise from causes beyond my own control. I can only write upon the lines laid down for me by my informants, and defects of omission are more likely to occur than would have been the case if I had been a spectator of the engagement. This half-apology, if accepted in the spirit in which it is offered, should absolve me in the eyes of those critics who are most able to estimate the fairness and accuracy of the story, namely, the men who fought in the action. They did their work right nobly and well, and if appreciation of their efforts is lacking, it will be rather because they are too modest to do justice to themselves than to any unwillingness on the part of others to concede to them the honour they so well deserve.

Sir Donald Stewart’s march upon Ghazni was uneventful as far as Shahjui, the limit of the Candahar province, but from that point a change took place; it began to be understood that opposition was likely to occur before Ghazni was reached. At Shahjui the Taraki country begins, and the moollahs had been so active in preaching & jehad that several thousand men had collected on the hills to the east. These were at first Tarakis, ghazis from Candahar, and contingents from Zamindawar and other neighbouring districts. They kept well away from the British force, but marched day by day, parallel to it, along the foot of the high hills on the right of the valley along which our troops were making their way. They gathered strength daily, but it was deemed unwise to attack them, as they would probably have retired up the hillsides out of reach, and our men would have been unable to scatter them. Besides, the baggage train of the column was over six miles in length (the elephant battery with its bullock-teams yoked to the ammunition waggons stretched away for a mile or more), and to have detached a brigade to make an attack upon the enemy would have left the baggage open to molestation from the right flank. The tribesmen, therefore, were allowed to march quietly along, our spies keeping Sir Donald Stewart well informed of all that was happening in their camp. Their numbers, the names of their chiefs, and their probable intentions were made known to Major Euan Smith, Political Officer, and from the first it was certain that they would try issues with the British before Ghazni was reached. The aspect of the country, too, showed that war was meant; the valley was fertile and well cultivated, but every village had been deserted, all supplies buried, and the women and children carried away to the hills for safety. It was as if the people had fled from pestilence; the moollahs had done their work well, and had so wrought upon the fears and fanaticism of the ignorant peasants that they had left their homes to the tender mercies of our soldiery. Perhaps, also, it was believed that by cutting off supplies the march northwards might be retarded or checked altogether; but this belief can never exist again, as our foraging parties unearthed the hidden stores, and the troops were never really short of food. The leaders of the tribesmen were Shir Jan (Taraki), and Mahomed Aslam Khan (Tokhi), and so overawed were the villagers by their threats that even those who would willingly have traded with our purchasing agents had to throw in their lot with the more fanatical spirits.

With the British force were several thousand Hazaras, who, as is usually the case with native allies, were rather a source of anxiety than any real aid. They marched in wild irregularity on the flanks of the column, and every deserted village was plundered by them without compunction. They thus appropriated large quantities of supplies which would have been welcome to our army, and it was at times annoying to find they had cleared a village of grain before our own men could arrive. Their inveterate hatred of the Afghans had full swing, and they hailed our march upon Ghazni with savage satisfaction as giving them an opportunity of wiping off old scores. Now that they find we do not intend staying in the country their spirits are somewhat damped, as their future presents nothing more pleasing than a war of revenge by the southern tribesmen as soon as our armies have returned to India. The excesses likely to be committed when that return takes place can only be thought of with pain and humiliation by us. We may exact what promises we choose from the new Amir, but he will be helpless to check his unruly subjects, and we cannot march again to Cabul to save the Hazaras from their fate. There will be nothing for them but to retire into the fastnesses of their high table-land between Bamian and Herat, there to hold their own until the bitterness of the vendetta shall have died away.

With such allies and with his force well on the alert, Sir Donald Stewart encamped at Mushaki, two long marches south of Ghazni, on the 18th of April, the enemy’s camp being a few miles away. Our spies visited the camp, and returned with the news that on the morrow the tribesmen would attempt to drive back the column, and would probably take up their position on a low spur running eastwards from the Gul Koh Mountains and dominating the road. With this warning to guide him, Sir Donald Stewart formed his order of march, so as to place his infantry on his left flank, upon which the brunt of the attack would be likely to fall. It should be remembered that the column was marching in a valley running almost due north and south, and that the road from Mushaki was much nearer the hills on the west (or left flank) than the Shilghur ranges on the east. The order of march from Mushaki was as follows:—

19th Bengal Lancers, 300 sabres.Leading brigade under the command of Brigadier-General C. H. Palliser, C.B.
A-B, Royal Horse Artillery, six 9-pr. guns.
19th Punjab Native Infantry, 470 Rifles.
Field Force Headquarters1 company 2-60th Rifles, 63 Rifles.
1 company 25th Punjab Native Infantry, 85 rifles.
1 troop 19th Bengal Lancers, 50 sabres.
Nos. 4 and 10 Companies Bengal Sappers and Miners, 80 rifles.
59th Foot, 436 rifles.Under the command of Brigadier-General R. J. Hughes.
3rd Ghoorka Regiment, 289 Rifles.
G-4th, Royal Artillery, six 9-pr. guns.
6-11th, Royal Artillery,Two 40-prs.
Two 6-3-in. howitzers.
2nd Punjab Cavalry, 349 sabres.
Field Hospitals.
Ordnance and Engineer Field Parks.
Treasure.
Commissariat.
Baggage.
2-60th Rifles, 443 Rifles.Under the command of Brigadier-General R. Barter.
15th Sikhs, 570 rifles.
25th Punjab Native Infantry, 380 rifles.
11-11th, Royal Artillery (Mountain Battery) six 7-pr. guns.
1st Punjab Cavalry, 316 sabres.

The length of the column was about six miles, so that the 19th Bengal Lancers were close upon Ahmed Khel when the rear-guard was leaving Mushaki. Upon nearing the spur of the Gul Koh hills the enemy were seen drawn up in the shape of a huge parallelogram at right angles to the road and completely barring the way. The road passes over a low kotal just where the spur loses itself in the valley, and it was clear that Shir Jan and Mahomed Aslam Khan meant to contest the advance at this point. The village of Ahmed Khel was marked in the maps as lying in a hollow below the spur, but really no village exists, though the halting-place at a karez is called Ahmed Khel. The enemy were three miles away when first sighted, and Sir Donald Stewart made his disposition to attack by deflecting General Hughes’s brigade to the left so as to face the Gul-Koh spur. A squadron of the 19th Bengal Lancers was sent out on the extreme left to reconnoitre the enemy’s position in that direction, while A-B and G-4 batteries were placed on the right, under escort of the 2nd Punjab Cavalry and the second squadron of the 19th Bengal Lancers. The heavy battery was halted about a mile in rear on a low hill. The Lieutenant-General and Staff with the reserve (composed of the 19th Punjabees, the Sappers, and the General’s escort) were on a hill in rear commanding a good view of the country. Soon after seven o’clock orders were sent to General Barter to double forward half his infantry, and to send on two squadrons of the 1st Punjab cavalry without delay. At eight o’clock the troops moved forward in order of battle. The two batteries of artillery with their cavalry escort were on the extreme right; the 59th Foot were in the centre of the line, with the 2nd Sikhs on their left flank, while the 3rd Ghoorkas were in the extreme left with their ranks deflected a little to the rear. There was a gap of 400 or 500 yards between the artillery and the 59th, and to fill this up Sir Donald Stewart’s escort of a troop of the 19th Bengal Lancers, a company of the 60th Rifles, and one company of the 25th Punjab Native Infantry were told off; but even then the gap could not altogether be filled. A company of the 19th Punjabees were moved to the left of A-B battery, thus protecting both batteries at the same time. Such was the first formation, but it was afterwards modified, the guns of G-4 being moved to various points between the infantry regiments, and directing their fire wherever the numbers of the enemy seemed to threaten persistent attack. The two squadrons of the 19th Bengal Lancers were also extended upon the left flank to check any turning movement from that quarter, and also a guard to two of the guns of G-4, which came into action in that quarter. The infantry were thus flanked on either hand by a battery of artillery, while the cavalry formed the wings, as it were, of the column ready to strike to right or left, or to charge on converging lines upon a common enemy in front. The baggage stretched away in the rear for several miles, and it was all-important to prevent the head of the column being out-flanked, as in such a case the line would have been broken, and a stampede of men and animals have taken place upon General Barter’s brigade. The enemy, seeing the preparations for attack, moved down bodily from the crest of the ridge to the lower slopes with standards waving and tom-toms beating; and a fair amount of order was preserved among the horsemen and foot soldiers, who numbered 12,000 or 15,000—the Tarakis, Andaris, Suleiman Kheyls, and Tokhis having mustered their fighting men in obedience to the summons of the moollahs sent by Mushk-i-Alam. Our artillery (A-B and G-4) got into action and began shelling the slopes preparatory to the infantry attack; but suddenly a commotion was observed in the most advanced lines of the opposing army, the moollahs could be seen haranguing the irregular host with frantic energy, the beating of the tom-toms was redoubled, and then, as if by magic, a wave of men—ghazis of the most desperate type—poured down upon the plain and rushed upon General Stewart’s force. The main body of the Afghan army remained upon the hill to watch the ghazis in their reckless onslaught, and to take advantage of any success they might gain. The fanaticism of the 3,000 or 4,000 men who made this desperate charge has perhaps never been equalled; they had 500 or 600 yards to cover before they could come to close quarters with our infantry, and yet they made nothing of the distance. They advanced, or rather rushed forward, in three lines; many of the men were on horseback, and nearly all well armed with tulwars, knives, and pistols. Some carried rifles and matchlocks, while a few—and these must, indeed, have been resolute fanatics—had simply pikes made of bayonets, or pieces of sharpened iron fastened upon long sticks. The ground right and left of our troops was more open and level than that immediately in front, and consequently the ghazis’ attack broke with greatest violence upon our flanks. On our left flank the two squadrons of the 19th Bengal Lancers were still at the trot moving into position when the ghazis rushed among them. Lancers are always at a disadvantage when infantry have broken their ranks, and the 19th were no exception to the rule. In an instant they were lost to sight in the cloud of dust and smoke caused by the fight; and in the confusion, owing, perhaps, to some misunderstood order, or to the men losing their heads, a troop charged to the right in rear of the infantry line and came smashing into the 19th Punjab Native Infantry, in rear of the Lieutenant-General and his Staff. All was confusion for a moment; the ammunition mules were stampeded, and with the riderless horses of the Lancers killed or wounded in the mêlée, dashed into the head-quarters’ Staff. The ghazis had continued their onward rush and were engaged in hand-to-hand fighting with our infantry. Some penetrated to within twenty yards of the spot upon which the Staff were watching the action, and so critical was the moment, that Sir Donald Stewart and every man of his Staff drew their swords and prepared for self-defence. The impetuosity of the ghazis on the left carried them right in rear of our infantry, and but for the cool promptitude of Colonel Lyster, V.C., commanding the 3rd Ghoorkas, this rush might have had terrible results. Colonel Lyster formed his men into company squares, and poured volley after volley into the fanatics as they surged onwards. In the meantime the attack had also burst all along the line, and in the hurry and confusion some of our men did not fix bayonets.

ACTION OF AHMED KHEL
20 MILES from GHUZNI
19th April 1880.[[42]]

The General’s escort, filling the gap between the Horse Artillery Battery and the 59th, were driven back, and the 59th were ordered to throw back their right to check the rush. The order was so delivered that it was understood to imply the retirement of the whole regiment, and the movement was carried out. The ghazis were so close that there was a tendency to collect in groups for mutual protection—a fatal course when a general rush has to be checked; but General Hughes, by his example and energy, checked this in time, and after a few minutes’ excitement,—an excitement quite pardonable under the circumstances,—our men settled down and began a steady and continuous fire from their breech-loaders, which swept away the ghazis and covered the plain with dead. But there had been persistent hand-to-hand fighting before this fire began to take effect, for the ghazis fought with a bravery never excelled, and sold their lives as dearly as fanatics can sell them. Yet the three regiments—British, Sikh, and Ghoorka—to whom they were exposed, held their own, the 2nd Sikhs, in particular, attracting the General’s notice for their splendid steadiness in rolling back the attack, and the main body of Afghans holding aloof, the ghazis could not hope to break our line. But with what grand disregard for their lives they must have fought is shown by their charging to within thirty yards of the muzzles of Major Warter’s guns, and facing case and reversed shrapnel, which at close quarters mowed them down in scores. The gunners never flinched, but stood to their pieces manfully, trusting to the 2nd Punjab Cavalry to clear the enemy away until the infantry fire should begin to tell. The charges made by the 2nd Punjab Cavalry were repeated again and again, and were as brilliant as any made by cavalry during the whole war. This is the deliberate opinion of the men who witnessed them, and who owed much to the sowars who kept the right flank safe. The Horse Artillery guns were retired 150 yards when the first shock had passed, and at a range of a few hundred yards they continued to fire shell into the enemy with admirable precision. The guns of G-4 were in a comparatively safer position among the infantry, and their fire also was well directed and very effective. In the gap I have mentioned between A-B battery and the 59th Foot the General’s escort had a tough hand-to-hand fight with a body of ghazis who closed with them. Breech-loader and bayonet told against pistol and tulwar, while the few sowars of the 19th Bengal Lancers also gave their aid in the mêlée. How desperate the fighting must have been is shown by the casualties among the escort alone, which was merely used to give cohesion to the line. The company of the 60th lost its Colour-Sergeant (Chesham) and two privates killed and a bugler wounded; the company of the 25th had two sepoys killed, and the detachment of the 19th Bengal Lancers had seven sowars wounded. The heavy battery contributed its quota to the engagement as it got into action on a convenient piece of rising ground in rear of the infantry, and shelled a hill south of Ahmed Khel spur, on which large masses of the enemy had congregated, as if meditating a flank attack upon the baggage line. In the early part of the day Sir Donald Stewart, as I have said, had sent back word to General Barter to hurry up with reinforcements. General Barter started the 1st Punjab Cavalry at a trot, and followed with the 60th Rifles. The 1st Cavalry arrived in time to share in the pursuit of the fugitives, who had been unsuccessful in their attack upon our right flank, and many were killed before they could reach the protecting slopes of the Shilghur Hills on the east. The 60th formed up on the right of the 59th Foot, and the “cease fire” sounded just as they arrived, the enemy by that time being in full retreat. The cavalry pursuit had to be checked, as the six miles of baggage had to be looked after; and with so many regiments in advance, it was feared that detached bodies of ghazis might run amuck in the rear. The action had begun at nine o’clock, and “cease fire” sounded at ten, just an hour’s fighting; but the casualties were unusually heavy for Afghan warfare. Of the enemy 1,000 dead were counted on the field, and many bodies had been carried off: while their wounded must, at the smallest estimate, have numbered 1,000 or 1,500. The ghazis killed were all fine, handsome men, well nourished and of splendid physique, and their fanaticism had given them courage which veteran soldiers might envy. Among the dead was one woman, while twelve others were taken prisoners with arms in their hands. The casualties among our troops were seventeen killed, and 126 wounded; among the latter being six officers whose names have already been published. Lieutenant Young, of the 19th Bengal Lancers, had the misfortune to lose control over his horse, and the animal carried him into the thick of the ghazis, by whom he was cut down and fearfully wounded. From head to heel he was slashed until almost past recognition, and when picked up he was believed to be in a dying state. The surgeons have since given better reports of him, and his recovery seems assured. Of the wounded men, four have since died of their wounds, which in nearly every case were tulwar or knife-cuts received in hand-to-hand encounters. The 19th Bengal Lancers had fifty-three casualties, and twenty-four amongst the horses; the total loss of the whole cavalry brigade was more than 100, and from seventy to eighty horses.

The Hazaras, seeing the Afghans in full flight, pursued them with ardour, and their knowledge of the country gave them an advantage European troops could not hope to possess. How they harassed the fugitives only their own kinsmen will ever know, as pursuers and pursued disappeared into the hills very shortly after the action came to an end. The prisoners taken after the fight were dealt with by Major Euan Smith, Political Officer, all the wounded being treated by our surgeons and taken onwards towards Ghazni. Two ghazis only had to be shot; they were fanatics of too exalted minds to accept mercy, and when promised liberty in return for an undertaking to go quietly to their homes, they simply cursed all Kafirs, and swore to kill a Feringhi the instant they should be released. In justice to our men, their lives had to be taken, as Candahar experience has shown that such fanatics always keep their word. Our dead were buried on the field by Mr. Warnford, the Chaplain, as Sir Donald Stewart had resolved to march on to Nani without delay; and early in the afternoon the column was again moving northward. As our men passed along, ghazis who had feigned death rose and fired at them, and men severely wounded slashed at the legs of the soldiers; these dying spasms of fanaticism proving that the ghazis were consistent to the end.

On the evening of the 19th the force encamped at Nani, within fifteen miles of Ghazni, and on the following day the cavalry reached the fortress itself without further opposition. The tribesmen had made their grand effort to save the place, and had failed; there was nothing for it but to allow the Kafirs to do as they willed with the city and citadel, since it had fallen into their hands. The infantry and artillery encamped for the night at Chel Butcha Gaum (the Village of the Forty Children), a few miles south of Ghazni. It was noticed at the time that a low hill, some miles away on the right, was occupied by a large force of Afghans, who had their standards flying, but did not seem otherwise bent on hostilities. They were not interfered with then, as it was deemed advisable to push on to Ghazni, under the walls of which the Candahar column encamped on the 21st without further incident. Sir Donald Stewart had orders to make no long stay in Ghazni, and he intended moving out on the 23rd; but it was reported that the gathering of men seen on the 20th and 21st had largely increased, and that they were the advance-guard of an army of 15,000 or 20,000 which Mushk-i-Alam had raised in Shilghur and Zurmut. The effect upon the native mind, if such a force had been left unmolested when our troops evacuated Ghazni, would have been very damaging to our prestige, and Sir Donald Stewart resolved to disperse the tribesmen before moving northward. The peaceful state of Ghazni itself was an encouragement to this course of action, as he could freely use the regiments at his disposal without fear of an émeute[émeute] in the city.

As a preparatory measure a wing of the 19th Punjab Infantry occupied the citadel, and early on the morning of the 23rd a force under command of Brigadier-General Palliser marched towards Shalez, six miles south-east of Ghazni, said to be occupied by the enemy. The troops detailed for the work were:—

A-B, Royal Horse Artillery.
11-11th, Royal Artillery.
11-11th, Royal Artillery.Brigadier-General R. Barter commanding.
2-60th Rifles, 525 rifles.Under the command of Brigadier-General C. H. Palliser, C.B.
15th Sikhs, 578 rifles.
25th Punjab Native Infantry, 458 rifles.
2nd Sikhs, 424 rifles.
1st Punjab Cavalry, 322 sabres.
2nd Punjab Cavalry, 325 sabres.

On the previous day a cavalry reconnaissance had been made, and 2,000 or 3,000 men had been seen about the Urzoo villages near Shalez. General Palliser, on arriving near the villages, found them occupied in force by 3,000 or 4,000 men. He immediately got his guns into action, and shelled the villages, but without any apparent effect. The enemy remained quietly within the walls, except their videttes, which were pushed forward more into the open, while some of their sharp-shooters lined a narrow ditch in the fields, and began firing at long ranges upon our infantry. The villages consisted of three walled enclosures, two in close proximity to each other facing our right, and a third somewhat in rear of, and removed from, the others. This third village would have borne the brunt of any attack from our left flank, and it had as a sort of screen a small garden outside the walls. General Palliser believed the ground between his troops and the villages to be irrigated, and thought that much loss of life would occur if he sent his infantry to make a direct attack. He silenced such of the enemy’s sharp-shooters as grew troublesome by telling off marksmen to keep their fire under, and continued shelling the villages very vigorously. Still the enemy made no sign either of attacking or retiring, and a message was at last heliographed to Sir Donald Stewart, saying the place was too strong to be taken by the troops then in front of it without sacrificing many lives. Upon news being received, General Hughes’s Brigade was ordered under arms, and a half battalion of the 59th foot (253 rifles), and six companies of the 3rd Ghoorkas (191 rifles), were sent out as a reinforcement. Still General Palliser did not consider it advisable to attack, and he withdrew to a ridge 2,500 yards from the villages, whence he continued to shell the enemy. Upon this Sir Donald Stewart moved forward with G-4, R.A., 254 rifles of the 59th, a half battalion of the 19th Punjabees, and the 19th Bengal Lancers. The heavy battery was left in camp with two companies of the 59th, two companies of Sappers, and a complement of guards furnished from each regiment. Sir Donald Stewart reached Shalez at nine o’clock, and found that General Palliser had withdrawn his artillery and infantry to a low hill some distance from the villages, with a view to entice the enemy into the open. The tribesmen were too cautious to be deceived by this manœuvre, and preferred bearing bombardment to coming under infantry fire in the plain. The two batteries had fired the unusual number of thirty rounds of shell per gun, a total of 360 rounds, but 7-pr. and 9-pr. shells can do but little damage against walled enclosures and stout mud walls. When our reinforcements arrived, a sudden burst of fanatical enthusiasm seized the defenders of the villages, and it seemed as if the ghazis’ rush at Ahmed Khel was about to be repeated. At first only their videttes were seen watching our troops, while an occasional puff of smoke from the ditch showed the presence of a sharp-shooter; but soon a number of mounted men were seen galloping about, and then out poured a mob from the shelter of the walls. They formed themselves rudely into line, and to the din of their tom-toms began to advance. This unexpected boldness on their part was met by our batteries of artillery opening fire at 800 or 900 yards’ range, and the first few shells caused many of the more timid to break and retire. Sir Donald Stewart ordered the infantry to clear the villages without delay, and General Barter’s Brigade advanced in line upon the right; while General Hughes, whose brigade had been joined by the 2nd Sikhs, made a direct attack in front, his left swinging round so as to take the detached village of Urzoo in rear. Our troops steadily advanced until within 200 yards of the enemy, when file-firing commenced. The fusillade was terrible, and so stunned were the wretched and ill-armed tribesmen, that they fled in confusion. Some preferred staying crouched in the ditch to running the gauntlet of the bullets. One can imagine the incessant “ping” when six regiments armed with breech-loaders are advancing in one long line, firing as rapidly as men can load. It was natural that an undisciplined mob should melt away before such an attack. The men who lay hidden fought hand to hand with our soldiers as the latter reached them; but there was really no stubborn resistance, and the cavalry and horse artillery were let loose to pursue the fugitives as soon as the villages were surrounded. The total loss on the part of the enemy was 300 or 400; while our casualties were almost nil—one private of the 60th and one sowar of the 1st Punjab Cavalry shot dead. Such of the enemy as came to close quarters with our men fought bravely enough, one ghazi making a desperate rush at Lieutenant Legh, of the 60th, who killed him with his sword.

The Tajik villagers of Urzoo stated that there were originally 4,000 footmen and 200 cavalry in the villages when General Palliser first arrived; but that, when our troops did not attack, word was sent to all neighbouring villages to turn out their fighting men, and many Pathans joined their friends just before Sir Donald Stewart’s arrival. There can be no doubt that Mushk-i-Alam had worked upon the fanaticism of the local tribesmen, in the hope of retrieving the defeat of Ahmed Khel. His hopes have been completely shattered, but as he has young Musa Khan still with him he may yet give us trouble. General Stewart left Sirdar Alum Khan in charge of Ghazni when the Candahar force moved towards Cabul. The defences of Ghazni were not touched, as they were considered too contemptible to give trouble if a force should ever find itself beneath the walls of the city.

ROUGH SKETCH
Showing the attack upon the villages of Urzoo
and Shalez by the Ghazni Field Force,
on the 23rd April 1880.