§ 11. Orthodox Doctrine of Inability.
Let us see what Orthodoxy says of the inability of the unregenerate man. The Assembly's Confession declares (chap. 6, § 4), that by our corrupt nature “we are utterly indisposed, disabled, and made opposite to all good, and wholly inclined to all evil.” In chap. 9, § 3, it says that “man, by his fall into a state of sin, hath wholly lost all ability of will to any spiritual good accompanying salvation.”
This seems plain enough. It would justify the charge made by Dr. Cox, that there are those who teach that “a man has no ability to do his duty,”[16] and “that, where the means of grace are abundantly vouchsafed, a man can do nothing for, but can only counteract, his own salvation.” It would also seem to lay a fit foundation for that kind of Calvinistic preaching which, according to Professor Finney, of [pg 164] Oberlin (see “Revival Lectures”), virtually amounts to saying,
“You can, and you can't;
You shall, and you shan't;
You will, and you won't;
You'll be damned if you don't.”
These charges, it must be noticed, are brought against Calvinism, not by us, but by Presbyterian divines, themselves holding to this same Westminster Confession.
But let us look at some of the expositions given to this doctrine of inability by modern Orthodox authorities.
(a.) The Old School Presbyterians.—As stated by one of their own number (Professor Atwater, of Princeton College, Bibliotheca Sacra, January, 1864), they hold an inability “moral, sinful, and real,” “irremovable by the sinner's own power.” He sets aside the objection that we are not bound to do what we are unable to do, by saying that this applies to actions only, not to sinful dispositions. He illustrates this by saying that an irrepressible disposition to slander would be only so much more culpable. But in this he is evidently wrong. Such a habit has become a disease, and the unfortunate victim is no longer accountable for what he does.
(b.) The New School Presbyterians.—(Rev. George Duffield, in Bibliotheca Sacra, July, 1863.) Although Dr. Duffield objects to the language of the Old School Presbyterians in denying “free agency,” and regarding man “as destitute of ability as a block of marble,” he yet declares that the New School, as well as the Old, believe that in the unconverted state “man can do nothing morally good.” Still, he adds, men can accept the offers of salvation made by Jesus Christ. But he positively denies that “man, in his natural state, independent of the gospel and Spirit of Christ, has ability perfectly to obey all the commandments of God.” We suppose that most persons would agree with him in this statement.
(c.) The Old School in New England Theology.—(Bibliotheca [pg 165] Sacra, April, 1863. Article by Professor Lawrence, East Windsor, Connecticut.) This writer contends that human inability is moral, and not natural—a distinction much dwelt upon by the Hopkinsians, but rejected by the Old School Presbyterians. This system differs from the Arminian or Methodist view in insisting that man has power enough to sin, though not enough to obey.
(d.) Hopkinsianism.—(Bibliotheca Sacra, July, 1862.) The Hopkinsians profess to contend for free agency, in order to save responsibility. They adopt the ideas of Edwards on free agency. But freedom, with them, consists only in choice. Whatever we choose, we choose freely. The carnal man is as free in choosing evil as the spiritual man in choosing good. All real freedom in this system disappears in a juggle of words.
The result of this examination will show that the great body of the Orthodox, of all schools, continues to deny any real ability in the unregenerate man to do the will of God. They do not say that “man has no power to do his duty,” but that is the impression left by their teaching. The distinction between natural and moral inability is insufficient; for it is as absurd to say that a man is unable not to sin, when you only mean that he chooses to sin, as it would he to say, when invited to eat your dinner, “I am unable to eat,” meaning only that you were unwilling. Besides, if inability is moral, it is in the will, and not in the nature, and so is not natural depravity at all. It is also making God unjust to teach that he considers us guilty for a misfortune. If we derive a corrupted nature from Adam, that is our misfortune, and not our fault, and God owes us not anger, but pity. Instead of punishing us, he should compensate us for this disaster.
Therefore the unreason, the want of logic, and the absence of any just view of God, appear, more or less, throughout these statements. For where there is no ability, there can [pg 166] be no guilt. Just as soon as man ceases to have the power to do right, he ceases to have the power to do wrong. Inability and guilt, which are connected by all these creeds, logically exclude each other. If our nature is incapable of doing good, then it is incapable of committing sin. One or the other must be given up. Keep which you will, but you cannot keep both. We may be totally depraved by our nature; but then we cease to be sinners, and cease to be guilty. Or we may be going wholly wrong, and so be sinful, but then we have the power of going right.
This is the inconsistency in almost all Orthodox systems. By dwelling so much on human weakness, they destroy at last the sense of responsibility.