PROPOSED SCHEDULE
1st, 2d and 3d Days.
1st week
| A. M. | |
| 6-30 to 7-45 | Drill for instructors and officers only. |
| 7 to 7-30 | Callisthenics. |
| 8 to 8-45 | School of the soldier without arms. |
| 9 to 9-45 | Same. |
| 10 to 10-30 | Callisthenics. |
| 10 to 10-45 | Drill for officers and instructors. |
| 11 to 11-45 | Verbal. |
| P. M. | |
| 1 to 1-45 | School of the soldier without arms. |
| 2 to 2-45 | Same. |
| 3 to 3-45 | Same. |
| 4 to 4-30 | Callisthenics. |
| 4 to 5-00 | Drill for officers and instructors. |
| 7 | School to last from ½ to ¾ of an hour at first, later the time to be extended. |
4th and 5th Days and Morning of the 6th Day.
The same as above except that the drill from 9 to 9-45 A. M. and 2 to 2-45 P. M. will be in the manual of arms.
Some camp guards will probably be necessary. This should be done by platoon and this time on guard used to the utmost to teach this duty.
2d week
2d Week.—During this week drills will be in the school of the soldier without and with arms, the proportion with arms steadily increasing.
Commencing Thursday one-half hour each half-day will be pointing and aiming drill.
| A. M. | |
| 6-30 to 7-45 | Drill for officers and instructors. |
| 7-00 to 7-30 | Callisthenics. |
| 8-00 to 9-15 | Drill—school of the soldier. |
| 9-30 to 10-15 | Verbal. |
| 10-30 to 11-45 | Drill. |
| P. M. | |
| 1-00 to 2-00 | Drill for officers and instructors. |
| 1-30 to 2-00 | Callisthenics. |
| 2-15 to 3-45 | Drill |
| 4-00 to 4-30 | Callisthenics. |
| 4-00 to 5-00 | Drill for officers and instructors. |
| 7-00 | School. |
3d week
3d Week.—Squads combined in pairs. Drill will be with arms. Part of each drill will be pointing and aiming drill and extended order, close order work being continued. Beginning Thursday an aggregate of half an hour daily will be given to bayonet exercise. The drill must be varied, change made every 15 or 20 minutes.
| A. M. | |
| 7-00 to 7-30 | Callisthenics. |
| 6-30 to 7-45 | Drill for officers. |
| 8-00 to 10-45 | Drill. |
| 11-00 to 11-45 | Verbal. |
| P. M. | |
| 1-00 to 3-45 | Drill. |
| 4-00 to 5-00 | Monday and Wednesday—estimating distance. |
| Tuesday and Thursday—intrenching, using the small tools. | |
| Friday—Instruction in guard duty by company. | |
| 7-00 | School. |
4th week
4th Week.—Squads are combined into full platoons. Five or six men are selected from each company to form the signal detachment of the company. These men are required to do at least one hour’s work a day at this from now on until thoroughly proficient, and excused from a corresponding amount of other work, preferably police and close order in the afternoon.
| A. M. | |
| 7 to 11 DRILL | Each drill to be divided approximately as to time as follows: |
| 30 minutes pointing and aiming drill. | |
| 20 minutes bayonet exercise. | |
| 1 hour close order drill. | |
| Remainder of time extended order drill. | |
| 11 to 12 | All non-commissioned officers have gallery practice and instruction in use of range finder. |
| P. M. | |
| 1 to 4 DRILL | The best officers of the company for the work take one-half the non-commissioned officers of the company for work in patrolling. The two sections alternate as to days. Remainder of company will be divided into groups. All must have gallery practice at least 5 shots per man daily. Only one group at target at a time. |
| Each group to have estimating distance twice during week. Each group to have individual cooking twice. | |
| Each group to have one hour’s instruction during week in first aid and care of feet on a march. | |
| All to be taught to form for and pitch shelter tent camp. | |
| If the necessary masks and plastrons are available practice in bayonet fencing at least three times during week for each group. If no fencing rifles are available, poles the length of the rifle and bayonet, with a good pad fastened on the end, answer the purpose. If masks are not available bayonet exercise and close order drill will fill up the rest of the time. | |
| In arranging this work the best man for it should be put in charge of each class of work. | |
| 4 to — | Company formed with full kit, except rations and ammunition, and marched first day about twenty minutes, lengthening the time each day by 10 minutes. |
| 7 P. M. | School. |
5th Week.
5th week
| A. M. | |
| 7 to 11 | Drill same as last week. |
| 11 to 12 | Same as last week. |
| Gallery practice same as last week. | |
| Patrolling same as last week. | |
| First aid, same as last week. | |
| Estimating distance, once during week. | |
| Bayonet fencing or exercise for at least one hour during the week. | |
| P. M. | |
| 1 to 4 | Each platoon to be posted as a picket of an imaginary outpost line and men instructed twice during week. |
| 11 to 12 | Each squad as above once as a sentry squad. |
| A wall prepared and men given instruction in scaling it. | |
| Any time left over to be used as thought best. | |
| 4 to 5 | March with pack as before, giving instruction in advance and rear guard. |
| 7 | School. |
6th Week—Company.
6th week
Company
| A. M. | |
| 7 to 11 DRILL | One hour close order, remainder extended order drill. |
| Much practice in attack as explained in Chapter IV. | |
| 11 to 12 | Same as last week. |
| P. M. | |
| 1 to 4 | Gallery practice as last week, except on Friday. |
| Friday whole company as support of an outpost, sentinels and patrols carefully instructed. | |
| Each non-commissioned officer, twice during week, to conduct a patrol, instructing privates. | |
| Bayonet fencing and wall scaling as last week. | |
| Estimating distance as last week. | |
| Remainder of time teaching men brush work, hurdle revetment, fascines, etc. | |
| 4 to 5 | Same as last week. |
| 7 | School. |
| Saturday, formal inspection by company. |
7th Week—The Company.
7th week
Company
| A. M. | |
| 7 to 11 DRILL | As last week except that time given to close order may be reduced to 15 minutes daily. |
| 7 to 11 DRILL | At least two days must be given to maneuver of company against company. |
| All the men must fire 20 shots during the week at gallery practice at such times as found practicable without interfering with the prescribed program. | |
| P. M. | |
| 1 to 5 | Monday. Outpost, company as a support. |
| Friday. Practice march with instruction in patrolling, advance and rear guard, and attack and defense, either one company to work against another or enemy to be outlined. | |
| Estimating distance drill while out. Men must not march more than 10 miles nor less than 6. Packs will be carried. | |
| Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday. | |
| 1 to 3-30 | Patrolling at least once during week by each non-commissioned officer as leader. |
| Remainder of time to brush work, filling and piling sand bags, making loopholes and intrenching. | |
| 9 to 10 | Drill in dark as training for night work. |
| School as last week. | |
| Saturday, formal inspection by company. |
8th Week—Battalion.
8th week
Battalion
| A. M. | |
| 7 to 11 | Drill by Battalion. Not more than one hour of this time per day should be devoted to close order. Gallery practice, same as last week. |
| P. M. | |
| Tuesday and Thursday. | |
| 1 to 5 | March and instruction by battalion similar to that by company last week. Distance marched about 10 miles. |
| Monday. | |
| 1 to 5 | Tent pitching and making camp, including the large tents. |
| Wednesday and Friday. | |
| 1 to 3-30 | Field engineering. |
| Work same as last week. | |
| 9 to 10 | Night drill. |
| 6 | Monday, Wednesday, Friday, battalion dress parade. Each battalion once during week. School as usual. |
| Saturday morning, battalion review and inspection. |
9th week
target
practice
9th Week. Target practice on the range with ball cartridges.
If the pits are not large enough so that each company can have three targets, only part of the companies should go at a time so as to give that number of targets. It should be completed by end of 9th week and may have had to come earlier for some companies.
If the range is right at the instruction camp it would be much better to have the companies shoot only a couple of hours a day beginning with 7th week and reduce the other instruction by that much, but so that at the end of the 9th week the work accomplished is the same.
10th Week.
10th week
| A. M. | |
| 7 to 11 | Battalion drill all but 15 minutes daily, extended order work. Battalion against battalion at least twice. |
| P. M. | |
| 1 to 5 | Monday, battalion outpost instruction. |
| Wednesday, march by battalion with packs. Instruction as before. | |
| Tuesday and Thursday from 1 to 5 and Friday from 1 to 3 instruction by company. Gallery practice, pointing and aiming and estimating distance, each once. Bayonet work for one hour. Wall scaling once. Two patrol problems for each non-commissioned officer. Balance of time field engineering work as before. | |
| Friday 9 to 10 P. M. Night drill by battalion. | |
| Battalions in turn have battalion dress parade on Monday, Tuesday and Thursday. | |
| Saturday morning battalion review and inspection. | |
| School, 7 P. M. |
11th Week.
11th week
Regimental work. Colonel uses it to best advantage.
One afternoon practice march. Regimental dress parade 4 evenings. School, 7 P. M. as before.
Saturday, regimental review and inspection.
12th Week.
12th week practice march
A seven days’ practice march under war conditions with as much instruction as possible in field service, care of men, especially the feet, and of course in loading wagons, making and breaking camp.
Marches, especially the first two or three, must not be long.
13th Week.
13th week
Work each forenoon from 7 to 11-30 in what, by careful observation, the colonel finds is most needed.
No work in the afternoon except as follows:
Each man to have gallery practice once, ten shots. Each man to estimate distance once. Companies to have bayonet work for at least two half-hour periods each week and pointing and aiming drill once for some length of time.
Dress parade by regiment three times during week.
Regimental review and inspection Saturday.
School as usual.
Results of training
This regiment can be used at the end of this three months. It will not be completely nor even well trained but it is believed to be the best that can be done in that time.
Can we have even this much time without great sacrifice and loss? It is very doubtful, and yet it is not believed practicable to use volunteers with less training except in fortifications.
The work has been very strenuous for all; the weaklings will have been eliminated. Any one fit for a soldier in war could have stood the strain, and the others had better be eliminated before taking the field.
If at the end of our 13th week we find we have more time, the work for the week following should be reduced to three hours per day and the schools, after that we may resume the long days of work.
XI
RECRUITING
The method of recruiting has a decided influence on effective training. It is much harder to train a company whose recruits dribble in a few at a time than one, all of whose recruits for the year come in at once.
When recruits should join
The best results can be obtained if these recruits can all be had in the fall. As stated before, the course of instruction should run from November 1st to October 31st. In the indoor season all that part of the instruction course that can be given, should be. It should be preparatory to the outdoor work. The foundation of sound training should be laid during this season; the recruit can then be given his elementary instruction and be ready to begin the outdoor work with the company. The outdoor season is none too long in which to go through properly the whole course of work that should be taught outside.
If recruits are received late in the spring or summer they are not prepared to do the work with the company, they get only part of it and that in a way that does not give good results. It is like trying to teach Algebra first, then Arithmetic. Another drawback to this method is that it results in the captain’s not having all his company for this outdoor work. Our present peace strength is so low that correct training in parts is difficult and when much below this the training is very imperfect.
Recruit depots
Most, if not all, good captains very much prefer to have their recruits directly on enlistment to having them go to a depot for several weeks. The training they receive in these depots, in value, is out of all proportion to the time spent. In their companies, from the very start, while learning the recruit drill they are learning much else of value. The recruit is better off and more contented. In his company there is a personal feeling for him and interest in him not found at the depot.
The instruction and ways of doing things first learned are those of his company, not always the case at the depot. The few movements taught at the recruit depots must be taught exactly right if precise close order drill is to be had, it is harder to change a recruit’s ways of doing anything than to teach him the right way from the start. It has been suggested that if the depots are kept up, all drill thereat except callisthenics be prohibited.
Recruits dribbling in, waste effort. It is as much bother to a company to train and get one recruit into the company as a squad of eight. The large number of men held at these recruit depots would give a very desirable increase in strength to our companies if we could have them. The vaccinations that are attended to at the depots could just as well be done at the posts.
Plan of recruiting
The following is offered as a plan of recruiting that it is believed, would improve that branch of the service and greatly improve the training of our infantry:
All recruiting stations and recruit depots in time of peace to be abolished.
Each regiment in the U. S. to be assigned a permanent district within which its recruits are to be found. The regiment may never be stationed inside this district but its recruits are all to come from there.
Early in November of each year, each regimental commander to select a few recruiting parties composed of an officer and three or four men from his regiment to beat up this district for recruits. They should visit the small towns as well as have stations in the larger ones. Before enlistment the recruits to be physically examined by a doctor, either of the Medical Corps or one hired in the district.
These recruits are to be sent directly to their regiments in detachments as enlisted and their training commenced.
As there are many young men who will not enlist for service in the U. S., but do want to go on foreign service, each home regiment will, in addition to getting its own recruits, be given the task of getting a certain number for the Philippines, Hawaii and Panama, the number being allotted by the War Department. Men reënlisting should be sent, as far as practicable, to foreign service. These latter will be sent to designated posts and held long enough to be properly equipped, vaccinated, etc., and then be sent to their regiments.
Large cities like New York and Chicago should not be assigned to a single regiment but three or four regiments to have stations there and part of the outlying districts to be theirs to beat up.
These recruiting parties to remain out until they have completed their quotas then to return to their stations, but never later than February 1st.
Advantages of plan
This plan offers several advantages and some disadvantages, but is believed to be an improvement.
Its advantages are:
All the recruits of the company come in at one season and that the best one.
They come directly to the company on enlistment.
Companies can be larger without increasing strength of army.
The officer enlisting them belongs to the regiment as does his recruiting party and will exercise more care to get only suitable men.
The recruiting will be more widely distributed and as the men go back to their homes knowledge of the service, and trained men in case of war, will be generally distributed.
Fewer men from the slums of the big cities and more from small towns and rural districts.
The men of a regiment coming from one locality, year after year, a friendly feeling for the regiment should be built up and future recruiting assisted and, in case of a great war, every section will have its nucleus of trained men.
Discipline will be improved and desertion diminished. The men will realize that their comrades are from their home section and people at home will know of their misdeeds. Besides it is pleasanter for the men to serve with those they have known before.
It cannot be asserted without a trial that this method will be cheaper than the present one but the author believes it will be.
To send out these recruiting parties will be a considerable expense but to offset this there is the cost of the present recruiting stations for rent, the difference in the cost of commutation paid and actual cost at posts, the travelling expenses incurred sending recruits to depots, often in an opposite direction from that to their future posts, the costs of keeping up these depots, a large amount, the loss of the service of all the recruiting personnel for any other valuable purpose during the year as well as the cost for the time lost in training of all the recruits.
The recruiting parties sent out by the regiments are taken from trained men at the season when they can be best spared and probably they would be absent but for a relatively short time.
If this plan be adopted the method will work better each year. The men who have gone back, and even those in the ranks, can and will help in the recruiting, and as the number of these increase recruiting will be more easily and quickly done. Each village will know that the party will visit it at a certain season and many will be ready at once.
It will be more expensive the first year or two than afterwards. The saving on deserters should be large after the first two or three years.
Discussion of objections
There are two apparent objections. That there will be no large number of recruits in hand to be sent to particular regiments in an emergency. This is of small consequence. Where the regiment is wanted for a sudden emergency, the adding of a large number of raw recruits is of no immediate advantage.
Suspending recruiting February 1st may result at first in some regiments not being filled up but this is doubtful. Most of our original enlistments at present are made in winter, and this would be offset, if it does occur, by the other advantages enumerated.
Convenience of administration and keeping records should have no weight as against efficient training for action, the only reason for our army’s existence.
Possible modification
If the infantry cannot have the above system the following modification would improve matters.
Each company to receive recruits but once during the year, each in its turn and regiments as nearly at one time as practicable. The recruits to be sent out within one week of their receipt at the depots except those for foreign service. If the peace strength of the companies be kept at 65, when the company is assigned recruits it should be filled to a strength of 80 it will then average about 65 for the year possibly a few more. It is not believed the total enlisted strength of the army would be increased at all. It would amount to having the men with companies instead of in recruit depots.
The above will enable the captains to do much better training and greater efficiency will result.
Of course those who receive their recruits in October or November would have a great advantage over the others but all could do better work.
Recruits enlisted in summer could be held much longer than others and then, about September 1st, sent to the regiments stationed in the tropics. It is more comfortable for the recruits if they can reach those stations in the fall and get their first hard drills and become acclimated while weather conditions are most favorable. This would give the regiments at home their recruits at a favorable season if not the best for all of them.
Need for a change of system
Either of the above changes can be made by a change in regulations and orders.
With our great population and military needs and very small army it is folly not to use what army we have so as to be as well prepared for war as conditions permit.
In the preceding chapter it has been shown how important it is that we have some trained men for every new regiment. We must have trained men to fill the regular army which must bear the brunt of the first attack.
The present law does not provide this. The enlistment law should be radically changed to get the best results for training, general efficiency and preparedness for war.
Enlistment law
All men should enlist for 5 years. At the end of one year’s honest and faithful service, except when serving beyond the limits of the U. S., the man should, on his application, be granted a furlough for the remaining four years; if war breaks out, or becomes so imminent as to call for mobilization, these furloughs to cease and the men to rejoin. The men to have the privilege of remaining on in the service if they so desire and of taking their furloughs at the end of any completed year of service. Discharges not to be given the men until the end of their full five years. Hence these men can not reënlist in another organization while on furlough, and there can be no doubt of their status and liability for punishment as deserters if they fail to rejoin when called.
Men on furlough
For the present, men should not be required to take the furlough and reënlistment should not be prohibited, but remaining in service with the colors over two years in time of peace should not be encouraged; later, if found practicable to get sufficient recruits, reënlistment for all, except non-commissioned officers and certain mechanics who first enlist after that date, should be prohibited. Men who have enlisted with the understanding that they can remain in service until retired, provided they behave themselves properly and are physically fit, should be honestly treated; they have an implied contract at the least.
Time on furlough not to count for retirement or increase of pay, and men on such furlough not to be counted in strength of company.
Recruits on foreign service should have the privilege of the furlough only after two years service, and men with regiments in the U. S. who wish to remain in the service, after one year’s service should be encouraged or required to transfer to foreign service for the next two years.
Men whose service in their first year has not been satisfactory and who are not fairly trained should be required to serve two years before being granted a furlough. The law should also provide that men, whose conduct is found unsatisfactory by a board of officers and the finding is approved by the colonel, may be furloughed at any time after two years service whether the man desires it or not.
It is believed the plan would work if no pay were given men on furlough, but if each be paid ten dollars each six months on reporting his address by mail to the adjutant of the post it would help in finding him when wanted and might be an inducement to some to enlist.
An effort should be made to get young men as recruits. Boys of eighteen or over if physically strong should be encouraged to enlist. Young men are easier to train and for a longer time afterwards are available for service.
We need a reserve but no men should be enlisted directly for it. The reserve for the regular service should be our men on furlough. Men too long out of service and advanced in years are not what is needed for the regular service which must be ready at short notice to face serious war.
Reasons for enlistment plan
The reasons for the foregoing recommendations as they appear to the author are:
1. Five years is as long as the average man is willing to pledge his future for military service unless he means to make it a life occupation. The latter class is not the best for the government. Young men are the best for the ranks in time of war. Men who serve only long enough to be trained for the work are to be desired. It results in a much greater number of trained men being available in time of war and is much cheaper, for it reduces current pay and the retired list.
2. The great importance of having as many trained men as possible and having them dispersed through the country to help in the formation of the new regiments at the outbreak of war is apparent to any one who thinks on this subject.
3. If recruits be received during the winter months only, the organizations can follow a prescribed course of instruction and complete it annually. If recruits dribble in throughout the year a proper course of instruction cannot be satisfactorily given in that time.
4. At the outbreak of war, it is of vital importance that we have as strong a force as possible of men fully ready trained and equipped. The losses at first in this force will be heavy. If green recruits, enough to fill the regular organizations to war strength and to make good the early losses, be poured in on them they will cease to be trained organizations. A reserve is a necessity. This will provide it at small cost.
5. Many excellent and patriotic young men are willing to serve a short time in the army for the experience and training. Four years, however, is longer than they are willing to postpone settling down to their real life’s work. These are the men it is most desirable to get into the army, not as professional soldiers, but as a trained reserve for war. For the first years they are a reserve for the regular companies, then they become available for officers or non-commissioned officers of volunteers. This class of young men will enlist much more freely when they can do so and lose only one year from civil pursuits.
6. Enlisting men as young as they are physically fit interferes less with their civil careers, hence will get us more desirable recruits. The physical and mental discipline a boy thus gets will help him in his future work and the younger he gets it, so long as it does not interfere with his schooling, the more it will be worth to him. Taking the recruit young, the five years while his military service is with the regulars are the five best for that purpose. Later when older, more developed mentally and matured in judgment he is best in higher rank than private with the volunteers. If he enters at 18 he is available at 23 for the volunteers or national guard and has at least seven years left in which he can be considered at his best.
7. The provision for letting men out at the end of one year, provided their conduct has been good and they are fairly instructed, will be a great aid to discipline and a preventative of desertion. A good many young men enter the service thoughtlessly and find after a few weeks that the life is different from what they expected. They look ahead to over three years more of it and the weak ones desert. They are not vicious nor criminal as a rule but this step injures them seriously; they become prisoners or fugitives, and either will decrease the man’s moral stamina and self respect. This provision will greatly reduce this. The man will see that he has only to behave himself for the rest of the year to return to civil life with a clean record. The great expense resulting from desertion will be largely eliminated. The men will be more contented, they will feel they can leave in a short time if they wish, which will tend to decrease the desire to quit. This does not prevent those staying in the service who wish to do so. A few old soldiers are desirable.
Less than one year’s training is not sufficient in which to cover properly the course the infantry soldier should have. Two years is necessary to make a good job of it. But we need more men who can be used in war. With some thoroughly trained men in the ranks it is believed better to have 100 others of one year’s training than fifty of two or more.
Enlistments for the national guard
The national guard should have the same period of five years for enlistment with a provision for inactive service, except in war, after two years of service, unless the man has had service in some other organization, as a college battalion. Less than two years is not enough training to be of value where so little time per year is devoted to it.
While it has nothing to do with training, there is another provision that should be in the enlistment law; that is, that every man who enlists for five years, and is in service when war breaks out, shall be liable for service for at least one year thereafter no matter when his term expires. At the outbreak of a great war is no time to discharge trained men.
XII
IN CONCLUSION
Relative values
Time is wasted at most posts on some things that are of little value compared with the time spent on them.
“Butt’s Manual” is fine callisthenic drill and at proper times should be practiced. It would be just as valuable and even more so if, instead of having the men learn to go through it all without command, an instructor gave the movements and the men executed them purely for physical drill. The cadence amounts to little, but executing them so as to exercise properly the desired muscles is important.
Many captains spend a great deal of time practicing this so that their companies can go through the whole series without command and to music. It is pretty, and for the chorus in a musical comedy act might be a success, but for soldiers it is a waste of valuable drill time that could and should be put to better use.
Our inspectors have had something to do with this, and county fairs and similar shows, more. The narrow scope of instruction followed in some companies, and the seeking for the easiest way to kill the drill hour by a few, has helped to give this its prominence in our training.
Target practice
Our target practice is open to criticism in some respects. Its importance can not be overestimated and it must not be slighted, but rational methods should be followed. It is necessary to appreciate fully what is required and wanted.
The individual man must be a fairly good marksman for two reasons: so that he can place his shots in a designated locality, and to give him confidence in himself. The better the men can shoot, other things being equal, the more confidence they have in themselves and in each other. For practical results on the battlefield an expert rifleman is of little if any more value than a marksman. Good, fair shooting by every man in the company is what is desired.
On the battlefield much depends on the confirmed habit, this habit-forming can not be done on the target range, but throughout the year’s work. Not to exceed two weeks a year should be allowed to any company for known distance practice on the range. If its work during the rest of the year has been properly done, this is sufficient. The rest of the time is needed for other work. But the time put on field firing, where done in the solution of correct tactical problems, cannot well be excessive. The more of this the better.
Extra pay
The law granting extra pay to expert shots, sharpshooters and marksmen is not believed good in its effect; it gives undue importance to range firing. An expert rifleman without other training and discipline is of but little value on the battlefield, while even a second class shot, well trained and disciplined, is infinitely his superior as a soldier. This law should be amended so as to divide the men into two classes: the best men in each company to be rated as 1st class. To be so rated the man must be thoroughly well trained in all his duties, of excellent character and 1st classmen or better in target shooting. The extra pay for 1st classmen to be so alloted as to cost the government no more than is now paid for higher classifications. Men have drawn this extra pay for qualification as shots who were of but little account as soldiers.
Rifle firing competitions
Rifle firing among young men in civil life should be encouraged. It is a necessary part of a soldier’s training and is that much accomplished toward making efficient soldiers of them if the occasion arises.
Our rifle competitions take too much time and are allowed to interfere too much with regular training. Officers should not be allowed to compete. Their work during this season is with their companies; they should be learning the duties of an officer not that of the private in the ranks. It is undoubted that a man can not make much of a success teaching what he does not know. The officer must know how to shoot well enough to be an instructor, he must know the theory and have the knack of instructing. He does not need to neglect his regular work for weeks at a time several summers to acquire this at competitions.
The best company instructor in rifle firing the author ever saw on a target range was a first sergeant who himself never made better than marksman. The company was very short on sharpshooters and experts but was still shorter on 3d class men. The poorest instructor he ever saw was an officer whose breast on state occasions was covered with big medals for shooting. He had to spare his own eyes so as to make phenomenal scores; the instruction of the new men in the company was of little importance compared with the former.
Proper garrisoning
The proper garrisoning of the army, to avoid so much necessary labor and afford better opportunities for training, has been given great attention by the War Department. May it soon meet with success. But much can be done even under present conditions to help in this matter. This beautiful parking perfectly kept is pretty, but it takes ground needed for other purposes and requires an immense amount of “fatigue” labor. This labor could be reduced: the parks would not be so pretty but military efficiency would be greater. For which does the government spend its money?
Strength of the company
Our companies should be increased in size to 100 men in peace, in war to 150. Our companies are now too small for good training; it requires too many new men to raise them to war strength, and the present strength is wasteful of money and effort.
With the companies at a fixed peace strength of 65 it means much of the time still less. There are not enough men to drill in the regular platoon formations. In our extended order work the captain is reduced to the capacity of a platoon commander and platoon commanders are out of a job. These men do not get practice in the handling of their proper units and it can not fail to diminish their interest and enthusiasm and result in poorer work as well as in incomplete work.
In the case of war we shall need our regular organizations very promptly and as efficient as possible. At the same time these organizations are certain to lose many officers taken for other duties. The addition of much more than one man to each two then in ranks, even if they have been previously trained, is a serious blow to efficiency. The new men must either be untrained or men from a reserve. If from a reserve they are rusty on many points and are apt to be strange to the officers who change in a company so frequently. Adding 50 reservists to a company of 100 men will do no harm; adding 85 to a company of 65 will be very different and, if the men added in the second case be untrained recruits, we shall not have a trained unit but a school of instruction.
A great objection to our present strength is the fact that it is so wasteful of money and effort.
The object of the army is to have a trained force ready for action and to help train the great mass of men that will be called out in case of war. We want as many trained men as possible, both for the ranks and to help prepare others. Since we cannot have a large army we should do all we are able with what we have.
We have in the regular army an expensive plant; the interest on cost and overhead charges form a large part of the annual cost, the cost for privates is relatively small. There is a demand and need for the output, trained soldiers; yet we produce less than half of what we could for the same cost, except pay of privates. With no increase in interest on plant and pay of officers and senior non-commissioned officers and administration, we could more than double our output of trained men and more than double our efficiency for war, and the training would be much better.
A private corporation doing business this way would probably go into bankruptcy.
New organization in war
One thing should be made a fixed policy and made positive law now so that in case of a real war it will be carried out. All organizations received into the service for the war must be at full strength.
We shall require in such a war a very large army which means the utilizing of all the organizations we now have and forming many new ones. By filling all existing organizations to war strength we reduce the number of new ones to be formed and utilize their training capacity to the best advantage; they can not be taken at their existing strength and state of training and have much value in battle. We shall need so many men that must be trained that we must use what means of training we have to its utmost.
By reducing the number of new organizations, more and better officers can be used for their training; there will be more chance of getting the necessary instructors for them. A few of the right kind of men can fit for service a full strength regiment as well as one of half strength and better officers and non-commissioned officers can be found for it, for there will be fewer required and the average can be higher.
Besides the difference in cost, administration, road space on the march, and the tactical handling when massed in great numbers, are of great importance and are much better done with fewer organizations.
The army’s responsibility
Upon the army today rests a great responsibility. With our small numbers and many faults in organization and stations we must be as nearly ready for a great war as possible; not only personally ready but do what we can to make the organization of a great and efficient army, if it ever becomes necessary, a possibility.
This means we must study and know our profession thoroughly, give a helping hand to the national guard when and where we can and to any other organization that does something toward the military training of men who may make up this great army if it has to be raised. We must remember that there are many things to be taught a man before he is an efficient soldier; all he learns before he joins a volunteer regiment is that much of a help.
But our chief duty, after personal qualification, is to make the best soldiers possible out of the men under us. This is what we are paid for and this is worth much more to our country than anything else we can do in peace. We should make the best we can of the conditions as they exist at our post, they may not be favorable for getting the best results but that is no reason for our not getting the best possible.
The quitter, the man who does as little as possible, who always wants to be away from troops because things are not as he thinks they should be, or who does nothing because he cannot do it exactly as laid down, is a curse to the army; he should leave the service and sell ribbons.
Rational, systematic training besides producing the greatest military efficiency will keep the men interested in their work and will occupy more of their time; the men will be more contented. Interested and contented men will furnish a smaller sick report and fewer deserters. There will be less dissipation hence less punishment.
Discontent, ennui, a constant grouch, injure digestion and bring on other physical ills. This is another responsibility resting on officers—that for the men under them. With young men we have a great influence on their characters and future careers. We make men better fit for life’s work or turn them back worse than we found them.
To the credit of the army it can be said that in most cases an enlistment served therein is a benefit to the majority who so serve. The men are physically and mentally better for a short service and I believe morally. There is certainly less excessive drinking among our soldiers in nearly all regiments than in a corresponding number of civilians in the same vicinity, and the same is true as to other vices. In personal cleanliness, decency and politeness they are far ahead of the average man of the same social standing as that from which they come. Many employers have recognized this, and are giving preference to discharged soldiers in employment. The uniform makes the man conspicuous and one drunken soldier in a thousand will call for more attention than ten drunken civilians out of five hundred.
The duty of trying to improve the men morally is a military as well as a moral duty. It is in line with what has been said before: the better the man, the more valuable the soldier, the more he can be taught, the more he can help to train others, and the more likely is he to remain in physical condition to be fit for service in the field.
“We have a profession not a trade.” Let us take it seriously, appreciate our responsibility, make the best of conditions as we find them, improving them where we can, and train ourselves and those under us to be The Best Infantry.