Machiavelli
Machiavelli’s view of emergency powers as one element in the whole scheme of limited government furnishes an ironic contrast to the Lockean theory of prerogative. He recognized and attempted to bridge this chasm in democratic political theory:
“Now in a well-ordered republic it should never be necessary to resort to extra-constitutional measures; for although they may for the time be beneficial, yet the precedent is pernicious, for if the practice is once established of disregarding the laws for good objects, they will in a little while be disregarded under that pretext for evil purposes. Thus no republic will ever be perfect if she has not by law provided for everything, having a remedy for every emergency, and fixed rules for applying it.”[24]
Machiavelli attempted, perhaps without complete success, but with greater caution than the later theorists, to design a system of constitutionalized emergency powers.
The incumbent executive authority, on finding that an emergency existed, could appoint a temporary “dictator”[25] on the Roman model. The constitution was not suspended, and the emergency executive did not enjoy absolute power. His narrow function was to cope with the emergency.[26] He operated under the surveillance of the regularly constituted legislators and government officials. A key element of Machiavelli’s scheme was a short term of office—“and I call a year or more [27]
Thus Machiavelli—in contrast to Locke, Rousseau and Mill—sought to incorporate into the constitution a regularized system of standby emergency powers to be invoked with suitable checks and controls in time of national danger. He attempted forthrightly to meet the problem of combining a capacious reserve of power and speed and vigor in its application in time of emergency, with effective constitutional restraints.