3 RESULTS
In order to ascertain the practical effects that could be expected from steps taken by the Churches, the political and geographical position of the countries concerned, as well as the time factor, must be born in mind. Where there was a national Government, as was the case in Slovakia, Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria, protests had a better chance of some success than in countries under direct Nazi control. Yet even then what Jeno Levai stated about Hungary was sometimes true:
"The Church was not in a position to promise or to threaten. Thus, in spite of their very best intentions, they could obtain only very little. Naturally this little meant life to the persons concerned." [77]
Typical were the differences between the Scandinavian countries: Sweden was neutral; Finland was an ally of the Germans; Denmark was occupied but it had its own King and was officially not even in a state of war with Germany; Norway's King had fled and the infamous Quisling had become Prime Minister. <19>
Geography also played an important role. The Jews in the Netherlands were in a deadly trap; Hungary was, at least for some time, a place of refuge for Jews in the neighbouring countries; Jews in Denmark and Norway had a chance to flee to Sweden and the Jews in France and Italy to Switzerland, in so far as that country was willing to admit them. The time persecution began was a vital factor. The earlier it started, the smaller the chance of saving at least some lives. It should be noted that these three factors were utterly unfavourable in Germany. It is difficult to assess the range of influence of any Church. Figures have been given about membership in Appendix II, but one must remember that many Churches have a high percentage of nominal members who, perhaps since their baptism, never attended a church service. Therefore it can be misleading to read that there were forty-five million Protestants in Germany, or, that 96,2 per cent of the population of Norway are members of the State Church. Only 5 per cent of the members of the Norwegian Church regularly attend Sunday services. In many other countries the situation is similar.
Many people who were not church goers may never even have known about the protests of the Church, and this is especially true of occupied Europe in those days, for there the Church could only speak from the pulpits, not through press and radio. Moreover, many nominal Christians are influenced by other outlooks on life, rather than by the Christian faith. However, when press and radio were silenced and the Church alone could voice an open and public protest, it met with the response of many people who were outside the fold. Church services were better attended than in times of peace. The former editor-in-chief of the Dutch communist daily De Waarheid relates that he went to a church service in those days:
That church meant something to us in those black days, were it only to listen to the prayer of a man, who dared make a public address on behalf of the people tortured in the concentration camps. [78] <20> I myself belong to the persons who, in those days, found their way back to the fold, attracted as we were by the Church's spiritual resistance to the Nazis.
When attempting to assess the practical results of steps taken by Churches or Church leaders on behalf of the Jews, we distinguish between countries under German occupation, countries under a satellite government, neutral countries, and countries that were at war with Germany. In countries under German occupation, efforts made by the Churches had hardly any direct practical result for the Jews in general. Personal intervention did not help or, at best, could only cause some delay in the deportations. The only step that had some effect on the Germans (as we now know!) was the issuing of a public protest.
Again it was evident, that the German authorities did not fear or have any step taken by the Churches as much as their protests which were read from the pulpits. Letters of protest they could throw in the dustbin or file away. They could listen to oral protests without taking them to heart. But they tried in every way to prevent public protests (in those days the only form of public protest), fearing their effect upon the people."[79]
The most effective protests were those, which clearly encouraged the faithful to help the Jews. Others called for non-cooperation with the Germans, and this had at least some result.
Six Roman Catholic police-agents at Utrecht informed their chief on February 24, 1943, that on the grounds of a pastoral letter read in their church on February 21, they would have to refuse if ordered to arrest Jews. Their chief threatened to dismiss them without pension and said that "those who do not announce their intended refusal and yet have the impudence to carry it out will be considered saboteurs, with all the serious consequences. The Germans immediately tried to arrest these agents but they had gone into hiding. The Germans then arrested their wives and children." [80] <21> Generally speaking, the positive indirect effect of public protests was, that it counteracted the attempts of the Germans to separate and isolate the Jews from the non-Jewish population, in order to break their will to resist deportation and annihilation. [81] It is impossible to count the lives saved through the activities of the Churches in the occupied territories. I agree with the opinion of Dr. Visser 't Hooft:
"So far we have only spoken of public protests. But were these protests implemented by deeds? The answer is that they were, though by no means as generally as ought to have been the case. The full story of Christian assistance to the Jews in their hour of great need will never be fully told, for in many cases individuals acted quietly and behind the scenes." [82]
In the countries under a satellite government, actions undertaken by the Churches were of some and sometimes even of much avail. [83] Concerning the neutral countries, the steps and protests of the Churches in Switzerland contributed to the relaxation of measures against the refugees [84], and in Sweden the Lutheran Archbishop encouraged his government to broadcast its willingness to take in the Jews of Denmark. [85] It is difficult to assess how far the protests of the Churches in countries that were at war with Germany had a practical effect. [86] They apparently helped to combat anti-Semitic influences in these countries (the same applies to protests issued in the countries mentioned above) and they contributed towards "breaking the wall of silence." <22> "The world wide public, overburdened with the issues and the incidents of a world conflict fraught with the gravest consequences, was not receptive to reports which it was ready to dismiss as propaganda tales; besides, the facts were hidden from it, not withstanding persistent endeavours by the (World Jewish) Congress to keep it informed. A wall of secrecy concealed the terrible tragedy… The main difficulty was how to convince public opinion and induce the Allied Governments to act. The battles of World War II raged fiercely on three continents, the onslaught of barbarity was nowhere decisively checked, the democratic nations feverishly tried to overcome their unprepared ness for a conflict of such dimensions. The Governments in Exile were chiefly concerned with the sufferings of their nations as a whole." [87]
The pressure exerted by Jewish and Christian leaders on their Governments did not, however, result in effective rescue activities being undertaken by these Governments.
It has been suggested that the protests from the Churches mostly came too late, and thus fell flat. This is partly true. The Protestant leaders in Hungary did speak out very late, and Bishop Wurm of Wurttemberg sent his letters when there only remained a chance of doing something for the "privileged" Jews.
On the other hand, Churches or Church leaders in Belgium, France, Switzerland, Sweden, Great Britain and the United States began to protest in 1933. The Churches in the Netherlands protested at the very beginning of the German attacks on the Dutch Jews, in 1940. The Church of Denmark had prepared a public protest before the deportations started.
It is, however, necessary to keep the dates of protests in mind, in order to arrive at a fair evaluation of the moral courage which such protests required. After Hitler's defeat at Stalingrad, at the end of 1942, and the defeat of Rommel at El-Alamein, it became more and more clear that Germany would lose the war. The measure of success is in itself no yardstick for the moral value of a deed. One can hardly say that Church leaders in Rumania behaved better than Church leaders in, for instance, the Netherlands, because the former, contrary to the latter, actually succeeded in saving many lives. <23>
To this it must be added, however, that the seeming absence of any chance of success could not be an excuse for maintaining silence or for doing nothing against the terror of the Nazis. Prince William the Silent is said to have stated that it is not necessary to hope in order to try, nor to succeed in order to persevere.