"MY LORD!
"Your lordship has imposed upon me a very painful task, by desiring me to communicate to his Royal Highness the Crown Prince the contents of that letter with which your lordship has favoured me the 22d of April; and in which you have treated Commodore Fischer with a severity which, as a brother officer, I cannot but think too great, indeed, I conceive, that your lordship has felt a certain degree of displeasure at that incorrectness which you have thought to find in Commodore Fischer's official report; but your lordship did not fully consider, at that moment, that he himself might have received incorrect reports: a fatality to which every commander in chief is exposed. I flatter myself, from your lordship's well-known candour and indulgence, that you will not think it presuming in me, or contrary to the respect I feel for your lordship, if I take the liberty of offering you some few observations in vindication of the conduct of Commodore Fischer. But, first, let me have the honour to assure your lordship, that I have not communicated to that officer your letter of the 22d of April; and that, what I take the liberty of offering your lordship, is absolutely my private and individual opinion.
"Your lordship thinks, that Commodore Fischer has over-rated the forces by which he was attacked, and under-rated his own; or, that he wrongly asserts the superiority of numbers on the part of the British. I must confess, that I am now, as I have always been, of opinion, that the squadron with which your lordship attacked our southern line of defence, say all those ships and vessels lying to the southward of the Crown Battery, was stronger then than that line. I will say nothing about our not having time sufficient to man our ships in the manner it was intended: they being badly manned, both as to number and as to quality of their crews, the greatest part of which were landmen; people that had been pressed, and who never before had been on board a ship or used to the exercise of guns. I will not mention our ships being old and rotten, and not having one-third of our usual complement of officers; I will confine myself to the number of guns, and from the ships named in your lordship's official report: and there I find, that your squadron carried one thousand and fifty-eight guns, of much greater calibre than our's; exclusive of carronnades, which did our ships so much injury; also, exclusive of your gun-brigs and bomb-vessels.
"Now, I can assure your lordship, upon my honour, that to my certain knowledge the number of guns on board of those eighteen ships and vessels of our's which were engaged (including the small ship the Elbe, which came into the harbour towards the end of the action) amount to six hundred and thirty-four, I have not included our eleven gun-boats, carrying each two guns, as a couple of them only had an opportunity of firing a few shot. Nor need I to mention the Crown Battery, on which sixty-six guns were mounted, as that battery did not fairly get into action, and only fired a few random shot.
"When Commodore Fischer left the Dannebrog, that ship was on fire, had many killed, several of it's officers wounded, and otherwise suffered much. It was, I conceive, the duty of the commander, to remove his broad pendant to another ship; and he went on board the Holstein, from whence he commanded the line of defence; and where he remained two hours, his broad pendant flying on board the said ship. When this ship was mostly disabled, the Commodore went to the Crown Battery, which also was under his command. He would, in my humble opinion, have been justified, from the wound he received on his head, to quit the command altogether, when he left the Dannebrog; and no blame could ever have attached, for it, to his character as a soldier. I have given myself every possible pain, to be informed whether Commodore Fischer's pendant has been removed before or after the ship struck; and the officers all agree, in declaring, that the broad pendant has been replaced by a captain's pendant, both on board the Dannebrog and the Holstein, previous to those ships hauling down their ensign. It is even remarkable that, on board the Dannebrog, the man who had taken down the broad pendant, and hoisted the captain's pendant, was killed when coming down the shrouds, and fell upon deck with the commodore's pendant in his hand.
"I do not conceive that Commodore Fischer had the least idea of claiming as a victory what to every intent and purpose was a defeat: he has only thought, that this defeat was not an inglorious one; and, that our officers and men displayed much bravery and firmness, against force so superior in every respect. Your lordship's report, and your letter to me, proves it. I confess, that your lordship took all the vessels opposed to you; except five, carrying together eighty-six guns. I am of opinion, with your lordship, that three ships of seventy-four guns each would have been a hard match for the Three Crowns Battery; but, they certainly would have been forced to go away.
"As to your lordship's motive for sending a flag of truce to our government, it can never be misconstrued; and your subsequent conduct has sufficiently shewn, that humanity is always the companion of true valour. You have done more; you have shewn yourself a friend of the re-establishment of peace, and good harmony, between this country and Great Britain. It is, therefore, with the sincerest esteem, I shall always feel myself attached to your lordship; and it is with the greatest respect I have the honour to subscribe myself, my lord, your lordship's most obedient and most humble servant,
"H. Lindholm."
On these respective letters, the judicious part of mankind will judge for themselves. We need not have blushed for a Lindholm, but we have reason to glory in our Nelson. Olfert Fischer, notwithstanding the arguments of his able apologist, must always be considered as having been superabundantly solicitous for the safety of his own person: in leaving two different ships, by his own confession, while the respective crews continued fighting; and finally retiring, to continue his command, under cover of a powerful battery on shore. His roundly asserting, that we had two ships for one, and that he was told two English ships had struck; his ungenerous and distorted application of Lord Nelson's noble acknowledgment of the general bravery of the Danes; and the low source of solace that he finds in disingenuously limiting the advantage gained by the victory to the possession of a few wretched wrecks, without at all appreciating the grand political consequences which it so fully accomplished; exhibit, in the whole, a disposition meanly selfish, conspicuously sordid, and deplorably deficient in all the most lofty qualities of mind. What a contrast to our immortal Nelson! whose single sentence, in his letter of rebuke for this man—"God forbid that I should destroy an unresisting Dane! When they became my prisoners, I became their protector!"—deserves to be charactered with letters of diamonds on the shrine destined to cover the hero's hallowed remains.
Lord Nelson did not think it necessary to differ with his friend Lindholm, an undoubted man of honour, about punctilious particulars. To his own mind, however, or that of an enemy, he would not abate a particle of what he had asserted. The following statement is copied from a private memorandum of his lordship's, in which he acutely turns the scale of superior force against the Danes.
"Lindholm ought to have omitted the guns of the Russell, Bellona, Agamemnon, Amazon, Alcmene, Blanche, Dart, and Arrow; as the two first were aground; and, although within random shot, yet unable to do that service expected from seventy-four gun ships. The Agamemnon was not within three miles; the others, frigates and sloops, were exposed to a part of the Crown Battery and the ships in the other channel, but not fired upon by the eighteen sail drawn up to the southward of the Crown Islands. Therefore, sixty-six guns are to be taken from the British, and a hundred and sixty-six guns added to the Danes: viz. sixty-six, Crown Batteries—(I think, there were eighty-eight)—and a hundred for the batteries on Amack; besides random shot from the ships in the other channel, citadel, &c. Therefore, the account ought to stand thus—
Guns, by Lindholm's account 1058
Deduct, as above 366
——
British force in action 692
——
Danish force, by Lindholm's account 634
Add, I say, at least 166
Danish force 800
British force 692
Superiority of the Danes 108"
Though Lord Nelson could not have rested without satisfying himself of the precise fact, he saw no necessity for entering into any altercation, on so trivial a topic, with General-Adjutant Lindholm. He contented himself, therefore, with immediately closing the subject, by the following very liberal reply.
St. George, May 3d, 1801.