INDEX.
- Absolute—and relative Ethics, according to Spencer [72].
- Accountability—See [responsibility.]
- [Activity]—human, the subject-matter of ethics [1 ff].
- —the object of desire [21 ff].
- —the standard of pleasure [45]; [50].
- —equals exercise of function [101].
- —opposed to mere possession [209]; [215]; [218]; [220].
- —two sides of [219].
- —see [freedom].
- Æsthetic feelings—may be moral [199].
- —see [art].
- Agent—moral, one capable of acting from ideas [3].
- —see [person].
- Alexander, S.—quoted: on idea of sum of pleasures [46].
- —referred to: [9]; [46]; [77]; [111]; [134]; [158]; [165]; [202]; [216]; [221]; [227].
- [Altruism]—how identified with egoism [59].
- —reconciled, by Spencer, with egoism [70 ff].
- —conflicts, at present, with egoism [76].
- —older moralists termed benevolence [195].
- —not necessarily moral [107].
- —not disguised selfishness [109].
- —may equal charity [125].
- Amusements—moral nature of [133].
- Approbation—nature of [161].
- Aristotle—quoted: on pleasure [18];
- on pleasure and character [29];
- on the mean [136].
- —referred to: [31].
- [Art] (and Science)—nature of interest in [111].
- —distinction of fine and useful [112].
- —interest in, why moral [113 ff].
- —interest in, really social [118 ff].
- —life an, [120].
- —essentially dynamic [126].
- Asceticism—means formalism [94].
- —element of truth in [95].
- —results when interest is excluded [106].
- Aspiration—involved in morality [213]; [222].
- Autonomy—Kant's conception of justified [149].
- Badness—of environment a factor in right action [176]; [224].
- —its source and factors [214].
- —its relation to goodness [223].
- —potential and actual [223].
- —of good people [232].
- Bain, A.—quoted: that pleasure is a self-evident criterion [16];
- his definition of utilitarianism [53];
- on obligation [140]; [141].
- —referred to: [17]; [66]; [227].
- Barratt—quoted: that all pleasure is individual [14].
- Baseness—why badness becomes [219].
- Benevolence—see [altruism].
- Bentham, J.—quoted: pleasure both criterion and motive [15];
- self-evident criterion [16];
- all motives good [34 ff].;
- hedonistic calculus [36 ff].;
- identity of individual and general pleasure [57 ff].;
- influence of law [59].
- —referred to: [53].
- Birks—referred to: [66].
- Blackie, J. S.—referred to: [66].
- Bradley, F. H.—quoted: on pleasure and desire [21];
- scientific interest not necessarily social [122];
- on merely individual conscience [189].
- —referred to: [25]; [26]; [42]; [48]; [54]; [91]; [124]; [134]; [165]; [221].
- Browning, R.—referred to: [111].
- Butler—Bishop, quoted: on conscience [167].
- —referred to: [110].
- Caird, E.—quoted: on collision of moral ends [88].
- —referred to: [21]; [82]; [87]; [91]; [92]; [93]; [95]; [109]; [111]; [149]; [165].
- Calderwood—referred to: [158]; [166].
- [Capacity]—its relation to environment [97].
- —increased by moral action [206].
- Carlyle, T.—referred to: [128].
- Casuistry—inevitable, if moral end is not wholly social [119].
- [Character]—reciprocal with conduct [9].
- —the source of motive, desire and moral pleasure [26 ff].
- —separated from conduct by hedonists [32 ff].
- —and virtues [227 ff].
- —see [capacity], [conduct], [interests] and [motive].
- Charity—idea of, involves social inequality [125].
- Christianity—ethical influence of [224].
- —has no specific ethical code [231].
- Coit, S.—referred to: [28]; [66].
- Commands—moral value of: [203].
- [Common Good]—an ethical ideal [51].
- —not furnished by hedonism [60].
- —not furnished by Kant [91].
- —why necessarily involved in morality [117]; [217]; [222].
- —demands reciprocal satisfaction of individual and society [127].
- —its existence postulated by moral conduct [130].
- —results from exercise of function [168].
- —constituted by activity [169 ff].
- —realized in institutions [173].
- —development of [210].
- —see [institutions] and [society].
- Comprehensiveness—growth of, in moral end [210 ff].
- [Conduct]—defined [3].
- —relation to consequences [7].
- —relation to character [9].
- —an individual system [133].
- —a social system [136].
- —how related to character [163].
- —see [activity], [consequences], [character] and [motive].
- [Conflict]—of moral ends [88 ff].
- —morality has an aspect of [151]; [227].
- Conscience—Bain's idea of [141].
- —equals consciousness of action [181].
- —elements in [182].
- —not a special faculty [183].
- —kinds of [183 ff].
- —not merely individual [188].
- Conscientiousness—nature of [199].
- —does not equal introspection [200].
- —nor application of code [201].
- —a cardinal virtue [232].
- [Consequences]—moral value of [7 ff].; [84]; [114]; [160].
- —excluded from morality by Kantianism [13]; [29].
- —identified with moral value by hedonism [33].
- —responsibility for [160].
- Criterion—hedonistic is pleasure [15].
- —criticism of hedonistic [31 ff].
- —two ends to be met by every [32].
- —of higher and lower pleasures [49 ff].
- —when pleasure may be a [50].
- —Mill's really social [63].
- —Spencer's really social [73].
- —Kant's nominally formal [79 ff].
- —the real [132 ff].
- —its elasticity [135].
- Darwin, C.—referred to: [78].
- Demoralization—involved in badness [220].
- [Desire]—pleasure as end of [16]; [18 ff].
- —defined [19].
- —how spiritualized [23].
- —not purely pleasurable [27].
- —an expression of character [28].
- —excluded from moral motive by Kant [79].
- —all or no involved in morality [94].
- —relation to pleasure [83].
- —particular, an abstraction [96].
- —how distinguished from interest [103].
- —opposed to reason by Kant [147].
- —when opposed to moral action [148]; [155]; [213]; [216].
- —how socialized, [237].
- Dewey, J.—referred to: [25]; [78]; [194].
- Disinterestedness—equals full interest [107].
- —an aspect of cardinal virtue [232].
- Disposition—Bentham on [35].
- Dualism—the Kantian [148 ff].
- Duty—see [obligation].
- Egoism—see [altruism].
- Empiricism—Spencer's reconciliation with intuitionalism [69 ff].
- End—moral: see [common good]; [function]; [motive].
- Environment—defined by relation to capacity [99 ff].
- —meaning of adjustment to [115 ff].
- —moral, exists in institutions [171].
- —badness of, an element in right action [176]; [190].
- —enlarged by moral action [207].
- Ethical World—discussed [167 ff].
- —nature illustrated [168].
- —relation to moral law [174].
- —see [Institutions].
- Ethics—defined [1].
- —divided [3].
- —its object according to Spencer [68].
- —see [theory].
- Evolution, Theory of—combined with hedonism [67 ff].
- —not really hedonistic [71 ff].
- —its real standard objective [72].
- Faith—a factor in moral progress [123]; [127 ff].
- —in humanity, meaning of [129].
- —why demanded in moral action [217]; [222].
- Feelings—natural and moral [5 ff].; [25 ff].; [87].
- —sympathetic relied upon by utilitarians [57].
- —necessary in moral activity [85].
- —active, equal interests [102].
- —moral, defined by end [108];
- see also [motive].
- —value of [195 ff].
- —moral, not too narrowly limited [199].
- [Freedom]—is object of desire [24].
- —equals exercise of function [138].
- —various aspects of [158].
- —of choice defined [159].
- —of indifference discussed [161 ff].
- —actualized in rights [172]; [174].
- —positive, realized in virtues [229].
- [Function]—union of capacity and circumstance in act [103].
- —freedom found in exercise of [164 ff].
- Gizycki—referred to: [66].
- God—an external, cannot be the source of obligation [149].
- Goethe—referred to: [128].
- Golden Rule—identified by Mill with principle of utilitarianism [59].
- —gives no directions as to conduct [204].
- —is a concrete statement of ethical postulate [205].
- Green, T. H.—quoted: on desire and pleasure [21];
- on sum of pleasures [43];
- on nature of happiness [45];
- on conscientiousness [200]; [202];
- on goodness [215].
- —referred to: [9]; [25]; [42]; [54]; [110]; [158]; [165].
- Grote, J.—referred to: [66]; [158].
- Guyau—referred to: [66]; [143].
- [Hedonism]—defined [14 ff].
- —its paradox [25].
- —confuses feeling and idea [26]; [43 ff].
- —summarized [30].
- —all motives good [33].
- —its calculus [36].
- —fails to provide laws [39 ff].
- —its contrast with Kantianism [82 ff].
- —its treatment of obligation [140 ff].
- —is correct in holding rightness to be pleasurable [228].
- —truth and falsity in [234].
- Hegel—quoted: on reflective conscience [188];
- on merely individual conscience [189].
- Hinton, J.—quoted: on altruism [109];
- on badness [216].
- —referred to: [202].
- Hodgson, S. H.—referred to: [14].
- Idealism—when feeble [128].
- Ideals—moral, progressive, [206].
- Imperative, Categorical—of Kant [147].
- —of conscience [191].
- Impulse—and pleasure [17].
- —and desire [22].
- —nature of action from [159].
- —see [desire].
- Individuality—defined [97].
- —not identical with inner side alone [98].
- —evils of defining from this standpoint [110].
- —made by function [131].
- —realized is autonomy [150].
- —realized is freedom [164].
- —growth in [210].
- —see [freedom] and [rights].
- [Institutions]—nature of [169 ff].
- —sovereignty, rights and law inhere in [171 ff].
- —influence of, upon conscience [184]; [189].
- —movement of, the source of duties, [194].
- —see [common good] and [society].
- [Interests]—are functions on personal side [102 ff].
- —classified and discussed [104 ff].
- —social, involve science and art [123 ff].
- —realized in institutions [170].
- —their relation to conscience [198].
- —pure, are virtue [228].
- —the active element of [218].
- —the freeing of, the moral goal [233].
- James, Sr., H.—referred to: [202].
- James, Wm.—quoted: on pleasure and desire [20].
- —referred to: [77].
- Kant—agrees with hedonism as to end of desire [79].
- —his end an abstraction [84].
- —his practical ideal that of Mill and Spencer [93].
- —value of his theory [93].
- —his theory of obligation [147].
- —his conception of autonomy [149].
- —his idea of duty [156].
- —his conception of practical reason [191].
- —quoted: on pleasure [47];
- on pleasure as common good [52];
- on priority of duty to good [78];
- on good will [79];
- his formula for right action [80];
- illustrations of moral law [80 ff].
- —referred to: [14]; [78]; [212]; [221]; [235].
- Kantianism—compared with hedonism [82 ff].
- —its practical breakdown [90].
- Knowledge—moral effect of advance in [207].
- —socializes wants [237].
- —see [art].
- Laurie, S. S.—quoted: on happiness [66].
- —referred to: [227].
- [Law]—utilitarian use of [58]; [61 ff].
- —Kant's moral, formal [78].
- —relation to desire [94].
- —realized in institutions [172]; [174].
- —of the 'is', not merely of the 'ought' [175].
- —idea of, in general [195].
- —see [obligation].
- Lawlessness—involved in morality [216].
- Leckey—referred to: [66].
- Limitation—the basis of moral strength [128].
- Lincoln, A.—anecdote regarding [28].
- Lotze—referred to: [16]; [166].
- Love—the union of duty and desire [154].
- Martineau, J.—quoted: on the difficulty of the hedonistic calculus [38].
- —referred to: [42]; [78]; [158]; [166]; [227].
- Maurice, F. D.—referred to: [191].
- Merit—means social desert [225].
- Mill, J. S.—criticizes Kant [91].
- —his equivoke of pleasure and pleasant thing [20].
- —his fallacy [56].
- —introduces quality of pleasure into hedonism [42]; [46].
- —quoted: pleasure self-evident criterion [16];
- end of desire [17];
- on rules of morality [39 ff];
- on moral tribunal [48];
- on utilitarian standard [53];
- on importance of law and education [59];
- on social feeling [63 ff].
- —referred to: [25]; [30]; [49].
- Morality—sphere of as broad as conduct [2]; [154].
- —not dependent upon an individual's wish [167 ff].
- —realized in institutions [170].
- —struggle for private, bad [202].
- —in the nature of things [233].
- [Motive]—defined [5].
- —two elements in [10].
- —determined by character [28].
- —never bad according to hedonism [33].
- —formal and legislative according to Kant [80].
- —not a subjective mood [232].
- Norms—in philosophy [1].
- [Obligation]—in conflict with pleasure [76 ff].
- —how related to function [138].
- —theories regarding [139].
- —distinct from coercion [144].
- —enforced, not created by power [145].
- —Kantian idea of criticized [148].
- —does not relate simply to what ought to be, but is not [151]; [174 ff].
- —relation to conscience [183].
- —how made known [190 ff].
- —practical value of sense of [196].
- —must be individualized [197]; [201].
- —when opposed to desire [213]; [216].
- —the union with desire the moral ideal [234].
- —see [desire], [law] and [universal].
- Pater—referred to: [66].
- Pathological—all inclination, according to Kant [86].
- —opposed to active [212].
- Paulsen—referred to: [67]; [111].
- [Person]—is one capable of conduct [97].
- Pleasure—an element in activity [24].
- —not the moving spring to action [26].
- —sum of, dependent on objective conditions [44 ff].
- —quality of, similarly dependent [47 ff].
- —may symbolize action [51].
- —general, a vague idea [62].
- —fixed by social relations [65]; [77].
- —not a sufficient guide at present [75].
- —dependent on self-realization [83].
- —all right action involves [228].
- —see [desire] and [hedonism].
- Postulate—moral, defined [129 ff].
- —equals Golden Rule [205].
- Problem—moral [3].
- Progress—necessary in moral action [135 ff].
- —moral, nature of [209].
- Prudence—not outside moral sphere [105].
- Reason—opposed to desire by Kant [147].
- —Kant's conception too immediate [150].
- —practical, idea of [191].
- Reformation—possibility of [162 ff].
- Relativity—of morals, means what [136].
- [Responsibility]—nature of [160 ff].
- —of parents and children [203].
- Reverence—Kant regards as sole moral feeling [86].
- [Rights]—exist by common will [172].
- Rousseau—his influence upon Kant [148].
- Royce, J.—referred to: [61]; [111].
- Rule—moral, not a command [204].
- —a tool of analysis [204].
- Satisfaction—moral, creates new wants [208].
- —good and bad [217].
- Science—nature of interest in [111].
- —the preëminent moral means [237].
- —see [art].
- Schurman, J. G.—referred to: [78].
- Self—interest in [105 ff].
- —involves sympathy [109].
- —dualism in self, how arises [216].
- —knowledge of [237].
- Selfishness—involved in immorality [216].
- Self-sacrifice—its moral nature [222].
- Sentimentality—immoral [113].
- —escape from, only through knowledge [120].
- —results from abstract idea of duty [157].
- —refined, equals sensuality [220].
- Shakespeare—quoted: on common good [131].
- Sidgwick, H.—quoted: on the hedonistic assumption [43];
- on utilitarian standard [53];
- on intuitional utilitarianism [54].
- —referred to: [14]; [16]; [18]; [66]; [111]; [227].
- [Society]—its moral influence [146]; [157].
- —its relation to obligation [152].
- —constituted by moral relationships [175].
- —development of, changes moral ideals [207].
- —see [common good], [institutions].
- Socrates—author of idea of reflective conscience [188].
- —initiator of modern ethical spirit [237].
- Sorley—referred to: [78]; [111].
- Sovereignty—exists in common will and good [171].
- —ultimate possessed in humanity [173].
- Spencer, H.—believes in fixed social ideal [73 ff].; [235].
- —quoted: on pleasure as a necessary effect [68];
- not immediate object of desire [69];
- egoism and altruism [70 ff].;
- on ideal man [73];
- equilibrium of functions [74];
- on obligation [142]; [143].
- —referred to: [16]; [67]; [72]; [73]; [74]; [75]; [76]; [111]; [125]; [235].
- Stephen, L.—quoted: on feeling as universal motive [27];
- on sympathy [109 ff].
- —referred to: [16]; [25]; [67]; [68]; [78]; [111]; [165]; [227].
- Struggle—when morality is a [212].
- —changed by Christianity into movement [225].
- —see [conflict].
- Sully, J.—referred to: [17].
- [Theory]—ethical and conduct [1].
- —ethical, sub-divided [13].
- —ethical, not casuistry [89].
- —value of [186].
- [Universal]—a, lacking in hedonism [37].
- —Kant's emphasis of [80].
- —Kant's, formal [80]; [85]; [90].
- —Kant's, leads to conflict [87].
- —true, equals organization, [88]; [90]; [96].
- —bad action cannot be [221].
- —means a method, not a thing [136].
- —found in movement of character [234].
- —see [law].
- Utilitarianism—is universalistic hedonism [13]; [53].
- —defined by Mill, Sidgwick, Bain, [53].
- —criticized [54 ff].
- —assumes social order [63 ff].
- —combined with evolution [67].
- Virtue—change in nature of [211].
- —correlative to duty [225].
- —distinguished from merit [226].
- —is an interest of character [228].
- —two types of [229].
- —cardinal [230].
- Wants—see [desires].
- Wilson (and Fowler)—referred to: [67].
- Will—Kant's good will [79].
Transcriber's Corrections:
| page | original text | correction |
| [17] | endquote missing | |
| [20] | sweat-meats | sweet-meats |
| [24] | becoms | becomes |
| [35] | suprise | surprise |
| [38] | the the | the |
| [38] | cicumstances | circumstances |
| [42] | pleasnres | pleasures |
| [47] | agreableness | agreeableness |
| [68] | Ehtics | Ethics |
| [74] | endquote missing | |
| [83] | of | as |
| [92] | expressily | expressly |
| [124] | and and | and |
| [156] | what what | what |
| [183] | LVIX | LIX |
| [192] | superflous | superfluous |
| [251] | entry Society missing in original | |