FOOTNOTES:
[219] Small parties of troops were, of course, sometimes swooped down on suddenly in 1879 and overwhelmed, e.g. the Prince Imperial's party and the Intombi disaster. Such tactics, however, were merely incidental or subsidiary to those generally practised.
[220] N.C. remained with the O.C. troops at Gun Hill during the drive.
[221] W. Bosman, The Natal Rebellion of 1906, p. 66.
[222] This appointment had become necessary early in June, owing to Colonel Bru-de-Wold being obliged, through illness, to temporarily relinquish the duties of his office.
[223] The following account is now published for the first time.
[224] This cloth (Turkey-red) had been issued to members of levies as a badge to indicate that they were loyalists. It was worn either round the left arm or round the head (above the forehead).
[225] Report, Col. D. McKenzie, September, 1906.
[226] Some account of the excellent services performed by N.N.H. will be found in Appendix XI.
[227] During this drive, a few N.N.H. were directed to look after the horses. One of the men, Hendrick Mkabela, seeing a party of rebels, with twenty-one head of cattle, attacked them and, though single-handed, succeeded in capturing the stock, and subsequently handing it over to the Provost-Marshal.
[228] Barker had assumed duty on the 8th.
[229] Barker had two 15-pounders.
[XIV.]
ACTION AT MOME[230] GORGE.
Of so important a nature were McKenzie's instructions, that three men were employed to carry them to Barker, who was known to be camped three or four miles from the grave.[231] The three selected were Tprs. C.W. Johnson (because of his knowledge of the district), G.O. Oliver (because of his ability to speak Zulu), and W. Deeley (as additional rider in case of accidents)—all of the Z.M.R. In informing the men of the contents of his despatch, McKenzie explained he did so, so that, in case of mishap, one or other of them should ride through and acquaint Barker thereof, even though only verbally.
It was just about 10 p.m. when the men, quitting Nomangci camp, moved towards the road a mile off. Once in it, they pushed forward at a sharp pace, which increased to a gallop on entering, as they presently did, the great black forest. The speed at which they went naturally caused the clatter of the horses' hoofs to reverberate loudly in the still, dark avenue formed by the trees on either side. It was for a double purpose they galloped along as they did, firstly, to convey the intelligence with utmost speed, secondly, to give the impression to any of the enemy that might be lurking about—for the entire route to be traversed was held by him—that the party was larger than it really was. After proceeding about half a mile in the forest, a large tree was found lying at right angles across the road. It had not fallen by accident, but had been chopped to come down as it had done, so as to obstruct waggons going to and fro. (Only a few days before, it will be remembered, a waggon carrying supplies had been captured in this locality). Leaping the hurdle, the riders were next surprised at seeing a fire burning but a short distance away to the right, one of them declaring he heard persons running from there further into the forest. It was not until they had got to the looted store at Sibudeni peak, where they left the road to proceed along a rough track leading through other dense forests and broken country to Bobe ridge, that the horses were pulled in and compelled, owing to the nature of the ground, to proceed at a walk. At this point, two or three cow-hides were found tightly stretched and pegged out to dry across the said track. To prevent more noise than necessary at this dangerous part (it was one of the enemy's principal outposts—the attack on Mansel of 5th May began near there), the men dismounted, made a detour round the hides, and then went on again as before. They soon emerged altogether from the forest, descended the long steep Bobe ridge, and crossed the Halambu stream at the bottom. Here doubt arose as to the whereabouts of the Transvaalers' camp, but the existence of fresh wheel-marks, fortunately noticed in the nick of time leading off the well-beaten Fort Yolland track, induced the men to follow them, with the result that, after proceeding but a few hundred yards, they found the object of their mission had been successfully achieved. To be passed through the lines of sleeping soldiers and on to the Officer Commanding was the work of but a few moments. The despatch was safely delivered at about 1 a.m.[232]
Barker at once made arrangements to move as directed. He had all the officers and men quietly roused. Calling the former together, he read them the despatch and made known the order of march, anticipating he would be in time to lie in ambush at Tate gorge, that being a part of the country which lent itself well to such tactics.[233] The strictest orders were issued that there was to be neither smoking nor talking. Leaving a force sufficient to defend the camp, the rest of the column moved off at 2 a.m. It was made up as follows: T.M.R. (three squadrons—B, C and D); N.P. (90); N.F.A. (one section—two 15-pounders); one Maxim gun; one Colt gun; Nongqai (100); and a levy of about 800 Natives (Chiefs Mfungelwa and Hatshi).
When near Cetshwayo's grave, Inspector C.E. Fairlie, with Nongqai and levies, branched off to the right and proceeded to a position overlooking a small neck in that large bend of the Mome stream situate some 200 yards below where the "pear-shaped" forest (Dobo), tapering down, abuts on the said stream. He was directed to stop the rebels on their making an appearance at the neck. If nothing happened for an hour after daybreak, he was to proceed up to Sigananda's already burnt Enhlweni kraal and there, as directed, co-operate with McKenzie's forces.
On reaching the entrance of Mome gorge, the advanced guard of the main body, consisting of a troop of C squadron, had already moved across the comparatively level ground opposite the mouth, when Barker and those with him, glancing over their right shoulders, observed a number of fires burning brightly in the gorge, some 1,000 yards away. There were about sixty. It seemed as if the troops had come too late. Word to halt was immediately passed along. The guns at the moment were half a mile in rear. On looking intently, it seemed as if figures were moving in front of the fires. The time then was about 4 a.m. Barker dismounted, and, taking two or three men with him, advanced on foot along the slope of the small ridge on the west of the mouth of the gorge to obtain a nearer view. Having satisfied himself the enemy was actually bivouacked on an old mealie garden, and in considerable force, exactly where the fires were, he proceeded to make his dispositions for attack, which, it was arranged, should begin as soon as daylight came. B and D squadrons and a Maxim gun were posted on a ridge to the immediate east of the Mome stream, where a good field of fire could be commanded. C squadron and fifty N.P. with a Colt gun, occupied the eastern face of a low ridge on the west, whilst the rest of the Police, except the troop that formed an escort to the guns posted on a prominent and detached hillock (in front of the mouth of the gorge), were kept in reserve out of sight and close to where the road passes between the gun position and the said low ridge on the west. The object of the latter force was to prevent a possible breaking back of the enemy into Insuze valley. The guns, crossing at the drift, purposely made a big detour to the left, skirted the left bank of the Insuze, and came up the southern face of the hillock referred to.[234] As it was, it was feared the noise was enough to alarm the enemy.
When Fairlie arrived at his position, finding the enemy bivouacked immediately below him, he detached about twenty Nongqai and 400 of the Native levy, with two or three Europeans, to hold ground north of him, and opposite and within 100 yards of where the Dobo bush meets the Mome.
The orders were that not a shot was to be fired nor the slightest noise made until daybreak, when a round from the 15-pounders was to be taken as the signal for a general fusillade. Barker made it known that he himself was with the guns.
For about two hours everybody remained in position, perfectly still. As silent were they as their sleeping foes. The fires died out gradually, one by one. The time was one of the greatest anxiety for the commanding officer, as he did not know but that the whole of his remarkably elusive foe had slipped through the neck immediately in rear of their bivouac, which neck, owing to the nature of the country, it was impossible to completely block in rear without disclosing the presence of a hostile force. Owing to a heavy mist that arose towards dawn, making it difficult to discern objects at a distance of 200 yards, daylight was longer than usual in coming.
After watching for a long time through field-glasses, the mist cleared slightly, when Barker saw something resembling the outline of a burnt kraal where he had hoped to set eyes on the enemy himself. Suddenly remembering no burnt kraal existed on that particular spot a few days previously, he looked again, when he became convinced that what he beheld was nothing else but the enemy himself, drawn up in a circle—the inevitable circle in which orders are given as to engaging an enemy. Barker, moreover, saw enough to convince him that he had himself by then been seen.
The preconcerted signal was fired a few seconds later, not, however, by the 15-pounders, but by the Maxim under Lieut. R.G. Forbes, on the opposite or eastern side. What occurred at that point was this: D squadron under Capt. H. McKay, lay on Forbes's immediate right. Forbes's orders were not to fire without consulting McKay, and fire was on no account to be opened unless found to be absolutely imperative, viz. to prevent actual escape of the enemy up the gorge. If, however, it started in any other quarter, the Maxim was, of course, to do likewise. Just as it began to get light, the time being about 6.50 a.m., Forbes and McKay, using a good pair of field-glasses, 400 yards closer to the enemy than Barker, could see the rebels getting up and forming themselves into companies. It appeared as if they were about to move up the Mome and towards the redoubtable stronghold. McKay declined to give the order to fire until, after closer examination, he agreed that, by not opening, the first company, then obviously on the move, must be lost. "All right, have a go," he cried, whereupon the Maxim blazed forth at a range which, as it turned out, had been correctly fixed at 600 yards.
As soon as the Maxim started, practically simultaneous volleys broke from all troops east and west, including the two 15-pounders and Colt gun—the whole forming almost a semi-circle of flame in the gloomy, early dawn. The consternation among the rebels was such as, for a few moments, to paralyze action; they rushed wildly to and fro, throwing down coats, tin cans, equipment, etc. and seeking shelter in the greatest disorder, anywhere and everywhere. Large numbers dashed through the neck in the hope of escaping to their original destination, only to be met, first by well-directed fire of the men posted immediately above that part on the east, and, where these failed, by that of men (also on the east), detached from Fairlie and pushed forward still nearer the Dobo forest. Thus those fortunate in escaping the hail of bullets at the mouth had to continue to run the gauntlet for another 200 or 300 yards over rugged country. The day of reckoning had come, and come with a vengeance. Some, by sheer perseverance and good luck, succeeded in reaching the forest immediately below the waterfall, where they were, of course, safe; but, on this retreat being completely cut off by McKenzie, as will presently be seen, the fugitives found themselves forced to enter the then only available shelter, namely the Dobo forest; but to proceed thither was no better than jumping out of the frying pan into the fire. That forest was nothing less than a huge trap, capable of being completely surrounded and driven at leisure. Moreover, in attempting to gain entrance thereto, more than one sharp encounter took place with the Nongqai, levies, and supporting European troops.
At 7.5 a.m. the "cease fire" was sounded, when the troops were directed to leave the ridges and drive down the slopes, as well as over the area and along the stream in the immediate vicinity of the bivouac, also between the neck and Dobo. Much of the ground was covered with shrubs, long grass or rushes, and, here and there, the banks of the stream were hollowed out through the action of the water. In carrying out the movement, several cases occurred of individual rebels feigning death, when, on being more closely examined, they suddenly jumped up and attacked, either by seizing their assailant's rifle, or lunging at him with an up-till-then carefully concealed assegai.
Having described how Barker (who happened to be nearest the enemy) carried out the instructions he had received from McKenzie, it is necessary now to see what action was being simultaneously taken by the latter. The infantry and artillery were moved from Nomangci at 3 a.m. and the mounted troops at 3.30 a.m. to co-operate with Barker by descending both ridges overlooking Mome gorge, with the principal object of cutting the enemy off from the stronghold on fleeing from Barker below.[235] The western side was occupied by N.C. (C squad), Z.M.R. (about 100), N.D.M.R. (about 100), R.H. (about 450), D.L.I. (about 140), N.F.A. (one 15-pounder), two pompoms, a Maxim detachment, and a Native levy. The eastern side was held by the Natal Rangers (with Maxim guns), under Lieut.-Col. J. Dick.[236]
As part of McKenzie's plan was to effect the capture of Sigananda, he dismounted the Z.M.R. and marched them and the D.L.I. in single file, together with the Native levy, down to the large forest known as Mvalasango (on the west of the waterfall), in which Sigananda was said to be, with the object of driving it. The men were lining the edge of this forest, extremely dense and steep at that part, and awaiting the order to move forward into the bush, under Lieut.-Col. J.R. Royston, when the loud and simultaneous fire already referred to burst from Barker's Maxim, artillery and rifles, about 2,500 yards further down. The first thought that flashed across McKenzie's mind was that Barker had trapped the rebels at the mouth whilst they were marching to enter. If such surmise were true, it became necessary at once to prevent fugitives from retreating towards Tate gorge and Macala. With this object in view, the troops were recalled and the order given to mount, the intention being to move down into the Insuze valley by way of Gcongco ridge which, as will be remembered, had been used on the occasion of the converging movement on Cetshwayo's grave. These movements, although extremely difficult in the mist and dark, were carried out with great rapidity and dash, but resulted only in the troops being presently wheeled to a position lower down the gorge than the one just vacated. McKenzie came to the decision to right about wheel whilst on the gallop, owing to seeing that the flash from the fire of Barker's 15-pounders, 1,400 feet below, was directed up the Mome instead of westwards as at first anticipated. To return to hold ground half-way between top and bottom of the gorge and 300 yards from the edge of Dobo, was a matter of but a few moments. On this hurried rush back, a solitary armed rebel was come upon and shot whilst attempting to escape in the mist.
Alive to the importance of swift movement, McKenzie dashed down the side of the gorge at a pace that excited at once the surprise and envy of his men. These could but follow to the best of their ability. He grasped the situation in an instant—his eye for country is proverbial. He saw that the main line of retreat, the disposition of forces then being what it was, must necessarily be up the Dobo, to the top of the ridge (down whose eastern slopes that forest grew), and from thence into as precipitous though narrower a ravine on the west. Stringent orders were thereupon given for that particular topmost part to be effectively guarded by Royston's Horse, who were, moreover, ordered to connect with Barker's left. So important did McKenzie deem this, and rightly so, that a staff officer was at once sent to see that the order he had already sent by another staff officer was, as a matter of fact, being properly executed.[237] His next act, as essential as the other, was to push troops down to check the rebels already making along the river banks towards the waterfall and the large dense forests in that neighbourhood. Detachments of the Z.M.R., N.D.M.R. and R.H., having once more dismounted, accordingly ran down to the Mome and there effectually cut off such fugitives as had not already made good their escape, compelling them to find refuge, though only for a time as it happened, in the pear-shaped or Dobo bush. At the same time, the N.C. Maxim (Sergt. Ross), was smartly got down to a suitable position and greatly assisted in preventing the enemy's escape.
The Rangers had originally been directed to hold the upper eastern ridge of the Mome and get in touch with Fairlie. On leaving Nomangci camp at 3 a.m., they were obliged to traverse a large section of forest along narrow paths, where they were delayed owing to the guides for a time losing their way, so much so, that when the action started, the men had barely emerged from the forest at the left rear of the waterfall. On hearing the fire, however, they pushed forward at a brisk pace to occupy the ground assigned them.
When the action was at its height, they were required to move down and assist men of N.C., Z.M.R., R.H. and other corps in cutting off the retreat. The necessary orders, however, could not be conveyed, as there was insufficient sunshine to use the heliograph. The semaphore was tried, but also proved unsuccessful. It is, however, doubtful, if, had the men come down, they would have been in time to be of material assistance.
After running down to check escapes along the banks of the Mome, the detachments of Z.M.R., N.D.M.R., N.C. and R.H. that had assembled there, when it was evident the fugitives had been cut off, were reinforced and then directed by McKenzie to drive, under the command of Lieut.-Col. Royston, down the Mome through the scrub and bush towards the lower part of Dobo. In the course of this drive, the notorious ringleader, Mehlokazulu, one of the men who started the Zulu War, was shot. He was wearing a new pair of riding trousers, shirt, socks and overcoat, whilst a pair of new tanned boots was being carried for him by one of his servants.
About 9 a.m. Barker got into communication with McKenzie by semaphore, when he received orders to move his guns to the ridge in immediate rear of the enemy's bivouac (where the neck referred to was), and to search Dobo thoroughly with shrapnel. The forest was accordingly shelled from top to bottom. The enemy, realizing that he had been caught in a trap, could do nothing else than conceal himself as effectually as possible among the numerous boulders, crevices and other hiding-places to be found there. The troops at the bottom, including Nongqai and levies, now began to drive the bush upwards. They had not proceeded many yards before Colonel McKenzie directed them to withdraw, climb the western face of the gorge immediately north of Dobo, and, joined on top by N.D.M.R., R.H., D.L.I. and B and C companies N.R. (which battalion had been ordered to come down from the opposite side of the gorge)[238] to drive downwards towards the Mome. The reason for operating in this way was because, by advancing upwards, the troops were at a disadvantage, as the rebels, most of whom still retained possession of their assegais, would have been able to throw with effect at men climbing under the greatest difficulties up so steep an incline.
It was already 2 p.m. when the drivers, purposely as numerous as possible, were in position. N.R., R.H., and D.L.I. took the left, N.D.M.R. the centre, with Nongqai and levies on the right. The rate of progress, owing to the exceptionally steep and rugged area, and to the enemy having concealed himself in various and most ingenious ways, was very slow. Steps, too, had to be taken to see that the line advanced in as uniform a manner as possible to prevent accidents. Occasionally Nongqai or levies on the right, more used to such movements than Europeans, got ahead, when they had to be halted to allow the rest to move up. With the constant interruptions that occurred, it is surprising the drive was conducted as well as it was.
After reaching a point about three-quarters of the way down, it was seen the Nongqai had again swung round in advance and partly overlapped. If their being in advance had been dangerous when higher up, it was more so now where the bush, narrowing as it approached the Mome, was only 250 yards across instead of 1,200. All this time, independent firing had been going on in various directions and many rebels were killed. Fairlie, who led the Nongqai, fearing accidents, decided to withdraw, leaving the rest of the bush to be completed by such troops as remained. He directed the "assembly" to be sounded. The effect of this unfortunate mistake was that, not only did all the Nongqai begin to leave, but also all the European troops and Native levy (though not so fast), for, hearing the call, the majority naturally supposed it had been ordered by the general officer commanding. Had the "assembly" not been sounded, the rest of the bush—only a small portion remained—must have been as thoroughly driven as that already done, with the result that many rebels, who had continually slipped further and further to the bottom end as they heard the drivers advancing, would not have escaped as they did. For all anyone knew at the time, Bambata and other important rebels were among those who escaped. When the bugle sounded, it was already late (4.30 p.m.), though not so late as those engaged supposed, nor too late for the drive to be completed. Exactly how many rebels escaped at that particular spot it is impossible to say. A hundred would probably be beyond the mark.
After withdrawing from Mvalasango forest, in which it was supposed Sigananda was concealed, McKenzie could not, of course, take steps to drive it that day. Even supposing Sigananda was there, which, as a matter of fact, was not the case—information subsequently obtained proved he was in the small gorge immediately on the west of Mome—the futility of driving increased every moment after withdrawing to cut off the enemy. Sigananda, on hearing the fire at the mouth (supposing him to have been in the gorge), would naturally have retreated further into his stronghold, and to one or other of its innumerable recesses where, after the delay of say an hour or two, it would have been utterly impossible, even for the total forces engaged, to have found him, had they been withdrawn from all parts of the field to undertake the search.
Among the slain were Mtele[239] of Umsinga division uncle of Chief Kula, who will be dealt with at length in Chapter XV.; Nondubela (alias Mavukutu), a Chief also of Umsinga division and an associate of Mehlokazulu; Paula and Moses, the Christian teachers who had joined Bambata at Mpanza; and the rebel protagonist Bambata himself.
The death of Bambata occurred as follows: Some time after those who fled into Dobo had passed in, and shortly before the shelling thereof, a solitary unarmed man, with but a shirt on, was seen making his way up the Mome stream, walking in the water. The first to notice him was a Native loyalist, some sixty yards away on the left bank of the Mome. Behind the man in the shirt, however, on the right bank, and only ten yards off, was another loyalist. The man in the water perceived the Native sixty yards off, but not the one in rear. Seeing the more distant man rushing to attack him, he left the water, but no sooner did he mount the right bank, than the one in rear, seizing the opportunity, darted forward and planted his long-bladed assegai in the rebel's body. This happened just as that part, where Dobo abuts on the Mome, had been reached. The loyalist, a powerfully built fellow, endeavoured to withdraw the weapon, the only one he had, with the object of again stabbing his far-from-dead foe. But, having thrust too hard, the assegai had got so bent that it could not be extricated. The unfortunate victim had by this time fallen. Presently, the man who had first observed him, crossed the stream and, raising his assegai, attempted to thrust at the half-prostrate form. Quick as lightning, the latter—never uttering a sound—clutched the assegai with both hands before it had struck him, and violently struggled for its possession. It seemed he must succeed, notwithstanding two were against him. He fought with the valour of despair. By this time, however, a Nongqai, also on the left bank, had noticed what was afoot. Coming up quickly, he raised his rifle and shot the rebel through the head. And there, after further unsuccessful efforts to withdraw the assegai, the corpse was left to lie. None of those present bothered themselves with deceased's identity. As the establishment of such identity did not take place until a couple of days afterwards, and then only under special circumstances, the rest of the story must be reserved for its proper place.
MOME
Dispositions are at beginning of action; for subsequent ones, see Reference and text
REFERENCE
A = Colonel McKenzie's position during action
B = Where N.C., N.D.M.R, and R.H. prevented escape of rebels
C, D, E = Positions N.C., D.L.I., N.D.M.R. respectively, at 7.30 a.m.
F = Squadron, R.H., 8 a.m.
G = Barker's 15-pdrs., 8 a.m.
H to J = Barker's force was operating at 8 a.m. between these points
K = Bambata killed here
L to M = Line held by N.R., 8 a.m.
N = Mehlokazulu killed here
Enemy; after being repulsed at G, fled to forest near waterfall, also to Dobo (pear-shaped) forest
When the last troops (among them the D.L.I. and the Native levy) had emerged from Dobo, orders were given for the columns to march back to their respective camps. Needless to say the infantry that had taken part in the last drive, were thoroughly exhausted by the time they got back. For them, indeed, the day had been particularly long and arduous.
It is only to be expected that the enemy's losses were severe. The total, however, as has been proved by subsequent enquiry, was not so great as believed by some. The estimates were at first fixed at anything between five and six hundred. Taking into consideration the accounts given by rebels, by members of various units that took part, and others likely to know, it would appear the number was about five hundred. The losses amongst McKenzie's troops, including Barker, were small. Capt. S.C. Macfarlane (D.S.O.), T.M.R., was killed (probably by his own side, through his pushing further forward in the early dawn than directed to do). Lieut. C. Marsden, R.H., and Tpr. F.H. Glover (I.L.H.), T.M.R., were mortally wounded, and eight other Europeans wounded. Sergt. Mahashahasha, Z.N.P. (Nongqai), and members of the levies were also wounded. This great disparity in losses of the opposing forces is, of course, accounted for by the fact that the rebels were taken at a disadvantage. It is only natural that heavy losses would have resulted on well-armed troops waylaying the enemy as was done on the day in question. The rebels knew perfectly well what the result of clashing with European troops would be (this from lessons drawn especially from the Zulu War), even where the ground was not particularly favourable to either side. They had still to experience the effects where, with greatly inferior weapons, they were tactically at serious disadvantage. Such contingency they were, of course, aware might occur. No doubt, looking on their opponents as slow and ponderous, they thought it would never arise. It is, however, the unlikely that occurs in war. There is no question that the end they kept constantly in mind was in some way or another to secure tactical advantages over detached sections of European troops similar to that obtained over themselves by the latter on the 10th of June, when, it is needless to add, they would have administered punishment even more severe and relentless than was meted out to them then.
To be shot down or stabbed in battle is regarded by Natives as the natural consequence of war, and, when an advantage has been obtained, they are surprised if it be not used to the greatest effect. It is difficult to describe the contempt with which the warlike Zulu regards what we are pleased to style magnanimity—the magnanimity, for instance, of Gladstone in 1881, with certain victory in view, and the magnanimity of restoring Cetshwayo to Zululand in 1883. They reason thus: Two peoples are at war; one must defeat the other, and the best way is to do so in a thorough-going way. Nothing, they hold, is so effective and lesson-serving as wholesale slaughter. Anything else is to pander to future trouble and misery. When the blow has to be struck, let each strike and strike severely. To spare an enemy during continuance of hostilities is fatal. As well spare flames doing their best to burn down a kraal.
Curious incidents sometimes occur on the eve of momentous events, but escape narration because irrelevant to the issue. An exception must be made on the present occasion, for the story will at least surprise any Zulu that happens to hear it. "As we were marching at a walk on the night in question," says Barker, "and when about two miles to the south of Cetshwayo's grave, I and my Adjutant (Capt. W. Jardine) leading, I noticed in our path a black cat. I called Jardine's attention to it, jocularly supposing it to be a sign of luck ahead. It was moonlight, and before the mist had come on. The cat, black all over, was evidently tame. It led the way towards the Mome. I afterwards forgot and lost sight of it. On our way back after the fight, coming along last, as I wanted to see all our men out, the same cat entered my path and came along. Again I lost sight of it, but next morning found it lying on or near my pillow. After this, it remained in camp and became a regimental favourite. I subsequently took it to the Transvaal."
The chapter will conclude with a brief survey of what took place among the rebels themselves between the converging movement on Cetshwayo's grave (17th May), and their collapse at Mome.
Not satisfied that the order to rebel had emanated from Dinuzulu, as declared to be the case by Cakijana and Bambata, seeing the promised reinforcements had not arrived, Mangati resolved to visit Usutu and learn the truth from Dinuzulu himself. Bambata decided to accompany him, but Cakijana, owing to the wound he had received, could not go. The two, accompanied by two other mounted men, rode off on the 20th. Interviews took place, probably on 24th (Queen's birthday), and 25th, between them and Dinuzulu. The latter denied having started or authorized the Rebellion, emphasizing he had merely said to Bambata: "If you people want to fight, why do you not all unite and fight the whites?" He said, again, to Mangati: "If you people desire to fight, go and do so, it is not my doing. Go and join Mehlokazulu. I hear he also has joined the rebels. After joining him, go and join Sigananda, and, if necessary, go on fighting till you get to Natal.... Sigananda's messengers are here now to report that the white people have burnt my father's grave and are unearthing my father's bones. I tell you now, go and join Mehlokazulu and do what he tells you."[240] After spending two days at Usutu, where they were fed and hospitably treated by the man who, but five weeks before, had sent the loyal and reassuring statement printed on p. 214, and beginning: "I am not surprised that the Natal Government should have doubt as to my loyalty.... I can only say I am perfectly loyal and am most anxious to give proof of this...." the rebel ringleaders departed with a blessing from that 'loyal' and 'much maligned' Chief, to use their best endeavours to overthrow the white man's rule.
By the time Mangati and Bambata had got back to the area of hostilities, Leuchars had fought his action at Mpukunyoni (28th). Mehlokazulu and other leaders from the north-west moved to Nkonyeni forest, near Kombe. After the fight at Manzipambana (3rd June), the greater portion of the Nkandhla rebels collected at Macala. Bambata, leaving Macala with his tribesmen, got into touch with Mehlokazulu, and returned with him and them on the 7th to mass at Macala. Here, the combined forces were informed by Mangati that he had just returned from Dinuzulu whose wish it was that Macala—"a man with a temper"—should take supreme command, and Mganu command the regiment Mavalana. Under this arrangement, Bambata and Mangati assumed the title of 'princes.'
Finding the impi had, for the most part, gone to Macala, Sigananda sent word to Bambata to return at once, as, having started a rebellion in his (Sigananda's) ward, it was unfair to desert, leaving him to cope as best he could with the enraged Europeans. Bambata had deceived them once by declaring the white man's bullets would not 'enter,' was he going to do so again by throwing over the original plan of adopting Nkandhla as the principal rallying-ground? The reply was that the forces would return at once.
It was now resolved by the leaders to further increase their numbers if possible. A large force accordingly proceeded on the 7th to the Tugela, near Watton's store, where Mangati alone paid a visit to a son of Chief Gayede to induce him, as diplomatically as he could, to join them. The son explained his father was ill and unable to join, being a mere "dog of the Government." The primary object of the expedition was to put Gayede and another adjoining Chief, Hlangabeza, to death, whereupon their people would probably espouse the cause of the rebels. These irregular and hazardous proceedings were strongly disapproved by Macala and others. These men, therefore, refrained from accompanying the force.
After visiting Watton's store, the impi bivouacked in Zululand, close to the river. It was mid-day before they were again astir. A couple of Native police from Krantzkop were soon observed on the opposite bank. They began shouting at the rebels. Cakijana dismounted, dropped on his knee, and shot one of them dead, after which the force moved back to Macala.
There being no reason why the impi, considerably augmented by the arrival of Mehlokazulu's and other men, should not return to Nkandhla to continue tactics up till then comparatively successful, a start was made for the Mome between 6 and 7 p.m. on the 9th. The men, leaving in batches, marched in the loosest order. When close to Tate, they got reliable intelligence that Barker was still near Insuze river, although his waggons had gone off to Fort Yolland. Ndabaningi believed the news, but Mehlokazulu ridiculed it, retorting that the informants were partial to Europeans and purposely wished to mislead.
Mangati, with four companies, moved at once up the Mome gorge and bivouacked near the waterfall. Owing to sheer obstinacy on Mehlokazulu's part, the main impi camped at the mouth of the gorge instead of moving further in with Mangati. It was, moreover, owing to him that intelligence brought about 3.30 a.m., three hours before the action began, by a little boy to the effect that some waggons were approaching was ignored—these 'waggons,' as it happened, being the two 15-pounders and ammunition waggons. In reply, Mehlokazulu described the intelligence as rubbish, for he had himself seen from Macala every waggon belonging to Barker's column trek off towards Fort Yolland. Thus, this vaunted leader, chiefly on account of personal fatigue, did his side the greatest possible disservice, forfeiting his own life in addition.
After hearing the little boy's story, Ndabaningi detached himself with a section of the rebels and followed Mangati, leaving Mehlokazulu and Bambata with the bulk of the impi behind.
The aggregate force that came from Macala would have been anything between 1,200 to 1,500 strong. Of these, probably not more than 1,000 were in action, if so many.
Had the whole body entered the stronghold unperceived, the plan was to rest a day, then begin attacking the surrounding Chiefs and looting their stock. These Chiefs, although members of their tribes had become rebels, had themselves refrained from joining. It was, therefore, supposed that, on conclusion of hostilities, they would visit their displeasure on those who had rebelled. Consequently, the intention was to deal vigorously with and kill off these half-hearted men; such were the tactics of Tshaka, for, after killing the leaders, the ordinary people, it was found, flocked to the 'conqueror.' The policy, furthermore, was to lie in wait for small parties of the Government forces near, but especially in, the forests, and massacre them before reinforcements could arrive, as, indeed, had almost happened at Manzipambana.
The reader will naturally wonder what became of the newly-appointed commanders, Macala and Mganu. Macala thought it wiser to push into the gorge. He joined Mangati and Ndabaningi, leaving the headstrong Mehlokazulu and Bambata to look after themselves. Mganu, however, remained.
On Bambata and Mehlokazulu's suspicions being aroused, scouts were sent out to examine the ridge on the west, occupied by part of Barker's force. These returned a few minutes before the Maxim opened to report troops were really there. The impi was speedily roused and formed into an umkumbi, that is, the 'circle' Barker had seen. Bambata then completely lost his head, so much so that Mganu, in the absence of Macala, was called on to take general command. He immediately gave such orders as appeared necessary to meet the situation. His own regiment, Mavalana, was told to charge at Barker in one direction, and the others to do likewise in another. But before the men (already arranged in companies) could move forward (not backward as McKay and Forbes had believed), the Maxim began—not from the ridge suspected by the rebels, but from a different one. What followed at this stage has already been related. It remains to add that, when it became a case of sauve qui peut, the majority turned and made over the neck in rear as hard as they could. It flashed across the minds of those familiar with that part of the country that Dobo was a snare; that being the case, there was nothing for it but to run the gauntlet towards the waterfall. This, as has been seen, many accordingly did.
And so, as far as the ordinary rebel could see, the great storm that was to come turned out to be nothing more than a thunder of artillery and hail of bullets, brought on by that very race against whom the mysterious command had been specially directed. Truly, the manner in which Dinuzulu had directed the elements left much to be desired.