D.—The Declaration of War and the first Hostilities.
The three Successive Proposals of Wilhelm II to Belgium.
Under its dry, cold, diplomatic phrasing the reply to the ultimatum (1st Grey Book, No. 22) scarcely conceals the indignation which thrilled the heart of Belgium when Wilhelm II offered her the chance of associating herself with his crime against loyalty. But the German Government did not understand this indignation, neither was it conscious of its own infamy. Otherwise how could it have repeated the same offer a few days later—an offer at once contemptible and full of contempt, as was so well said by M. Jules Destrée before the meeting of the Federation of Advocates, on the 3rd August, 1914. Two remarks on the subject of this fresh proposal (1st Grey Book, No. 60). In the first place the United States Minister in Belgium, who was entrusted with the German interests, refused to transmit it; as for the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, he accepted the mission "without enthusiasm." In the second place, when the Emperor affirmed, on the 9th August, that the fortress of Liége had been taken by assault, he must have known that the fortress was still resisting; for although the city of Liége was occupied by the Germans from the 7th, the forts were intact. Let us remember that the first fort which fell was that of Barchon, on the 8th August, 1914; that of Évegnée fell on the 11th, that of Fléron on the 14th, that of Loncin, commanded by General Leman, fell only at 5 p.m. on the 15th: and several forts were at that time still holding out.
German diplomacy naturally received a fresh indignant refusal (1st Grey Book, No. 23).
Even then official Germany, dazzled by the brilliance of its Kultur, had not yet grasped the full baseness of its crime, since on the 10th September it posted up in Brussels its new proposal and Belgium's reply.
Could candour in perfidy go any farther? Yes! for the German Government, during the siege of Antwerp, made proposals of peace for the third time. This offer was secret. The terms have not been published; even the Germanic Press sought to deny that it had been made; but the avowal appeared in a Viennese newspaper, the Neue Freie Presse, and was reproduced by order of the German authorities in La Belgique (Brussels, 13th January, 1915).
Hostilities preceding the Declaration of War.
So the Emperor Wilhelm II did not succeed in making us his accomplices. Needless to say, we did not tremble before the two bogies which are given so large a place in his harangues: his store of dry powder and his newly-whetted sabre.
And so the sovereign of the formidable German Empire declared war upon tiny Belgium. "He would find himself, to his keenest regret, obliged to execute, if need be by force of arms, the measures of security set forth as indispensable," as the declaration of war expressed it (1st Grey Book, No. 27). This declaration reached Brussels at 7 a.m. on the 4th of August. But, apparently unknown to the Emperor, the German troops, before the telegram had reached Belgium, had crossed the frontier during the night of the 3rd.
We have just seen that the declaration of war reached Brussels on the 4th August, at seven o'clock in the morning. This, at least, is what we learn from the official documents published by Belgium. What does official Germany say upon this point? Nothing. Nowhere is any mention made of the declaration of war, and it is this intentional vagueness which allows the Germans to declare, without blushing, that the German troops entered Belgium on the night of the 3rd August. They let it be supposed that the state of war existed from the moment when Belgium, on the 3rd, refused the German ultimatum. Thus the Chronik des Deutschen Krieges (p. 33) gives the text of the ultimatum; then, in two lines, a summary of the reply. The first document which follows relating to Belgium is the proclamation of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army of the Meuse (6th Report, I).
This is very vague as to the political relations between the two countries: are they at war, or are they not? No one could say. Of the declaration of war, which should have found a place here, not a word; there is no further question of Belgium before the telegrams of the 7th August (p. [84]).
When we say that the declaration of war is not mentioned in any German publication, we are going too far. Die Wahrheit über den Krieg ("die Wahrheit!") speaks of the declaration of war; but only to say that Belgium declared war (p. 40): Belgiën antwortete darauf mit der Kriegserklärung.[10]
The same publication appends some documents; No. 41 (p. 160) is a reproduction of the ultimatum. One would naturally expect that No. 42 would be either Belgium's reply or the declaration of war. By no means; these two documents are not given. Any one who reads the text and hopes thereby to learn "die Wahrheit" concerning the war will be no better informed by the documents. Let us in passing remark that the German Government, in the White Book published for the session of the Reichstag of the 4th August, had also, by its own admission, made a selection among the documents which it submitted to the members of Parliament. This procedure is no doubt a logical consequence of Kultur.
The Pacific Character of Belgium.
Nearly all the nations of Europe cherish national animosities, racial hatreds handed down from century to century, the heritage of conflicts never pacified, which a mere nothing suffices to renew; or the survival of oppressions and spoliations suffered of old by men's forbears, whose abhorred memory is transmitted like a sacred trust from generation to generation. And in all these countries, moreover, there is a chauvinist, a jingo party, which urges a "war of revenge against the hereditary enemy." In Belgium, as Mr. Asquith stated in his speech in Dublin, there was nothing of the kind. We had no spite against any one, and our people, laborious and peaceful, only asked to be allowed to live in friendship with its neighbours. Never had there been in Belgium any manifestation against a foreign country; never had a political party inscribed in its programme any sort of hostility towards another people. Who, then, will be persuaded that "the Belgian Government had for a long time been carefully preparing for this war,"[11] as the Emperor Wilhelm II asserted in his telegram to the President of the United States (in which he also stated that his heart was bleeding!)? No, there is no possible doubt on this point: Belgium brought into the conflict no racial enmity,[12] and if she has found herself thrown into the furnace, despite her constant love of peace, it is solely because her haughty neighbour confronted her with this dilemma: either peace with dishonour, or honour with war. The choice was not in doubt.
German Espionage in Belgium.
It is idle to insist on the accusation of premeditation, for it is unhappily too certain that Belgium was is no way ready for war. But it is also incontestable that Germany had "for a long time carefully prepared for" the invasion of Belgium. We cannot as yet reveal in detail the facts as to German espionage, with its often odious methods, for in most cases these revelations would expose those who have informed us to reprisals. We must for the present be intentionally vague, reserving preciser details for a later date.
When the occupation comes to an end we shall report in detail the case of a German engineer, who, in returning to us with the rank of officer, presided over the systematic destruction by fire of the workshop which he had managed; and the case of another engineer, who commanded the gang ordered to set fire to the quarter adjoining the factory in which he had been employed. Thanks to his knowledge of the locality, he was able in a few seconds to set fire to the richest streets of the neighbourhood. We shall be able to mark on a map the foundations of reinforced concrete for the great German guns, constructed long in advance, in the localities most favourable to bombardment; we shall also point to the store of timber intended to serve for the construction of a bridge over the Scheldt, which was found in a factory established by Germans on the banks of the river. As for the store of Mauser rifles discovered at Liége, our newspapers spoke of that at the time.
Here is a fact which can be related without danger. A German officer dropped from his pocket—we shall state later on in what locality—a detailed plan of the town of Soignies, in which his troops had lodged a few days earlier. This plan gives, besides the details of streets, and even houses, information concerning the occupants of certain buildings: pharmacies, breweries, tanneries, the Communal treasury, the bank, and other establishments where the army might need to make requisitions. The large buildings are coloured blue. It was there that the troops were lodged. This plan, drawn in Chinese ink and coloured, dates from fifteen years back according to the indications which it contains. But it has quite recently been revised and completed, for the latest alterations in the town have been added in pencil; improvement of the Senne, creation of a public square, etc.
The case related by the N.R.C. of 19th August (evening) is particularly instructive. When the Germans occupied Liége and Seraing the Cockerill workshops naturally refused to work for them, since the Germans wished them to make munitions for them. The German Colonel Keppel then assumed the direction of the works, promising the workers an increased salary of 50 per cent. And this officer did not blush to sign his proclamation: "Attaché of the German Government at the Liége Exposition." He had consequently profited by his privileged situation in Belgium in order to make himself familiar with the organization of the Cockerill works. But it must be supposed that matters were too difficult for him, for Herren Koester and Noske (Kriegsfahrten, p. 21) assert that he had to abandon the position.
The Mentality of the German Soldiers at the beginning of the Campaign.
Until the very last moment our enemies deluded themselves as to the loyalty of the Belgians: they still hoped that the latter would only resist as a matter of form. This idea is openly expressed in the Chancellor's speech of the 2nd December; it is also implicitly contained in the proclamation of General von Emmich (see 6th Report, I). The officers and soldiers who crossed the frontier at the beginning of the war were quite bewildered by the unforeseen resistance of the Belgian Army; this is what the German prisoners interned at Bruges tell their relatives; they even go so far as to deplore having to fight a neutral country.
Letters from German Prisoners of War.
We hear from Belgium:—
The correspondence of the German prisoners of war (to the number of about two thousand) who, at the beginning of the war, were interned in the barracks of the Bruges Lancers, has passed almost entirely through our hands.
All say they are well treated. Some even hope that the Belgian prisoners in Germany will be as well treated as they. One wounded soldier in a Bruges hospital relates that the Belgians treat the German wounded like brothers; another speaks only of his "Belgian comrades"! The good food served to them seems to make a great impression. Most of them say, "We have enough to eat"; or even, "We have food in abundance." Only one complains of "beer without flavour and bad wine"; but another says with much simplicity: "The people here are very kind to us, for we have enough to eat and drink." The word for is amusing....
The letters of the officers are quite different. No more joy because their lives are safe. The war absorbs them entirely. They are warriors at heart and the struggle interests them passionately. They know nothing of what is happening, or rather they are not told what is happening, and they want to know ... to know, and it is painful to hear in each letter the same question: what news? The forced inactivity becomes a torture. Boredom presses on them: they are discouraged and greatly disillusioned; they had hoped to pass very rapidly across Belgium (it must be remembered that at this time the war was only beginning, that Brussels was not yet occupied, and that the letters date from this period).
The attack upon Belgium does not seem to please a great many of them. "We have attacked a neutral country," says a medical officer, "and we shall now have to suffer the eventual consequences."
"When we got out of the train," says another, "we received the order to fight against Belgium, a thing which is to me and to all highly antipathetic. But what is commanded has to be executed."
"The attack on Belgium was from the first a shameful thing."
"We violated Belgium before any declaration of war had been made"!
All the letters show how little the resistance of Liége was expected. Many say: "Of all our company, of our battalion, of our regiment, there are left only so many or so many men." One relates how in a few minutes his colonel, his major, the captains, and nearly all the lieutenants were mown down by the balls. "We are all mightily deluded," admits another; "we were too confident; we thought the Belgians were disheartened"! "The Belgians fight like lions," says another.
German Lies respecting the Occupation of Liége.
It is the truth, although the news is partly from a German source, that the Germans entered Belgium on the night of the 3rd of August; they crossed the frontier near Gemmenich at two o'clock in the morning, and the following night (of the 4th of August) they were already attempting an attack upon Liége. But the official telegrams from Berlin have never mentioned this date. To make it believed that the capture of Liége was extremely rapid and that the German army had met with no serious resistance, the staff pruned the siege of Liége at both ends; it made the operation commence on the 5th August instead of the 4th, and declared that it was already completed by the 7th August.
We could not give a more precise idea of the manner in which the Government and its "reptile Press" deceives public opinion than by reproducing two telegrams relating to the fall of Liége. On the 7th of August, having reported the entrance of the troops into Belgium on the previous day, the telegrams announced the capture of the fortress of Liége.[13] Note this: the capture of the fortress (Festung). Now the Germans had merely occupied the town of Liége, a town absolutely open, without ramparts or defences of any kind. They themselves were forced to own, on the 10th, that the forts had not been captured; but they added that the guns were no longer firing, which was false (p. [50]).
Berlin, 7th August.—Our advance guard entered Belgium the day before yesterday, along the whole frontier. A small division attempted, with great valour, a surprise attack upon Liége. A few cavalrymen pushed on into the city, and attempted to seize the commandant, who was only able to escape by flight. The surprise attack against the fortress, constructed according to modern principles, did not succeed. Our troops are before the fortress, in contact with the enemy. Naturally the whole enemy Press will describe this enterprise as a defeat; but it has no influence on the great operations; for us it is only an isolated fact in the history of the war, and a proof of the aggressive courage of our troops.
(Kr. D. des K. Z., p. 9.)
Berlin, 7th August. Official. (Wolff Agency.)—The fortress of Liége is taken. After the divisions, which had attempted a surprise attack upon Liége, had been reinforced, the attack was pushed to a successful termination. This morning at 8 o'clock the fortress was in the power of Germany.
(Kr. D. des K. Z., p. 11.)
However, it was necessary to prevent the bad effect which would be produced on the population by foreign communiqués announcing that the German army was continuing to besiege Liége after taking it. After the complete success announced on the 7th the task was, in fact, rather difficult. How was it to be effected?
(a) Discredit might be thrown on news coming from abroad, for example, by "demonstrating" its untruthfulness. Der Lügenfeldzug gives on p. 19 the announcement of the taking of Liége, and on the following page the Havas telegram stating that Liége is not taken. What will the superficial reader conclude if he does not take the trouble to dissect the telegrams? That the Allies are shameless liars, going to the length of denying the obvious. But examine the dates: Liége was taken, according to the Germans, on the 7th August, at 8 a.m., while the Allies declare that Liége is not taken—on the 6th! And to think that the book which perpetrates this trickery is entitled Der Lügenfeldzug unserer Feinde ("Our Enemies' Campaign of Lies")! and that it undertakes the mission of calling attention to the lies and calumnies of the enemy in order to correct them!
(b) To establish confusion between the city and the fortress. As early as the 7th August the false newsmongers were rejoicing over the taking of the fortress, intentionally confusing the city and the fortified place, so that the reader of these communiqués no longer knows what to think, and naturally accepts the official news of his own country.
The sudden Attack upon France is checked.
To understand how completely it was in Germany's interest to create the belief that Liége was taken in two days by a small body of troops, we must remember that the object of the Germans was to traverse Belgium as rapidly as possible, in order to crush the French and capture Paris. The author of J'accuse reports the remark of old Marshal von Haeseler, who proposed to celebrate in Paris the anniversary of Sedan—on the 2nd September, 1914. We ourselves copied a charcoal inscription written on the front of a house burned down at Battice, making an appointment in Paris for the 2nd September with a certain regiment of artillery.
Now this sudden march was completely spoiled and the German plan of campaign undone by the unexpected resistance of the Belgians, first at Liége, then at Hesbays. This loss of a few days was fatal to Germany, and Germany bears us malice on that account.
The Disinterested Behaviour of Belgium.
One last point as to the violation of our neutrality.
The Germans now pretend to pity the poor Belgians, who allowed themselves to be fooled by England as much as by their King and Government, and who, by their credulity, brought the war upon themselves. But what am I saying?—the German Government assures the world that we ourselves desired the war. Official Germany has become incapable of conceiving that a people should remain faithful to its international obligations, and if need be sacrifice itself for them.
"Why," our adversaries ask us, "did you not accept the proposals of Germany? You would have profited by them." And indeed our eastern neighbours offered us £200,000 as the price of our complicity (F. Bettix, Der Krieg).
It would be very interesting to know on what data Germany calculates the value of a nation's honour; in any case, we may assure her that no one in the world would be so simple as to offer so great a sum for hers.
For the rest, as far as we Belgians are concerned our interest has never entered into our calculations. It was not in order to profit by it that we resisted Germany; it was because we judged that such was our obligation as an honest nation. And yet, as the Minister, M. Carton de Wiart, remarked, at the Hotel de Ville in Paris, on the 20th December, 1914, we had, even then, the vision of our country ravaged by the Prussian hordes; but even to-day, after suffering such terrible atrocities, there is not a Belgian "who would change his poverty for the profits of a bandit."