Twenty Years of Congress, Vol. 1 / From Lincoln to Garfield, with a Review of the Events Which Led to the Political Revolution of 1860

by James Gillespie Blaine

CHAPTER XX.

Elections of 1862.—Mr. Lincoln advances to Aggressive Position on Slavery.—Second Session of Thirty-seventh Congress adjourns.— Democratic Hostility to Administration.—Democratic State Conventions. —Platforms in Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois.—Nomination of Horatio Seymour for Governor of New York.—The President prepares for a Serious Political Contest.—The Issue shall be the Union or Slavery.—Conversation with Mr. Boutwell.—Proclamation of Emancipation.—Meeting of Governors at Altoona.—Compensated Emancipation proposed for Border States.—Declined by their Senators and Representatives.—Anti-slavery Policy apparently Disastrous for a Time.—October Elections Discouraging.—General James S. Wadsworth nominated against Mr. Seymour.—Illinois votes against the President.—Five Leading States against the President.— Administration saved in Part by Border States.—Last Session of Thirty-seventh Congress.—President urges Compensated Emancipation again.—Emancipation Proclamation, January 1, 1863.—Long Controversy over Question of Compensation for Slaves.—Test Case of Missouri. —Fourteen Million Dollars offered her.—General Pope's Campaign. —Army of the Potomac.—Battle of Antietam.—McClellan removed.— Burnside succeeds him.—Defeat at Fredericksburg.—Hooker succeeds Burnside.—General Situation.—Arming of Slaves.—Habeas Corpus.— Conscription Law.—Depressed and Depressing Period.

Popular interest in the summer of 1862 was divided between events in the field and the election of Representatives to the Thirty- eighth Congress. A year before, the line of partisan division had been practically obliterated in the Loyal States—the whole people uniting in support of the war. The progress of events had to a large extent changed this auspicious unanimity, and the Administration was now subjected to a fight for its life while it was fighting for the life of the Nation.

The conservatism which Mr. Lincoln had maintained on the Slavery question had undoubtedly been the means of bringing to the support of the war policy of his Administration many whom a more radical course at the outset would have driven into hostility. As he advanced however towards a more aggressive position, political divisions became at each step more pronounced. The vote on the question of abolishing slavery in the District of Columbia had been strictly on the line of party, and the same is true of the proposition for compensated emancipation in the Border States, and of the Act confiscating the property of Rebels. Not a single Democrat in the Senate or House sustained one of these measures. They were all passed by Republican votes alone, the Democratic minority protesting each time with increasing earnestness and warmth.

The second session of the Thirty-seventh Congress adjourned on the 17th of July, 1862, but long before that date the excitement prevailing in Congress had extended to the people, and political divisions were every day growing more earnest, partisan leaders every day more active, their followers every day more excited. The Slavery question was the source of the agitation, and by a common instinct throughout the free States, the Democrats joined in the cry against an Abolition war. They were as ready, they declared, as on the day after the firing on Sumter, to uphold all measures necessary for the defense of the Government and the maintenance of the Union, and they demanded that the Republicans should restrict the war to its legitimate ends—as defined by the supporters of the Administration in July, 1861, by the unanimous adoption of the Crittenden Resolution. They would not listen to any change of action based on change of circumstances, and they prepared to enforce at the ballot-box their opinions touching the new departure of Congress and the President.

The Democratic State Conventions in Pennsylvania and Ohio, both held on the 4th of July, reflected the feeling which so largely pervaded the ranks of the party throughout the North. In Pennsylvania the Convention unanimously declared that "the party of fanaticism or crime, whichever it may be called, that seeks to turn loose the slaves of the Southern States to overrun the North and to enter into competition with the white laboring masses, thus degrading their manhood by placing them on an equality with negroes, is insulting to our race and merits our most emphatic and unqualified condemnation." They further declared that "this is a government of white men and was established exclusively for the white race"; that "the negroes are not entitled to and ought not to be admitted to political and social equality with the white race."

DEMOCRATIC PLATFORMS IN 1862.

The Democratic Convention of Ohio made an equally open appeal to race prejudice. They avowed their belief that the Emancipation policy of the Republican party if successful "would throw upon the Border free States an immense number of negroes to compete with and under-work the white laborers and to constitute in various ways an unbearable nuisance"; and that "it would be unjust to our gallant soldiers to compel them to free the negroes of the South, and thereby fill Ohio with a degraded population to compete with these same soldiers upon their return to the peaceful avocations of life." It was not by mere chance that the Democratic party of these two great States held their conventions on the National Anniversary. It had been carefully pre-arranged with the view of creating a serious impression against the Administration.

The Democrats of Indiana went beyond their brethren of Ohio and Pennsylvania in the vigor with which they denounced the anti-slavery policy of the President. Their convention was held a month later, and unanimously demanded that "the public authorities of Indiana should see that the constitution and laws of the State are enforced against the entrance of free negroes and mulattoes," declaring that "when the people of Indiana adopted the negro exclusion clause in their constitution by a majority of ninety-four thousand votes they meant that the honest laboring white man should have no competitor in the black race; that the soil of Indiana should belong to the white man, and that he alone was suited to the form of her institutions." In Illinois the Democratic party adopted substantially the same platform as that proclaimed in Indiana. They made the distinct and unmistakable issue that a war for the abolition of slavery could not have their support; that the Government of the United States was made for white men, and that negroes could not be admitted to terms of equality in civil rights.

The most important election of the year was that to be held in New York, not merely because of the prestige and power of the State, but on account of the peculiar elements that entered into the contest. The Democratic party proceeded in the selection of candidates and in the definition of issues with great circumspection. They avoided the rancorous expressions used in Pennsylvania and Ohio, declared that they would continue to render the government their sincere and united support in the use of all legitimate means to suppress the rebellion, and cited the Crittenden Resolution, unanimously passed by Congress in July, 1861, as embodying the principles upon which they appealed for popular support. They expressed their "willingness to withhold their views upon all questions not rendered imperative by the imperiled condition of the country." The had not one word to say on the subject of slavery, and they avowed their readiness to act in the coming election with any class of loyal citizens who agreed with them in the principles embodied in their platform. This last clause related to a third party, the remnant of those who had supported Mr. Bell in 1860 and who had just held a convention at Troy. They had comprised their entire platform in "the Constitution, the Union and the enforcement of the laws," and had nominated Horatio Seymour for governor.

It was not difficult to see that politically the case was well managed, and that the most partisan of partisans in the person of Mr. Seymour, was enabled to appear before the voters of New York in the attitude of one who could graciously correct the errors of the Administration, and direct the course of the war in channels of patriotism that would harmonize the entire people. The nomination of Mr. Seymour was made with great enthusiasm by the Democracy, and the policy of the National Administration was thus challenged in the leading State of the Union. Mr. Lincoln looked upon the situation as one of exceeding gravity. The loss to the Administration, of the House of Representatives in the Thirty-eighth Congress, would place the control of the war in the hands of its opponents, and, as the President believed, would imperil the fate of the National struggle. The power of the purse controls the power of the sword. The armies in the field required a vast and constant expenditure, and to secure the money a rigorous system of taxation must be enforced. A House of Representatives controlling the power to tax and the power to appropriate could, if hostile to the war, neutralize and destroy all the efforts of the Executive.

The President measured the extent of the danger and prepared to meet it. He clearly read the signs of the times. He saw that the anti-slavery policy of Congress had gone far enough to arouse the bitter hostility of all Democrats who were not thoroughly committed to the war, and yet not far enough to deal an effective blow against the institution. He saw that as the Administration was committed to the partial policy which involved all the danger of a re-action and a retreat, it would be wise to commit it to the bold, far- reaching, radical and aggressive policy from which it would be impossible to turn without deliberately resolving to sacrifice our nationality. He determined therefore to lay before the people a choice between the Union and Slavery. He would persuade them that both could not be saved and that they must choose the one which they regarded as the more worthy of preservation. Slavery was not only the inciting cause of the rebellion but was its chief strength and support in the South and at the same time a weakening element to the Union cause in the Loyal States. No man had looked at the question in all its bearings so closely as Mr. Lincoln. He had studied the consequences of every step and had proceeded with the utmost caution.

THE PRESIDENT'S MONITORY PROCLAMATION.

The President kept his own counsels so closely, and relied so confidently upon his own conclusions, that it is not possible to say when he first seriously entertained the thought of general emancipation as a war measure. Mr. George S. Boutwell of Massachusetts who enjoyed Mr. Lincoln's confidence and who at this period of the contest was appointed Commissioner of Internal Revenue, is authority for some interesting statements. About the time that the anti- slavery legislation now under discussion was in progress Mr. Lincoln received a letter written by a loyal citizen of Louisiana, containing a strong argument against emancipation. He depicted in vivid colors the bad results to flow from it and appealed earnestly to the President not to take so dangerous a step. Without combating in detail the arguments of his correspondent who personally enjoyed his confidence, Mr. Lincoln said, "You must not expect me to give up this government without playing my last card."

During an interview with Mr. Lincoln after the adjournment of Congress in July, and when military disasters were falling thick and fast upon us, Mr. Boutwell suggested to the President that we could not hope to succeed until the slaves were emancipated. To which Mr. Lincoln answered, "You would not have it done now, would you? Had we not better wait for something like a victory?" The statement, widely made in the autumn of 1862, that Mr. Lincoln had been frightened or driven into the issuing of the proclamation by the meeting of the governors of the Loyal States at Altoona, had no foundation in fact. When the President's attention was called to it, he said, "The truth is, I never thought of the meeting of the governors at all. When Lee came over the Potomac I made a resolve that if McClellan drove him back I would send the proclamation after him. The battle of Antietam was fought Wednesday, but I could not find out until Saturday whether we had won a victory or lost a battle. It was then too late to issue it that day, and on Sunday I fixed it up a little, and on Monday I let them have it." This colloquial style was characteristic of Mr. Lincoln, and the frankness with which it was spoken disposes utterly of the claims made in behalf of Mr. Chase and Mr. Sumner that they contributed to the text of the Monitory Proclamation of 1862.

Two months before issuing the Proclamation Mr. Lincoln had urgently requested the senators and representatives of the Border States to give their effective co-operation in aid of compensated emancipation. In his letter of July 12 he said "Before leaving the Capitol, consider and discuss this subject among yourselves. You are patriots and statesmen, and as such I pray you to consider this proposition and at least commend it to the consideration of your States and people. As you would perpetuate popular government, I beseech you that you do in no wise omit this. Our common country is in great peril, demanding the loftiest views and boldest action to bring a speedy relief. Once relieved, its form of government is saved to the world, its beloved history and cherished memories are vindicated, its happy future assured and rendered inconceivably grand. To you more than to any others the privilege is given to assure that happiness, to swell that grandeur, to link your own names therewith forever."

The majority of the senators and representatives from the Border States did not concur with Mr. Lincoln's views and did not respond favorably to his earnest appeal. The Maryland delegation in Congress, the Kentucky delegation with one exception, and the Missouri delegation with one exception, entered into a long argument dissenting from the conclusions of the President. The West Virginia men (with the exception of Mr. Carlile), Mr. Casey of Kentucky, Mr. John W. Noell of Missouri, Mr. George P. Fisher of Delaware, together with Mr. Horace Maynard and Mr. A. J. Clements from Tennessee (not a Border State), expressed their readiness to co- operate with Mr. Lincoln. Mr. Maynard wrote a separate letter distinguished by breadth of view and strength of expression. It is impossible to comprehend the determination of the Border State men at that crisis. Having resisted in vain the aggressive legislation of Congress already accomplished, they could hardly fail to see that the institution of slavery was threatened with utter destruction. It seems absolutely incredible that, standing on the edge of the crater, they made no effort to escape from the upheaval of the volcano, already visible to those who stood afar off.

THE PRESIDENT'S ANTI-SLAVERY POLICY.

The Monitory Proclamation of Emancipation was issued on the 22d of September. It gave public notice that on the first day of January, 1863—just one hundred days distant—"all persons held as slaves within any State or designated part of a State, the people whereof shall be in rebellion against the United States, shall be then thenceforward and forever free." It was a final tribute to those engaged in rebellion that every agency, every instrumentality would be employed by the government in its struggle for self-preservation. It brought—as Mr. Lincoln intended it should bring—the seriousness of the contest to the hearts and consciences of the people in the Loyal States. He plainly warned them that every thing was at stake and that if they were unwilling to meet the trial with the courage and the sacrifice demanded, they were foredoomed to disaster, to defeat, to dishonor. He knew that the policy would at first encounter the disapproval of many who had supported him for the Presidency, and that it would be violently opposed by the great mass of the Democratic party. But his faith was strong. He believed that the destruction of slavery was essential to the safety of the Union, and he trusted with composure to the discerning judgment and ultimate decision of the people. If the Administration was to be defeated, he was determined that defeat should come upon an issue which involved the whole controversy. If the purse of the Nation was to be handed over to the control of those who were not ready to use the last dollar in the war for the preservation of the Union, the President was resolved that every voter in the Loyal States should be made to comprehend the deadly significance of such a decision.

The effect of the policy was for a time apparently disastrous to the Administration. The most sagacious among political leaders trembled for the result. Only the radical anti-slavery men of the type of Sumner and Stevens and Lovejoy were strong and unyielding in faith. They could not doubt, they would not doubt the result. For many weeks the elections in the North promised nothing but adversity. Maine voted a few days before the Proclamation was issued. Ever since the repeal of the Missouri Compromise the majorities against the Democrats in that State had varied from ten to nineteen thousand. Under the pressure of military reverses and the cry of an abolition war, the majority for Abner Coburn, the Republican candidate for governor, was a little over four thousand; and for the first time in ten years one of the districts returned a Democratic representative to Congress in the person of L. D. M. Sweat. Vermont, contrary to the tide of opinion elsewhere, increased her majority for the Administration—an event due in large part to the loyal position taken by Paul Dillingham who had been the leader of the Democratic party in the State.

The October elections were utterly discouraging. In Ohio the Democrats prevailed in fourteen of the Congressional districts, leaving the Republicans but five,—registering at the same time a popular majority of some seven thousand against the Administration. The extent of this reverse may be measured by the fact that in the preceding Congressional election Republican representatives had been chosen in thirteen districts. In Indiana the result was overwhelming against the President. The Republicans had held their convention early in the summer and had re-affirmed the Crittenden Resolution as embodying their platform of principles. They were not in position therefore to withstand the furious onslaught made by the Democrats on the Slavery question. Of the eleven Congressional districts the Republicans secured but three, and the Democrats had a large majority on the popular vote.—In Pennsylvania whose election was usually accepted as the index to the average public opinion of the country, the Democrats secured a majority of four thousand, and elected one-half the delegation to Congress. In November, 1860, Mr. Lincoln had received a majority of sixty thousand in Pennsylvania, and this change marked the ebb of popular favor created by the anti-slavery policy of the Administration.

Against the candidacy of Mr. Seymour for the governorship of New York, the Republicans nominated James S. Wadsworth, formerly a partisan of Mr. Van Buren and Silas Wright. He was a gentleman of the highest character, of large landed estate which he had inherited, and of wide personal popularity. He had volunteered for the war and was then in the service, with the rank of Brigadier-General. The convention which nominated him assembled after Mr. Lincoln's decisive action. They hailed "with the profoundest satisfaction the recent proclamation of the President declaring his intention to emancipate the slaves of all rebels who did not return to their allegiance by the 1st of January, 1863," and they urged upon the National Government "to use all the means that the God of battles had placed in its power against a revolt so malignant and so pernicious." Lyman Tremaine, a distinguished citizen who had been theretofore connected with the Democratic party, was nominated for Lieutenant-Governor.

The contest was extremely animated, enlisting the interest of the entire country. The result was a victory for Mr. Seymour. His majority over General Wadsworth was nearly ten thousand. His vote almost equaled the total of all the Democratic factions in the Presidential election of 1860, while Mr. Wadsworth fell nearly seventy thousand behind the vote given to Mr. Lincoln. The discrepancy could be well accounted for by the greater number of Republicans who had gone to the war, and for whose voting outside the State no provision had been made. No result could have been more distasteful to the Administration than the triumph of Mr. Seymour, and the experience of after years did not diminish the regret with which they had seen him elevated to a position of power at a time when the utmost harmony was needed between the National and State Governments.

REPUBLICAN DEFEAT IN ILLINOIS.

To the President the most mortifying event of the year was the overwhelming defeat in Illinois. Great efforts were made by the Republican party to save the State. Personal pride entered into the contest almost as much as political principle, but against all that could be done the Democrats secured a popular majority of seventeen thousand, and out of the fourteen representatives in Congress they left but three to the Republicans. They chose a Democratic Legislature, which returned William A. Richardson to the Senate for the unexpired term of Mr. Douglas,—filled since his death by O. H. Browning who had been appointed by the Governor. The crushing defeat of Mr. Lincoln in his own State had a depressing effect upon the party elsewhere, and but for the assurance in which the Administration found comfort and cheer, that the Democrats were at home to vote while the Republicans were in the field to fight, the result would have proved seriously discouraging to the country and utterly destructive of the policy of emancipation as proclaimed by the President.

In the five leading free States, the Administration had thus met with a decisive defeat. The Democratic representatives chosen to Congress numbered in the aggregate fifty-nine, while those favorable to the Administration were only forty. In some other States the results were nearly as depressing. New Jersey, which had given half its electoral vote to Mr. Lincoln two years before, now elected a Democratic governor by nearly fifteen thousand majority, and of her five representatives in Congress only one was friendly to the policy of the Administration. Michigan, which had been Republican by twenty thousand in 1860, now gave the Administration but six thousand majority, though Senator Chandler made almost superhuman efforts to bring out the full vote of the party. Wisconsin, which had given Mr. Lincoln a large popular majority, now gave a majority of two thousand for the Democrats, dividing the Congressional delegation equally between the two parties.

If this ratio had been maintained in all the States, the defeat of the war party and of the anti-slavery policy would have been complete. But relief came and the Administration was saved. The New-England States which voted in November stood firmly by their principles, though with diminished majorities. The contest in Massachusetts resulted in the decisive victory of Governor Andrew over General Charles Devens, who ran as a Coalition candidate of the Democrats and Independents against the emancipation policy of the Administration. New Hampshire which voted the ensuing spring had the benefit of a Loyal re-action and sustained the Administration. In the West, Iowa, Kansas and Minnesota cheered the Administration with unanimous Republican delegations to Congress, and on the Pacific coast California and Oregon stood firmly by the President.

The result in the Border slave States amply vindicated the sagacity and wisdom of the President in so constantly and carefully nurturing their loyalty and defending them against the inroads of the Confederates. They responded nobly, and in great part repaired the injury inflicted by States which were presumptively more loyal to the Administration, and which had a far larger stake in the struggle for the Union. Delaware's one representative was Republican, Missouri elected a decisive majority of friends to the Administration, and in the ensuing year Kentucky, West Virginia, and Maryland materially increased the strength of the government. The Administration was finally assured that it would be able to command a majority of about twenty in the House. But for the aid of the Border slave States the anti-slavery position of Mr. Lincoln might have been overthrown by a hostile House of Representatives. It is true therefore in a very striking sense that the five slave States which Mr. Lincoln's policy had held to their loyalty, were most effectively used by him in overpowering the eleven slave States which had revolted against the Union.

COMPENSATED EMANCIPATION URGED.

The third and last session of the Thirty-seventh Congress assembled four weeks after the close of the exciting contest for the control of the next House of Representatives. The message of Mr. Lincoln made no reference whatever to the political contest in the country, and unlike his previous communications to Congress gave no special summary of the achievements by our forces either upon the land or the sea. He contended himself with stating that he transmitted the reports of the Secretaries of War and of the Navy, and referred Congress to them for full information. He dwelt a length upon the total inadequacy of Disunion as a remedy for the differences between the people of the two sections, and quoted with evident satisfaction the declarations he had made in his Inaugural address upon that point. In his judgment "there is no line, straight or crooked, suitable for a National boundary upon which to divide. Trace it through from east to west upon the line between the free and the slave country, and we shall find a little more than one-third of its length are rivers easy to be crossed; and populated, or soon to be populated, thickly on both sides, while nearly all its remaining length are merely surveyor's lines over which people may walk back and forth without any consciousness of their presence. No part of this line can be made any more difficult to pass by writing it down on paper or parchment as a National boundary." In the President's view "a nation may be said to consist of its territory, its people, and its laws. The territory is the only part which is of certain durability. That portion of the earth's surface which is inhabited by the people of the United States is well adapted for the home of one National family, but it is not well adapted for two or more."

Mr. Lincoln was still anxious that the Loyal slave States should secure the advantage of compensated emancipation which he had already urged, and he recommended an amendment to the Constitution whereby a certain amount should be paid by the United States to each State that would abolish slavery before the first day of January, A. D. 1900. The amount was to be paid in bonds of the United States on which interest was to begin from the time of actual delivery to the States. The amendment was further to declare, that "all slaves who enjoyed actual freedom by the chances of war at any time before the end of the rebellion shall be forever free," but the individual owners, if loyal, shall be compensated at the same rate that may be paid to those in States abolishing slavery. The amendment also proposed to give to "Congress the right to appropriate money for the colonization of the emancipated slaves, with their own consent, at any place outside of the United States."

Congress had scarcely time to consider this grave proposition when the President issued on the first day of the new year (1863) his formal Proclamation abolishing slavery in all the States in rebellion against the Government, with the exception of Tennessee, and of certain parishes in Louisiana and certain counties in Virginia whose population was considered loyal to the Government. Tennessee was excepted from the operation of the Proclamation at the urgent request of Andrew Johnson who, after the fall of Nashville in the preceding spring, had resigned from the Senate to accept the appointment of military governor of his State. His service in the Senate, with his State in flagrant rebellion, was felt to be somewhat anomalous and he was glad to accept a position in which he could be more directly helpful to the loyal cause. He possessed the unbounded confidence of Mr. Lincoln who yielded to his views respecting the best mode of restoring Tennessee to the Union, and her inhabitants to their duty to the National Government. There is good reason for believing that both Mr. Lincoln and Mr. Johnson afterwards regarded the omission of Tennessee from the Proclamation of Emancipation as a mistake, honestly made in the first place by Governor Johnson and too readily acceded to by the President.

The recommendation of Mr. Lincoln for a system of compensated emancipation was taken up promptly and cordially by the Republican members of both branches of Congress. The House appointed a special committee on the subject. With but little delay a bill was passed appropriating to Missouri, the first State considered, ten millions of dollars with the restriction that the money should be paid only to the loyal slave-holders. The Senate increased the amount to fifteen millions of dollars and returned it to the House for concurrence in the amendment. The measure had been thus passed in both branches but with stubborn opposition on the part of some prominent Democratic leaders from Missouri. John B. Henderson in the Senate and John W. Noell in the House labored earnestly to secure the compensation for their State, but the bill was finally defeated in the House. By factious resistance, by dilatory motions and hostile points of order, the Democratic members from Missouri were able to force the bill from its position of parliamentary advantage, and to prevent its consideration within the period in which a majority of the House could control its fate. The just responsibility for depriving Missouri of the fifteen millions of dollars must be charged in an especial degree to Thomas L. Price, Elijah H. Norton, and William A. Hall, representatives from that State, who on the 25th of February, 1863, by the use of objectionable tactics deprived the House of the opportunity even to consider a bill of such value and consequence to their constituents. A large majority stood ready to pass it, but the determined hostility of the Democratic members from Missouri defeated the kindly and generous intentions of Congress towards their own State. At a later period in the session the attempt was made to pass the bill by a suspension of the Rules, but this motion though it received the support of a majority was defeated for the lack of two-thirds of the votes as required. The Democratic members of Missouri were again active in resisting the boon which was offered to their State and so earnestly pressed by the Republicans of the House.

MISTAKE OF BORDER STATE MEN.

The course of the Missouri representatives was sustained by the solid vote of the Democratic members from the free States, and received the co-operation of a majority of representatives from the Border slave States. If the bill for Missouri had passed, a similar relief would have been offered to Kentucky, West Virginia, Maryland and Delaware. Mr. Crittenden whose influence with the representatives from these States was deservedly great could not be persuaded to adopt the President's policy. The consideration which influenced him and other Border State men to the course which subsequent events proved to be unwise, was their distrust of the success of the Union arms. The prospect had grown steadily discouraging ever since the adjournment of Congress in the preceding July, and with the exception of General McClellan's success at Antietam there had been nothing to lighten the gloom which deeply beclouded the military situation. The daily expenditures of the nation were enormous, and the Secretary of the Treasury had at the opening of the season estimated that the National debt at the close of the current fiscal year would exceed seventeen hundred millions of dollars. The Border State men chose therefore to maintain possession of their four hundred thousand slaves, even with the title somewhat shaken by war, rather than to part with them for the bonds of a Government whose ability to pay they considered extremely doubtful.

They could readily have secured, indeed they were urged to accept, fifty millions of dollars, the equivalent of gold coin, in securities which became in a few years the favorite investment of the wisest capitalists in the world. Such opportunities are never repeated. The magnanimous policy of the President and the wise liberality of the Republican party were precisely adapted, if the Border State men could have seen it, to the critical situation of the hour. Subsequent events prevented the repetition of the offer, and the slave-holders were left to thank themselves and their representatives for the loss of the munificent compensation proffered by the Government. They could not believe Mr. Lincoln when at the pressing moment he pleaded with them so earnestly to accept the terms, and flavored his appeal with the humorous remark to Mr. Crittenden: "You Southern men will soon reach the point where bonds will be a more valuable possession than bondsmen. Nothing is more uncertain now than two-legged property."

After the unfortunate issue of the Peninsular campaign and in the fear that Lee might turn directly upon Washington, a new army was organized on the 27th of June, 1862, and placed under the command of Major-General John Pope. It included the forces which had been serving under Frémont, Banks and McDowell, and was divided into three corps with these officers respectively in command. General Frémont considering the designation below his rank asked to be relieved from the service, and his corps was assigned to General Rufus King, and soon after to General Sigel. General Pope took the field on the 14th of July with a formidable force. General McClellan was still within twenty-five miles of Richmond, and with Pope in front of Washington, the Confederate authorities were at a standstill and could not tell which way to advance with hope of success or even with safety.

If the army of Lee should move towards Washington he might be compelled to fight General Pope protected by the extensive fortifications on the south side of the Potomac, leaving Richmond at the same time uncovered, with the possibility that McClellan, re-enforced by Burnside's corps which lay at Fortress Monroe, would renew his attack with an army of ninety thousand men. But as soon as the Confederates ascertained that McClellan was ordered back to the Potomac, they saw their opportunity and made haste to attack Pope. Fault was found with the slowness of McClellan's movements. His judgment as a military man was decidedly against the transfer of his army from the point it occupied near Richmond, and it cannot be said that he obeyed the distasteful order with the alacrity with which he would have responded to one that agreed with his own judgment.

AGGRESSIVE COURSE OF THE CONFEDERATES.

No reason can be assigned why if the Army of the Potomac was to be brought back in front of Washington it should not have been transferred in season to re-enforce General Pope and give a crushing blow to Lee. General McClellan was directed on the third day of August to withdraw his whole army to Acquia Creek, and as General Halleck declares, "in order to make the movement as rapidly as possible General McClellan was authorized to assume control of all the vessels in the James River and Chesapeake Bay, of which there was then a vast fleet." General McClellan did not begin the evacuation of Harrison's Landing until the 14th of August—eleven days after it was ordered. General Burnside's corps was ordered on the 1st of August to move from Newport News to Acquia Creek, and an estimate of the transportation facilities at command of General McClellan, may be formed from the fact that Burnside's whole corps reached their destination in forty-eight hours. General Lee knew at once by this movement that it was not the design to attack Richmond, and he made haste to throw his army on Pope before the slow moving army from Harrison's Landing could re-enforce him. General McClellan did not himself reach Acquia Creek until the 24th of August. The disasters sustained by General Pope in the month of August could not have occurred if the forces of the Union, readily at command, had been brought seasonably to his aid. It was at this crisis that the unfortunate movements were made, the full responsibility for which, perhaps the exact character of which, may never be determined, but the sorrowful result of which was that the Union forces, much larger in the aggregate than Lee's, were divided and continually outnumbered on the field of battle.

Flushed with success the Confederate authorities pushed their fortunes with great boldness. General Bragg invaded Kentucky with a large army and General Lee prepared to invade Pennsylvania. The cruel defeat of General Pope disabled him for the time as a commander, and the Administration, fearing for the safety of Washington, and yielding somewhat to the obvious wishes of the soldiers, ordered General McClellan on September 2 to assume command of all troops for the defense of the Capital. General Lee avoiding the fortifications of Washington, passed over to Maryland, and prepared to invade Pennsylvania with a force formidable in numbers and with the added strength of a supreme confidence in its invincibility. General McClellan moved promptly westward to cut off Lee's progress northward. After preliminary engagements the main battle of Antietam was fought on the 17th of September, resulting in a Union victory. Lee was severely repulsed and retreated across the Potomac.

General McClellan fought the battle of Antietam under extraordinary embarrassment caused by the surrender of Harper's Ferry to the Confederates on the 13th, with a loss to the Union army of more than twelve thousand men. Could he have had the advantage of this force on the battle-field, under a competent commander, at the critical moment, his victory over Lee might have been still more decisive. His success however was of overwhelming importance to the National Government and put a stop to an invasion of Pennsylvania which might have been disastrous in the extreme. He was blamed severely, perhaps unjustly, for not following Lee on his retreat and reaping the fruits of his victory. He had the misfortune to fall into a controversy once more with the authorities at Washington. After a correspondence with the War Department he was peremptorily ordered by the General-in-Chief Halleck on the 6th of October in these words: "The President directs that you cross the Potomac and give battle to the enemy or drive him south. Your army must move now while the roads are good. . . . I am directed to add that the Secretary of War and the General-in-Chief fully concur with the President in these instructions." The order was not promptly obeyed. The Army of the Potomac—as those who spoke for General McClellan maintained—had been for six months engaged in a laborious campaign in which they had fought many battles and experienced much hardship. They needed rest, recruitment, clothes, shoes, and a general supply of war material before setting out on what would prove a winter march. The authorities at Washington asserted, and apparently proved on the testimony of Quartermaster-General Meigs, a most accomplished, able, and honorable officer, that the Army of the Potomac, when it received its first orders to move in October, was thoroughly and completely equipped. General McClellan thought however that if intrusted with the command of the army he should be allowed to direct its movements. He crossed the Potomac near Harper's Ferry in the last week of October, and began an advance through Virginia which effectually covered Washington. He had reached Warrenton, and, before the plan of his campaign was developed, received at midnight, on the 7th of November, a direct order from President Lincoln to "surrender the command of the army to General Burnside, and to report himself immediately at Trenton, the capital of New Jersey."

GENERAL McCLELLAN'S MILITARY CAREER.

The reasons for this sudden and peremptory order were not given, and if expressed would probably have been only an assertion of the utter impossibility that the War Department and General McClellan should harmoniously co-operate in the great military movements which devolved upon the Army of the Potomac. But the time of removal was not opportunely selected by the Administration. After General McClellan's failure on the Peninsula, a large proportion of the Northern people clamored for his deposition from command, and it would have been quietly acquiesced in by all. At the end of those disastrous days when he was falling back on the line of the James River, General McClellan had telegraphed the Secretary of War "If I save this army now, I tell you plainly that I owe no thanks to you or to any persons in Washington. You have done your best to sacrifice this army." Perhaps no such dispatch was ever before sent by a military officer to the Commander-in-Chief of the army—to the ruler of the nation. In any other country it would have been followed with instant cashiering. Mr. Lincoln, with his great magnanimity, had however condoned the offense, and after the defeat of Pope the Administration had enlarged the command of McClellan and trusted the fortunes of the country to his generalship. The trust had not been in vain. He had rolled back the tide of invasion by a great battle in which for the first time the army of Lee had been beaten. He was now marching forward with his army strengthened for another conflict, and without explanation to the country or to himself was deprived of his command. A large part of the people and of the public press and an overwhelming majority in the army were dissatisfied with the act, and believed that it would entail evil consequences.

This ended the military career of General McClellan which throughout its whole period had been a subject of constant discussion—a discussion which has not yet closed. The opinion of a majority of intelligent observers, both civil and military, is that he was a man of high professional training, admirably skilled in the science of war, capable of commanding a large army with success, but at the same time not original in plan, not fertile in resource, and lacking the energy, the alertness, the daring, the readiness to take great risks for great ends, which distinguish the military leaders of the world. For a commander of armies, in an offensive campaign, his caution was too largely developed. He possessed in too great a degree what the French term the defensive instinct of the engineer, and was apparently incapable of doing from his own volition what he did so well on the bloody field of Antietam, when under the pressure of an overwhelming necessity.

General Burnside assumed the command with diffidence. After a consultation with General Halleck he moved down the Rappahannock opposite Fredericksburg where he confronted General Lee's army on the 13th of December, and made an attack upon it under great disadvantages and with the legitimate result of a great defeat. The total loss of killed and wounded of the Union army exceeded ten thousand men. The public mind was deeply affected throughout the North by this untoward event. All the prestige which Lee had lost at Antietam had been regained, all the advantage we had secured on that field was sacrificed by the disaster on the still bloodier field of Fredericksburg. It added immeasurably to the gloom of a gloomy winter, and in the rank and file of the army it caused a dissatisfaction somewhat akin to mutiny. So pronounced did this feeling become and so plainly was it manifested that the subject attracted the attention of Congress and led to some results which, despite the seriousness of the situation, were irresistibly amusing.

On the 23d of January Mr. Wilson of Massachusetts offered a somewhat extraordinary resolution,—instructing the Committee on the Conduct of the War to "inquire whether Major-General Burnside has since the battle of Fredericksburg formed any plans for the movement of the Army of the Potomac or any portion of the same, and if so whether any subordinate generals of said army have written to or visited Washington, to oppose or interfere with the execution of such movements, and whether such proposed movements have been arrested or interfered with, and if so by what authority." The consideration of the resolution was postponed under the rule, and three days later it was called up by Mr. Anthony of Rhode Island and its adoption urged "with the view of finding out whether officers were coming up here from the Army of the Potomac to interfere with the plans of General Burnside." There was indeed no doubt that some of the general officers connected with the army had been in Washington, and confidentially informed the President of the dispirited and depressed condition of the whole force.

GENERAL BURNSIDE AND GENERAL HOOKER.

General Burnside's character was one of great frankness, truth, and fidelity. He was full of courage and of manliness, and he conceived from circumstances within his knowledge, that certain officers in his command were gradually undermining and destroying him in the confidence of the army and of the public. He had not desired the position to which the President called him as the successor of General McClellan. He did not feel himself indeed quite competent to the task of commanding an army of one hundred thousand men. But there as in every other position in life he would try to do his best. He failed and failed decisively. It would probably have been wise for him to resign his command immediately after the defeat at Fredericksburg. On January 23, the Friday before the Senate resolution was adopted, General Burnside, highly incensed by the injury which he thought had been done him, wrote an order peremptorily "dismissing, subject to the approval of the President, Major-General Joseph E. Hooker from the Army of the United States, for having been guilty of unjust and unnecessary criticism of his superior officers, and for having by the general tone of his conversation endeavored to create distrust in the minds of officers who have associated with him, and for having habitually spoken in disparaging terms of other officers." The order declared that General Hooker was dismissed "as a man unfit to hold an important commission during a crisis like the present when so much patience, charity, confidence, consideration, and patriotism is due from every person in the field." The same order dismissed Brigadier-General John Newton and Brigadier-General John Cochrane for going to the President with criticisms on the plans of the commanding officer, and relieved Major-General William B. Franklin, Major-General W. F. Smith, Brigadier-General Sturgis and several others from further service in the Army of the Potomac.

The outcome of this extraordinary proceeding was very singular. General Burnside took the order, before its publication, to the President who instead of approving it, very good-naturedly found a command for the General in the West, and on the very day that the Senate passed the resolution of inquiry, two orders were read at the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac,—one from General Burnside announcing that Major-General Joseph E. Hooker was assigned to the command of the Army of the Potomac and asking the army to "give to the brave and skillful General, who is now to command you, your full and cordial support and co-operation;" the other from General Hooker assuming command of the Army of the Potomac by direction of the President and conveying to the late commander, General Burnside, "the most cordial good wishes of the whole army."

In the South-West where General Grant, General Sherman, and General Rosecrans were stubbornly contesting the ground, no decisive results were attained. The army went into winter quarters, with a general feeling of discouragement pervading the country. A substantial advantage was gained by General Buell's army in driving Bragg out of Kentucky, and a very signal and helpful encouragement came to the Government from the fact that the public manifestations in Kentucky were decisively adverse to the Confederates, and that Lee's army in Maryland met no welcome from any portion of the population. General McClellan's army was cheered everywhere in Maryland as it marched to the field of Antietam; and as Bragg retreated through the mountain sections of Kentucky his stragglers were fired upon by the people, and the women along the route upbraided the officers with bitter maledictions. Perhaps the feature of the two invasions most discouraging to the Confederates was the condition of the popular mind which they found in the Border States. They had expected to arouse fresh revolt, but they met a people tired of conflict and longing for repose under the flag of the Nation.

Congress felt that the situation was one of uncertainty if not of positive adversity. They did not however abate one jot or tittle of earnest effort in providing for a renewal of the contest in the ensuing spring. They appropriated some seven hundred and forty millions of dollars for the army and some seventy-five millions for the navy, and they took the very decisive step of authorizing "the President to enroll, arm, equip, and receive into the land and naval service of the United States such number of volunteers of African descent as he may deem useful to suppress the present Rebellion for such term of service as he may prescribe, not exceeding five years." The enactment of this bill was angrily resisted by the Democratic party and by the Union men of the Border States. But the Republicans were able to consolidate their ranks in support of it. In the popular opinion it was a radical measure, and therein lay its chief merit. Aside from the substantial strength which the accession of these colored men to the ranks would give to the Union army, was the moral effect which would be produced on the minds of Southern men by the open demonstration that the President did not regard the Proclamation of Emancipation as brutum fulmen, but intended to enforce it by turning the strong arm of the slave against the person of the master. It was a policy that required great moral courage, and it was abundantly rewarded by successful results. It signalized to the whole world the depth of the earnestness with which the Administration was defending the Union, and the desperate extent to which the contest would be carried before American nationality should be surrendered. The measure had long been demanded by the aggressive sentiment of the North, and its enactment was hailed by the mass of people in the Loyal States as a great step forward.

SUSPENSION OF HABEAS CORPUS.

A subject of striking interest at this session of Congress was the passage of the "Act relating to habeas corpus, and regulating judicial proceedings in certain cases." The President had ordered for the public safety, and as an act necessary to the successful prosecution of the war, the arrest and confinement of certain persons charged with disloyal practices. No punishment was attempted or designed except that of confinement in a military fortress of the United States. It became a matter of argument not only in Congress but throughout the country, whether the President was authorized by the Constitution to suspend the writ of habeas corpus. In order to set the question at rest it was now proposed to pass an Act of indemnity for past acts to all officers engaged in making arrests, and also to confirm to the President by law the right which he had of his own power been exercising. The bill declared that "during the present Rebellion the President of the United States, whenever in his judgment the public safety may require it, is authorized to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in any case throughout the United States or any part thereof; and wherever the said writ shall be suspended no military or other officer shall be compelled, in answer to any writ of habeas corpus, to return the body of any person or persons detained by him by authority of the President."

The bill was stubbornly resisted by the Democratic party, and after its passage by the House thirty-six Democratic representatives asked leave to enter upon the Journal a solemn protest against its enactment. They recited at length their grounds of objection, the principal of which was "the giving to the President the right to suspend the writ of habeas corpus throughout the limits of the United States, whereas by the Constitution the power to suspend the privilege of that writ is confided to the discretion of Congress alone and is limited to the place threatened by the dangers of invasion or insurrection," and also because "the bill purports to confirm and make valid by act of Congress arrests and imprisonments which were not only not warranted by the Constitution of the United States but were in palpable violation of its express prohibitions." Mr. Thaddeus Stevens peremptorily moved to lay the request on the table, and on a call of the ayes and noes the motion prevailed by a vote of 75 to 41. The division in the House by this time amounted to a strict line, on one side of which was the war party and on the other side the anti-war party.

The crowning achievement of the session in aid of the Union was the passage of an "Act for enrolling and calling out the National forces and for other purposes." By its terms all able-bodied citizens of the United States between the ages of twenty and forty- five years, with a few exemptions which were explicitly stated, were declared to "constitute the National forces and shall be employed to perform military duty in the service of the United States when called on by the President for that purpose." Volunteering was not to be relied upon as the sole means of recruiting the army, but the entire population within the arms-bearing age was now to be devoted to the contest. Taken in connection with other legislation already adverted to—the enormous appropriations for the forthcoming campaign, the organization of African regiments, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus at the President's discretion—this last measure was the conclusive proof of the serious determination with which Congress and the people would continue the contest. The spirit with which the President and Congress proceeded in that depressing and depressed period proved invaluable to the country. The situation had so many elements of a discouraging character that the slightest hesitation or faltering among those controlling the administration of the Government would have been followed by distrust and dismay among the people.