TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTERPAGE
I. Introduction[1]
§ 1. Definition and Method:—Ethical and moral, specificproblem, [1]; importance of genetic study, [3]. § 2. Criterion ofthe moral:—The moral in cross section, the "what" and the"how," [5]; the moral as growth, [8]. § 3. Divisions of thetreatment, [13].
PART I
The Beginnings and Growth of Morality
II. Early Group Life[17]
§ 1. Typical facts of group life:—Primitive unity andsolidarity, [17]. § 2. Kinship and household groups:—Thekinship group, [21]; the family or household group, [23].§ 3. Kinship and family groups as economic and industrialunits:—The land and the group, [24]; movable goods, [25].§ 4. Kinship and family groups as political bodies:—Theircontrol over the individual, [26]; rights and responsibility, [27].§ 5. The kinship or household as a religious unit:—Totemgroups, [30]; ancestral religion, [31]. § 6. Age and sex groups,[32]. § 7. Moral significance of the group, [34].
III. The Rationalizing and Socializing Agencies in EarlySociety[37]
§ 1. Three levels of conduct:—Conduct as instinctive andgoverned by primal needs, regulated by society's standards,and by personal standards, [37]. § 2. Rationalizing agencies:Work, [40]; arts and crafts, [41]; war, [42]. § 3. Socializingagencies:—Coöperation, [42]; art, [45]. § 4. Family life asidealizing and socializing agency, [47]. § 5. Moral interpretationof this first level, [49].
IV. Group Morality—Customs or Mores[51]
§ 1. Meaning, authority, and origin of customs, [51].§ 2. Means of enforcing custom:—Public approval, taboos,rituals, force, [54]. § 3. Conditions which render group controlconscious:—Educational customs, [57]; law and justice,[59]; danger or crisis, [64]. § 4. Values and defects of customarymorality:—Standards, motives, content, organization ofcharacter, [68].
V. From Custom to Conscience; from Group Morality toPersonal Morality[73]
§ 1. Contrast and collision, [73]. § 2. Sociological agenciesin the transition:—Economic forces, [76]; science and the arts,[78]; military forces, [80]; religious forces, [81]. § 3. Psychologicalagencies:—Sex, [81]; private property, [83]; strugglesfor mastery and liberty, [84]; honor and esteem, [85]. § 4. Positivereconstruction, [89].
VI. The Hebrew Moral Development[91]
§ 1. General character and determining principles:—TheHebrew and the Greek, [91]; Political and economic factors, [92].§ 2. Religious agencies:—Covenant, [94]; personal law-giver,[95]; cultus, [97]; prophets, [99]; the kingdom, [100]. § 3. Moralconceptions attained:—Righteousness and sin, [102]; responsibility,[104]; purity of motive, [105]; the ideal of "life," [107];the social ideal, [108].
VII. The Moral Development of the Greeks[111]
§ 1. The fundamental notes:—Convention versus nature, [111];measure, [112]; good and just, [113]. § 2. Intellectual forcesof individualism:—The scientific spirit, [114]. § 3. Commercialand political individualism:—Class interests, [119]; whyobey laws? [122]. § 4. Individualism and ethical theory:—Thequestion formulated, [124]; individualistic theories, [126].§ 5. The deeper view of nature and the good, of the individualand the social order:—Aristotle on the natural, [127];Plato's ideal state, [129]; passion or reason, [131]; eudæmonismand the mean, [134]; man and the cosmos, [135]. § 6. The conceptionof the ideal:—Contrast with the actual, [136]; ethicalsignificance, [138]. § 7. The conception of the self, of characterand responsibility:—The poets, [138]; Plato and theStoics, [140].
VIII. The Modern Period[142]
§ 1. The mediæval ideals:—Groups and class ideals, [143]; thechurch ideal, [145]. § 2. Main lines of modern development,[147]. § 3. The old and new in the beginnings of individualism,[149]. § 4. Individualism in the progress of liberty anddemocracy:—Rights, [151]. § 5. Individualism as affected bythe development of industry, commerce, and art:—Increasingpower and interests, [153]; distribution of goods, [157]; industrialrevolution raises new problems, [159]. § 6. The individualand the development of intelligence:—The Renaissance,[163]; the Enlightenment, [165]; the present significance of scientificmethod, [167].
IX. A General Comparison of Customary and ReflectiveMorality[171]
§ 1. Elements of agreement and continuity:—Régime ofcustom, [172]; persistence of group morality, [173]; origin ofethical terms, [175]. § 2. Elements of contrast:—Differentiationof the moral, [177]; observing versus reflecting, [178]; thehigher law, [181]; deepening of meaning, [182]. § 3. Oppositionbetween individual and social aims and standards:—Withdrawalfrom the social order, [184]; individual emancipation,[186]. § 4. Effects upon the individual character:—Increasedpossibilities of evil as well as of good, [187]. § 5. Moraldifferentiation and the social order:—Effects on the family,[193]; on industry and government, [194]; on religion, [195]; generalrelation of religion to morality, [197].
PART II
Theory of the Moral Life
X. The Moral Situation[201]
Distinguishing marks of the moral situation, [201]; Traits ofvoluntary activity, [202]; The good and bad in non-voluntarybehavior, [203]; Indifferent voluntary conduct, [205]; The moral isintroduced when ends have conflicting values, [207]; Selectionthen depends upon, and influences, the nature of the self,[209].
XI. Problems of Moral Theory[212]
Theory grows from practical problems, [212]; Three typicalproblems of reflective practice, [213]; Corresponding problemsof theory, [214]; Their historical sequence, [215]; Growth of individualism,[220]; The two types of individualism, [221].
XII. Types of Moral Theory[224]
§ 1. Typical divisions of theories:—Teleological and jural,[224]; individual and institutional, [225]; empirical and intuitional,[226]. § 2. Division of voluntary activity into Innerand Outer:—The "how" and the "what," [227]; attitude andconsequences, [228]; different types of each theory, [229]; bearingof each theory upon problems of knowledge and of control,[231]. § 3. General interpretation of these theories:—Ordinaryview of disposition and of consequences, [232]; advantagesclaimed for emphasis upon consequences, [234]; foremphasis upon disposition or attitude, [236]; necessity of reconciliationof these theories, [237].
XIII. Conduct and Character[240]
Problem of their relation, [240]. § 1. The good will ofKant:—Emphasis upon motive, [241]; motive with or withoutconsequences, [242]; necessity of effort, [243]; overt action requiredto prove motive, [245]. § 2. The "Intention" of theUtilitarians:—Emphasis upon consequences, [246]; distinctionof intention from motive, [247]; they are really identical, [248];motive as blind and as intelligent, [249]; practical importanceof insistence upon consequences, [251]; foresight of consequencesdepends upon motive, [252]. § 3. Conduct and character:—Thenature of disposition, [254]; partial and completeintention, [256]; complexity of motives, [257]. § 4. Morality ofacts and of agents:—Subjective and objective morality, [259];the doer and his deed, [260]; summary, [261].
XIV. Happiness and Conduct: The Good and Desire[263]
Residence and nature of goodness, [263]; happiness as thegood, [264]; love of happiness as the evil, [265]; ambiguity inconception of happiness, [266]. § 1. The Object of Desire:—Isit pleasure? [269]; desire presupposes instinctive appetites,[270]; and objects of thought, [271]; happiness and desire, [272];need for standard, [274]. § 2. The Conception of Happinessas a Standard:—Utilitarian method, [275]; Difficulty of measuringpleasure, [276]; character determines the value of apleasure, [277]; Mill's introduction of quality of pleasure, [279].§ 3. The constitution of happiness:—Pleasures depend uponobjects, [281]; they are qualitative, [282]; they vary with disposition,[283]; happiness as the moral good, [284].
XV. Happiness and Social Ends[286]
Utilitarianism aims at social welfare, [286]; value as a theoryof social reform, [287]; its aim conflicts with its hedonistic theoryof motive, [289]; Bentham's method of reconciling personaland general happiness, [291]; Mill's method, [293]; sympathyand the social self, [298]; the distinctively moral interest, [300];equation of virtue and happiness, [301]; moral democracy, [303].
XVI. The Place of Reason in the Moral Life: MoralKnowledge[306]
§ 1. Problem of reason and desire:—Nature of a reasonableact, [306]; theories about moral knowledge, [307]. § 2. Kant'stheory of practical reason:—Traits of morality, [309]; reasonas a priori and formal, [310]; true meaning of generalization,[313]; the general and the social, [314]. § 3. Moral sense intuitionalism:—Functionof reason, [317]; habit and sense, [319];invalid intuitions, [321]; deliberation and intuition, [322]; thegood man's judgment, [324]. § 4. The place of general rules:—Theirvalue, [325]; casuistry, [326]; and its dangers, [327];secondary ends of utilitarianism, [329]; empirical rules andcustoms, [330]; distinction of rules and principles, [333]; sympathyand reasonableness, [334].
XVII. The Place of Duty in the Moral Life: Subjection toAuthority[337]
Conflict of the rational with the attractive end, [337]. § 1.The subjection of desire to law, [339]; cause of conflict ofdesire and thought, [342]; demand for transformation of desire,[343]; social character of duties, [345]; the social self is the"universal" self, [346]. § 2. Kantian theory:—Accord withduty versus from duty, [346]; the two-fold self of Kant, [347];criticism of Kant, [348]; emphasis falls practically on politicalauthority, [351]; "Duty for duty's sake," [351]. § 3. The Utilitariantheory of duty:—The hedonistic problem, [353]; Moralsanctions, [354]; they are too external, [355]; Bain's account,[356]; Spencer's account, [358]; such views set up a fictitious non-socialself, [361]. § 3. Final statement:—Growth requires disagreeablereadjustments, [362].
XVIII. The Place of the Self in the Moral Life[364]
Problems regarding the self, [364]. § 1. The doctrine of self-denial:—Explanationof its origin, [365]; four objections todoctrine, [366]. § 2. Self-assertion:—Ethical dualism, [369];"naturalistic" ethics, [369]; false biological basis, [371]; misinterpretsnature of efficiency, [373]. § 3. Self-love and benevolence;or egoism and altruism:—The "crux" of ethical speculation,[375]; are all motives selfish? [376]; ambiguity of termselfish, [377]; are results selfish? [379]; self-preservation, [380];rational regard for self, [382]; regard for others, [384]; the existenceof "other-regarding" impulses, [385]; altruism maybe immoral, [387]; social justice necessary to moral altruism,[389]. § 4. The good as self-realization:—Self-realization anambiguous idea, [391]; true and false consideration of the self,[393]; equation of personal and general happiness, [395].
XIX. The Virtues[399]
Introductory—virtue defined, [399]; natural ability and virtue,[400]; evolution of virtues, [401]; responsibility for moral judgment,[402]; futility of cataloguing virtues, [402]; their cardinalaspects, [403]. § 1. Temperance:—Greek, Roman, and Christianconceptions, [405]; negative and positive aspects, [407];pleasure and excitement, [408]. § 2. Courage or persistentvigor:—Dislike of the disagreeable, [410]; "dimensions" ofcourage, [411]; optimism and pessimism, [412]. § 3. Justice:—Threemeanings of, [414]; justice and love, [415]; justice andpunishment, [416]. § 4. Wisdom or conscientiousness:—Importanceof intelligent interest, [418]; Greek and modern ideasof moral wisdom, [419]; ideals and thoughtfulness, [420]; idealsand progress, [422].
PART III
The World of Action
XX. Social Organization and the Individual[427]
Object of discussion, [427]. § 1. Growth of individualitythrough social organizations:—Emancipation from custom,[428]; double movement towards individuality and complexassociations, [429]; morality and legality, [432]; two-fold contributionof social environment to individual morality, [433];moral value of the state, [434]. § 2. Responsibility and freedom:—Liability,[436]; freedom as exemption and as power,[437]; legal and moral freedom, [438]. § 3. Rights and obligations:—Theirdefinition, [439]; they are correlative, [440]; physicalrights, [442]; limitations put upon them by war and punishment,[443]; by poverty, [444]; mental rights, [445]; limitations tofreedom of thought and expression, [446]; education, [448].
XXI. Civil Society and the Political State[451]
§ 1. Civil rights and obligations:—Their definition, [451]; theirclasses, [452]; significance of established remedies for wrongs,[454]. § 2. Development of civil rights:—Contrast with savageage justice, [456]; social harm versus metaphysical evil, [457];recognition of accident and intent, [459]; of character andcircumstances, [460]; of mental incapacity, [462]; significanceof negligence and carelessness, [464]; conflict of substantial andtechnical justice, [465]; relations of the legal and moral, [467];reform of criminal procedure necessary, [468]; also of punitivemethods, [470]; and of civil administration, [471]. § 3. Politicalrights and obligations:—Significance of the state, [473];distrust of government, [474]; indifference to politics, [476];political corruption, [477]; reform of partisan machinery, [478];of governmental machinery, [479]; constructive social legislation,[480]; a federated humanity, [481]. § 4. The moral criterionof political activity:—Its statement, [482]; the individualisticformula, [483]; the collectivistic formula, [484].
XXII. The Ethics of the Economic Life[486]
§ 1. General analysis:—The economic in relation to happiness,[487]; relation to character, [488]; social aspects, [491].§ 2. The problem set by the new economic order:—Collectiveand impersonal organizations, [495]; readjustments required,[496]. § 3. The agencies for carrying on commerce and industry:—Earlyagencies, [497]; the business enterprise, [498]; thelabor union, [499]; reversion to group morality, [500]; membersand management, [500]; employer and employed, [501]; relationsto the public, [502]; to the law, [503]. § 4. The methodsof production, exchange, and valuation:—The machine, [507];basis of valuation, [508]. § 5. The factors which aid ethicalreconstruction:—Principles more easily seen, [511].
XXIII. Some Principles in the Economic Order[514]
1. Wealth subordinate to personality, [514]. 2. Wealth andactivity, [514]. 3. Wealth and public service, [515]. 4. Achange demanded from individual to collective morality, [517].5. Personal responsibility, [519]. 6. Publicity and legal control,[520]. 7. Democracy and distribution, [521].
XXIV. Unsettled Problems in the Economic Order[523]
§ 1. Individualism and socialism:—General statement, [523];equal opportunity, [526]. § 2. Individualism or free contractanalyzed; its values:—Efficiency, [527]; initiative, [527]; regulationof production, [528]. § 3. Criticisms upon individualism:—Itdoes not secure real freedom, [528]; nor justice, [530]; competitiontends to destroy itself, [531]; position of the aristocraticindividualists, [532].
XXV. Unsettled Problems in the Economic Order (Continued)[536]
§ 4. The theory of public agency and control, [536]. § 5.Society as agency of production:—Charges against privatemanagement, [537]; corruption, [538]; conditions of labor, [540];collective agency not necessarily social, [544]. § 6. Theoriesof just distribution:—Individualistic theory, [546]; equal division,[547]; a working programme, [548]. § 7. Ownership anduse of property:—Defects in the present system, [551]. § 8.Present tendencies:—Individualistic character of the Constitution,[554]; increased recognition of public welfare, [555];social justice through economic, social, and scientific progress,[557]. § 9. Three special problems:—The open versus theclosed shop, [559]; the capitalization of corporations, [561]; theunearned increment, [564]. Appendix: Prof. Seager's programmeof social legislation, [566].
XXVI. The Family[571]
§ 1. Historical antecedents of the modern family:—Maternaltype, [572]; paternal type, [572]; influence of the church, [576].§ 2. The psychological basis of the family:—Emotional andinstinctive basis, [578]; common will, [580]; parenthood, [581];social and religious factors, [582]; the children, [582]. § 3.General elements of strain in family relations:—Differencesbetween the sexes in temperament and occupation, [584]; inattitude toward the family, [587]; differences between parentsand children, [589]. § 4. Special conditions which give rise topresent problems:—The economic factors, [590]; cultural andpolitical factors, [593]. § 5. Unsettled problems:—Economicproblems, [594]; the dilemma between the domestic life andoccupations outside the home, [595]; the family as consumer,[598]. § 6. Unsettled problems:—Political problems, authoritywithin the family, [599]; equality or inequality, [600]; isolationnot the solution, [602]; authority over the family, divorce,[603]; general law of social health, [605]; conclusion, [605].