INDEX.

Absolute—and relative Ethics, according to Spencer [72].
Accountability—See [responsibility.]
[Activity]—human, the subject-matter of ethics [1 ff].
—the object of desire [21 ff].
—the standard of pleasure [45]; [50].
—equals exercise of function [101].
—opposed to mere possession [209]; [215]; [218]; [220].
—two sides of [219].
—see [freedom].
Æsthetic feelings—may be moral [199].
—see [art].
Agent—moral, one capable of acting from ideas [3].
—see [person].
Alexander, S.—quoted: on idea of sum of pleasures [46].
—referred to: [9]; [46]; [77]; [111]; [134]; [158]; [165]; [202]; [216]; [221]; [227].
[Altruism]—how identified with egoism [59].
—reconciled, by Spencer, with egoism [70 ff].
—conflicts, at present, with egoism [76].
—older moralists termed benevolence [195].
—not necessarily moral [107].
—not disguised selfishness [109].
—may equal charity [125].
Amusements—moral nature of [133].
Approbation—nature of [161].
Aristotle—quoted: on pleasure [18];
on pleasure and character [29];
on the mean [136].
—referred to: [31].
[Art] (and Science)—nature of interest in [111].
—distinction of fine and useful [112].
—interest in, why moral [113 ff].
—interest in, really social [118 ff].
—life an, [120].
—essentially dynamic [126].
Asceticism—means formalism [94].
—element of truth in [95].
—results when interest is excluded [106].
Aspiration—involved in morality [213]; [222].
Autonomy—Kant's conception of justified [149].
Badness—of environment a factor in right action [176]; [224].
—its source and factors [214].
—its relation to goodness [223].
—potential and actual [223].
—of good people [232].
Bain, A.—quoted: that pleasure is a self-evident criterion [16];
his definition of utilitarianism [53];
on obligation [140]; [141].
—referred to: [17]; [66]; [227].
Barratt—quoted: that all pleasure is individual [14].
Baseness—why badness becomes [219].
Benevolence—see [altruism].
Bentham, J.—quoted: pleasure both criterion and motive [15];
self-evident criterion [16];
all motives good [34 ff].;
hedonistic calculus [36 ff].;
identity of individual and general pleasure [57 ff].;
influence of law [59].
—referred to: [53].
Birks—referred to: [66].
Blackie, J. S.—referred to: [66].
Bradley, F. H.—quoted: on pleasure and desire [21];
scientific interest not necessarily social [122];
on merely individual conscience [189].
—referred to: [25]; [26]; [42]; [48]; [54]; [91]; [124]; [134]; [165]; [221].
Browning, R.—referred to: [111].
Butler—Bishop, quoted: on conscience [167].
—referred to: [110].
Caird, E.—quoted: on collision of moral ends [88].
—referred to: [21]; [82]; [87]; [91]; [92]; [93]; [95]; [109]; [111]; [149]; [165].
Calderwood—referred to: [158]; [166].
[Capacity]—its relation to environment [97].
—increased by moral action [206].
Carlyle, T.—referred to: [128].
Casuistry—inevitable, if moral end is not wholly social [119].
[Character]—reciprocal with conduct [9].
—the source of motive, desire and moral pleasure [26 ff].
—separated from conduct by hedonists [32 ff].
—and virtues [227 ff].
—see [capacity], [conduct], [interests] and [motive].
Charity—idea of, involves social inequality [125].
Christianity—ethical influence of [224].
—has no specific ethical code [231].
Coit, S.—referred to: [28]; [66].
Commands—moral value of: [203].
[Common Good]—an ethical ideal [51].
—not furnished by hedonism [60].
—not furnished by Kant [91].
—why necessarily involved in morality [117]; [217]; [222].
—demands reciprocal satisfaction of individual and society [127].
—its existence postulated by moral conduct [130].
—results from exercise of function [168].
—constituted by activity [169 ff].
—realized in institutions [173].
—development of [210].
—see [institutions] and [society].
Comprehensiveness—growth of, in moral end [210 ff].
[Conduct]—defined [3].
—relation to consequences [7].
—relation to character [9].
—an individual system [133].
—a social system [136].
—how related to character [163].
—see [activity], [consequences], [character] and [motive].
[Conflict]—of moral ends [88 ff].
—morality has an aspect of [151]; [227].
Conscience—Bain's idea of [141].
—equals consciousness of action [181].
—elements in [182].
—not a special faculty [183].
—kinds of [183 ff].
—not merely individual [188].
Conscientiousness—nature of [199].
—does not equal introspection [200].
—nor application of code [201].
—a cardinal virtue [232].
[Consequences]—moral value of [7 ff].; [84]; [114]; [160].
—excluded from morality by Kantianism [13]; [29].
—identified with moral value by hedonism [33].
—responsibility for [160].
Criterion—hedonistic is pleasure [15].
—criticism of hedonistic [31 ff].
—two ends to be met by every [32].
—of higher and lower pleasures [49 ff].
—when pleasure may be a [50].
—Mill's really social [63].
—Spencer's really social [73].
—Kant's nominally formal [79 ff].
—the real [132 ff].
—its elasticity [135].
Darwin, C.—referred to: [78].
Demoralization—involved in badness [220].
[Desire]—pleasure as end of [16]; [18 ff].
—defined [19].
—how spiritualized [23].
—not purely pleasurable [27].
—an expression of character [28].
—excluded from moral motive by Kant [79].
—all or no involved in morality [94].
—relation to pleasure [83].
—particular, an abstraction [96].
—how distinguished from interest [103].
—opposed to reason by Kant [147].
—when opposed to moral action [148]; [155]; [213]; [216].
—how socialized, [237].
Dewey, J.—referred to: [25]; [78]; [194].
Disinterestedness—equals full interest [107].
—an aspect of cardinal virtue [232].
Disposition—Bentham on [35].
Dualism—the Kantian [148 ff].
Duty—see [obligation].
Egoism—see [altruism].
Empiricism—Spencer's reconciliation with intuitionalism [69 ff].
End—moral: see [common good]; [function]; [motive].
Environment—defined by relation to capacity [99 ff].
—meaning of adjustment to [115 ff].
—moral, exists in institutions [171].
—badness of, an element in right action [176]; [190].
—enlarged by moral action [207].
Ethical World—discussed [167 ff].
—nature illustrated [168].
—relation to moral law [174].
—see [Institutions].
Ethics—defined [1].
—divided [3].
—its object according to Spencer [68].
—see [theory].
Evolution, Theory of—combined with hedonism [67 ff].
—not really hedonistic [71 ff].
—its real standard objective [72].
Faith—a factor in moral progress [123]; [127 ff].
—in humanity, meaning of [129].
—why demanded in moral action [217]; [222].
Feelings—natural and moral [5 ff].; [25 ff].; [87].
—sympathetic relied upon by utilitarians [57].
—necessary in moral activity [85].
—active, equal interests [102].
—moral, defined by end [108];
see also [motive].
—value of [195 ff].
—moral, not too narrowly limited [199].
[Freedom]—is object of desire [24].
—equals exercise of function [138].
—various aspects of [158].
—of choice defined [159].
—of indifference discussed [161 ff].
—actualized in rights [172]; [174].
—positive, realized in virtues [229].
[Function]—union of capacity and circumstance in act [103].
—freedom found in exercise of [164 ff].
Gizycki—referred to: [66].
God—an external, cannot be the source of obligation [149].
Goethe—referred to: [128].
Golden Rule—identified by Mill with principle of utilitarianism [59].
—gives no directions as to conduct [204].
—is a concrete statement of ethical postulate [205].
Green, T. H.—quoted: on desire and pleasure [21];
on sum of pleasures [43];
on nature of happiness [45];
on conscientiousness [200]; [202];
on goodness [215].
—referred to: [9]; [25]; [42]; [54]; [110]; [158]; [165].
Grote, J.—referred to: [66]; [158].
Guyau—referred to: [66]; [143].
[Hedonism]—defined [14 ff].
—its paradox [25].
—confuses feeling and idea [26]; [43 ff].
—summarized [30].
—all motives good [33].
—its calculus [36].
—fails to provide laws [39 ff].
—its contrast with Kantianism [82 ff].
—its treatment of obligation [140 ff].
—is correct in holding rightness to be pleasurable [228].
—truth and falsity in [234].
Hegel—quoted: on reflective conscience [188];
on merely individual conscience [189].
Hinton, J.—quoted: on altruism [109];
on badness [216].
—referred to: [202].
Hodgson, S. H.—referred to: [14].
Idealism—when feeble [128].
Ideals—moral, progressive, [206].
Imperative, Categorical—of Kant [147].
—of conscience [191].
Impulse—and pleasure [17].
—and desire [22].
—nature of action from [159].
—see [desire].
Individuality—defined [97].
—not identical with inner side alone [98].
—evils of defining from this standpoint [110].
—made by function [131].
—realized is autonomy [150].
—realized is freedom [164].
—growth in [210].
—see [freedom] and [rights].
[Institutions]—nature of [169 ff].
—sovereignty, rights and law inhere in [171 ff].
—influence of, upon conscience [184]; [189].
—movement of, the source of duties, [194].
—see [common good] and [society].
[Interests]—are functions on personal side [102 ff].
—classified and discussed [104 ff].
—social, involve science and art [123 ff].
—realized in institutions [170].
—their relation to conscience [198].
—pure, are virtue [228].
—the active element of [218].
—the freeing of, the moral goal [233].
James, Sr., H.—referred to: [202].
James, Wm.—quoted: on pleasure and desire [20].
—referred to: [77].
Kant—agrees with hedonism as to end of desire [79].
—his end an abstraction [84].
—his practical ideal that of Mill and Spencer [93].
—value of his theory [93].
—his theory of obligation [147].
—his conception of autonomy [149].
—his idea of duty [156].
—his conception of practical reason [191].
—quoted: on pleasure [47];
on pleasure as common good [52];
on priority of duty to good [78];
on good will [79];
his formula for right action [80];
illustrations of moral law [80 ff].
—referred to: [14]; [78]; [212]; [221]; [235].
Kantianism—compared with hedonism [82 ff].
—its practical breakdown [90].
Knowledge—moral effect of advance in [207].
—socializes wants [237].
—see [art].
Laurie, S. S.—quoted: on happiness [66].
—referred to: [227].
[Law]—utilitarian use of [58]; [61 ff].
—Kant's moral, formal [78].
—relation to desire [94].
—realized in institutions [172]; [174].
—of the 'is', not merely of the 'ought' [175].
—idea of, in general [195].
—see [obligation].
Lawlessness—involved in morality [216].
Leckey—referred to: [66].
Limitation—the basis of moral strength [128].
Lincoln, A.—anecdote regarding [28].
Lotze—referred to: [16]; [166].
Love—the union of duty and desire [154].
Martineau, J.—quoted: on the difficulty of the hedonistic calculus [38].
—referred to: [42]; [78]; [158]; [166]; [227].
Maurice, F. D.—referred to: [191].
Merit—means social desert [225].
Mill, J. S.—criticizes Kant [91].
—his equivoke of pleasure and pleasant thing [20].
—his fallacy [56].
—introduces quality of pleasure into hedonism [42]; [46].
—quoted: pleasure self-evident criterion [16];
end of desire [17];
on rules of morality [39 ff];
on moral tribunal [48];
on utilitarian standard [53];
on importance of law and education [59];
on social feeling [63 ff].
—referred to: [25]; [30]; [49].
Morality—sphere of as broad as conduct [2]; [154].
—not dependent upon an individual's wish [167 ff].
—realized in institutions [170].
—struggle for private, bad [202].
—in the nature of things [233].
[Motive]—defined [5].
—two elements in [10].
—determined by character [28].
—never bad according to hedonism [33].
—formal and legislative according to Kant [80].
—not a subjective mood [232].
Norms—in philosophy [1].
[Obligation]—in conflict with pleasure [76 ff].
—how related to function [138].
—theories regarding [139].
—distinct from coercion [144].
—enforced, not created by power [145].
—Kantian idea of criticized [148].
—does not relate simply to what ought to be, but is not [151]; [174 ff].
—relation to conscience [183].
—how made known [190 ff].
—practical value of sense of [196].
—must be individualized [197]; [201].
—when opposed to desire [213]; [216].
—the union with desire the moral ideal [234].
—see [desire], [law] and [universal].
Pater—referred to: [66].
Pathological—all inclination, according to Kant [86].
—opposed to active [212].
Paulsen—referred to: [67]; [111].
[Person]—is one capable of conduct [97].
Pleasure—an element in activity [24].
—not the moving spring to action [26].
—sum of, dependent on objective conditions [44 ff].
—quality of, similarly dependent [47 ff].
—may symbolize action [51].
—general, a vague idea [62].
—fixed by social relations [65]; [77].
—not a sufficient guide at present [75].
—dependent on self-realization [83].
—all right action involves [228].
—see [desire] and [hedonism].
Postulate—moral, defined [129 ff].
—equals Golden Rule [205].
Problem—moral [3].
Progress—necessary in moral action [135 ff].
—moral, nature of [209].
Prudence—not outside moral sphere [105].
Reason—opposed to desire by Kant [147].
—Kant's conception too immediate [150].
—practical, idea of [191].
Reformation—possibility of [162 ff].
Relativity—of morals, means what [136].
[Responsibility]—nature of [160 ff].
—of parents and children [203].
Reverence—Kant regards as sole moral feeling [86].
[Rights]—exist by common will [172].
Rousseau—his influence upon Kant [148].
Royce, J.—referred to: [61]; [111].
Rule—moral, not a command [204].
—a tool of analysis [204].
Satisfaction—moral, creates new wants [208].
—good and bad [217].
Science—nature of interest in [111].
—the preëminent moral means [237].
—see [art].
Schurman, J. G.—referred to: [78].
Self—interest in [105 ff].
—involves sympathy [109].
—dualism in self, how arises [216].
—knowledge of [237].
Selfishness—involved in immorality [216].
Self-sacrifice—its moral nature [222].
Sentimentality—immoral [113].
—escape from, only through knowledge [120].
—results from abstract idea of duty [157].
—refined, equals sensuality [220].
Shakespeare—quoted: on common good [131].
Sidgwick, H.—quoted: on the hedonistic assumption [43];
on utilitarian standard [53];
on intuitional utilitarianism [54].
—referred to: [14]; [16]; [18]; [66]; [111]; [227].
[Society]—its moral influence [146]; [157].
—its relation to obligation [152].
—constituted by moral relationships [175].
—development of, changes moral ideals [207].
—see [common good], [institutions].
Socrates—author of idea of reflective conscience [188].
—initiator of modern ethical spirit [237].
Sorley—referred to: [78]; [111].
Sovereignty—exists in common will and good [171].
—ultimate possessed in humanity [173].
Spencer, H.—believes in fixed social ideal [73 ff].; [235].
—quoted: on pleasure as a necessary effect [68];
not immediate object of desire [69];
egoism and altruism [70 ff].;
on ideal man [73];
equilibrium of functions [74];
on obligation [142]; [143].
—referred to: [16]; [67]; [72]; [73]; [74]; [75]; [76]; [111]; [125]; [235].
Stephen, L.—quoted: on feeling as universal motive [27];
on sympathy [109 ff].
—referred to: [16]; [25]; [67]; [68]; [78]; [111]; [165]; [227].
Struggle—when morality is a [212].
—changed by Christianity into movement [225].
—see [conflict].
Sully, J.—referred to: [17].
[Theory]—ethical and conduct [1].
—ethical, sub-divided [13].
—ethical, not casuistry [89].
—value of [186].
[Universal]—a, lacking in hedonism [37].
—Kant's emphasis of [80].
—Kant's, formal [80]; [85]; [90].
—Kant's, leads to conflict [87].
—true, equals organization, [88]; [90]; [96].
—bad action cannot be [221].
—means a method, not a thing [136].
—found in movement of character [234].
—see [law].
Utilitarianism—is universalistic hedonism [13]; [53].
—defined by Mill, Sidgwick, Bain, [53].
—criticized [54 ff].
—assumes social order [63 ff].
—combined with evolution [67].
Virtue—change in nature of [211].
—correlative to duty [225].
—distinguished from merit [226].
—is an interest of character [228].
—two types of [229].
—cardinal [230].
Wants—see [desires].
Wilson (and Fowler)—referred to: [67].
Will—Kant's good will [79].

Transcriber's Corrections:

page	original text	correction
[17]	endquote missing
[20]	sweat-meats	sweet-meats
[24]	becoms	becomes
[35]	suprise	surprise
[38]	the the	the
[38]	cicumstances	circumstances
[42]	pleasnres	pleasures
[47]	agreableness	agreeableness
[68]	Ehtics	Ethics
[74]	endquote missing
[83]	of	as
[92]	expressily	expressly
[124]	and and	and
[156]	what what	what
[183]	LVIX	LIX
[192]	superflous	superfluous
[251]	entry Society missing in original