CHAP. VIII.
There is no country with which Great Britain is likely so soon to come into hostile contact as the United States of America, and for such a war we must certainly want an army such as I have in view.
It has long been the fashion, and I believe it is the object of many interested and designing men, to endeavour to have the United States of America considered as much more powerful and dangerous to Great Britain then they really are. No nation, nor body of men, be they who they may, composed of such heterogeneous materials, scattered over so vast an extent of territory, in which the laws, enacted by an often unruly legislature, are so powerless, and in many places so weakly administered, as not to be able to prevent aggressions upon an unoffending neighbour, or to afford sufficient protection to the peaceably inclined against the hand of violence, can possibly be considered powerful. I am aware that parts of the United States ought, to a certain extent, to be looked upon as exceptions, but, generally speaking, this is by no means an over-drawn picture of what is the state of society in that part of the world.
If Great Britain was only prepared to convince the world of her strength in steam ships, and to send forth even a portion of them from the St. Lawrence, and from other points in our valuable North American possessions, she must in a very short time destroy, or shut up in their ports, in hopeless inactivity, all the so much boasted of Navy or traders of the United States. And it might be asked—would any other power, when they saw we were really in earnest, dare to aid them in their difficulties; and what would then become of their immense commerce, from which alone they derive their present importance? Are not the feelings and interests of the Northern, Southern and inland States directly opposed to each other; and would not the continuance of the last war, for even a short time longer, have had the effect of causing discontents and divisions amongst the several States, already independent of each other, which could never again, in all human probability, have been brought in consequence to act in unison.
But to convince even the most incredulous of this, and of the kind of spirit which was found to exist amongst the people of the States, and to point out clearly with what zeal and patriotism we were opposed in the last war in the march of our troops upon Plattsburg, I have only to lay before them some Brigade orders which were issued by Sir Thomas Brisbane at the time.
"No. 5. None of the inhabitants of the country are to be prevented from passing the advanced posts either to the front or rear, from one hour after sunrise till sunset; and they are to be permitted to drive in cattle, or any thing else they may think fit; but officers commanding picquets are to be very careful in examining those who pass; and must take up, and send to the head-quarters of the Brigade (Dowy's house) such as may appear suspicious.
"No. 7. Major-General Brisbane having received instructions to advance with the troops under his command into the territory of the United States, avails himself of the opportunity, to request that commanding officers will use every exertion to maintain the strictest discipline in their corps; and he holds them responsible, that in every instance when a complaint is made to them of any injury sustained by the inhabitants, that it is inquired into, and if necessary redressed; and whatever damage is done, that it is instantly paid for and charged against those concerned, and where this cannot be ascertained to the corps in general, so that unoffending people may not be sufferers.
"In taking the necessary precautions against individuals, who may so far forget what is due to themselves and their country, as to commit acts of plunder or violence, the Major-General is at the same time fully convinced, that the troops in general are determined, that their conduct shall not bring disgrace upon the British name; he therefore calls upon them to discover those who may be guilty of acts of plunder or oppression, that they may be brought to the punishment they merit; and the soldiers must soon find that such a line of conduct will add much to their comforts; for the inhabitants of the country finding that they are properly treated and protected, will bring every article requisite into the camp; for those who remain quiet in their homes are not in the smallest degree to be molested, nor is their property to be taken from them without their full consent and its being paid for; as it is not against such persons that Great Britain makes war, but against the Government whose folly and ambition have brought the miseries of war into their country, and the army and individuals in arms for its support.
"The Major-General commanding has requested the magistrates of the country, to explain to the people his object and determination, on entering the American territory; and he trusts that the conduct of the soldiers will be such as to reflect no shade of dishonour on their country."
The apparent state of indifference of the people was so great, and the effects of these orders, which were widely circulated, so evident, that we found all the houses occupied, and every thing might have led us to suppose we were still marching through Canada; and I do not remember that a shot was fired at us until we fell in with some of the United States troops as we approached Plattsburg.
Owing to a want of arrangement, and of sufficient preparation on our part, we were last war unsuccessful upon Lake Champlain, and upon its shores; and I had the mortification of seeing our fleet discomfited in Plattsburg Bay. In consequence of this, and of the advanced state of the season, and as no calculations of any kind seemed to have been made for contingencies, our fine, but feebly commanded, army had to fall back upon Canada; and the extensive and important conquests, which were supposed to have been the objects of those who ordered us to advance into the States, had to be abandoned.
The Americans pretended, that, in our retreat, they hotly pursued, and occasioned us great losses; but there was no foundation whatever for what they in this respect asserted, or for what was said on this subject in their newspapers; for our only loss, I may say, consisted in some heavy shot and an old gun, taken from the Americans, and which had been left many years before in the States when General Burgoyne's expedition failed, and which the state of the roads obliged us to throw into the swamps, and in some worthless men who deserted from their corps; for, whatever might have been said to the contrary, nothing could be more unhurried or undisturbed than we were in all our movements during the retreat. I do, however, recollect, that in crossing the bridge at Champlain with the rear-guard, on our return, that a Yankee had the impudence to say, when spoken to with civility: "I guess as how you are not playing Yankee doodle now." Some of the soldiers were inclined to have thrown him into the river, but of course this was not allowed.
I was attached as Brigade-Major to the strong brigade (about 5,000 men) of the army, which, under Sir Thomas Brisbane, formed its rear-guard, and I can safely say, that although various stratagems were practised, and every thing done by him so as to induce the American commander to approach us, he never was able to succeed. I only mention this to show what grounds they had for boasting. But is it not also too bad and vexatious that works written by American authors are patronized and lauded even in the United Kingdom, not so much perhaps on account of their style of composition, or literary merits, as for the subjects they contain; which are intended to extol, chiefly at the expense of our navy, fierce and lawless men, many of whom were actually British subjects? Yet who can for a moment suppose, that sending British seamen or landsmen to the other side of the Atlantic, can deprive them of their natural courage. There is, however, a degree of moral depravity existing throughout the Union, which must always prevent these extraordinary Republicans, should they even become more powerful than they are at present, from being able to cope with us in war. And in speaking of the degree of liberty enjoyed in the United States and in Great Britain, what comparison can be drawn in this respect between the two countries?—for who would prefer the tyrannical rule of a usually tumultuous Democracy to the mixed Government under which all men enjoy protection and sufficient liberty in the United Kingdoms, and all over our vast empire, without its being allowed to become licentiousness?
As for the unfinished works at Plattsburg, had not Sir George Prevost halted the troops, led by experienced and often before distinguished generals, rapidly advancing against them, they must, with their commander and all his troops, have been, I have no hesitation in saying, in twenty minutes more in our possession; but as for the idea which was foolishly entertained by some at the time, of our being able, if successful in the assault of the works, to re-capture our lost ship and vessels, it was too absurd to merit a moment's consideration.
The following official document will, I expect, be read with interest, as it certainly removes much of the blame from Sir George Prevost for the attack having been made upon the American fleet by ours in an unprepared state; at least our Commodore (whether he was injudiciously urged to go forward or not I cannot tell) acted with a perfect knowledge of what he was about to attempt, and it would have been produced had the former been brought to a court-martial as intended. But the question should have been, why was the fine army, confided to Sir George Prevost, pushed forward at all into the United States, especially in the month of September, before our superiority on Lake Champlain had been established? Extract from a communication to Major-General De Rottenburg, dated Friday evening, 10 o'clock, P.M.:—
"I have this moment received from Captain Downie intelligence of his intention to weigh and proceed with the squadron, from its anchorage off Chazy, about midnight, with the expectation of rounding into the Bay of Plattsburg about the dawn of day, and with the intention of commencing an immediate attack on the enemy's ship, vessels, and gun-boats, if the anchorage they are in affords any chance of success; in consequence you are to hold the left division in readiness to execute the contemplated service at six o'clock to-morrow morning.
"The batteries directed to be completed and armed in the course of the night, are to open on the enemy's position the instant the naval action has commenced. You will cause the necessary preparations to be made for the rocket service of each battery.
(Signed), "G. Prevost,
"Commander of the Forces."
I shall pass this over without any remark, leaving it to the reader to judge for himself; but we had far too many commanders, for they were actually in each other's way. Here was Sir George Prevost himself, Baron De Rottenburg and his staff, a brilliant head-quarter staff, consisting of Adjutant and Quarter-master-general, assistants to both; Military Secretary, Aides-de-Camp, Chiefs of Engineers, Artillery, &c. &c., in short, enough to have caused confusion in an army three times our numbers, and much more so amongst the three brigades, whose experienced generals and staff wanted no help.
The moment the naval action commenced, the batteries, which had been constructed entirely under Sir Thomas Brisbane's directions, opened such a well-directed fire, that they apparently demolished all before them, and in a very short time nearly silenced that of the enemy's guns in their works. Under the protection of our artillery, the bridge over the Seranac, (the planks only of which the Americans in their retreat had been able to destroy or take up,) was repaired in a few minutes by materials we had ready for the purpose; part of the troops, under Sir Thomas Brisbane were moving down to pass by it to the assault, and the greater part were marching rapidly under General Sir Manley Power, and Sir Frederick Robinson, with the intention of effectually cutting off the enemy's retreat, when the order from Sir George Prevost to halt arrived, in consequence of our fleet having been discomfited upon the Lake. It is, however, to be regretted that the works were not allowed to be carried, for it would have prevented much boasting, and would have served in some manner to counterbalance the loss of our vessels. But what I witnessed during the whole of this unfortunate and miscalculated business, convinced me that the enterprise which embraced, as we understood, many extensive and important objects, no doubt suggested from England, had been begun without almost any fixed plan, carried on in considerable ignorance of the country, and ultimately abandoned, because of an event, the probability of which occurring, from the state of the two fleets, might, in a great measure, have been calculated upon.
Any one of the three strong brigades into which our force was divided was sufficient alone for all we had hitherto undertaken, and also for the reduction of Plattsburg, if properly handled by an able and experienced officer: but the ideas of military matters entertained by the Generals and Staff we found in possession of power were very different from ours; and I merely mention this to shew, that until our Staff had acquired experience under the Duke of Wellington, they were in general very deficient, and, as a further proof of this, I must observe, that nothing could betray greater weakness and indecision than the manner in which it was proposed to move upon Plattsburg.
It was at first intended that we were to have had a large body of Indian warriors along with us in our invasion of the States; and Sir Thomas Brisbane, attended by his Staff and several other officers, had to go through all the customary ceremonies of war councils, speeches, dances, presents, feastings, drinkings, &c., but after all we only took them with us as far as the village of Champlain, and from thence, to my great delight, at the request of Sir Thomas Brisbane, they were sent back into Canada.
It was also intended that the whole army were to have moved in one column, by the road leading to Plattsburg, which crosses the Dead Creek, near to its mouth, where there is a bridge, and a ford a little lower down, where it enters the Lake, and there we knew the enemy had for some time been preparing to receive us. Sir Thomas Brisbane, who led the advance, not looking upon this plan as judicious, and being also fully aware of the difficulties which this Creek even naturally presented, sent me from Champlain, accompanied by some flank companies and Indian warriors, which altogether formed a strong reconnoitring party, to ascertain if a road fit for the march of troops and cannon, (of which we had lately heard), could not be found to our right, and by which the formidable position of the Dead Creek might be turned. I marched by what is called the Batemantown road, and very soon found that it had been made, even as far as Plattsburg, fit for any military purposes, at least, at that time of the year.
Sir Thomas Brisbane, at such an evident proof of want of necessary and proper information on the part of our Staff, (for we were still strangers in the country), had almost made up his mind to allow them to take their own way and to march as they intended; but those feelings he has so often evinced for the welfare of those placed under his command, and for the good of the service; together with being convinced, that his brigade must have suffered severely in forcing the Creek, induced him to communicate in time with head-quarters on the subject, and the consequence was, that the whole arrangements were altered; his own column only marching towards the mouth of the Creek, and the other two taking the road, which, it had been ascertained, turned the enemy's position. The result was, that the Americans had to retreat upon Plattsburg without being able to offer almost any resistance; and the only loss, I may say, we did sustain was from the fire from the enemy's gun-boats stationed at the mouth of the creek, where we were obliged to ford it, as the bridge had been nearly destroyed. Sir Thomas Brisbane was anxious to have turned our field artillery against the gun-boats. But a senior general, who happened to be present, would not allow this to be done; as he said it would only the more attract the enemy's fire towards a point upon which it was already directed with right good will. He, however, at last went off, as my general had previously done with the advance towards Plattsburg, when our rocket-brigade was brought forward, and a rocket well laid by the officer commanding it, having, I believe the very first discharge, struck one gun-boat, and as we heard afterwards wounded the officer commanding on board, and as it in its continued flight went close over most of the others, the whole took to their oars in an instant, and we were no more molested by them.
Up to this period the war had been carried on in a very irritating manner, and in some instances in a way which could produce no advantage to either party; for even sentinels on their posts were cautiously approached and fired at.
Sir Thomas Brisbane proposed to the American generals Izard and M'Combe, to put an end to such barbarities, and in future to carry on military operations in the manner adopted by European nations. This being readily agreed to by them, I did not hear of another instance of the kind occurring upon either side as long as the war lasted; indeed, this kind of polite intercourse between the generals was attended with the best results, not only amongst those under them, but also produced feelings of respect and offers of attention, if opportunity offered, after the war was over.
Neither during our expedition to Plattsburg, nor for some time afterwards were our affairs in the Lower Province well managed. Just before the closing in of the ice on the lake, and when a part of the United States fleet were still at Plattsburg, but, as we well knew, from good authority, completely off their guard, and full of that dangerous confidence often arising out of a victory too easily achieved, it was arranged to surprise and capture them by our gun-boats, and a number of batteaux manned by volunteers, of which there were hundreds from the regiments. The attempt was intended to have been made in the night; the soldiers in the batteaux being armed with cutlasses, pistols, and with boarding pikes, of which there were plenty at Isle aux Noix; and the following letter was addressed, by order of Sir Thomas Brisbane, by me to the lieutenant of the Navy in command of the gun-boats there; who, as it may be well supposed, being delighted at an opportunity of retaliating upon the Americans, most readily agreed to the proposal contained in it.
"St. Johns, November 12, 1814.
"Sir,
"Major-General Brisbane has desired me to communicate the following circumstances to you, with a view to induce you to co-operate in an attack upon such of the enemy's fleet as still remain in the Bay of Plattsburg, upon which, with your assistance, it is proposed by Sir George Prevost to make the attempt.
"The enemy's force there, by the latest information, consists of only two sloops, and seven gun-boats, indifferently manned, and little or no attention is paid to the common measures of precaution. It is therefore natural to suppose, a sudden attack, or even surprise, might be attempted with every prospect of success.
"On our part we can only employ batteaux for this enterprise, manned by volunteers from the regiments, in such numbers as you would think necessary to act along with your gun boats; and the strength of your crews could be increased if you require it. Of course, the whole will be under your direction, and success must depend upon secrecy, rapid preparation and action.
"Major-General Brisbane, therefore, begs you will ascertain if the report of the strength and number of vessels in Plattsburg Bay be correct, and at all events, he requests that you will lose no time in coming here to arrange matters, or should you not think such an undertaking practicable, you will be so good as to point out in what the difficulties consist. It is, however, obvious, that when affairs of this nature are once proposed, the sooner they are carried into execution the better, or else entirely laid aside."
This well arranged attack, which, if successful, would have greatly improved our situation upon the Lake the following spring, had the war lasted, was, however, put a stop to only a few hours before the departure of the expedition, by an express from the General commanding the forces, who had become apprehensive that the attempt was too hazardous.
I am induced to continue this subject for various reasons, but principally because much that occurred during the last war in North America, is at this moment becoming interesting; and useful conclusions, in both a naval and military point of view, may be drawn from what has already taken place there.
After the disappointment to our hopes of retaliating upon it, the whole of the enemy's fleet were laid up for the winter at Whitehall, at the head of Lake Champlain. It was again proposed by Sir Thomas Brisbane, and agreed to by Sir George Prevost, to destroy them by an expedition of five thousand men, which were to have started suddenly under the orders of the former, to be conveyed to the point of attack, with their supplies of provisions, and combustibles for destroying the ships, &c. over the ice and snow in sledges. This also, from the excellent information we had been able to procure, held out every prospect of complete success; but the same timid councils again prevailed, and this second, but much more important expedition, when about to start, was almost similarly countermanded; and the disappointment was particularly felt by us, for several of the regiments which were to have been employed in this enterprise, formed part of the force which was not long after assembled under Sir Thomas Brisbane at Paris, and when the Duke of Wellington inspected it, he was pleased to say, that had these fine regiments (and they amounted to nearly nine thousand men) been in time for Waterloo, the Prussians would not have been wanted upon that occasion. I must also add, that most of these corps had been formed and accustomed to war under his Grace in Portugal, Spain, and the south of France; and having been found at the end of the war to be the most efficient of the army, they had been at once ordered off to North America, where, from the way in which things were managed, they had not the power of farther distinguishing themselves.
But I could, if necessary, show that at last we would have completely effected our object in destroying the American fleet at Whitehall; but in a very different manner, and which, from the share I had in the transaction, and from the secrecy I thus feel imposed upon me, I do not consider myself at liberty to disclose, and which the notification of peace with the United States alone prevented. At that moment it was quite evident that the effects of the war had begun to be most seriously felt; and it was also an expensive, and as the Duke of Wellington would pronounce it to be, a useless little war for Great Britain to be so long engaged in. If we are again provoked to hostilities, which is very probable, the people of the United States should be made to feel what are the effects of a war carried on in earnest in their own country, by such a powerful empire as Great Britain; but for this our navy and army must be properly prepared.
I have for several years past given the subject of our Boundaries with the United States much consideration, and I have endeavoured to obtain, by all the means I could bring to my aid, a correct view of it; but what has been published in the "Times," of the 27th of April, and 26th of May, 1840, as communications from Mr. Waddilove to the Editor, puts the whole of that long misunderstood question, in so much clearer a light than what I had prepared for this work (though I had come nearly to the same conclusion) that I hope I shall be excused for giving them in this place.
THE TREATY BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.
[TO THE EDITOR OF THE TIMES.]
Extract from the definitive treaty of peace and friendship between his Britannic Majesty and the United States of America, signed at Paris, September, 3, 1783.
The first article recognizes the several States.
The second proceeds as follows:—
"And that all disputes which might arise in future on the subject of the boundaries of the said United States may be prevented, it is hereby agreed and declared that the following are and shall be their boundaries viz.,—from the north-west angle of Nova Scotia, viz., that angle which is formed by a line drawn due north from the source of the St. Croix to the highlands, along the said highlands which divide those rivers that empty themselves into the St. Lawrence from those which fall into the Atlantic Ocean, to the north-western-most head of the Connecticut River, thence down along the middle of that river to the 45th degree of north latitude."
"If it can be shown, as it easily may, that there existed a then known tract of country called "the Highlands," which had been in use in former official documents, and which did separate the river flowing south into the Atlantic Ocean from others flowing into the St. Lawrence and into the St. John, which emptied itself into the Bay of Fundy, not into the Atlantic Ocean,—if also the documents of the period show that it was a leading object with Great Britain to preserve to their dependencies the exclusive navigation of the river St. John, and that the river St. Croix, and the line drawn north from it to the said highlands, were fixed as boundaries to the land conceded to the States, for the purpose of securing this exclusive possession,—if it can be shown that a tract of country so circumstanced was one of the concessions specially objected by Mr. Fox, Mr. Burke, Lord North, and Mr. Sheridan, in the debates upon the peace (wherein upon a division, the numbers were, against the Ministry 224, in favour 208), under the name Penobscot, the principal river of the tract, which, with its tributary streams did rise on the south side of these highlands, and did fall into the Atlantic Ocean—if, too, as appears from all these circumstances, the district now called Maine, was no other than the district ceded to Massachusetts, under the name Penobscot, the very objections made by these leading oppositionists afford the strongest possible proof that the claims of an additional extent now made by Maine and Massachusetts were unjust and unreasonable, and more palpably absurd and untenable, when it is considered, that with a view to obtaining a right to the navigation of the St. John, the negociators did actually endeavour to obtain the portion of country lying between the St. Croix—the St. Croix line and the St John, then first attached to the government of Nova Scotia—and that the secret articles of Congress prove it to have been a subject of debate, whether the war should be continued on account of such additional territory, (a question which was decided in the negative). The very contest about the navigation of the St. John, also is in itself a proof of the unsoundness of the claim, for it would be of little value to shut out the mouth of the St. John, and the extent of its course cut off by the St. Croix, and the northern line, if, by allowing America possessions beyond the then known highlands, you had conceded a territory connecting them with the St. John; and such would be the case by allowing the extension of their settlements beyond the highlands to the Aristook. I take it this fact of itself is sufficient to prove the injustice of the claim.
"Moreover, the district so conceded, under the name Penobscot, and which is no other than the present Maine, does actually fulfil the special conditions laid down in the second article. It includes all the rivers which flow from the highlands, and fall into the Atlantic, and includes no other, and after crossing these said highlands, not one river, except the St. John, does flow south towards the Atlantic, except as a tributary stream of the St. John, through the Bay of Fundy.
"Neither can it be said that these tracts were then as little known at the conclusion of a war, in which every part had been traversed, as they have been to later Colonial Ministers, for the Government of that day met the objections made to the cession of Penobscot in this way:—One objector had stated that it ought not to have been ceded by a maritime state, on account of the wonderful supply of excellent timber for masts which it was known to afford. In opposition to which, the Minister stated, "that it was proved by the certificate of Captain Twiss, one of the ablest surveyors in the service, that there was not a tree in the tract capable of making a mast."
"And one leading member of the Opposition, condemning the neglect of Government in not making terms for the deserted loyalists, who had forfeited their property by adhering to Great Britain, put his question in these terms—"Could not all the surrenders we were to make—the surrender of New York, the surrender of Charleston, of Long Island, Staten Island, Penobscot, and Savanna, purchase security for these meritorious persons?" Now, how much stronger would have been the argument, if the cession of Penobscot had not been limited, as the British boundary line limits it, by the highlands, but had extended further, so as to entitle the States to the waters of the St. John, and enable them to cut off the communication between Canada and Nova Scotia? He adds also, that the inhabitants of these very places were armed with us in the defence of their estates, and therefore we can only attribute the rise of Maine as a State to the circumstance of Massachusetts becoming possessed of the confiscated estates of Penobscot, the boundaries of the state of Massachusetts having previously been in a direct line from the Connecticut River to the Bay of Passamaquoddy.
"That the description given in the treaty of 1783, Art. 2,—'A line drawn due north from the heads of the St. Croix to the highlands, along the said highlands which divide those rivers that empty themselves into the St. Lawrence from those which fall into the Atlantic Ocean,' was a description known and acknowledged in 1783 both to American and British commanders and negotiators, is proved by the fact of that description being used not only in the act of 1774, but in the Royal proclamation of 1763. And this point is confirmed by another fact—viz. the movement of a detachment of the American army under Colonel Arnold for the invasion of Canada from the side of New England, while General Montgomerie invaded it by the upper side and the lakes, in September, 1775, in not more than seven years before the preliminaries of peace; and it is also to be observed that no part of Arnold's route came near the northern ridge of highland to which the Americans lay claim, and which in fact does not divide the rivers falling into the St. Lawrence from those falling into the Atlantic Ocean, but only divides those falling into the St. Lawrence from those falling into the St. John; whereas the ridge claimed by Britain, referred to in the 14th George III., 1774, and in the Royal proclamation of 1763, does actually separate all the rivers flowing southward into the Atlantic from all the rivers which flow north and north-east, whether they fall into the St. Lawrence or into the St. John; and further, upon the north side of the ridge claimed by Britain as the bound there does not rise a single river which falls into the Atlantic, while all the rivers rising on the south of the British boundary do fall into the Atlantic. It is a long passage to copy, but the whole may give your readers a better notion of the country traversed than were I merely to transcribe the passage which proves my point. Under that passage I shall therefore place a score:—
"'On the 22d of September, 1775, Arnold embarked upon the Kennebec (one of the rivers rising on the south of the British ridge, and flowing towards the Atlantic), in 200 batteaux, and proceeded with great difficulty up that river, having a rapid stream, with a rocky bottom and shores, continually interrupted by falls and carrying places, with numberless other impediments to encounter. In this passage the batteaux were frequently filled with water, or overset, in consequence of which arms, ammunition, and stores were lost to a great extent. At the numerous carrying places, besides the labour of loading and reloading, they were obliged to convey the boats on their shoulders. The great carrying place was above 12 miles across. That part of the detachment which was not employed in the batteaux marched along the banks of the river, and the boats and men being disposed in three divisions, each division encamped together every night. Nor was the march by land more eligible than the passage by water. They had thick woods, deep swamps, difficult mountains, and precipices, alternately to encounter, and were at times obliged to cut their way for miles through the thickets. The constant fatigue and labour caused many to fall sick, which added to their difficulties, and provisions became at length so scarce, that some of the men ate their dogs, and whatever else of any kind which could be converted into food.
"'Arriving at the head of the Kennebec, they sent back their sick, and one of their colonels took that opportunity of returning with his division, without the knowledge or consent of the Commander-in-Chief. By this desertion Arnold's detachment was reduced about one-third: they, however, proceeded with their usual constancy: and having crossed the Heights of Land, as a ridge that extends quite through that continent is called, and from whence the waters on either side take courses directly contrary to those on the other, they at length arrived at the head of the Chaudiere, which, running through Canada, falls into the River St. Lawrence near Quebec. Their difficulties were now growing to an end, and they soon approached the inhabited parts of Canada; on the 3d of November a party, which they had pushed forward, returned with provisions, and they soon after came to a house, being the first they had beheld for 31 days, having spent the whole time in traversing a hideous wilderness, without meeting anything human.'
"Now, here you have, in the report of a campaign made by an American general eight years before the peace, viz. in 1775, and printed in an English Annual Register five years before the peace, viz. 1799, as direct a reference to the same marked distinction of rivers flowing different ways, in consequence of the peculiar nature of the country, as it is possible to desire; and you have an acknowledgment, totidem verbis, that the then known designation of such tract was no other than that used in the article of the subsequent treaty, as it had been also used in the 14th of George III. by the British Legislature and in the Royal proclamation of 1763, and upon examining any map, that of the Useful Knowledge Society or any other, it will be seen that all the rivers rising on the south side of the British boundary do fulfil the terms of the above treaty, and that all on the other, or north side, do, as the above account of Arnold's march expresses it, 'take courses directly contrary.' The rivers on the south side flow towards the Atlantic Ocean, not one on the other side does flow towards it—in itself the most indisputable proof that the American claim cannot stand with those words of the article which assign to them only that tract of territory wherein the rivers flow towards and 'fall into the Atlantic Ocean.'
"I may here remark, that as the proclamation of 1763 is the earliest reference I know to these highlands so dividing the rivers, and as that proclamation proceeds from west to east, and as General Arnold found at the west end the peculiar marks required, the only really amicable, and perhaps the only certain, mode of ascertaining the bound, would be not to start on a loose cruise for highlands at the line of St. Croix, which can itself only be determined by its abutment with the specified highlands (in fact, I believe this loose and hand-over-head mode of proceeding has produced all the difficulty), but to start the search where General Arnold crossed, and run the line eastward according to the direction of the rivers, giving all the territory wherein 'the rivers fall into the Atlantic,' as by the treaty, to America, that wherein 'the rivers flow the contrary way' to Britain; for with this report of General Arnold's march seven years before under our view, it is impossible to believe that General Washington would have sanctioned a reference to so marked a distinction as these so-called 'highlands' in one sense, while he meant, in future times, the reference to be interpreted in another. Viewing the matter according to these lights, which is the only just mode of viewing it, as a case between Christians, Penobscot, the cession of which was reprobated in the British Parliament at the time (and when many officers who had been employed in Canada and in the States were present in both Houses), does fulfil the terms required by the treaty—namely, it embraces all the rivers which, rising on the south of Arnold's ridge, flow towards and 'fall into the Atlantic Ocean;' whereas, neither the boundary claimed by America nor the line set out by the King of Holland as a fair compromise, acceded to by the sufferer, Britain, and refused by the gainer, America, can in any wise be said to meet.
"I know not, Sir, whether you will think these remarks, and this information, upon a question likely to terminate in a war, or a disgraceful concession of the just rights of the British nation, may be useful or acceptable to you; but, such as they are, you are welcome to them, and may use them as you please; and allow me at the same time to add, there are other parts of the history of the same period which would cast considerable light upon the present extraordinary proceedings of the British Government in regard to Canada.
"I have the honour to remain, Sir,
"Your obedient servant,
"W.J.D. Waddilove."
TO THE EDITOR OF THE TIMES.
"My intention is now to show you, from a document already quoted, the Royal proclamation of 1763, a further confirmation that the division expressed, 'Rivers falling one way, and rivers falling directly contrary into the Atlantic,' was a distinction perfectly well understood, and that this peculiar expression being applicable to "Penobscot," was the probable reason why that district was ceded in 1783, and many tribes of Indians driven from a hunting ground previously enjoyed, under the protection of the British Crown. If I recollect right, some influential member of the opponents of Lord Shelburne's peace stated in debate, that above 20 tribes, whom we were bound by previous treaties and wampum belts to protect, were driven from their homes by this unnecessary cession, for it may be here remarked that one uniform condition of all treaties with that ill-used race of men, by whomsoever made (Sir W. Johnson or others), was this—for the sole purpose of guarding themselves against the wanton aggression of the settlers, provided the tracts ceded be always appropriated to His Majesty's sole use, and that the lines be run in the presence of the British authority, and some of their own chiefs, to prevent disputes hereafter.
"The 11th clause of the proclamation, evidently with a view to this feeling on the part of the Indians, runs thus. After setting out the limits and grants, &c. in the previous part of the instrument (binding upon America, as well as upon ourselves, except where they may be specifically relieved from its effect by the express words of the treaty of 1783, since they were at the time British subjects) we read—
"'Whereas, it is just and reasonable, and essential to our interest and the security of our colonies (the States then included), that the several nations or tribes of Indians, with whom we are connected, and who live under our protection, should not be molested or disturbed in the possession of such parts of our dominions and territories as, not having been ceded to, or purchased by, us, are reserved to them, or any of them, as their hunting grounds; we do therefore, with the advice of our Privy Council, declare it to be our Royal will and pleasure that no governor or commander-in-chief, in any of our colonies, Quebec, &c. do presume, upon any pretence whatever, to grant warrants of survey, or pass any patents for lands beyond the bounds of their respective governments, as described in their commissions.' Now mark: 'As also that no governor or commander-in-chief of our colonies or plantations in America do presume for the present, and until our further pleasure be known, to grant warrants of survey, or pass patents, for any lands beyond the heads or sources of any of the rivers which fall into the Atlantic Ocean from the west or north-west, or upon any lands whatever, which not having been ceded to, or purchased by, us, as aforesaid, are reserved to the said Indians or any of them.' Now, will any man of common reflection say, that under such circumstances, known to all our governors and commanders-in-chief, of course also to all engaged in the internal legislation of the plantations, there could be any obscurity to admit of dispute in the reference made to this precise mark of distinction—'beyond the heads or sources of any of the rivers falling into the Atlantic?' the same mark being again referred to in the Imperial Act 14th George III., 1774, in nearly the same words, only adding 'the highlands,' &c., dividing, &c., again expressly described in the account of General Arnold's march over the very country; and lastly, briefly referred to in the treaty of 1783, the very brevity and looseness of the expression being the strongest possible proof of the notoriety of such division and landmark. I confess, Sir, I cannot divine any mode of escape from the dilemma in which the sticklers for this unreasonable claim are placed—either to recede from what is palpably an unjust pretence, or to stamp Washington, Dr. Franklin, Mr. Adams, and Mr. Jay as the most consummate knaves, adopting a loose phraseology to escape at a future time from the effects of their own treaty. To the latter alternative no Englishman acquainted with the history of Washington's glorious, and—except in one point, too stern an adherence to what he conceived to be justice-unblemished career, will ever be disposed to accede.
"The next point on which I engaged to remark was the probable reason which induced Lord Shelburne to cede a country which the Indians had possessed, and thereby drive so many tribes from their homes, and the tombs of their ancestors, to them a heavier blow than any other That the Indians did possess it, is proved not only by the statement in the Imperial Parliament, but also by the fact of sundry raids occasionally made by them from this tract upon the settlers of Nova Scotia, known to be at that time altogether confined to the region about Pasamaquoddy Bay, which now forms the southern part of New Brunswick.
"Now the clause which I have quoted above I conceive to afford that probable reason. The governors, &c. are restricted not to grant warrants of survey on any pretence 'beyond the heads and sources of the rivers which fall into the Atlantic.' Though I believe it admits a question whether any patents were passed extending the British settlements beyond the 45th degree of north latitude, for the old geographers carry the line along that degree to the Bay of Pasamaquoddy, and bound Massachusetts on the west by New Hampshire—though the description of General Arnold's march is a traverse of a wild wilderness, wherein 'human face divine' seems never to have been seen, yet this clause most decidedly leaves a discretion in the Governor of Massachusetts, when population required it, to extend his surveys and his patents as far north as the heads of those rivers which fall into the Atlantic. The district now called Maine, then Penobscot, is exactly a tract so situated, and, whatever might have been the original intentions of the Crown as regarded the Indians within this tract, the discretion so given formed a just and proper reason, when peace was to be established, why the territory so described should be ceded to the United States, and that very cession of a country so circumstanced affords the strongest possible confirmation that 'the heads and sources of the rivers falling into the Atlantic' literally were the limits referred to in 1783, and that no just claim can be made out in the face of this evidence to a territory in which, by the confession of General Arnold's march, the rivers fall 'the contrary way.' I shall not trouble you further. A war founded on unjust aggression can never expect God's blessing upon it. A calm produced by concession to unjust aggression can never end in lasting peace.
"'If thou seest the oppression of the poor, and violent perverting of judgment and justice in a province, marvel not at the matter, for he that is higher than the highest regardeth." Eccles. v. 8.
I remain, Sir, your obedient servant.
W.J.D. Waddilove.
"Beacon Grange, April 28."
After Great Britain had acknowledged the independence of the several States, if the true spirit of this treaty were not to be strictly adhered to, it must have been obvious at the time, that it would be impossible for her to defend her remaining North American possessions; much less be able at any future period to make them sufficiently powerful to cope with the United States. But surely with the Treaty, and the various documents alluded to by Mr. Waddilove, in their hands, a commission, composed of able military men, sent out to that part of the world, could so well define the boundary between the two countries, as to leave no further doubts upon the minds of our Government, as to the line of conduct to be with justice pursued towards the United States and also towards our North American possessions; and they would then be enabled also to act with that firmness and decision with which these republicans should be met in all our dealings with them. The idea of umpires ought not for a moment be tolerated—the treaty and the features of the country render them quite unnecessary. Without having any ambitious views, Great Britain evidently wants this disputed territory, if it were only for the security of her North American Provinces; and it might reasonably be expected that this point could be amicably arranged, if there is a sincere wish for peace, and any thing like good will towards us to be found in the United States. If therefore we are provoked to war, by simply working on both flanks of any body of troops hazarded by the States into the country alluded to, their fate may be pretty easily guessed or calculated upon; for we could have no difficulty in acting at once from Quebec, Halifax, &c.; and if hereafter emigration from the United Kingdom were duly and liberally encouraged, as it should be, into a country rightfully belonging to the British Empire, abounding in small lakes and fine rivers, we might soon begin to talk not only of our valuable but also of our powerful American colonies; especially if convicts, in place of being all sent to New Holland, were employed to make good roads to connect the countries lying between the Atlantic and the St. Lawrence. These convicts should never upon any account be allowed to become settlers.
Having so far entered upon the subject, I think I ought to proceed in what I hope may be useful; and whilst I speak from observations made upon the spot, I must take the liberty of reminding the reader that during the period occupied by "improvements" in the States; the Canadas, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, &c., though somewhat retarded by late events, have not been standing still.
The country behind the line running from Lake St. Francis, to Lake Memphremagog, ought as soon as possible to be secured from sudden incursions, by a few respectable forts, or strong redoubts; capable of affording good cover for a certain number of cavalry and infantry; situations for which, upon or close to the present frontier, can be found, so that that entrance into Lower Canada may be covered. The line mentioned being taken as a base, and Isle aux Noix, Ash Island, and the part of the frontier extending along from the La Colle river towards Lake St. Francis being judiciously protected, the Lower Province would thus be secured from the inroads of brigands from the adjoining States; and if they, or if even an army should venture forward in that direction, it would not be quite easy for them to return; especially if the redoubts I speak of, are by the labour of soldiers made strong enough to require a week's regular siege for their capture, and which might be scientifically thrown up at no great expense. They should, however, be connected with each other by military roads; the making of which, as well as constructing the redoubts, would be excellent practice for the regular troops I am so anxious to have called out; who could never be better employed, (for habits of labour are essential to them,) than in works of this kind; and I hope I have already shown, that veterans are quite unfit for the duties of our North American frontiers.
The thick, in some places, almost impassable woods and swamps, extending often for a considerable distance along the frontier line of the Lower Province, render it difficult to make arrangements to oppose inroads from the States; for it is impossible to calculate upon the direction in which an enemy's force may make its appearance, and in order to watch all the roads or approaches, especially in winter, our troops must necessarily be too much scattered over the country; for owing to want of cover, they cannot be kept in sufficient bodies, but so far to the rear as to expose the advanced posts to be overpowered and cut off.
The following documents, which appear to be official, will show clearly, that I have not without good reason made the foregoing observations respecting the state of our affairs with the United States, and which call for energetic measures on our part.
"MILITARY AND NAVAL PREPARATIONS ON OUR NORTHERN FRONTIERS.
"The Chair submitted the following message from the President of the United States:—
"TO THE SENATE.
"I communicate to the Senate, in compliance with their resolution of the 12th instant, a report from the Secretary of War, containing information on the subject of that resolution.
"M. Van Buren.
"Washington, March 28."
"War Department, March 27.
"Sir,—The resolution of the Senate of the 12th inst. 'That the President of the United States be requested to communicate to the Senate, if in his judgment compatible with the public interest, any information which may be in the possession of the Government, or which can be conveniently obtained, of the military and naval preparations of the British authorities on the northern frontiers of the United States, from Lake Superior to the Atlantic Ocean, designating the permanent from the temporary and field works, and particularly noting those which are within the claimed limits of the United States,' having been referred by you to this department, it was immediately referred to Major-General Scott, and other officers who have been stationed on the frontier referred to, for such information on the subject as they possessed, and could readily procure; and an examination is now in progress for such as may be contained in the files of the department. General Scott is the only officer yet heard from, and a copy of his report is herewith submitted, together with a copy of that to which he refers, made upon the resolution of the House of Representatives of the 9th instant. As soon as the other officers who have been called upon are heard from, and the examination of the files of the department is completed, any further information which may be thus acquired will be immediately laid before you.
"Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
"J.R. Poinsett.
"To the President of the United States."
"Head Quarters, Eastern Division, Elizabethtown, New Jersey, March 23, 1840.
"Sir,—I have received from your office, copies of two resolutions, passed respectively, the 12th and 9th instant, one by the Senate, and the other by the House of Representatives; and I am asked for 'any information on the subject of both, or either of the resolutions, that may be in [my] possession.'
"In respect to the naval force recently maintained upon the American lakes by Great Britain, I have just had the honour to report to the Secretary of War, by whom the resolution of the House of Representatives (of the 9th instant) was directly referred to me.
"I now confine myself to the Senate's resolution, respecting 'military (I omit naval) preparations of the British authorities on the northern frontiers of the United States, from Lake Superior to the Atlantic Ocean, distinguishing the permanent from the temporary and field works, and particularly noting those which are within the claimed limits of the United States.'
"I will here remark, that however well my duties have made me acquainted with the greater part of the line in question, I have paid but slight attention to the forts and barracks erected by the British authorities near the borders of Maine, above Fredericton, in New Brunswick, or in Upper Canada, above Cornwall, being of the fixed opinion which need not here be developed, that all such structures would be of little or no military value to either of the parties in the event of a new war between the United States and Great Britain.
"I was last summer at the foot of Lake Superior, and neither saw nor heard of any British fort or barrack on the St. Mary's River, the outlet of that lake.
"Between Lakes Huron and Erie the British have three sets of barracks—one at Windsor, opposite to Detroit; one at Sandwich, a little lower down; and the third at Malden, 18 miles from the first; all built of sawed logs, strengthened by block-houses, loopholes, &c. Malden has been a military post, with slight defences. These have been recently strengthened. The works at Sandwich and Windsor have also, I think, been erected within the last six or eight months.
"Near the mouth of the Niagara the British have two small forts—George and Messisanga. Both existed during the last war. The latter may be termed a permanent work. Slight barracks have been erected within the last two years on the same side, near the Falls, and at Chippawa, with breast works at the latter place; but nothing, I believe, above the works first named, on the Niagara, which can be termed a fort.
"Since the commencement of the recent troubles in the Canadas, and (consequent thereupon) within our limits, Fort William Henry, at Kingston, and Fort Wellington (opposite Ogdensburg old works,) have both been strengthened within themselves, besides the addition of dependencies. These forts may be called permanent.
"On the St. Lawrence, below Prescott, and confronting our territory, I know of no other military post; 12 miles above, at Brockville, there may be temporary barracks and breastworks. I know that of late Brockville has been a military station.
"In the system of defences on the approaches to Montreal, the Isle Aux Noix, a few miles below our line, and in the outlet of Lake Champlain, stands at the head. This island contains within itself a system of permanent works of great strength. On them the British Government has, from time to time, since the peace of 1815, expended much skill and labour.
"Odletown, near our line, on the western side of Lake Champlain, has been a station for a body of Canadian militia for two years, to guard the neighbourhood from refugee incendiarism from our side. I think that barracks have been erected there for the accommodation of those troops, and also at a station, with the like object, near Alburgh, in Vermont.
"It is believed that there are no important British forts or extensive British barracks, on our borders, from Vermont to Maine.
"In respect to such structures on the disputed territory, Governor Fairfield's published letters contain fuller information than has reached me through any other channel. I have heard of no new military preparations by the British authorities on the St Croix or Pasamaquoddy Bay.
"Among such preparations, perhaps I ought not to omit the fact that Great Britain, besides numerous corps of well-organized and well instructed militia, has at this time within her North American provinces more than 20,000 of her best regular troops. The whole of those forces might be brought to the verge of our territory in a few days. Two-thirds of that regular force has arrived out since the spring of 1838.
"I remain, Sir, with great respect,
"Your most obedient servant,
"Winfield Scott.
"Brigadier General R. Jones, Adjutant-General
United States Army."
BRITISH ARMED VESSELS ON THE LAKES.
"The papers on this subject submitted to Congress by the President, in compliance with a resolution of the House, show that at the close of navigation last fall, two steamers (owned or hired by the British authorities), one schooner, and a number of barges, were employed on Lake Ontario, and the river St. Lawrence, as a security against an apprehended renewal of the troubles of the preceding year; and from the annexed communication of Mr. Forsyth, there is reason to expect that even this small force, or at least a part of it, will be soon withdrawn."
"Department of State, Washington, March 13.
"The Secretary of State, to whom has been referred a resolution of the House of Representatives of the 9th instant, requesting the President to communicate to that body, 'if compatible with the public service, whether the Government of Great Britain have expressed to the Government of the United States a desire to annul the arrangements entered into between the two Governments in the month of April, 1817, respecting the naval force to be maintained upon the American lakes; and that, if said arrangements be not annulled, whether there has been any violation of the same by the authorities of Great Britain,' has the honour to report to the President a copy of the only communication on file in this department on the subject to which the resolution refers. Prior to the date of that communication, the Secretary of State, in an interview invited for that purpose, called Mr. Fox's attention to the disregard by Her Majesty's colonial authorities of the conventional arrangement between the two countries, as to the extent of naval armaments upon the lakes.
"In the autumn of the past year the Secretary of State made known verbally to Mr. Fox, that the cause assigned in his note no longer existing, the President expected that the British armament upon the lakes would be placed upon the footing prescribed by the convention. Mr. Fox engaged to communicate without delay to his Government the substance of the conversation between them: and expressed his own conviction, that if the winter then ensuing passed without renewed attempts to disturb the tranquillity of the Canadas, there could be no sufficient motive for either Government maintaining a force beyond that authorized by the convention of 1817.
"All of which is respectfully submitted.
"John Forsyth.
"To the President of the United States."
The instructions which were deemed expedient to be given to Colonel Sir William Williams of the 13th Regiment, commanding Isle aux Noix and its dependencies in 1814, after we lost the superiority on Lake Champlain, will clearly show that what I have proposed should be seriously considered; and also support my opinion of the necessity of establishing the fortresses I have mentioned, in which troops could at all times be comfortably quartered; indeed, with such neighbours as the Americans, our possessions can never be safe from insult without them.
"St John's, November 9, 1814.
"Sir,
"I am commanded by Major-General Brisbane to transmit, for your guidance, the following instructions, which are to be acted upon as far as circumstances will permit, in case of an attack upon any of the advanced posts; not that the Major-General has reason to conclude the enemy have such an object in view; but the confusion always arising out of unexpected occurrences in time of war, must as far as possible be avoided or guarded against; and you ought also to be aware of his intentions in case of such events happening.
"1st. The enemy appearing in force in the direction of Caldwell's Manor, coming from Missisquoi Bay.
"It is not probable that the enemy would appear in that direction with any other intention, but for a demonstration, unless he came with the determination of attacking Isle aux Noix, in which case it is to be expected he will bring with him, if before the frost sets in, the means of water conveyance on the south river, or if afterwards, means of transport for heavy guns on the ice. His intentions, therefore, in these respects can be easily ascertained. If the former should be his object, a force must be detached into the Manor, or the concessions, (say five companies under a field-officer) to keep him in check, and to prevent the country from being over-run and plundered; this may in a great measure be effected by the choice of favourable situations or positions, but no general affair must be permitted without the consent of the Major-General.
"Whilst the enemy might be thus manœuvring, a real attack would likely take place on the line of the La Colle and Ash Island. Such an attack is not improbable, although the enemy could have no other object in view but to beat up our cantonments, and cause the troops, in some measure, to take the field exposed to the inclemency of the season, and might be effected with only a small part of his force. The whole of the posts upon that line must be ordered to hold out till reinforcements can arrive from this place; for until then it would not be safe to detach but small parties from the garrison of Isle aux Noix. A force from L'Acadie could only be brought up in support of the bridge. La Colle Mill and its dependencies must look to Isle aux Noix alone for assistance.
"2ndly, If the enemy should come with the intention of attacking Isle aux Noix with heavy guns, a certain time is requisite for him to make his arrangements; and measures could be taken on our part to frustrate his views.
"For some time longer, it is in the enemy's power to make an attack by means of his fleet, upon Ash Island and La Colle, in conjunction with a force acting in Caldwell's Manor; the necessity therefore, of keeping the guns in battery there, as long as possible, even till the frost sets in, must be obvious.
"It is not probable that the enemy might venture to pass Isle aux Noix entirely, and move down the Richlieu at once upon this place; which might perhaps be the case, if collecting a sufficient force, he should meditate the invasion of the Lower Province. Under such circumstances, the posts on the La Colle might be greatly exposed. It would then be for you to act powerfully on his line of operations; and as most likely, in such a case, your communications with the advanced posts might be attempted to be cut off, it would therefore be advisable, after destroying the road from the Mill to La Colle bridge, to withdraw the troops from the former and Ash Island (after destroying the works) to Isle aux Noix, which would place at your disposal sufficient means to annoy an invading army. Of course the Burtonville road from the bridge would be disputed to the utmost.
"3rd. The enemy appearing in force in Odletown.
"This is not likely to happen until the frost sets in; and could only have in view the occupation of the posts of the La Colle and Ash Island; objects of the first importance to us to prevent; and an attack on that side in force must distract us much more than in the direction of Caldwell's Manor, and in this case it would be reasonable to expect a diversion on the right bank of the river, or even if the enemy has sufficient force, a dash down the South river upon the Isle aux Noix, which would make it hazardous to detach much from it for the support of the advance before the troops from this can arrive; yet a force could be easily, at this season, brought up to support the bridge of La Colle, which is in itself no position to be held against cannon; but the entrance of the Burtonville road is very favourable for light troops and if they are judiciously posted there, it would be next to impossible for the enemy to force a passage in that direction, and it is not very likely such an attempt would be made; the danger rests in La Colle Mill being taken, by which means we might be forced to retire back on the road to L'Acadie, whereby the troops intrusted with the defence of that entrance would be totally deprived of cover.
"Lastly. Any advance of the enemy upon us could deviate but little from what has been stated in numbers one, two, and three, with any chance of success; it must, therefore, be evident throughout the whole, that the arrival of reinforcements from the rear is the primary object; it, upon this account, becomes essential, that the Major-General should receive the earliest possible intelligence of the appearance of the enemy in any direction, and he, therefore, desires me to request, that in any instructions you may give to the officers in command of the advanced posts, sending immediate information of suspicious movements in their front may be held up to them as of the first importance.
"I am also to acquaint you, that we do not, at present, possess, at St. John's, more means than would enable us to move one regiment at a time up the river Richlieu to your assistance."
No doubt, since 1814, the number of roads from the States into the Canadas have been considerably increased, which must render it still more difficult, without the redoubts I speak of, to make arrangements for the protection of the country; I hope, however, that what has been said, and what are shown to be the difficulties to be met with and overcome, together with the anxiety evinced on the part of the American Government, as to any preparations we may have made in case of a war, to which they evidently look forward, will receive timely and serious consideration, but in any future contest with the United States, the command of Lake Champlain ought instantly to be acquired; and our superiority in war steamers upon all the Lakes cannot possibly be dispensed with, if these fine and valuable provinces of the empire are to be protected from inroads, and consequent devastation; and such is my opinion of the loyalty of the people in general of the Canadas, and even of the Canadians of the French extraction in the Lower Province, if not allowed to be misled by designing men, that, I am convinced, they would readily contribute towards their own defence, rather than be brought under the democratical rule of the United States.
If the whole of our North American territories had arrived at a certain point, when an increased, educated, and intelligent population, and improved resources, had made it safe for them as one nation, to be allowed entirely to manage their own affairs without any interference on the part of the mother country, and that they really desired to do so, Great Britain ought readily to comply with their wishes, yet still remaining their friend and protector, and receiving, in return, every commercial advantage; but to abandon them in their present weak and distracted state, as some men have ignorantly talked of, and even recommended, would only be throwing them into the power of our friendly neighbours, who, thus strengthened, and we proportionally weakened, might, to a certain degree, become more formidable.
I beg, however, to ask, why is Great Britain become, as it were, timid, or reluctant to declare, that no act nor pretensions on the part of the United States can give them a right to incorporate British subjects into their Union without the consent of our Government; and why is it not made known, by proclamation, or otherwise, all over the world, that British-born subjects have no right to renounce, and that they can never be looked upon as having renounced, in whatever part of the world they may think fit to reside, their allegiance to their Queen; and that if any of them are taken in arms on land, or upon the seas, fighting against their countrymen, they shall be tried and condemned as traitors, and become liable to be punished as such. It may probably be said, that in case of a war, this would render desperate many thousands of our seamen now navigating the United States' ships at high rates of wages, and would cause those in their ships of war to fight with a halter about their necks. This might, perhaps, be the case at first with a few of the worthless; but let our seamen be offered the same, or even higher wages than they can receive in the ships of war of the States, or in those of any other country, and I cannot, for a moment believe, that brave men, the descendants of many of those who fought with Nelson, and our other renowned naval chiefs, will abandon their country, though it may have shown itself, perhaps, ungrateful to them or their fathers for former services.
But surely it ought to be high time for us to consider the effects produced by our now rather too long tried reciprocal system of trade with other nations, in which I have never heard, that we had been fairly met, nor do I believe we ever will be met by any of them. Let us, therefore, lay aside for the moment, the wild, and to the generality of men, incomprehensible theories, clothed in the mystical jargon of political economists; and permit me to ask any man of common sense, where reciprocity is to be found in the commercial intercourse between Great Britain and the United States? I suppose reciprocity to mean, in this instance, mutual benefits conferred and received.
A few years ago—and I am not aware of any important change having since taken place—Great Britain professed her principles as regarded reciprocity to be,—"To abolish all discriminating duties affecting the like productions of foreign countries, and in lieu thereof to establish one uniform Tariff for the whole.
"To reduce that Tariff to the lowest degree, consistent, in each particular country, with the two legitimate objects of all duties—either the collection of the revenue, or the protection absolutely requisite for the maintenance of our own internal industry.
"To abolish all discriminating duties upon the navigation of other countries, so that the products and merchandize of these nations, when imported in their own ships, shall be subject to the same rates only as when imported in British ships."
Such principles are certainly most liberal; but in what did the wisdom of those who professed them consist? certainly not in that of this world; if the lofty position of Great Britain was considered at the period when such regulations were framed, and when the then state of our commerce with other nations were taken into account. But let us see how this system has worked. Suppose we speak of cotton, (but we might take, with almost equal advantage, other articles imported into the United Kingdom), as being the chief export from the United States. It is mostly brought to us in American ships, navigated, in a great measure, by British seamen, some of whom they pretend to have naturalized; but at present we shall say no more of this. Our merchants will not of course, employ, to any extent, British ships to bring cotton from the United States, because the Americans can afford, from various causes, not counteracted by us, to convey it cheaper to them. Where then can we find reciprocity in the shipping and seamen employed in this great branch of trade? To balance this fairly, we should surely, if it were only in self-defence, lay a tax upon cotton imported in American, or any other vessels, in order to compel British merchants to employ British ships and British seamen to bring it in its raw state from America, or from our East India possessions, or from any other country where we might think fit to encourage the growth of this article. It may be said that cotton, thus raised in price, would become too expensive for our manufacturers to be able to contend with foreigners in the continental and other markets; but this could not be long the case, for the American carrying trade being thus diminished, they could not afford to convey it at low prices to any country, or to pay their or rather our seamen such high wages; and are we not wisely improving the models of all new ships which are built; and consequently their rates of sailing, so that we shall soon be able to cope in this respect, with the United States ships also.
I may, however, be told that the United States can meet us in this way by laying taxes upon articles manufactured in the British dominions and imported into their Union; or, perhaps, upon the cotton itself, before it is exported to this country. Let them do so if they please, but they will not adhere very long to that plan. We can find cotton elsewhere or substitutes for most of it in flax and wool, to the great benefit of our own colonies, and the Americans would soon create for our advantage, by taxing our wares, a "pretty considerable" body of fair traders out of the present sympathizers all along their most extensive frontier. The last war did this, to my certain knowledge, to a great extent, and I even had a person connected in some manner with a high civil authority of the State of New York caught and brought to me when engaged in this kind of traffic. We had, at the time I allude to, excellent information of what was going forward in the adjoining States to Canada. I was told that a military man of rank was in the habit of crossing the boundary line, generally at night, and it was supposed, judging from some of those who met him, that he came as a spy. I had him therefore taken and marched into St. John's one morning.—I was surprised however to find that he was a very gentleman-like man, both in appearance and manners. He at once acquainted me with his object in venturing so imprudently into Canada: indeed the very unpleasant situation in which he stood as a spy made this quite necessary. He was soon able to convince me by mentioning mercantile houses with which he was connected in Montreal, &c. that though in a kind of military situation, about the high authority I have alluded to, he had no intention whatever of acting the part of a spy, but had only some commercial business of importance on his hands. I had, of course, to report the circumstance of his capture, through Sir Thomas Brisbane, who was then at Montreal upon duty, for the information of Government, and in the meantime I took this gentleman-like person into my own house, he having pledged his word of honour that he would not attempt to escape.
The answer I received to my letter respecting him rather alarmed me on his account, for what I had mentioned as the reasons for his coming into the Province were not deemed sufficiently satisfactory; and I saw they were more inclined to look upon him as a spy than in any other light. I therefore had to examine him again more minutely, and according to instructions sent me; when he gave references to so many respectable mercantile gentlemen as being well aware why he had come into Canada, that I at last received orders to permit him to go back to the States. But during the time I had the pleasure of his company I had also an opportunity of becoming acquainted with a highly-informed agreeable gentleman. But this, I conceive, will show clearly that the fair trade during the war, had fallen into very respectable hands; and from all I knew it was progressing in such a way as to hold out expectations of great improvement had it lasted. I have been induced to be thus minute in order to show how our manufactures are at any time, and under any circumstances, certain of finding their way into the States.
I shall most likely be told by the admirers of reciprocity, that the American ships carry back our wares in return for their raw cotton. This is not the case to any very great extent, and is chiefly done where British mercantile houses have establishments in both countries; for Jonathan will make what he can at home; and he would do much more in this way, if he did not find that he can purchase most articles cheaper ready made, than he can (owing to the great expense of labour, and of living in the States) manufacture them himself, or else he will send for what he wants to the cheapest markets, such as Hamburg, Holland, Belgium, &c. where, we are informed, things are sold at lower prices than what we can afford, even with the aid of science and improved machinery, to make them for; and thus I am again at a loss to understand where reciprocity in trade, carried on with all the advantages on one side, is to be found.
I shall not enter into other branches of commerce, for such matters would not suit this work, nor allude to what is practised by other countries; but the same principles would apply equally to them as to the United States. But it may not, perhaps, be improper here to ask, if it has ever entered into the calculations of our "Squires of the lofty Towers," which we see looking proudly down upon so many parts of the country, in what manner the multitudes they have congregated, like our chiefs of old, around their Baronial castles, are to be fed in case of even a temporary stagnation of trade? But it is beneath them to think of such matters, and they wisely leave subjects of this kind to be discussed hereafter by improvident landlords, who, in consideration of temporary advantages, have granted certain leases of parts of their estates to these squires, to enable them to create cities, towns, and villages, the enormous population of which, if it is to be kept in tranquillity, must constantly require the presence of such troops as I have in view.
I am afraid it may be found out before long, that we are rather too closely connected with the United States; and are sacrificing far too much, in a national point of view, and to our serious injury, in order to maintain this imprudent connexion. Has it not already thrown the greater part of the carrying trade into the hands of the Americans; and has it not been the means of seducing from Great Britain her best seamen? Let it, therefore, be made the interests of our merchants to employ our sailors at such rates of wages as they can receive in American or in any other ships. Let us meet countries fairly in commercial affairs, who will really meet us fairly, and let us look less to theories, and more to the essential object of practically promoting our maritime prosperity.
Naval and military men must hereafter be much more closely connected, than they have hitherto been, or I should not, in this work, presume to speak of them as acting together; but must not every contemplative mind foresee, that wonderful changes must soon be wrought by the power of steam, not only upon naval, but also upon military affairs.
We must, therefore, turn our thoughts to it, with the deepest interest, so as to ascertain, in time, what may be the best modes of bringing the vast resources of Great Britain, in this respect, into action; and also to the manner in which powerful armaments are to be conducted with skill and rapidity to points selected for sudden invasion, for that such must be the most prominent feature in all our future wars, will most assuredly be developed, and that too before many years have passed away.
Amongst the great and important changes to be brought about in war by steam, we must look forward to its facilitating, by the certainty and rapidity of the movements of those destined to accomplish the objects in view, the protection, or destruction of much property, both public and private; also to its occasioning, for the same reasons, vast suffering to the inhabitants of the countries fixed upon, for whatever cause, to become the theatres of these awful and devastating operations. I cannot exactly compare them, and their consequences, to the unlooked for descents of the sea-kings of old, yet they must greatly, I fear, resemble them in their destructive and other effects, and they must be felt ere long all over the world. We were, as a nation, allowed by Providence, no doubt for wise purposes, to live so long in, I fear, not duly valued tranquillity and security, under the protection of our splendid navy of former days, that those who remained at home really knew nothing of war, and its attendant trials and privations, but the name. Long may this be the case, and this happy state, when compared with that of other countries, may, in all human probability, be rendered more lasting, if we will only be wise enough to take timely lessons from the past. History tells us of the rapid fall of many once powerful nations—how they fell it is not for me to relate; but Spain, her former greatness, and the causes of her present debasement, should be constantly before our eyes. We are still a great and warlike people, but I trust that we may be enabled to act with judgment, and to take, at all events, such steps as will prevent any other nation from anticipating us in the use of steam for warlike purposes.
Those who have already deeply considered the subject, have come to the conclusion, that a comparatively small, but well constructed, and powerfully propelled steamer, alike overcoming wind and tide; capable of taking up and retaining a position within a certain distance of the largest sailing vessel, may be supposed able to destroy or capture her, however brave or excellent her officers and crew may be, and it is concluded, that this could probably be accomplished with but very little loss or damage, being sustained by the steamer, if judiciously manœuvred, and her commander would besides possess the great advantage, of going into action or not, as he might think most advisable. The old naval tactics, such as that of ships gaining what is termed the weather gage of each other, or any thing of that kind, in going into action, must be wholely abandoned whenever a steamer heaves in sight; for the sailing vessel is at once supposed to be, in a great measure, at her mercy.
But such reasoners also calculate upon what would happen in an engagement between two fleets, in which steam-ships of a large class would be more numerous on one side than the other; for they could at once act together, regardless of wind or weather, and thus concentrating their force, they could cut off or destroy a certain part of their opponent's fleet, before sailing vessels could possibly come to their assistance. They also calculate upon this manœuvre being repeated upon the remainder of the enemy's ships, which cannot escape from these powerful steamers.
These are points, however, for seamen to decide; yet suppose a steamer, calculated to carry only a few traversing guns of the longest range for shot or shells, with what are usually termed percussion locks, to insure good practice even when the vessel is in motion, to be well managed or manœuvred by a skilful naval officer; and should he occasionally use shot heated in the furnaces for the boilers, what a formidable opponent she must prove, especially in a calm, or even in a storm, to any sailing vessel. Many officers may remember what treatment our ships of war frequently met with in parts of the Mediterranean, from even a single Spanish gun-boat, carrying perhaps but one long gun; and when the facility and rapidity of movement of a steamer are considered, there can be no comparison whatever drawn between her and a common gun-boat, even when propelled by sweeps or oars, but which become useless in a rough sea. Such matters as these can, however, be brought by calculation to something very near to certainty as to results.
I am aware that the great difficulty which presents itself at present is how to protect from shot the chimneys, paddles, and machinery of war-steamers; but if, in these times, when science is daily performing such wonders amongst us, sufficient rewards were offered for the best plans for this purpose, I have no doubt but we should soon see much accomplished; but even until this may be effected, the position which can be taken up by the steamer will, it is thought, insure her being no great sufferer from the shot fired from a sailing vessel. But these, and many other points connected with steam, will be fully elucidated the very first war in which we may be seriously engaged; but in the mean time much can be immediately done, by merely making some useful experiments, whereby we may, to a considerable extent, be taught whether it be advisable or not for us to continue, at a great expense, building and equipping, at all events for what may be termed home service, the present description of sailing vessels, or whether it would not be prudent to direct more attention to war steamers, or to those ships which are propelled by both sails and steam; though I should fear that this combination of the two propelling powers must be found objectionable, as both would most likely be imperfect.
For foreign service, or for those parts of the world where the necessary supplies of fuel for steamers cannot easily be procured, the combining the two principles in a ship may be useful; but wherever perfect steamers can be available, they should decidedly have the preference. But for some time to come, causing both steamers and sailing vessels to act together for mutual assistance and support in action, especially in distant parts of the world, must obviously be desirable.
It appears to be demonstrated that a steamer, from fifteen hundred to two thousand tons burden, and upwards, possesses great proportional advantages over one of only four or five hundred, in carrying troops, cargo, or fuel; and her increased power of steam, gives her also proportional superiority in forcing her way through the water, and storms or heavy seas have much less effect upon her than upon smaller vessels. A steamship of war of two thousand tons burden, well manned and armed—and she need not carry many, but they ought to be guns of long range—must possess such powers of movement, and of destruction, as cannot be easily calculated or understood; and conceive that ship to carry, independent of her crew, (which need not be anything like so numerous as that of even a large frigate,) a regiment of cavalry, or two of infantry; then suppose thirty such steam ships conveying an army of perhaps 30,000 men, cavalry, infantry, and artillery, such as I am so anxious to have called out in the manner I have proposed, and which could be carried by these irresistible steamers into almost any port having sufficient depth of water, or to any selected point, and there landed, ready to act against an unprepared, or perhaps distracted people; and how easy it would be with such ships to supply an army afterwards with every requisite; and the object in view being accomplished, or even if frustrated, with what little difficulty could the troops, and their materiel, be again received on board, and conveyed to any other point of attack, or back to our own shores.
I had written the above observations, when I saw, by accident, the following description of the Cyclops steam frigate, and from what is said of her, it may be seen what I had in view. A few of the 96-pounders will soon decide the fate of a battle.
"The Cyclops, Steam Frigate.—This magnificent vessel, the largest steam man-of-war in the world, was launched from Pembroke Dock-yard a few days ago. Her dimensions are as follow:—Length 225 feet, beam between paddles 38 feet, depth of hold 21 feet. Her tonnage is about 1,300, being 200 tons larger than the Gorgon, launched from the same slip about eighteen months since. Her equipment, as a man-of-war, will be the same in all respects as a frigate, having a complete gun, or main-deck, as well as an upper or quarter-deck. On the main-deck she will carry eighteen long 36-pounders, and on the upper deck four 48-pounders, and two 96-pounders on swivels, carrying a ball of ten inches diameter, and sweeping round the horizon 240 degrees. The Cyclops, like the vessel already referred to, will be commanded by a post-captain, these two being the only steamers taking frigate's rank. Her crew will consist of 210 men, 20 engineers and stokers, and a lieutenant's party of marines, who will have charge of the guns, all of which move upon slides and fixed pivots, thereby taking a much wider range than the ordinary carriages can give. She will be schooner-rigged, but her foremast will be of the same scantling and height as that of a 36-gun frigate. Her draught of water, with all on board, including six months' provisions, completely armed, and with twenty days' fuel, will be fifteen feet. This quantity of fuel (400 tons) will be carried in the engine-room, but there is a space in the fore and after holds for ten days more coal, making, in all, sufficient fuel for a thirty days' run. She has an orlop deck below the gun-deck, of dimensions so magnificent that there is room to stow with comfort eight hundred troops and their officers; so that, taking her all in all, the Cyclops may be considered the most powerful vessel in her Majesty's service. The Cyclops has been built in six months, under the immediate inspection of Mr. W. Eyde, master-builder, of Pembroke-yard, from drawings and plans prepared by his brother, Mr. John Eyde, the able assistant of Sir W. Symonds, the inspector of the navy, upon whose principle—namely, the combining of the sailing and steaming properties—this vessel has been constructed. The Cyclops will be docked in Sheerness Dock-yard on the 30th instant, and, after remaining there for a few days, will proceed to the manufactory of Messrs. Seaward, at Millwall, Poplar, to receive her engines, which will be of 320 horsepower, on the principle which, in the case of the Gorgon, has proved so successful that the Lords of the Admiralty have given orders for five more pairs of engines upon the same plan, for as many frigates. Half-a-dozen such steamers would do three times as much work as the same number of line-of-battle ships. Twelve years ago Lord Cochrane maintained, that a few well-appointed steamers would suffice to keep in check opposing fleets in the Mediterranean; and if we may judge from appearances, a short time only will elapse before the experiment is tried."
Suppose also that each of these powerful steamers had assigned to her to take in tow, when necessary, a sailing vessel, conveying either additional troops, horses, coals, provisions, forage, &c. &c., how much more formidable such an armament would become.
In combined naval and military operations, I should conclude that the usual mode of proceeding would be to secure the point of debarkation, or any other considered more suitable, so as to admit of the army being again received on board the ships with as little difficulty and loss as possible; for we may well suppose that the exasperated and suffering inhabitants would do every thing in their power to destroy and annoy the invaders. Field entrenchments, but on as confined a scale as possible, must be thrown up with skill and rapidity, in situations to favour the re-embarking of the army, with all that belongs to it; and how essential it must then be, that soldiers should be as much accustomed to the use of the pickaxe and shovel as to their arms; in short, it will become indispensable that they should have habits of working, like the Roman soldiers of old.
Let us consider the consequences of such a descent. The country to a considerable extent must be instantly over-run by an army perfect in all respects, and amply supplied independent of the invaded country. Should the destruction of the power of an adversary in steam be alone the object, gunpowder and other means we can readily command, would speedily accomplish this. Dock-yards, building-yards, coal pits, mines, machinery, railways, constructed at enormous expense, and all public and private works of vast value—in a few days, and before any force sufficient for their protection could be assembled, might be laid in ruins, or so destroyed, as to render the amount of mischief done incalculable. But these are matters which demand instant and due consideration; and the country should be prepared to meet the expense which must be incurred, if it is only to ensure our exemption from such mortifications and misfortunes. Fortifications can afford a country but little protection against such calamities; for to a superiority in steam ships we can alone look for this, and to that Omnipotent Being who can influence the judgments and views of those who, by Him, are permitted to direct the affairs of this mighty empire.
It is obvious, that in our future wars, we must require not only an efficient steam navy and a fine army, but also that the latter should be in the highest state of discipline, and be led by able officers. Such conduct as that of which our troops were guilty at Badajoz, Ciudad Rodrigo, and on many other occasions, if attempted in these enterprises, to which we must look forward as of frequent occurrence, would most certainly lead to total ruin: sobriety, good conduct, and the strictest obedience to orders cannot then be dispensed with; and the country I hope will be convinced by what has been adduced, that we could not possibly expect to find these necessary qualities in a British army unless raised, organized, and officered in the manner I have ventured to propose. In short, we want an army, similar in point of discipline, though differently enforced, to that which Charles the 12th of Sweden led to constant victory, until the fatal battle of Pultowa. And to our army of reserve I would hold up, as an example, the brave and patriotic behaviour of the Swedish militia, which under General Steinbock, during the absence of Charles at Bender, defeated at Helsingborg, though almost entirely composed of raw recruits, unclothed and badly armed, a regular Danish army that dared to invade their country, and of which, as its rash and extraordinary king was absent, they expected to have made an easy conquest.
But what a contrast to our troops, or indeed to those of any other country, must a victorious Swedish army have been; as we find in the account given of them by the famous Comte de Saxe, who tells us, that the Swedes always kept their ranks and that after the battle of Gadebesck was gained, the first line of these brave troops, with the enemy dead at their feet, did not even dare to stoop down to strip them—such was the discipline established in their regiments—until prayers had been offered up on the field of battle.
It has, as a matter of course, been proposed that men regularly brought up to the sea, should be exempted from serving in our armies; but this can answer no wise purpose, so long as it is in their power to enter the service even of our enemies, or rather of those who may soon become so. A captain of the navy, in one of his works, has lately given us a very melancholy account of the desertion of their country by British seamen; and has also, I believe, assigned the true causes of such defection; but it would be giving up as hopeless and unavailing, every good feeling implanted in the heart of man towards his country, if no exertions are made to recall to their allegiance these brave, thoughtless, but warm-hearted wanderers.
This may not now be easily accomplished, but something ought notwithstanding to be attempted, or else our navy should be rendered independent of the merchant service for supplies of sailors; and the changes which steam is producing in seamanship, must make this the less difficult to be effected, as seamen for steamers can be much sooner formed than those intended for sailing vessels; and allow me to ask, why might not bodies of seamen be raised, so as to become crews for ships of war, for a certain number of years service; and ought there not to be held out to them even superior advantages, as to pension, &c. to what has been spoken of for soldiers; for a navy is of much more importance to Great Britain than an army; and why might not seamen and their officers of all ranks be transferred bodily from ship to ship, as might be found desirable or necessary, without obstinately adhering to the old injurious plan of paying all off, when the ships in which they have served are put, for whatever cause, out of commission; and why might not such a plan render it seldom necessary to have recourse to impressment, which ought never, however, to be altogether abandoned. There might surely be for the navy, as well as for the army, a fixed peace establishment, on a proper and enlarged scale; and in case of a war, if additional crews are wanted for ships of a larger class about to be commissioned, those which until then had been serving in the smaller rates, could be augmented to the required establishments in both officers and men, and new crews for the smaller rates, if still to be employed, could be easily raised by impressment or bounty; but seamen taken by the former, ought invariably to be discharged as soon as their places can be supplied by volunteers; but most of them, if the advantages I have just mentioned are held out to them, will have no wish to leave their ships and comrades, or the officers they have served under; and having had a good foundation of seamen (if I may use the expression) to build upon, excellent crews, increased in numbers, would in a very short time be available for ships of even the largest class.
Although a soldier, I have been much at sea, and I have frequently heard and remarked, that the very best sailors were those trained, especially from boyhood, in our ships of war.
At first, seamen might be taken wherever they could be found, to man our ships; but if a system of this kind were adopted—and of course many points connected with it would require to be well weighed—there could not be a doubt but our ships would soon be very superiorly manned by perfectly trained seamen, who could use cannon, mortars, &c. with proper effect; and if they were only treated with kindness, which I have no doubt they would be, and paid fairly and liberally, the navy would have a most decided advantage over our merchant service, and men would gladly enter the former in preference to the latter.
A considerable proportion of the crews for the several classes of ships, should even at the commencement of the system be boys; and it might naturally be expected, that they would not only grow up in a complete knowledge of their duties as sailors, but also become, like soldiers, strongly attached to their officers, in whom they could have confidence, and from whom they were not, under any circumstances, to be separated. Of course, such permanent seamen would require occasionally, and especially after long voyages, to be allowed to visit their families and friends; leave of absence from their ships, ought, whenever it was possible, to be liberally granted to them; and such men, when on shore, would know how to conduct themselves with propriety; for on board, I should conclude that due attention was paid to their religious and common education.
But I must not forget that there is one serious objection to this plan being adopted, however advantageous it might be to the navy, not on account of its being suggested by a soldier, but it would do away with much patronage, which those in power do not like to relinquish.
Much has been said of the hardships experienced by mates, and the class of petty officers of the navy in general; but this is a subject into which I cannot, and ought not, to enter. But let us look a little into other matters, and try to comprehend what interest it takes, even to have one's son made a midshipman—then to get a captain to take him with him for the three years he may be afloat—then another captain must be found to take him for three years more under his wing, or else we must have excellent interest indeed, if we can contrive to get him forward without nursing captains; and all this time we have been obliged to allow him sufficient for his messing, and to enable him to appear dressed like an officer and a gentleman. In some ships this cannot be done under sixty pounds a year. Then he probably comes home to us a stout light-hearted fellow, who has already passed his examinations for a lieutenancy, and would give the world to be made one; but to effect this (for any services he may have performed are of no importance) takes a vast deal of interest. This at last accomplished; again patronage is required to get him afloat for some years longer. But although now an experienced officer, what interest it must take to have him made a commander. And then how much more to get him appointed to a ship. In short, nothing but patronage or interest from beginning to end will answer, or ever did answer in our navy; and the reader need not therefore be surprised at my feeling next to hopeless, that all this will ever be overturned, to suit what will no doubt, be held up to the world as the effusions of a madman. Be this, however, as it may, (and I leave it to the good sense of the country to settle the matter with patrons,) a captain now commanding one of our frigates, in a conversation I had with him on subjects of this kind, mentioned, that he calculated it would cost him about £1,200., over and above his pay, &c. to keep his table, and to meet other unavoidable expenses, and that too, with strict attention to economy, for the three years he calculated upon being actively employed; and I am aware that it took a good deal of interest on his part, to get the ship he now commands.
Our navy, I believe, has but little, if any, fixed system for its guidance. Every captain of a ship carrying on its duties or discipline, and managing almost everything according to his own views, or as taught by experience. Ought this to be permitted, and should not certain regulations be established to prevent his running into extremes, even in zeal for the credit of his ship, in appearance, discipline, or even in points which in themselves may be good, if not carried so far as to become from their frivolity vexatious to those under his command, and which I have seen occasion much punishment, which might have been better avoided. In short, ought a captain not to be restrained by established system, almost in a similar manner to that by which I propose to prevent the injurious effects of whim or caprice in commanding officers of regiments.
I am aware that I must look forward to every possible objection being thrown in the way of what I have presumed to suggest for the benefit of both our navy and army; and I fully expect some will say that all this is very well, but what do you intend to do with the numbers of retired officers, now on the lists of both services? In the first place, to expect me to answer every objection is not a little unreasonable; and in the next, I am convinced it cannot be anticipated, that one-tenth of such ancients can ever again be called into active service, I therefore suppose the country must continue, under any circumstances, to furnish the pittance now doled out to them, as long as most of them shall live; but even to balance this continued charge upon the country, and which cannot be avoided, have I not, amongst other items, shown that we can call out our army, and keep it up hereafter in a much more efficient state than it ever was, without any expense in the shape of bounty? Now the bounty for at least 100,000 men, taking the army in all its branches, at a low establishment, amounts to something; yet we shall not take this into account, but let us say (whilst I have no intention of recapitulating all the modes I have mentioned, by which savings can be effected), that we want annually 20,000 recruits, according to our present system, to keep it up to its peace establishment, in which calculation I consider that I am borne out by the returns of the number of men raised for Her Majesty's service in Great Britain and Ireland. Then suppose that each of these recruits stands the country in only five pounds (but in time of war it could not be done for much more) a-head for bounty, &c. we should thus save something considerable; let this sum be therefore allowed to go annually towards providing for retired officers, who it may be apprehended will continue a burden upon the country for a few years longer. But alas! climate, wounds, &c. under the effects of which many of these poor but gallant fellows are suffering, will not admit of our having very long an opportunity of evincing our gratitude to them for past services.
Colonel Pasley, one of our ablest and most scientific officers, I believe, about the year 1807, wrote a most useful work, calling the attention of the country to a plan he proposed for carrying the war, which had even then been of unusually long duration, into the north of Europe, where landing an army, it was, as he suggested, to have proceeded gradually, as joined by the troops which could be assembled in the countries that lay between the point selected and France, till Napoleon could be at last assailed upon his own ground. His work produced a considerable sensation at the time, but Spain and Portugal, very opportunely, presented themselves to us, and in which the very game recommended by Colonel Pasley was successfully played. I hope, therefore, I may be allowed to observe, that it is much to be regretted, it has not struck Colonel Pasley, that a work coming from him, elucidating some of the subjects I have reluctantly ventured to touch upon, especially those connected with Russia, and a new boundary line for our North American territories, would be well received by statesmen, military men, and the country in general; all of whom must allow that an efficient and highly disciplined army and navy are now wanted by Great Britain, and that no time should be lost in acquiring them. If these essential objects were once attained, would it not be wiser for us to look more to our own interests, and with a view to securing our internal tranquillity and national industry, than to what we have so little to say to; and would it not be better, if we did not allow ourselves to be led away and entangled in intricate Russian, Austrian, and Turkish policy? This ought certainly to be carefully watched by us; but it should never be permitted so to embarrass us, as to prevent our being able at all times to direct our attention and powerful means to objects of much more importance to us as a great maritime empire, possessing the finest and most valuable colonies in the world. It is also to be hoped that the brave people of France and Great Britain have at length seen the madness of having wasted centuries in unceasing rivalry and jealousy, and likewise the folly of tearing each other to pieces, to the delight of countries which would glory in seeing both so humbled as to suit their own boundless ambitious views. What is Constantinople, and even all Turkey, Egypt, and such countries, to us, farther than our commercial relations with them are concerned, in comparison to Great Britain retaining her superiority upon the ocean, and which pre-eminence was acquired, in former wars, at the cost of so much blood and treasure, and which enabled her to extend her enlightening influence, religious and commercial blessings all over the world. Let Austria and other states, which must immediately feel the effects of Russian acquisitions of territory from the Turkish dominions, take measures to guard against the consequences to arise out of such acquirements, especially as the aspect of the times most clearly indicates that the very storms, we are taught to look for, are now gathering in that quarter, and the awful effects attendant upon their bursting upon the world cannot probably by any human means be prevented from ever reaching us. Ought not we, therefore, if possible, to be prepared? Should not Great Britain at all times look with a jealous eye from her vast Eastern Empire towards Russia, so as to be ready for such events as may happen? Should not the question be asked—what has Russia, not a maritime nation, in view, in forming and keeping up such fleets as we are told she now possesses in the Baltic and in the Black Sea? For with the numerous and well-trained armies at her command, she can have nothing to apprehend from her neighbours, nor from us. Encroachments upon other nations can therefore be her only object. If Russia will not regard our remonstrances as to her unnecessary, and to other nations dangerous naval preparations for war, the safety and honour of Great Britain require, that such diversions should be made, as must compel her to look to her own already enormous acquisitions from her weaker neighbours. For instance, a little assistance from us would soon enable Circassia, and other countries to the south of Russia, to give ample employment to her overgrown armies. Poland, if fully assured of aid, from France especially (for France is as much interested in Russia being kept in check as we are), could be easily roused at the same time to assert her freedom, and to revenge her wrongs. It could not be very difficult to form, under the powerful protection of Great Britain, a coalition of the Northern States, whose frontiers are now bounded by Russia, and which only exist as kingdoms through Russian sufferance, with the view of insuring their independence. Wars thus created, through her ambition, by exhausting her resources, would effectually put an end to her power of subjugating other nations; and if the standard of a war arising out of opinions, which such measures would most likely produce, was once unfurled in that extensive empire, in which the lofty ideas of a proud, turbulent and wealthy nobility would to a certainty come into contact with the hitherto suppressed feelings of millions of enslaved serfs, there is no possibility of calculating in what such a war might terminate, for there is no middle class in Russia which could act as a check to both.
A few of the steam expeditions, which were before alluded to, would quickly settle such questions, and curtail the deliberations of diplomatists, and convince the world—that it is both dangerous and impolitic to rouse Great Britain, or to give her cause of alarm about the superiority of her navy upon the ocean. "Ships, colonies and commerce," ought to be inscribed upon the banner of Britain, and our chief efforts and views, should at all times be directed to these, to us as a nation, important objects, whilst at the same time every possible encouragement should be given to our own agriculture; for we must never depend upon the continent of Europe, or upon any other part of the world, for bread—if we are ever obliged to do so, we must no more talk or even think of war.
I do not, like some men, look upon history to be as worthless as an old almanack, for by it we are taught many useful lessons; and whatever their opinions may be of history, popery, or even of prophecy, I avow myself to be one of those who attach some importance to what is handed down to us, especially in Scripture. Yet, without almost touching upon such subjects, we may find, that a great maritime power will seemingly soon be required, to act a most prominent part in the world, when events will undoubtedly occur to command the attention and excite the fears of mankind in general. As to what power may be intended to perform this conspicuous part, it would be most presumptuous and even impious to conjecture; and such is the rapid fall and rise of nations, that all calculations in this respect must be as vain as unprofitable.
The grand object which ought never for a moment to be lost sight of, is to have Great Britain ready for coming events. Let her vast resources be, as far as necessary, called forth in time. Let the attention of Government be wisely directed to providing such a number of steamers of all classes, as to render competition on the part of other countries hopeless; and why might not engagements be entered into with wealthy companies and individuals, so as to induce them to employ, in mercantile and other pursuits, steam vessels of such a construction, that they could, in cases of emergency, be instantly fitted up and armed with guns of long range for war; for very few, of those now in use, can be made efficient in this respect. To accomplish this could not be attended with any great expense to the country, especially if advantages, as to exemption of vessels so constructed from various charges, to which all are now liable, are held out to the owners; and this would make it unnecessary at once to provide such a number of war-steamers as might otherwise be requisite; and thus Government could, at any moment, know where to find ships of all classes fit for immediate service, on board of which, crews, such as I have ventured to speak of, could be employed with every advantage to the country. Lastly, let our army be also perfectly organized, and in all respects prepared for a new and more rapid mode of warfare; and, under Providence, we may not only be still the most powerful of maritime nations, but also the means of promoting the tranquillity and happiness of the world in general.
THE END.
G. NORMAN, PRINTER, MAIDEN LANE, COVENT GARDEN.