INDEX
Absentmindedness, [173]
Accidents, in history, [101];
in consequences, [49], [51], [206–208], [241], [253], [304], [309]
Acquisition, [116–118], [143–148]
Activity is natural, [118–123], [160], [226], [293]
Aims, see [Consequences], [Ends]
Alexander M., [28], [36]
Altruism, [133], [293]
Analysis, [183]
Anger, [90], [152]
Appetite, [7], [275];
see [Impulse]
Aristotle, [33], [109], [174], [224], [290]
Arts, [15], [23], [71], [159–164], [263]
Atomism moral, [243]
Attitude, [41];
see [Habit]
Authority, [2], [65], [72], [79], [187], [324]
Benevolence, [133]
Bergson, [73], [178], [245]
Blame, [18], [121], [320]
Causation, [18], [44]
Calculation, [189], [199–209];
see [Deliberation]
Casuistry, [240]
Certainty, love of, [236]
Character, defined, [38];
and consequences, [47]
Childhood, [2], [64], [89], [96], [99]
Choice, [192], [304], [311]
Classes, [2], [82], [270]
Classification, [131], [244]
Codes, [103]
Compensatory, [8], [30], [33], [257], [275]
Conduct, see [Character], [Habit], [Impulse], [Intelligence]
Confidence, [139]
Conflict, [12], [39], [66], [82], [194], [208], [217], [300]
Conscience, [184–188], [314]
Consciousness, [62], [179], [184], [208]
Consequences, and motives, [45–47];
and aims, [225–229], [245–247]
Conservatism, [66], [106], [168]
Continuity, [12], [232], [239], [244], [259]
Control, [21], [23], [37], [101], [139], [148], [266–270];
see [Accident]
Conventions, [6], [97], [166]
Crowd psychology, [60]
Creative and acquisitive, [143–148]
Customs and habits, [58–69];
and standards, [75–83];
rigidity, [103–105]
Deliberation, [189–209];
as discovery, [216]
Democracy, [61n], [66], [72]
Desire, [24], [33], [194], [234], [299], [304];
and intelligence, [248–264];
object of, [249–252]
Disposition, [41];
see [Habit]
Docility, [64], [97]
Dualism, [8], [12], [40], [55], [67], [71], [147], [275], [309]
Economic man, [220]
Economics, [9], [12], [120–124], [132], [143–148], [212–221], [270–273], [305]
Education, [64], [72], [91], [107], [270], [320]
Egotism, [7]
Emerson, [100], [144]
Emotion, [75], [83], [255], [264]
End, [28], [34–37];
knowledge as, [187], [215];
nature of, [223–237];
of desire, [250], [261];
and means, [269–272];
see [Consequences], [Means]
Environments, [2], [10], [15], [18], [21], [51], [151], [159], [179], [316]
Epicureanism, [205], [291]
Equilibration, [179], [252]
Evolution, [284–287], [297]
Execution, of desires, [33–35]
Expediency, [49], [189], [210];
see [Deliberation]
Experience, [31], [245]
Experimentation, moral, [56], [307]
Fallacy, philosophic, [175]
Fanaticism, [228]
Fantasies, [158], [164], [236]
Fear, [111], [132–133], [154–155], [237]
Fiat of will, [29]
Foresight, [204–206], [238], [265–270];
see [Deliberation], [Ends]
Freedom, [8], [165];
three phases of, [303–313];
see [Will]
Functions, [18]
Gain, [117]
Goal, [260], [265], [274], [281], [287–289];
see [Evolution], [Perfection]
Good, [2], [44], [210–222], [274], [278]
Goodness, [4–8], [16], [43–45], [48], [67], [227]
Good-will, [44]
Habits, place in conduct, [14–88];
and desire, [24];
as functions, [14];
as arts or abilities, [15], [64], [66], [71], [170];
and thought, [31–33], [66–69], [172–180], [182];
definition, [41];
and impulses, [90–98], [107–111];
and principles, [238]
Harmony, natural, [159], [167], [298]
Hedonistic calculus, [204]
Hegel, [312]
Helvetius, [106], [300]
Herd-instinct, [4]
History, [101], [110]
Hobbes, [133]
Human nature, [1];
and morals, [1–13], [295];
alterability, [106–124]
Humility, [289]
Hypocrisy, [6]
Hypothesis, moral, [239], [243]
Ideas, see [Ends], [Thought]
Ideals and Idealism, [2], [8], [50], [68], [77], [81], [99], [157], [166], [184], [233], [236], [255], [259–264], [274], [282–288], [301], [331]
Imagination, [52], [163], [190–192], [204], [225], [234]
Imitation, [66], [97], [132]
Impulse, place in conduct, [89–171];
secondary, [89];
intermediary, [169–170];
as means of reorganization, [93], [102], [104], [179];
plastic, [95];
same as human instincts, [105n];
and habit, [107–111];
false simplification, [131–149];
and reason, [196], [254]
Individualism, [7], [85], [93]
Industry, [11]
Infantilisms, [98]
Instinct, not fixed, [149–168];
and knowledge, [178];
see [Impulse]
Institutions, [9], [80], [102], [111], [166]
Intelligence, [10], [13], [51], [299], [312];
place of, in conduct, [172–277];
relation to habits, [172–180], [228];
and desire, [248–264], [276]
Interpenetration of habits, [37–39]
Intuitions, [33], [188]
James, Wm., [112], [179], [195]
Justice, [18], [52], [198]
Kant, [44], [49], [55], [245]
Knowledge, moral, [181–188];
see [Conscience], [Intelligence]
Labor, [121], [144]
Language, [58], [79], [95]
Le Bon, [61]
Liberalism, [305]
Locke, [106]
Marx, [154], [273], [300]
Magic, [20], [26]
Meaning, [37], [90], [151], [207], [262], [271], [280]
Means, [20];
relation to ends, [25–36], [218–220], [251];
see [Habit]
Mechanization, [28], [70], [96], [144]
Mediation, [197]
Mind, [61], [95];
and habit, [175–180]
Mind and body, [30], [67], [71]
Mitchell, W. C., [213]
Moore, G. E., [241n]
Morals, introduction, [40];
conclusion, as objective, [52];
of art, [167];
scope, [278–281]
Motives, [43–45], [118–122], [213], [231], [329]
Natural law and morals, [296–300]
Necessity, [312]
Nirvana, [175], [286]
Non-moral, [8], [27], [40], [188], [230]
Occult, [11]
Oligarchy, [2–3]
Optimism, [286–288]
Organization, [306]
Passion, [9], [193–196]
Pathology, [4], [50]
Perfection, [173–175], [223], [282]
Pessimism, [286]
Plato, [50], [78], [134], [290]
Play, [159–164]
Pleasure, [158], [200–205], [250]
Posture, [32]
Potentiality, [37]
Power, will to, [140–142]
Pragmatic knowing, [181–188]
Principles, [2];
and tendencies, [49];
nature of, [238–247]
Private, [9], [16], [43], [85]
Process and product, [142–143], [280]
Progress, [10], [21], [93], [96], [101], [105n];
in science, [149];
nature of, [281–288]
Property, [116–118];
see [Economics]
Psycho-analysis, [34], [86], [133], [153], [252]
Psychology and moral theory, [12], [46], [91];
social, [60–63], [84–88];
current, [118], [135], [147], [155];
and scientific method, [150], [322–324]
Punishment, [18]
Puritanism, [5], [157]
Purpose, see [Ends]
Radicalism, [168]
Reactions, [157]
Realism, [176], [256], [298]
Reason, pure, [31];
reasonableness, [67], [77], [193–198], [215]
Rebellion, [166]
Reconstruction, [164]
Religion, [5], [263], [330–332]
Responsibility, [315]
Revolution, [10], [108]
Right, [324–328]
Romanticism, [6], [100], [166], [256]
Routine, [42], [66], [70], [98], [211], [232], [238]
Satisfaction, [140], [158], [175], [210], [213], [265], [285]
Savagery, [93], [101], [103]
Science of morals, [3], [11–12], [18], [56], [224], [243], [296], [321]
Self, [16], [55], [85–87], [136–139], [217], [292], [314]
Self-deception, [152], [252]
Self-love, [134–139], [293]
Sensations, [18], [31], [189]
Sentimentalism, [17]
Sex, [133], [150], [153], [164–165]
Social, see [Environments]
Social mind, [60–63]
Socrates, [56]
Soul, [85], [94], [138], [176]
Spencer, [175], [297]
Standards, [75–82], [241]
Stimulation, [157]
Stimulus and response, [199–207]
Stuart, H. W., [218]
Subjective, [16], [22], [27], [52], [54], [85], [202];
see [Dualism]
Sublimation, [141], [156], [164], [194]
Success, [6], [173], [254]
Sumner, [77]
Suppression, [156], [166]
Synthesis, [183–184]
Tendency, [49]
Thought, [30], [67], [98], [108], [171], [190], [200], [222], [258];
vices of, [197]
Tolstoi, [285], [312]
Tools, [25], [32];
intellectual, [244]
Transcendentalism, [50–52], [54], [81]
Universality, [245–247]
Utilitarianism, [50], [189], [199–209], [211], [221–222], [291]
Virtues, [4], [16], [22];
see [Goodness]
War, [110–115]
Westermarck, [76]
Will, and habits, [25], [29], [40–44], [259];
will to power, [140–143];
freedom of, [9]
Williams, M., [273n]
FOOTNOTES:
[1] I refer to Alexander, "Man's Supreme Inheritance."
[2] The technique of this process is stated in the book of Mr. Alexander already referred to, and the theoretical statement given is borrowed from Mr. Alexander's analysis.
[3] Mob psychology comes under the same principles, but in a negative aspect. The crowd and mob express a disintegration of habits which releases impulse and renders persons susceptible to immediate stimuli, rather than such a functioning of habits as is found in the mind of a club or school of thought or a political party. Leaders of an organization, that is of an interaction having settled habits, may, however, in order to put over some schemes deliberately resort to stimuli which will break through the crust of ordinary custom and release impulses on such a scale as to create a mob psychology. Since fear is a normal reaction to the unfamiliar, dread and suspicion are the forces most played upon to accomplish this result, together with vast vague contrary hopes. This is an ordinary technique in excited political campaigns, in starting war, etc. But an assimilation like that of Le Bon of the psychology of democracy to the psychology of a crowd in overriding individual judgment shows lack of psychological insight. A political democracy exhibits an overriding of thought like that seen in any convention or institution. That is, thought is submerged in habit. In the crowd and mob, it is submerged in undefined emotion. China and Japan exhibit crowd psychology more frequently than do western democratic countries. Not in my judgment because of any essentially Oriental psychology but because of a nearer background of rigid and solid customs conjoined with the phenomena of a period of transition. The introduction of many novel stimuli creates occasions where habits afford no ballast. Hence great waves of emotion easily sweep through masses. Sometimes they are waves of enthusiasm for the new; sometimes of violent reaction against it—both equally undiscriminating. The war has left behind it a somewhat similar situation in western countries.
[4] "The Origin and Development of Moral Ideas."
[5] The use of the words instinct and impulse as practical equivalents is intentional, even though it may grieve critical readers. The word instinct taken alone is still too laden with the older notion that an instinct is always definitely organized and adapted—which for the most part is just what it is not in human beings. The word impulse suggests something primitive, yet loose, undirected, initial. Man can progress as beasts cannot, precisely because he has so many 'instincts' that they cut across one another, so that most serviceable actions must be learned. In learning habits it is possible for man to learn the habit of learning. Then betterment becomes a conscious principle of life.
[6] I owe the suggestion of this mode of interpreting the hedonistic calculus of utilitarianism to Dr. Wesley Mitchell. See his articles in Journal of Political Economy, vol. 18. Compare also his article in Political Science Quarterly, vol. 33.
[7] So far as I am aware Dr. H. W. Stuart was the first to point out this difference between economic and moral valuations in his essay in Studies in Logical Theory.
[8] Among contemporary moralists, Mr. G. E. Moore may be cited as almost alone in having the courage of the convictions shared by many. He insists that it is the true business of moral theory to enable men to arrive at precise and sure judgments in concrete cases of moral perplexity.
[9] Acknowledgment is due "The Social Interpretation of History" by Maurice Williams.
| page | original | correction |
| [v] | 13 | 14 |
| [003] | of | to |
| [008] | pleasureable | pleasurable |
| [017] | retibutive | retributive |
| [041] | some-counteracting | some counteracting |
| [074] | ungoing | ongoing |
| [090] | mudpuddle | mud puddle |
| [092] | southsea | Southsea |
| [123] | fulfillment | fulfilment |
| [145] | it | is |
| [163] | exitents | exigents |
| [211] | presentation | presentation. |
| [212] | only | only one |
| [234] | phantasy | fantasy |
| [236] | phantasy-building | fantasy-building |
| [262] | unreasonble | unreasonable |
| [276] | an | and |
| [325] | desire. | desire." |
| [334] | Phantasies | Fantasies |