Studies in Civics

by J. T. McCleary

SECTION III.—THE SENATE.[1]

Clause 1.—Composition.

The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two senators from each state,[2] chosen by the legislature thereof,[3] for six years;[4] and each senator shall have one vote.[5]

[1] Latin senatus, from senex, an old man. This dignified term seems a favorite, being used in many countries to designate the upper house. In other countries a term is used having the same signification.

[2] This arrangement will be remembered as the concession made by the large states to the small ones.

Had the number of senators been fixed at one from each state, equality of power among the states would still have been secured; but sickness or accident might then leave a state unrepresented. By having two, this difficulty is obviated. The two can consult about the needs of their state; and the Senate is large enough to "confer power and encourage firmness." Three from each state would bring no advantages which are not now secured, while the Senate would be unnecessarily large and expensive.

[3] This mode of election was fixed upon for two reasons: First, the senators represent the state, as such, and hence it seemed proper that they should be chosen by the body which acts for the state in its corporate capacity; second, the members of the House of Representatives being elected by the people, it was deemed advisable to elect the senators in a different way, in order that, by representing different elements, each house might act as a check upon the other. Incidentally, election by the legislature was considered good, because it would serve as a connecting link between the states and the United States.

[4] The long term gives dignity and independence to the position of senator; it gives assurance of stability in the national councils, and tends to secure for them confidence at home and respect abroad; it raises senators "above the whims and caprices of their constituents, so that they may consult their solid interests, rather than their immediate wishes."

[5] Under the confederation each state had from two to seven members of congress, but only one vote. If the delegation was equally divided on any question, or if only one member was present, the state lost its vote.

By the present arrangement a state need not go entirely unrepresented on account of the absence of one of its senators.

Clause 2.—Classification and Vacancies.

Immediately after they shall be assembled in consequence of the first election, they shall be divided, as equally as may be, into three classes.[1] The seats of the senators of the first class shall be vacated at the expiration of the second year; of the second class, at the expiration of the fourth year; and of the third class, at the expiration of the sixth year;[2] so that one-third may be chosen every second year; and if vacancies happen by resignation, or otherwise, during the recess of the legislature of any state, the executive thereof may make temporary appointments until the next meeting of the legislature, which shall then fill such vacancies.[3]

[1] The object of this division is to secure for the Senate at all times a large proportion of experienced members. By this arrangement, too, the Senate becomes a permanent body, ready at any time to convene for the consideration of treaties, for the trial of impeachments, or for confirming executive appointments.

[2] Only ten states were represented when, on May 15, 1789, this classification was first made. (North Carolina and Rhode Island had not yet ratified the constitution, and New York's senators had not yet presented their credentials.) The twenty senators had on the preceding day been grouped by name into three classes, two of seven senators each, and one of six. By the drawing of three numbered slips of paper, seven fell into class 1, seven into class 2, and six into class 3, with terms ending March 3, 1791, 1793, and 1795, respectively. After the classification had been fixed, the two senators from New York appeared. One was placed, by lot, in class 3 (thus filling the classes), and then the other, also by lot, in class 1. The two senators from the next state, North Carolina, were therefore placed in the unfilled classes 2 and 3. Since 1795, each class holds for six years, and a senator's term expires with that of his class.

[3] Senators represent the state, and are elected by the body which acts for the state,—by the legislature if in session, temporarily by the governor if it is not.

Clause 3.—Qualifications.

No person shall be a senator, who shall not have attained to the age of thirty years,[1] and been nine years a citizen of the United States,[2] and who shall not, when elected, be an inhabitant of that state from which he shall be chosen.[3]

[1] This was also the age for eligibility to the Roman Senate. It is five years more than the requirement for membership in the House.

[2] Two years of citizenship more than required of a representative. As the Senate acts with the president in making treaties, this requirement seems none too great.

[3] The propriety of this is self-evident. (I. 2: 2.)

Clause 4.—Presiding Officer.

The vice-president of the United States shall be president of the Senate,[1] but shall have no vote,[2] unless they be equally divided.[3]

[1] This arrangement was made for three reasons:

First. It would give the vice-president something to do.

Second. Partaking in the executive business of the Senate would give the vice-president excellent training for the duties of the presidency, in case he should be called thereto.

Third. The equality of power among the states would remain undisturbed. Had it been arranged that the Senate should choose its own presiding officer from among its members, one state might thereby gain (or lose) power in the Senate.

[2] Because he is not a member of the Senate. For this reason, also, he cannot take part in debates, nor can he appoint committees. These are elected by the Senate itself.

[3] But for his casting vote; a "dead-lock" might occur on some important question. This "might give rise to dangerous feuds, or intrigues, and create state or national agitations."

Clause 5.—Other Officers.

The Senate shall choose their other officers,[1] and also a president pro tempore,[2] in the absence of the vice-president, or when he shall exercise the office of president of the United States.

[1] These are similar to those of the House. (See p. 131.)

[2] The president pro tempore is chosen from among the senators. Being a senator, he can debate and vote upon any question. He cannot, of course, give a "casting vote," because that would virtually give him two votes.

The president pro tempore serves during the pleasure of the Senate, or until the expiration of his senatorial term.

It is the general practice for the vice-president to vacate his chair at the beginning of the session, to permit the Senate to chose a president pro tempore, so that if during vacation the vice-president should become president, the Senate might not be without a presiding officer. Until recently this was quite important, for the president pro tempore of the Senate was next to the vice-president in the succession to the presidency. But the succession has been changed. (See p. 190.)

Clause 6.—Impeachment.

The Senate shall have the sole power to try all impeachments.[1] When sitting for that purpose, they shall be on oath or affirmation.[2] When the president of the United States is tried, the chief Justice shall preside;[3] and no person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of the members present.[4] Judgement in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust or profit, under the United Sates;[5] but the party convicted shall, nevertheless, be liable and subject to indictment, trial, judgment and punishment, according to law.[6]

[1] For the mode of conducting impeachments, see pages 131 and 331.

To have impeachments tried by a court of law would be unwise for several reasons: In the first place, judges should be kept free from political contests, in order that they may retain the proper judicial frame of mind. In the second place, judges are appointed by the executive, who may be the one impeached. Lastly, a judge is himself subject to impeachment.

[2] To enhance the solemnity of the occasion. The British House of Lords when sitting as a high court of impeachment is not under oath. But courts usually are.

[3] The vice-president, having interest in the result, would be disqualified. The chief justice, from the dignity of his station and his great experience in law, seems the fittest person to preside on such a grave occasion. Except in this single instance, however, the vice-president presides in trials on impeachment.

[4] In an ordinary court, the verdict of the jury must be unanimous. To require similar agreement in this case would be to make it next to impossible ever to convict. To allow a bare majority to convict would be to place too little protection over a public officer.

[5] But for this provision abuses of power might occur in times of political excitement and strife. The question which the Senate settles is simply whether, in view of the evidence, the accused is or is not worthy to hold public office.

[6] This provision was inserted to prevent an official who had been deposed for crime from pleading the principle that "No one can be twice tried and punished for the same offense."