| | | PAGE |
| Editor’s Introduction | [xi] |
| Preface | [1] |
| Introduction | [7] |
| I. | Of the division of Philosophy | [7] |
| II. | Of the realm of Philosophy in general | [11] |
| III. | Of the Critique of Judgement as a means of combining the two parts of Philosophy into a whole | [14] |
| IV. | Of Judgement as a faculty legislating a priori | [17] |
| V. | The principle of the formal purposiveness of nature is a transcendental principle of Judgement | [20] |
| VI. | Of the combination of the feeling of pleasure with the concept of the purposiveness of nature | [27] |
| VII. | Of the aesthetical representation of the purposiveness of nature | [30] |
| VIII. | Of the logical representation of the purposiveness of nature | [35] |
| IX. | Of the connexion of the legislation of Understanding with that of Reason by means of the Judgement | [39] |
| First Part.—Critique of the Aesthetical Judgement | [43] |
| First Division.—Analytic of the Aesthetical Judgement | [45] |
| First Book.—Analytic of the Beautiful | [45] |
| First Moment of the judgement of taste, according to quality | [45] |
| § 1. | The judgement of taste is aesthetical | [45] |
| § 2. | The satisfaction which determines the judgement of taste is disinterested | [46] |
| § 3. | The satisfaction in the pleasant is bound up with interest | [48] |
| § 4. | The satisfaction in the good is bound up with interest | [50] |
| § 5. | Comparison of the three specifically different kinds of satisfaction | [53] |
| Second Moment of the judgement of taste, viz. according to quantity | [55] |
| § 6. | The Beautiful is that which apart from concepts is represented as the object of a universal satisfaction | [55] |
| § 7. | Comparison of the Beautiful with the Pleasant and the Good by means of the above characteristic | [57] |
| § 8. | The universality of the satisfaction is represented in a judgement of Taste only as subjective | [59] |
| § 9. | Investigation of the question whether in a judgement of taste the feeling of pleasure precedes or follows the judging of the object | [63] |
| Third Moment of judgements of taste according to the relation of the purposes which are brought into consideration therein | [67] |
| § 10. | Of purposiveness in general | [67] |
| § 11. | The judgement of taste has nothing at its basis but the form of the purposiveness of an object (or of its mode of representation) | [69] |
| § 12. | The judgement of taste rests on a priori grounds | [70] |
| § 13. | The pure judgement of taste is independent of charm and emotion | [72] |
| § 14. | Elucidation by means of examples | [73] |
| § 15. | The judgement of taste is quite independent of the concept of perfection | [77] |
| § 16. | The judgement of taste, by which an object is declared to be beautiful under the condition of a definite concept, is not pure | [81] |
| § 17. | Of the Ideal of Beauty | [84] |
| Fourth Moment of the judgement of taste, according to the modality of the satisfaction in the object | [91] |
| § 18. | What the modality in a judgement of taste is | [91] |
| § 19. | The subjective necessity which we ascribe to the judgement of taste is conditioned | [92] |
| § 20. | The condition of necessity which a judgement of taste asserts is the Idea of a common sense | [92] |
| § 21. | Have we ground for presupposing a common sense? | [93] |
| § 22. | The necessity of the universal agreement that is thought in a judgement of taste is a subjective necessity, which is represented as objective under the presupposition of a common sense | [94] |
| General remark on the first section of the Analytic | [96] |
| Second Book.—Analytic of the Sublime | [101] |
| § 23. | Transition from the faculty which judges of the Beautiful to that which judges of the Sublime | [101] |
| § 24. | Of the divisions of an investigation into the feeling of the Sublime | [105] |
| A.—Of the Mathematically Sublime | [106] |
| § 25. | Explanation of the term “Sublime” | [106] |
| § 26. | Of that estimation of the magnitude of natural things which is requisite for the Idea of the Sublime | [110] |
| § 27. | Of the quality of the satisfaction in our judgements upon the Sublime | [119] |
| B.—Of the Dynamically Sublime in Nature | [123] |
| § 28. | Of Nature regarded as Might | [123] |
| § 29. | Of the modality of the judgement upon the sublime in nature | [130] |
| General remark upon the exposition of the aesthetical reflective Judgement | [132] |
| Deduction of [pure] aesthetical judgements | [150] |
| § 30. | The Deduction of aesthetical judgements on the objects of nature must not be directed to what we call Sublime in nature, but only to the Beautiful | [150] |
| § 31. | Of the method of deduction of judgements of taste | [152] |
| § 32. | First peculiarity of the judgement of taste | [154] |
| § 33. | Second peculiarity of the judgement of taste | [157] |
| § 34. | There is no objective principle of taste possible | [159] |
| § 35. | The principle of Taste is the subjective principle of Judgement in general | [161] |
| § 36. | Of the problem of a Deduction of judgements of Taste | [162] |
| § 37. | What is properly asserted a priori of an object in a judgement of taste | [164] |
| § 38. | Deduction of judgements of taste | [165] |
| § 39. | Of the communicability of a sensation | [167] |
| § 40. | Of taste as a kind of sensus communis | [169] |
| § 41. | Of the empirical interest in the Beautiful | [173] |
| § 42. | Of the intellectual interest in the Beautiful | [176] |
| § 43. | Of Art in general | [183] |
| § 44. | Of beautiful Art | [185] |
| § 45. | Beautiful art is an art in so far as it seems like nature | [187] |
| § 46. | Beautiful art is the art of genius | [188] |
| § 47. | Elucidation and confirmation of the above explanation of Genius | [190] |
| § 48. | Of the relation of Genius to Taste | [193] |
| § 49. | Of the faculties of the mind that constitute Genius | [197] |
| § 50. | Of the combination of Taste with Genius in the products of beautiful Art | [205] |
| § 51. | Of the division of the beautiful arts | [206] |
| § 52. | Of the combination of beautiful arts in one and the same product | [214] |
| § 53. | Comparison of the respective aesthetical worth of the beautiful arts | [215] |
| § 54. | Remark | [220] |
| Second Division.—Dialectic of the Aesthetical Judgement | [229] |
| § 55. | | [229] |
| § 56. | Representation of the antinomy of Taste | [230] |
| § 57. | Solution of the antinomy of Taste | [231] |
| § 58. | Of the Idealism of the purposiveness of both Nature and Art as the unique principle of the aesthetical Judgement | [241] |
| § 59. | Of Beauty as the symbol of Morality | [248] |
| § 60. | Appendix:—Of the method of Taste | [253] |
| Second Part.—Critique of the Teleological Judgement | [257] |
| § 61. | Of the objective purposiveness of Nature | [259] |
| First Division.—Analytic of the Teleological Judgement | [262] |
| § 62. | Of the objective purposiveness which is merely formal as distinguished from that which is material | [262] |
| § 63. | Of the relative, as distinguished from the inner, purposiveness of nature | [268] |
| § 64. | Of the peculiar character of things as natural purposes | [272] |
| § 65. | Things regarded as natural purposes are organised beings | [275] |
| § 66. | Of the principle of judging of internal purposiveness in organised beings | [280] |
| § 67. | Of the principle of the teleological judging of nature in general as a system of purposes | [282] |
| § 68. | Of the principle of Teleology as internal principle of natural science | [287] |
| Second Division.—Dialectic of the Teleological Judgement | [292] |
| § 69. | What is an antinomy of the Judgement? | [292] |
| § 70. | Representation of this antinomy | [293] |
| § 71. | Preliminary to the solution of the above antinomy | [296] |
| § 72. | Of the different systems which deal with the purposiveness of Nature | [298] |
| § 73. | None of the above systems give what they pretend | [302] |
| § 74. | The reason that we cannot treat the concept of a Technic of nature dogmatically is the fact that a natural purpose is inexplicable | [306] |
| § 75. | The concept of an objective purposiveness of nature is a critical principle of Reason for the reflective Judgement | [309] |
| § 76. | Remark | [313] |
| § 77. | Of the peculiarity of the human Understanding, by means of which the concept of a natural purpose is possible | [319] |
| § 78. | Of the union of the principle of the universal mechanism of matter with the teleological principle in the Technic of nature | [326] |
| Appendix.—Methodology of the Teleological Judgement | [334] |
| § 79. | Whether Teleology must be treated as if it belonged to the doctrine of nature | [334] |
| § 80. | Of the necessary subordination of the mechanical to the teleological principle in the explanation of a thing as a natural purpose | [336] |
| § 81. | Of the association of mechanism with the teleological principle in the explanation of a natural purpose as a natural product | [342] |
| § 82. | Of the teleological system in the external relations of organised beings | [346] |
| § 83. | Of the ultimate purpose of nature as a teleological system | [352] |
| § 84. | Of the final purpose of the existence of a world, i.e. of creation itself | [359] |
| § 85. | Of Physico-theology | [362] |
| § 86. | Of Ethico-theology | [370] |
| § 87. | Of the moral proof of the Being of God | [377] |
| § 88. | Limitation of the validity of the moral proof | [384] |
| § 89. | Of the use of the moral argument | [392] |
| § 90. | Of the kind of belief in a teleological proof of the Being of God | [395] |
| § 91. | Of the kind of belief produced by a practical faith | [403] |
| General remark on Teleology | [414] |