Organization: How Armies are Formed for War

by Hubert Foster

Instructions

The system of Command customary before the French Revolution survived well into the nineteenth century. By it there were issued to each tactical unit of the Army, Orders containing minute, and even pedantic, details for carrying out the plan decided on by the Supreme Command. These details were not only wearisome to peruse, and unnecessary for experienced subordinates, but the time spent in merely copying and distributing them was so great, that it had a most prejudicial effect on the rapidity of the movements of the army. This system may be said to have greatly contributed to the ill success of the Austrians in their many wars against Napoleon, owing to the slow and dilatory movements it entailed.

The dissemination of the French Armies of the Revolution led to the plan systematized later by Napoleon, of giving short and general Instructions, prescribing to each Subordinate only his own part in the dispositions, with, perhaps, some information about the position of adjoining bodies of troops. This system had a great effect on the success of the French forces, but it only won its way very gradually in other armies. It is that now universally adopted; but the modern practice differs in one respect from that of Napoleon, who seldom indicated the general object of the movements, no doubt in order to avoid the danger of its becoming known by the enemy. The tendency is now to look on the latter danger as less than the evil of imperfect co-operation. If subordinates do not know the general situation, the object of the operations, and the position of the enemy, they will not always be able to act in accordance with the Commander’s purpose. The size and dispersion of modern armies make the independence of subordinates far greater than in the days of Napoleon, and have led to the practice of giving them general information about the situation, so as to ensure their co-operation to the common end.

Instructions (German Directiven) have been defined by the German General Staff as “Communications to a subordinate Commander intended less to convey definite Orders for his immediate action than to indicate leading features for his general guidance, which should facilitate his judgment as to the subsequent decisions to be taken independently.” Instructions therefore generally describe the situation, the operations decided on, and their object, but leave considerable latitude in the method of carrying out the general plan. The Subordinate Commanders are expected to act on their own judgment in furthering the Commander’s purpose, observing the spirit rather than the letter of their Instructions. For, it should be noticed, military obedience in the higher ranks does not lie in literal conformity to Orders, but rather in a true conception of their spirit. Such obedience is quite compatible with the independence and self-confidence indispensable in the Subordinate Commander, who has to act on his own judgment in carrying out Orders. He must take on himself the responsibility of giving effect to his Instructions by acting in conformity with the situation of the moment, which may be very different from the situation as it was when they were issued.

As regards the drafting of Instructions, it must be noted that the man who can make the best plans is not always the one to express them best. Napoleon’s brilliant combinations were embodied in Instructions which were often involved in their sequence, and ill-balanced from the intrusion of details among the broad outlines of the general plan. They were also generally so terse that they were not always clear to any intelligence inferior to his own. Jomini speaks of their “laconisme outré,” partly due to Napoleon’s temperament, and partly a revolt against the minute verbiage of the Military Orders of his generation. Hence the importance of a good Chief of the Staff, who can act for his General as Berthier did for Napoleon. He need not be a genius nor even a great strategist, but he must be able to translate into lucid Orders plans which he could never have originated, or perhaps even, like Berthier, never fully understand or appreciate.

Orders

Subordinate Commanders, although they act with some independence on the Instructions they themselves receive, do not leave the same latitude to their own subordinates. They exercise Command by the issue of precise Orders for executing the idea in the manner they themselves have decided on. These Orders will contain the substance of the Instructions they have received, as far as it may be desirable to pass on this information to their own subordinates. The method proposed to carry out the general plan will probably need explaining and developing in detail in the Orders. These will therefore prescribe the definite steps to be taken, such as the time and direction of marches and attacks, or the measures to be taken for security. Orders should not, as Instructions often may, provide for contingent possibilities. The issuer of an Order is generally on the spot, and can leave such contingencies to form the subject of further Orders. But unless a Commander can be present, and direct the operations himself, he must leave much latitude to those who have actually to lead the Troops. Without this, the operations will not always be the most suitable to the conditions of the moment, and the vigour which is the mainspring of successful action will suffer.

Division Commanders

During the war with France in 1870 the leading on the part of the Supreme and Army Commanders left much to be desired, but the way in which the German Subordinate Commanders worked together was very striking, and might well be imitated in other armies. Their co-operation was loyal, unhesitating, complete, and characterized by initiative and resolution. Holding similar views on fighting, and animated by the same energy, the German Commanders acted together to one common end—namely, to beat the enemy.

Subordinate Commanders require to possess moral courage and readiness to take responsibility, rather than merely physical bravery, while decision and resolution are essential. There will be a solid foundation of confidence and moral force in an army whose Divisional Commanders are so endowed. All Commanders should be brought up in the same school, and hold similar views on the conduct of war. This is the basis of good Command, and ensures harmonious co-operation.