II. Refutation of the Counterfeiter's pretended Right against the Editor.
The question remains still to be answered: since the editor projects to the public the ownership over the work of the author, does not the consent of the editor (and by implication also the author, who gave the editor legal control over it) to every use of the work, including reprinting it, result automatically from ownership of a copy of the work, such that such consent is automatically furnished to whoever purchases a copy of the work, however disagreeable such consent to permit counterfeiting may be to the editor? For the prospect of profit has perhaps enticed the editor to undertake, with the risk of having the published work counterfeited, the business of editor, where this risk is more likely since the purchaser has not been excluded from counterfeiting via an express contract, because it would hurt the editor's business if the editor tried to obligate all potential purchasers of the work to agree to a contract forbidding counterfeiting, because potential purchases would generally not consent to such an agreement and therefore would be less likely to purchase a copy of the work. My answer to this question is that the ownership of the copy does not furnish the right of counterfeiting. I prove this by the following ratiocination:
A personal positive right against another can never be
derived from the ownership of a thing only.
But the right of publishing a work is a personal positive right.
Therefore, the right of publishing never can be derived from the
ownership of a thing (the copy) only.