William Rose’s Case
William Rose, Plaintiff
The College of Physicians, London, Defendants
in Error
15th March, 1703.
In the 10th year of Hen. 8. the defendants were incorporated; and, in the letters patent granted for that purpose, which were confirmed by stat. 14 and 15 Hen. 8. c. 5. is, inter alia, the following clause: “Concessimus, etiam eisdem præsidenti et collegio, seu communitati, et successoribus suis, quod nemo in dicta civitate, aut per septem milliaria in circuitu ejusdem, exerceat dictum facultatem, nisi ad hoc perdict, præsidentem et communitatem, seu successores eorum qui pro tempore fuerint, admissus sit per ejudem præsidents et collegii literas sigillo suo communi sigillatas, sub pœna centum solidorum pro quolibet mense, quo non admissus eandem facultatem exercit, dimidium inde nobis et hæred. nostris, et dimidium dicto præsidenti et coll. applicandum.”
The plaintiff, who was an apothecary, and freeman of London, attended one Seale, a butcher, in the parish of Saint Martin in the Fields, and made up and administered proper medicines to him; but, without any licence from the faculty, and also without the direction of any physician, and without taking or demanding any fee for his advice.
The defendants apprehending this conduct to be an infringement of their privileges, brought their action against the plaintiff, to recover the penalty of 5l. per month, under the above clause in their charter; and, on the trial, the jury found a special verdict, stating the charter, the confirmatory statute, and the facts of the case; and submitted to the Court, whether the defendant Rose did practice physic, within the intent of the letters patent and act of Parliament.—And, after this verdict had been three several times argued in the Court of Queen’s Bench, the Judges were unanimously of opinion, that the facts found did amount to the practising physic, within the meaning of the act of Parliament; and gave judgment accordingly.
Hereupon, a writ of error in Parliament, was brought to reverse this judgment; and on behalf of the Plaintiff in error, it was argued, that the consequences of it would not only ruin him, but all other apothecaries; as, in case of the affirmance of this judgment, they could not exercise their profession, without the licence of a physician. That the constant usage and practice, which had always been with the apothecary, was conceived to be the best expounder of this charter; and, that therefore, the selling a few lozenges, or a small electuary, to any person asking a remedy for a cold, or in other ordinary or common cases, where the medicines had a known and certain effect, could not be deemed unlawful; or practising as a physician, when no fee was taken or demanded for the same. That the physicians by straining an act made so long ago, endeavoured to monopolize all manner of physic solely to themselves; and if they should succeed in this attempt, it would be attended with many mischievous consequences: For, in the first place, it would be laying a heavy tax on the nobility and gentry, who, in the slightest cases, and even for their common servants, could not have any kind of medicine, without consulting and giving a fee, to a member of the college: It would also be a great oppression upon poor families, who, not being able to bear the charge of a fee, would be deprived of all kind of assistance in their necessities: And, it would prove extremely prejudicial to all sick persons, who, in case of sudden accidents, or new symptoms, happening in the night-time, generally send for the apothecary; but who should not dare to apply the least remedy, without running the hazard of being ruined.
On the other side, it was contended, that by several orders of the college, its members were enjoined to give their advice to the poor gratis; and that not only to such as could come to them for it; but every physician, in his neighbourhood, was obliged to visit the sick poor, at their own lodgings; and therefore the objection, that, if the apothecaries could not administer physic but by the prescript of a physician, the poorer sort of people would be lost for want of proper remedies, had not the least foundation. And, when these orders were observed not to have their full intended effect, on account of the high prices which the apothecaries generally demanded for the remedies prescribed, whereby the poor were deterred from consulting the physician, for fear of the charge of the physic; the college, by a joint stock, erected several dispensaries in town, where, after the physicians had given their advice gratis, the patients might have the physic prescribed, for a third, and generally less, of what the apothecaries used to exact for it; by which expedient, many hundred persons of mean condition, received their cures at a very small expense, and without one farthing profit arising to the physicians. That in cases of sudden and immediate necessity, not only apothecaries, but any other person, might do his best to relieve his neighbour, without incurring the penalty of the law; but there was no reason why the apothecaries, under that pretence, should be permitted to undertake, at leisure, all dangerous diseases; and especially where, as in this city at least, a skilful physician may be as soon had as an apothecary. That, in common or trifling indispositions, the patients themselves were generally their own physicians; and would of course, send for any medicine, of which there had been common experience, for their cure, and which the apothecary might lawfully make up and sell; but, for the apothecary to be permitted to judge of diseases in their beginning, whether slight or not, and to order medicines for the same, would prove both dangerous, and more chargeable. Dangerous, because the most malignant distempers usually begin with apparently inconsiderable symptoms, and are many days before they appear in their proper colours; and, as apothecaries are not bred to have suitable skill, the management thereof ought not to be left to their judgment. And more chargeable, because, be the disease ever so slight, the apothecary will be sure to prescribe largely enough; and should he chance to mistake, then that distemper, which, by the discreet advice of a physician, might, by one proper medicine, have been eradicated at the beginning, runs out into great length, to the extreme hazard and great expense of the patient.
But, after hearing counsel on this writ of error, it was Ordered and Adjudged, that the judgment given in the Queen’s Bench, for the President and College, or Commonalty of the faculty of Physic, London, against the said Wm. Rose, should be reversed.
(From 1 Brown Par. Ca. p. 78.)
The King against the President and College of Physicians.
(From 7 Term Rep. p. 282)
This was a rule calling on the president and College or commonalty of physic in London to shew cause why a mandamus should not issue, commanding them to examine C. Stanger, M.D. as to his qualification and fitness to be admitted into the said Corporation as a member or fellow thereof.
* * * * *
Doctor Stanger, after referring to the above statutes (3 Hen. 8: 14 & 15 Hen. 8) and Charter, stated in his affidavit that in 1783 he took a degree of doctor of physic at Edinburgh after a residence there for three years, and after having studied physic there and at other places for many years; that afterwards he went abroad to France, Italy, and Germany, and studied physic there for several years more. That in 1789 he obtained a licence from the college of physicians here in the usual way to practise in London and within seven miles thereof, and that he has practised ever since. That in June 1796 he applied to the president and college at their general meeting to be admitted by them to be a member of their corporation, submitting himself to be previously examined by them concerning his qualification and fitness to be admitted a member of the corporation, which the college refused. Dr. Stanger also added in his affidavit that he was duly qualified and fit to be admitted a member of the college.
The affidavits in answer to the rule disclosed the following (among other) facts. For two hundred years past there have been three classes of persons practising physic in London and seven miles round; the fellows; candidates, persons desirous of becoming members and who have been examined and approved by the president and censors to be candidates for election into the society or fellowship; and the licentiates, who may practise as fully in all respects as fellows and have the same benefits and advantages. Various bye-laws have been made by the college respecting the qualifications of persons to be admitted fellows, one of them so long ago as 1637, by which it was ordained that no person should be admitted a fellow unless he had performed all his exercises and disputations in one of our universities without dispensation, and which has continued ever since with some little alterations. To prevent any mistakes arising from the words “aliquâ Britanniæ Academiâ” in some of the bye-laws respecting this qualification, an explanatory bye-law was made in 1751, in which it was declared that the meaning of the words was that no person should be admitted who was not a Doctor of Physic of Oxford or Cambridge. The bye-laws of the college have been revised and altered since the year 1768. By those now in existence no person can be admitted a fellow unless he has been a candidate for a year, except in certain cases hereafter mentioned. No person can be admitted into the class of candidates unless he has been created a Doctor of Physic in the university of Oxford or Cambridge, or unless he has obtained the same degree in the university of Dublin and has been incorporated into one of the universities of Oxford or Cambridge; nor can any such person be admitted into the class of candidates until after he has been examined as to his knowledge of physic in three of the greater or lesser meetings (called the comitia majora and comitia minora) of the college. After a person has been a candidate for a year, he may be proposed by the president at one of the greater meetings and admitted a fellow, if the majority of fellows consent, without further examination. But by two other bye-laws persons not having the above qualifications may be proposed in one of two ways; by one, the president is enabled once in every other year at the comitia minora to propose one licentiate of ten years standing, who may (if the major part of the comitia minora consent) be proposed by the president at the next comitia majora to be elected a fellow, and if the majority of fellows then present consent, he may then be admitted a fellow. By the other, any one of the fellows may propose any licentiate, of seven years standing and of the age of 36, in the comitia majora to be examined; if the major part of the fellows consent, such licentiate may be examined by the president or vice-president and censors, and if approved by the major part of the fellows then present, he may be proposed at the next comitia majora to be a fellow, and admitted if the majority of the fellows then present consent. The ordinary greater meetings (comitia majora) are holden four times a year, and consist of the president or vice-president and ten fellows at the least. The ordinary lesser meetings (comitia minora) consisting of the president or vice-president registar and censors of the college, are holden once a month. A letter was also inserted in the affidavits written by King Charles the Second to the college not to admit any person who had not had his education in either of our universities of Oxford or Cambridge: but it was admitted in the argument that no notice could legally be taken of this letter. It was also stated in the affidavits that Dr. Stanger, when he was licensed; gave his faith or promise to the college that he would observe the statutes of the college &c. in the usual mode.
Adair Serjt. Law, Chambre, and Christian, argued in support of the rule; and
Erskine, Gibbs, Dampier, and Warren, against it.
The case was argued very much at length on three several days: but it is unnecessary to give a detail of the arguments, as the Court in giving their opinions went into them. The points insisted upon by the counsel in support of the rule were these; 1st. That under the general words of the charter “omnes homines ejusdem facultatis” &c. Dr. Stanger, who came within that description by his license, had an inchoate right, which authorised him to tender himself to the college for examination in order that he might be admitted, if on examination the president and college thought him qualified; though they admitted that the president and college were the sole judges of his fitness. And they referred to the several dicta of Lord Mansfield and Aston J. in R. v. Dr. Askew and others, 4 Burr. 2169; 2202; 2193; 2202. Secondly, That the bye-laws requiring an education at either of our universities or at Dublin were illegal and void, on grounds of public policy, and also on the ground that they superadded a qualification not required by the Charter, 4 Burr. 2198, 9; 2203, 4; and that it narrowed the number of the eligible; R. v. Spencer, 3 Burr. 1827; and R. v. Cutbush, 4 Burr. 2204.
On the other hand it was insisted, 1st. That Dr. Stanger had no right to be examined in order to be a fellow, either as a licentiate, Dr. Archer’s case, 4 Burr. 2203; or as coming within the description “omnes homines ejusdem facultatis” &c.; but that the election into that body was a mere matter of grant or favor, for that the charter evidently marked out two descriptions of persons, the members of the college (the fellows) and all those who practised physic in London or within seven miles thereof, that the former were to superintend the latter; and that if the latter had also a right to be admitted fellows the distinction between the governors and the governed would be destroyed, and the very object of the charter and act of parliament, in giving to the fellows the superintendance of the others practising physic in and about London, would be defeated;—observing that the usage for a long period was in favour of this construction. 2dly, That Dr. Stanger, by giving his faith when he received his licence in 1789, was estopped to object to the bye-laws. But this point was abandoned in the course of the argument; it being considered that he was only bound to observe the bye-laws of the college that were not illegal. 3dly, That the bye-laws were neither against sound policy or law; and instances were alluded to of degrees taken in either of our universities giving privileges to the persons taking them in the other professions. And the counsel observed that the not having taken a degree in one of our universities was not an absolute bar to any person becoming a fellow of the college, there being two modes by which he might gain admission without that qualification.
Lord Kenyon, Ch. J. If in deciding this question it were necessary for us to answer all the arguments that have been urged at the bar, I should have desired further time to consider of the subject; but as the grounds on which I am warranted to determine the case lie in a very narrow compass, and I have formed my opinion upon it, I wish to put the question at rest now. By what fatality it has happened that almost ever since this charter was granted this learned body have been in a state of litigation I know not; and I cannot but lament that the learned Judges in deciding the cases reported in Burrow did not confine themselves to the points immediately before them, and dropped hints that perhaps have invited litigation; though indeed I cannot see what these parties are contending for that is worth the expense and anxiety attending this litigation. The public already have the benefit of the assistance of the licentiates; and their emoluments, the fair fruits of their education and advice, are just the same as those that the fellows of the college receive. We have however been pressed with the authority of those who have preceded us here: no person can have a greater veneration for those characters than I have, and if this point had been decided by them, I should have thought myself bound by their decision. But the cases are unlike. The principal ground on which it was said in 4 Burr. 2199. that the bye-laws of the college were bad was, that “they interfered with their exercising their own judgment, and prevented them from receiving into their body persons known or thought by them to be really fit and qualified;” and if I had found that objection existed in this case, I should have thought it fatal: but in the very sentence in which Lord Mansfield expressed himself as above, he added “such of them indeed as only require a proper education and a sufficient degree of skill and qualification may be still retained.” Two universities have been founded in this country, amply endowed and furnished with professors in the different sciences; and I should be sorry that those who have been educated at either of them should undervalue the benefits of such an education.
In this case it is admitted that a licentiate does not de facto become a fellow of the college: it is admitted that he must be first examined, and that those who are called the College of Physicians are to judge of his fitness. It seems that the appeal here is rather made ad verecundiam, and that Dr. Stanger could not be rejected if he were examined. If the college are not judges of the fitness of the person examined, I do not know who is. Then is this a reasonable test of the fitness of the party? possibly they might have framed a better, though I do not say that they could; but the question here is whether this is a reasonable bye-law? According to the concurrent opinions of all mankind it is. The Legislature have considered that persons who have taken their degrees in our universities are entitled to certain privileges in the church. So if we look into our own profession, those who have been educated at our universities have particular privileges; and though the inns of court are not corporations, yet their regulations shew that this has been considered as reasonable. It is not that a person becomes qualified from keeping his commons within the walls of the inns of court or the universities, but living with those of the profession will probably advance him in the knowledge of that profession for which he is a candidate. Again in the civil law; however competent any particular individual may be from extraordinary endowments or the exertion of superior talents, he must first take his degrees at one of our universities, and afterwards continue a year in a state of probation before he can practise. Those regulations that are adapted to the common race of men are the best: it does not follow that all institutions calculated for the ordinary classes are to be prostrated merely because they stand in the way of some few individuals of superior talents. Then the question is whether this is a reasonable bye-law that requires a degree to be taken at one of our universities, which in general is supposed to be conferred as a reward for talents and learning. If indeed this had been a sine qua non, and it had operated as a total exclusion of every other mode of gaining access to the college, it would have been a bad bye-law: but these bye-laws point out other modes of gaining admission into the college. If Dr. Stanger has all those requisites that qualify a person for that high station, any one of the fellows may now propose him; he may apply to the honourable feelings of the college, to the very same tribunal to which this mandamus (if it were granted) would refer him; for in all events he must submit to their examination and determination. In the profession of the church, we find that the bishops insist on having a testimonial of the person to be ordained signed by a certain number of clergymen; and though the bishops themselves may have the power of judging of the fitness of the person to be ordained it was never doubted but that this was one reasonable test of fitness, even before examination: it is a test to regulate their own conduct. So here I think this is a reasonable test. Therefore on this short ground, without entering into any of the other topics that have been argued, I am of opinion that these are good and reasonable bye-laws, and that we are bound to refuse the writ.
Ashhurst, J. Though this matter has taken a considerable time in the argument, it is now reduced to a narrow compass. The counsel who have argued for the issuing of the mandamus do not contend that a licentiate, as such, does ipso facto become a member or a fellow of the college: they only say that any man who is fit in learning and morals has a right to offer himself for examination, without any superadded qualification; and therefore that the bye-law requiring “that every licentiate, in order to entitle him to offer himself for examination, shall be a doctor of one of the two universities in England or that of Dublin,” is a void bye-law. It is not denied by counsel who have argued for the rule that the corporation have the right of making bye-laws for the regulation of their own body. And Lord Mansfield, on whose authority they ground themselves as in their favour, said in 4 Burr. 2199, “that such bye-laws as only require a proper education and a sufficient degree of skill and qualification may be still retained; that there can be no objection to cautions of this sort; and the rather if it be true that there are some amongst the licentiates unfit to be received into any society.” This brings it then to the question, whether the bye-law now under discussion is or is not to be considered as a bye-law of regulation. It does appear to me that in order to ensure a proper education and a competence in a learning, there cannot be a more likely method than the having spent fourteen years in one of our learned universities, and, after having been examined by persons competent to the subject, having been admitted to a doctor’s degree. This it should seem would prevent in limine the danger of that happening, which Lord Mansfield complains of, namely, of persons being admitted amongst the licentiates unfit to be received into that society. Indeed the Legislature so long ago as the passing of the act of the 14 and 15 Henry 8. seemed to shew their own opinion how much stress ought to be laid on such a kind of test; for there, in speaking of country physicians, the act says, “that no person shall be suffered to exercise or practise in physic through England until such time as he be examined in London by the president and three elects, and have from them letters testimonial of their approving and examination:” but then the act goes on with this exception (viz.) “unless he be a graduate of Oxford or Cambridge, which hath accomplished all things for his form without any grace.” This shews the opinion of the legislative body of that day; and the college might think it a very fit model for their imitation in the formation of the bye-law now under discussion, and that it would prevent them from having their time too much broken in upon by improper applications for examination. I would not be thought to infer that the gentleman now applying is in any degree deficient either in learning or education: but general laws cannot give way to particular cases; and as this law has been of some standing, we must suppose it has been found to be attended with general convenience, and therefore it should be abided by. I therefore concur in the opinion that the rule for a mandamus should be discharged.
Grose, J. This being a motion for a mandamus to a body incorporated by charter, we must see that we are authorised by the charter or the bye-laws to grant the application. On examining the charter, which was confirmed by act of parliament, we find that there was a select body of eight including the president, and an indefinite number of the commonalty. The election of the president is to be made annually by the college; so also is the election of the four censors. The intention of the crown was to put an end to the mischiefs occasioned by the ignorance of the unskilful practitioners; and for that purpose this corporation was created, with power of making bye-laws, of admitting skilful persons to practise physic, and of preventing all others practising: the great object was to admit only those to practise physic who were (to use the language of the act) “profound sad and discreet, groundedly learned and deeply studied in physic.” How or when the fellows are to be chosen or admitted is not directed by the charter: it is left to the discretion of the persons named in the charter under the general power given to them of perpetuating themselves and of making bye-laws. The charter is therefore silent both as to the election of fellows, and as to the examination of them before election: but the examination is incident to the power of election. The charter being silent on these heads, and the college having the power of making bye-laws, they have made bye-laws to ascertain a criterion of fitness of future candidates, by pointing out in some cases the mode of their education, in others the persons by whom they were to be proposed as candidates. One of these bye-laws is objected to as illegal, because it requires a degree to be taken at one of our universities, which (it is contended) is superadding a qualification to those required by the charter: but I think it is only ascertaining a criterion of fitness as has been done most properly in other professions in cases alluded to both at the bar and bench. Then it is said that a licenciate has an inchoate right: if by that Dr. Stanger’s counsel mean that he has one qualification which when added to others may give him a right of admission, I agree with them; but the college are to judge of the other qualifications: if by this inchoate right they mean any thing more, I dissent from them. It is admitted by this application that the college have a right to insist on an examination: and upon what ground? as a test of fitness—but though this right is not expressly given to them by the charter, nor is there a word denoting any obligation either to admit or examine, it is incident to their power of judging who is fit to be admitted. That Lord Mansfield thought that they have such a right incidently is clear from what fell from him in Dr. Askew’s case, in which he said, “It is true that the judgment and discretion of determining upon this skill ability learning and sufficiency to exercise and practise this profession is trusted to the college of physicians: and this Court will not take it from them in the due and proper exercise of it.” The same power that authorises them to judge of fitness also authorises them to regulate the mode by which they shall judge. They think, of which they are much better judges than we can be, that every man who is to be a candidate ought either to have taken his degree at one of our universities or in Dublin, or shall be proposed by one fellow, or by the president. The bye-laws requiring this do not appear to me unreasonable or inconsistent with the character any more than requiring a particular mode of education, and in the case so often alluded to Lord Mansfield thought such bye-laws were good; for when he recommended it to the college to revise their bye-laws, he said “Such of them indeed as only required a proper education and a sufficient degree of skill and qualification may be still retained.” In consequence of that opinion the college have reviewed and altered their bye-laws, requiring in some cases an education at either of our universities or at Dublin, in others permitting a nomination of persons as fit to be examined by men whom they deem worthy of such a trust, considering such degree and nomination merely as tests of the person taking it or named having skill and learning and being fit to be examined. And in making these bye-laws I think that the college have shewn a due attention to discharge their duty to the public and to attain the ends of their institution. Therefore I concur in the opinion already given that this rule ought to be discharged.
Lawrence, J. This is an application for a mandamus to compel the College of Physicians to examine Dr. Stanger in order that he may be admitted a fellow; and the foundation of the application is that he has been admitted to the practise of physic and is one of the homines facultatis within the meaning of the charter; which (it is said) gives him a right to admission, if on examination he shall be found fit; and that all the bye-laws militating against such right are illegal. His counsel have been under the necessity of insisting on the licence giving him a right to examination; for if the being admitted a member of the body be matter of election, it is immaterial whether the bye-laws be good or bad. It seems to me that the insufficiency of the provisions of the statute 3 Hen. 8. probably gave rise to this charter; the object of which was to establish a better mode of determining who were proper persons to be licensed to practise physic, and to prevent the practice of ignorant empirics; and if so, it was not necessary that all men of the faculty should be members of the body. All that was necessary was that it should be composed of a sufficient number of learned and discrete practisers of physic, who should have a power of continuing the succession in such persons as themselves, and that they should license proper persons and restrain unfit persons from the practice of it. If this were the object, is it natural to construe the charter as giving a right to all men of the faculty to become members of this body, when the charter speaks of men of the faculty in a sense contradistinguished from the members of the body; or to suppose that the Crown meant to incorporate all, when the charter was made for the government of some, who, if all were incorporated, could not exist? It is admitted that there were two distinct classes under the charter, and according to Dr. Stanger’s construction one class, that of the governed, would be extinguished. Another mode of construing the charter in the argument was by considering the words omnes homines ejudem facultatis to mean the individual members of the corporation: but if so, there would be no power given to make bye-laws to affect the licentiates; and the clause in the charter that gives the exemption from serving on juries speaks of the person exercising the faculty as contradistinguished from the members of the college; “nec presidens nec aliquis de collegio prædicto medicorum, nec successores sui, nec eorum aliquis exercens facultatem illam.” Therefore it seems to me that the homines facultatis are not the individual members of the college. Then it was said that there might be some persons who might not choose to become corporators, and that this would make a class to be governed: but that is improbable; it is not to be supposed that, as the principal object of the charter was to incorporate those who were skilled in physic and to prevent those from practising who were unfit, they to whom the charter was offered would refuse the advantages of this corporation, especially as the obvious means of constituting a body to consist of all would be to make it compulsory on the physicians to become members, as in the case with companies in some city and corporate towns, of which persons carrying on certain trades are obliged to be free. But seeing that there is in some degree an uncertainty as to the words “homnes ejusdem facultatis,” the usage that has prevailed ought to govern us in the construction of them, especially as the usage perfectly accords with the design of the incorporation. It is said indeed that the usage is in favour of Dr. Stanger’s claim: but that is not so; for there is no proof that before these bye-laws were made any persons were admitted into the body as a matter of right, and we must therefore take it that they came in by election. If Dr. Stanger claim as a matter of right, it must be under the words of the charter “quod ipsi omnesque homines ejusdem facultatis &c.” but if this gave him a right, the college could not resist his claim though he would not submit to examination. And if every homo ejusdem facultatis came within this description of claim, Dr. Archer would have had a right to be admitted. The charter does not say that all the men of the faculty, who on examination shall be found fit, shall be admitted; if it has said any thing in their favor, it has given them the right as soon as they become men of the faculty; it has directed no examination. Suppose by a charter all the weavers of a town were incorporated, they would all have a right to be admitted without any examination. If then all the men of the faculty within the limited district have a right from being men of the faculty, they possess all the fitness that the charter requires. This seems to me to be only a contrivance to get out of Dr. Archer’s case, and to set up a right on the ground of being a licentiate. In the course of the argument it was said that only those were to be admitted who were “profound sad and discrete, groundedly learned and deeply studied in physic:” but if so, it destroys the argument arising from the words “omnes homines ejusdem facultatis.” An argument has also been drawn from the statute 3 Hen. 8:, and it has been said that the persons licensed by that act were the only persons who at the time of the charter were men of the faculty, and that they and the six persons named were meant to be incorporated. But the words of the charter do not extend to all those persons; they are confined to the “homines de et in civitate prædictâ,” that is, to all men of and in the city of London practising physic: but this does not extend to persons practising in other places. Now if that construction had been adopted, it would have excluded the greater part of those who have been members of the college practising physic in Oxford, Cambridge, and other places beyond these limits, as not falling within the description of those persons of whom (according to the construction) the college is to consist.
Taking the whole of the charter and the usage this construction will reconcile all the difficulties; the intention of the Crown was to incorporate the six persons named in the charter and all men practising physic at that time de et in civitate prædictâ; and all those persons were entitled to admission: but the Crown did not intend to give any right to those, who might thereafter become homines facultatis, but intended that the succession should be continued by the power incident to all corporations to elect. Had the charter of incorporation nominated every man authorised to practise physic in London and given no directions as to the succession, they would have been authorised to continue themselves by election as they have done; and the charter has done the same thing in substance by incorporating the same persons by a general reference to their character and situation. This avoids all contradiction; it is consistent with the usage; and according to this construction no one is entitled as a matter of right but only by election. In making such elections there is a trust and duty to keep up the body by a choice of learned men sufficient to answer the purposes of the charter; and if this be done all the interest that the public have is consulted; they have no interest in this or that man being a member of the college: so long as the body is continued and there are proper censors elects and other officers, and so long as proper persons are licensed and improper ones restrained, the objects of the charter as far as concerns the public will be attained. We have been pressed however with the dicta of Lord Mansfield in R. v. Dr. Askew; very great deference is always due to whatever fell from him: but it is sufficient to say that this was not the point then before the Court, the only question there being whether licentiates were of the body.
On the other question respecting the validity of the bye-laws, I can hardly add to what has already been said by the Court; and therefore shall only say that I agree with them in thinking the bye-laws reasonable.
Rule discharged[[175]].
Return to a Habeas Corpus.
(Goodall. 467)
London. ss. Nos Johannes Warner & Thomas Adams Vic’ Civitat’ London, Serenissimo Domino Regi in brevi huic schedul’ annex’ nominat’ ad diem & locum in eodem brevi content’ Certificamus, quod ante adventum nobis praedict’ brevis scil’ duodecimo die Septembris Anno regni dicti domini Regis nunc Anglie &c. decimo quinto Christoferus Barton in dicto brev’ nominat’ commissus fuit Prisone dom’ Regis scil’ Computator’ scituat’ in Wood Street London prædict’ & in eadem Prisona sub custodia Isaaci Pennington & Johannis Woollaston tunc vic’ Civitat’ praedict’ & in eorum exit’ ab officio suo sub custodia nostra detent’ virtute cujusdam Warranti Otwelli Meverell, Laurentii Wright, Edmund Smith, & Willielmi Goddard in Medicinis Doctor’ & Collegii Medicor’ in London praedict’ custodi praedict’ Computatorii London praedict’ vel ejus deputat’ direct’ Cujus quidem Warranti tenor sequitur in hæc verba.
[A Copy of the Censors Warrant for the Commitment of Empiricks to prison.]
“ss. We Otwell Meverell, Lawrence Wright, Edmund Smith and William Goddard Doctors in Physick and Censors of the Collage of Physicians in London, being chosen by the President and Collage of Physicians aforesaid to govern and punish for this present year all offenders in the faculty of Physick within the City of London and the Suburbs thereof and seven miles compass of the said City, according to the authority in that behalf duly given by certain Letters Patents under the great Seal of England made and granted to the said Collage and Comminalty by the late King of famous memory King Henry the Eighth, bearing the date the 28th day of September in the Tenth year of his Raigne, And one Act of Parliament made in the 14th year of the said late King Henry the Eighth concerning Physicians Whereby the Letters Patents aforesaid and every thing therein are granted and confirmed: And by virtue of the said Act of Parliament and Letters Patents aforesaid and one other Act of Parliament made in the first year of the Raigne of our late Soveraigne Lady Queen Mary intituled An Act touching the Corporation of Physicians in London, did cause to be brought before us the sixth day of this instant September at our Collage house in Pater noster Rowe in London one Christofer Barton; and we have examined the said Christofer Barton, and upon his examination and other due proofs we have found that the said Christofer Barton hath unskilfully practised the Art of Physick within the City of London and Precinct aforesaid upon the bodies of Richard Ballady of Aldermary Parish London, Michael Knight of St. Buttolphs Parish Aldgate London and the child of one Jane Brigge and some others in the month of January in the year 1638, contrary to the Laws in that behalf made and provided; whereupon we have imposed upon the said Christofer Barton a fine of 20l. for his evil practice in Physick aforesaid; and we have also for the same cause sent you the body of the said Christofer Barton, Willing and requiring you in the King’s Majesties name to receive and keep him in safe custody as Prisoner, there to remain at his own costs and charges without bail or mainprize untill he shall be discharged of the said imprisonment by the President of the said Collage, and by such persons as by the said Collage shall be thereunto authorised according to the Statute in that behalf made, And this our warrant shall be your discharge. Given at the said Collage the eleventh day of September in the 16th year of the Raigne of our Soveraigne Lord King Charles.”
Otwell Meverell,
Law. Wright,
Edmund Smith,
William Goddard.
To the Keeper of Woodstreet Compter,
London or his Deputy.
Note. This Christopher Barton, like James Leverett a Gardener (whose case and the reference of it by the Court of Star Chamber to the College, are recited in Goodall p. 447) and the more celebrated Valentine Greatrex, was one of those Empirics, half enthusiasts and half imposters, who pretended to perform cures by touching or stroaking.
Doctor Burgess’ Case.
(Goodall’s Proceedings 376)
Doctor Burgess having been in Orders and now practising Physick in London, was summoned before the President and Censors to give an account by what authority he practised in this City contrary to the Statute Law of this Kingdom. He ingenuously confessed; Not by any authority, but by the indulgence of the College; and told them he had formerly offered himself to examination, though he had not yet been examined. The President replied, that by a Statute of the College (which was read by the Register) they could not examine admit or permit any to the practice of Physick, who had been in Holy Orders. Besides if the Statutes of the College would allow it He told him an admission to a person that had been so qualified was repugnant to the Statute Laws of the Kingdom and Canons Ecclesiastical. He replied with great temper and candour, that he would not contradict either the one or the other, but lay down practice in London. After this he was convened a second time before the President and Censors and interdicted the practice of Physick within the College Liberties, to which he submitted and promised that he would speedily betake himself to the Country. Some of the Fellows of the College were complained of for consulting with him.
