Fifty-Second Letter.
Rome, June 3, 1870.—Valerga attacked the “Gallicans,” drawing a parallel between the Pope and Christ, and between the Fallibilists and Monothelites. As in Christ the human will co-existed with the divine, so in the Pope may personal infallibility co-exist with moral sinfulness, and to conclude from the former against the latter—to draw an argument from scandals in papal history against the privilegium inerrantiæ—is analogous to the error of the Monothelites, who denied the possibility of a human will subject to sin co-existing with the divine will in the same person. Never has the well-known spirit of the Roman Curia shown itself so openly and with such technical adroitness as in this carefully elaborated and minute accusation against the Opposition. As Archbishop Purcell of Cincinnati expressed it, it was “exemplum sophismatum artis ad instar congestorum,” and great expectations might be [pg 594] formed of its salutary effect on the French. Purcell answered shortly and pointedly that the charge applied equally to the Council of Trent and the sixth, seventh, and eighth Œcumenical Councils, and that he and his colleagues were content to endure the patriarch's anathema in such good company. Even Bellarmine quotes a whole cloud of witnesses against infallibilism, and neither he nor later writers had refuted them. It is a matter of thankfulness to God that he has never suffered this opinion to gain dogmatic authority. Purcell then cited clenching proofs of the public erroneous teaching of Popes, and among them the history of the ordinations and reordinations of Formosus and Sergius. The standpoint which he took as a republican was interesting. He said that the Church was the freest society in the world, and was loved as such by its American sons, for the Americans abhorred every doctrine opposed to civil and spiritual freedom. As kings existed for the good of the peoples, so Popes for the good of the Church, and not vice versâ. Perhaps he was thinking of the words of the absolutist Louis xiv., “La nation ne fait pas corps en France, elle réside tout entière dans la personne du roi.” For “nation” put “Église,” and the words describe precisely the papal system, as it is now [pg 595] intended to be made exclusively dominant by means of the Council.
The most important speech in this sitting, and one of the most remarkable theologically since the opening of the Council, was that of Conolly, Archbishop of Halifax. Formerly an unhesitating adherent of personal infallibility he had come here without having specially studied the question, and under the full belief that the Allgemeine Zeitung had calumniated the Roman See in representing this dogma as the real object of the Council. But when he found what was expected of him here, he instituted a searching examination, and thoroughly sifted, as he said, what the classical Roman theologians cite for their favourite doctrine. He now frankly submitted to the Council the result of his studies,—that the whole of Christian antiquity explains the stock passages of Scripture alleged for papal infallibility in a different sense from the Schema, and bears witness against the theory that the Pope alone, without the Bishops or even in opposition to them (etiam omnibus invitis et contradicentibus), is infallible. But what our Lord has not spoken, even though it was certain metaphysically or physically, can never become the basis of an article of faith, for faith [pg 596] comes by hearing, and hearing is not by science, but by the words of Christ. It is the speciality of Catholicism not to interpret passages of Scripture singly and by mere critical exegesis, but in the light of tradition and in harmony with the Fathers. To found a dogma on the rejection of the traditional interpretation would be pure Protestantism. It is not therefore the words of Scripture simply but the true sense, as revealed by God and attested by the perpetual and unanimous consent of the Fathers, which all are pledged by oath to follow, that must be called the real revelation of God. To cite modern theologians, as Bellarmine does, is nothing to the purpose. I will have nothing, he said, but the indubitable word of God made into a dogma. The opinions of 10,000 theologians do not suffice me. And no theologian should be quoted who lived after the Isidorian forgeries. But no single passage of Fathers or Councils can be quoted from that earlier time of genuine tradition, which affirms the Pope's dogmatic independence of the rest of the Episcopate. If there be any such, let it be shown; but there is none, and innumerable and conclusive testimonies can be cited on the other side. Even at the Apostolic Council at Jerusalem St. James proved the teaching of Peter by the Prophets, and [pg 597] appealed to it because it agreed with theirs and not on account of his authority. Conolly was ready for his part to believe that no Pope could wilfully and knowingly become heretical,—i.e., persistently hold out against all the rest of the Church; but that did not prove papal infallibility, and to define it would be to bring the Vatican Council into contradiction with the three Councils which condemned Honorius, to narrow the gates of heaven, repel the East, and proclaim not peace but war. To those who said, “Pereant populi sed promulgetur dogma,” Conolly replied that the loss of one soul was serious enough to outweigh all the advantages looked for from the new dogma. He declared, against Manning, that no one was justified in calling an opinion “proximate heresy” which the Church had not condemned as such; for it was a duty to follow and not to anticipate her sentence. A Pope had said that no one should censure a doctrine before the Holy See had spoken, and the Penitentiary had declared in 1831 that the Gallican Articles were not under any censure. He had worked thirty-three years among Protestants, and could testify that what Manning affirmed was the reverse of the truth.
Conolly is a man who is on the whole in tolerable [pg 598] harmony with Roman views, but who is therefore all the more resolved to vote against infallibility. While he forbids the Gallican doctrine being taught in his diocese, he protests here against the Roman. There is evidently a process going on in his mind, which in so cultivated a theologian can have but one result. He ended by declaring that he would accept the definition if the Council proclaimed it, for he was convinced that God was among them. But that merely meant that he was convinced the dogma would never be proclaimed. On the strength of that conviction he was almost the first speaker who briefly but decisively maintained the doctrine to be untenable.
Yesterday, Thursday, Vancsa, Bishop of Fogarasch, of the Greek Rite, quoted the testimonies of Greek Fathers against infallibility, and his speech was thought a remarkable one. Dreux-Brézé of Moulins followed him, and again had the misfortune immediately to precede Strossmayer. He contended that, as the Pope is supreme teacher, and the French call him “Souverain Pontife,” and he is the highest judge, he must be infallible. As Vicar of Christ, he is also king, for Christ said to Pilate, “Thou rightly callest me king,” and the royal title was affixed to the cross. But if Christ was [pg 599] infallible as king, so is the Pope. He supported all this by texts of Scripture, and spoke against the Fathers who accused the Pope of despotism or maintained that the new dogma would be the formal introduction of the grossest despotism. Without the Pope, who is “Episcopus universalis,” and can seldom exercise his office on account of the number of the faithful and of his labours, the Bishops have no jurisdiction, and cannot even absolve without powers derived from him. “Let us therefore go on,” he concluded, “to unity and agreement, and give Cæsar what belongs to Cæsar, and the Pope what belongs to the Pope.”
Strossmayer followed him, and declared that papal infallibility was against the constitution of the Church, the rights of the Bishops and Councils, and the immutable rule of faith. He explained the constitution of the Church according to the holy Fathers and especially St. Cyprian (De Unitate Ecclesiæ), who did not hold their jurisdiction to be limited to their dioceses, since by virtue of their character they often had to exercise authority in the concerns of the universal Church, and were obliged to do so, as, e.g., in Councils. This sharing of authority and rights between the Pope and the Episcopate was evident from the controversy between Pope [pg 600] Stephen and Cyprian in the third century about the rebaptism of heretics, in which the latter did not the least admit any personal and absolute infallibility bestowed on the Pope by our Lord. And St. Augustine defended him on the ground that the question had not yet been decided by a General Council, which shows that the sole authority in matters of faith and morals was in his opinion a General Council, united with its head.
Strossmayer took this opportunity of vindicating the French Church admirably from the calumnies and attacks of the Patriarch of Jerusalem. He complained indignantly of a Church which had come forth pure and victorious from the bitterest persecution, and which boasted such great martyrs and confessors, being slandered by the comparison of so-called Gallicanism to Monothelitism, and of those great men being libelled who during life had rendered such conspicuous services to the Church of God, as well as their successors who had made wonderful and exceptional sacrifices for the Church and the Holy See. Strossmayer blamed the Patriarch's vague and general statements about the constitution of the Church, and advised him to bring arguments from positive tradition, which were alone of [pg 601] any decisive force. He proceeded to insist on the power and necessity of General Councils, especially in our days, and he proved the necessity of their being frequently held from the conduct of the Apostles, from the holy Fathers, and from the Councils of Constance and Trent. But if once the personal infallibility of the Pope were defined, Councils would become superfluous and useless, and the Bishops would be robbed of their authority as witnesses and judges of faith. In the one way the greatest injury would be done to the prosperity of the Church, and in the other the rights of Bishops would be reduced to a mere assent, so that they would hardly any longer be consultors and theologians; but this would be clearly against the unchangeable constitution of the Church and the usage of Councils, as for instance that of Chalcedon, where the Bishops most unmistakeably exercised the office of judges as regarded the Letter of Pope Leo. The Bishops could make no such concession without betraying their authority, and casting a slur on their predecessors at the Council of Trent, who are well known to have so emphatically vindicated their freedom and rights, when the two words “proponentibus Legatis” were inserted by the Legates against their will. And [pg 602] the speaker praised the wisdom of the Council of Trent in resolving to abstain from deciding any questions which might give occasion for discord or for prejudicing the rights and freedom of the Bishops.
In the last part of his speech Strossmayer discussed the Catholic rule of faith, which had been completely changed and violated by the comments of the members of the Deputation of Faith on the Schema. The principle of at least moral unanimity was, he said, a sacred one, corresponding to precedent and pleasing to the faithful. There were whole volumes of the holy Fathers extant on this principle, as of Irenæus, Tertullian, Augustine and Vincent of Lerins, who in common with all others maintained that there are three essential conditions for proving a divine tradition and propounding an article of faith, antiquity, universality and agreement. They all thought the tradition of the Roman Church a principal river, whereby the whole earth was watered, but they regarded the traditions of the other Churches also as tributaries by which the river must be constantly fed, or it would in course of time be dried up. They all ascribed the first authority to the witness of St. Peter's successor, but that authority was only manifested clearly to the Catholic world after being reinforced by [pg 603] the consent of all the other Churches. This divine rule would be completely overset by the personal infallibility of the Pope, to the great injury of faith. If it is said that the definition is earnestly desired by many, it must be replied that it is also desired by the worst enemies of the Church, who openly say in writing and by word of mouth that it is the best means for destroying the infallibility of the Church. That fact alone would explain the alarm and anxiety of so many of the most learned Fathers of the Council. Strossmayer dwelt in conclusion on the danger that would result from the definition for the Southern Sclaves and Catholic Croats, who lived side by side with eight million persons out of the unity of the Church. Not only would the return of these separated brethren be barred, but it might be feared that the Catholic Croats would be driven out of the Church. He therefore always hoped, and entreated the holy Father, that he would emulate the example of the humility of St. Peter in his martyrdom, and of Christ who was exalted by his Father because He had humbled Himself to the death of the Cross, and magnanimously have the subject withdrawn.
The speech was listened to with great attention, and became the topic of conversation in all circles at Rome, [pg 604] and even Bishops of the other party paid a high tribute to it. As yet 24 Bishops have spoken against the dogma and 35 for it,—most of the latter having no real dioceses.
Two interesting episodes have intervened. Last week the police refused the Prince Bishop of Breslau his visa for Naples, because he could show no permission from the Presidents of the Council to go there. This implied that the Fathers are civil as well as spiritual subjects of the Pope. The Bishop, who was wearied out with the objectless proceedings in the Council Hall, sent to Fessler, the Secretary of the Council, for the requisite permission; Fessler replied that he could not give it, and referred him to the President de Angelis, who tried to represent the whole affair as a mistake. It had not been so ill meant, and at most only the departure of the Orientals was intended to be prevented, he said, and he authorized Fessler to instruct the police to give the permission. But that was the most complete indorsing of what they had done, and proved that the Pope meant to use his temporal power for managing the Council and controlling the actions of the Fathers. On that account the departure of the Prince Bishop had been hindered, and the whole affair involves the [pg 605] question of ecclesiastical freedom and international right. Does a member of the Council thereby lose or prejudice his rights as the subject of a foreign state, or is the freedom of individual Bishops suspended while taking part in it? So anxious is the Pope to give up nothing which may serve for dominating the Council, that he restricts the Bishops in the most harmless exercise of personal freedom, which at other times he would never have thought of. I will not dwell on the insult in this procedure to the King of Prussia, whose safe-conduct was no more respected than the Emperor Sigismund's at Constance, for a graver question is at stake,—that of international right and freedom of the Council. Meanwhile they reckon on Prussia taking no further notice of the affair, and the Prince Bishop has given up his journey after these difficulties. France, too, has quietly endured a series of insults, and so they hope not to have to abolish the regulation or disavow the police.
Rome cannot admit the principle of international right in this case, without giving up one of her own principles, the Inquisition, according to whose laws foreigners can be arrested, imprisoned, and put to the question. No secular tribunal limits its power, and [pg 606] every Bishop therefore could in theory be brought before it. By papal law the Pope might at any moment have Cardinal Schwarzenberg arrested, and if the right has become inapplicable, that is due to the influence of foreign states and the modern spirit, whose restraints on the full exercise of Church authority it is the office of the Council to remove, as the Syllabus, Bull of Censures, Schema de Ecclesiâ, etc., prove. According to Roman canon law, freedom at the Council is inconceivable.
In a former letter I gave an inaccurate account of the Prince Bishop's conduct towards the priest Jentsch, at Liegnitz, being misled by statements in the Roman newspapers.[105] The text of the explanation accepted by the Bishop shows that no principle was conceded or denied, and he said himself that he agreed in substance with Jentsch.
The arrival of Father Hötzl in Rome seemed for a time likely to produce still more serious conflicts, for his affair looked as if it would oblige the minority to give expression to their view of Döllinger's teaching on the necessity of general consent for the œcumenicity of a Council. Those who had undertaken the instruction [pg 607] of Hötzl cared less for converting him than for using the opportunity to provoke dissension among the minority. He was told that an explanation, not a retractation, was all that was demanded of him, and when the explanation he offered was found unsatisfactory another was proposed to him on May 31. The crucial passage in it was read and examined by leading bishops of the minority, whose names were calculated to inspire complete confidence. Hötzl had some cause to think he had saved honour and conscience, and responsibility to man and God, when he sought the judgment of liberal German Bishops and resolved to abide by it. But though they disliked the passage, they thought it difficult to know how to save a man who had come to Rome in such childish confidence, and did not feel justified under the circumstances in urging him to go to extremities and sacrifice himself to their interests. It was not their place to drive him to a breach with his Order or a loss of personal liberty, at a time when they had not themselves publicly, solemnly and decisively repudiated the doctrine imposed on him. Still less did they want to compromise themselves or break up their harmony before the time. And their hesitation may have led Father Hötzl into his mistake; [pg 608] he was acting in concert with the minority when he signed.
I give only a brief preliminary notice of the most important points in to-day's sitting. After Dinkel, who spoke very well, and Domenec, Bishop of Pittsburg, who was much interrupted, Maret made a longer speech, which he delivered in a very loud voice, as deaf persons are apt to do. In the course of it he declared that it would be called a vicious circle for the less to give power to the greater, as would be done if the Council, which was said to possess a lower authority, were to confer on the Pope—a higher authority—the prerogative of infallibility. Thereupon Bilio struck in very excitedly, crying out “Concilium nihil dat Papæ nec dare potest, sed solummodo recognoscit, suffragia dat, et Sanctus Pater quod in Spiritu Sancto ipsi placet decidit.”
In yesterday's sitting a postulatum for the close of the general debate was prepared, which is said to have received 150 signatures. After Maret's speech it was at once produced and the close voted. Little more than 60 prelates have spoken, and above 40 were waiting their turn, amongst whom were Haynald and other considerable persons. The continuation of the debate [pg 609] had been reckoned upon and much was hoped from it; but now that the example has once been set of using the well-known clause in the order of business in the interests of one party, the step may be repeated in every succeeding debate. The Opposition will be driven into greater firmness by this occurrence, which they had foreshadowed in the half-threatening formula at the end of their great Protest. The question is now forced upon them, whether they were in earnest in what they then said.