LESSON IV.
“Barnes on Slavery. An Inquiry into the Scriptural Views of Slavery.” By Albert Barnes. Philadelphia, 1846.
In his fourth chapter, on the slavery of the Israelites in Egypt, Rev. Mr. Barnes says—
“The will of God may often be learned from the events of his providence. From his dealings with an individual, a class of men or a nation, we may ascertain whether the course which has been pursued was agreeable to his will. It is not, indeed, always safe to argue that, because calamities come upon an individual, they are sent as a punishment on account of any peculiarly aggravated sin, or that these calamities prove that he is a greater sinner than others;—but when a certain course of conduct always tends to certain results—when there are laws in operation in the moral world as fixed as in the natural world—and when there are, uniformly, either direct or indirect interpositions of Providence in regard to any existing institutions, it is not unsafe to infer from these what is the Divine will. It is not unsafe, for illustration, to argue, from the uniform effects of intemperance, in regard to the will of God. These effects occur in every age of the world, in reference to every class of men. There are no exceptions in favour of kings or philosophers; of the inhabitants of any particular climate or region of country; of either sex, or of any age. The poverty and babbling, and redness of eyes, and disease, engendered by intemperance, may be regarded without danger of error, as expressive of the will of God in reference to that habit. They show that there has been a violation of a great law of our nature, ordained for our good, and that such a violation must always incur the frown of the great Governor of the world. The revelation of the mind of God, in such a case, is not less clear than were the annunciations of his will on Sinai.
“The same is true in regard to cities and nations. We need be in as little danger, in general, in arguing from what occurs to them, as in the case of an individual. There is now no doubt among men why the old world was destroyed by a flood; why Sodom and Gomorrah were consumed; why Tyre, Nineveh, Babylon, and Jerusalem were overthrown. If a certain course of conduct, long pursued and in a great variety of circumstances, leads uniformly to health, happiness, and property, we are in little danger of inferring that it is in accordance with the will of God. If it lead to poverty and tears, we are in as little danger of error in inferring that it is a violation of some great law which God has ordained for the good of man. If an institution among men is always followed by certain results; if we find them in all climes, and under all forms of government, and in every stage of society, it is not unsafe to draw an inference from these facts on the question whether God regards the institution as a good one, and one which he designs shall be perpetuated for the good of society.
“It would be easy to make an application of these undeniable principles to the subject of slavery. The inquiry would be, whether, in certain results, always found to accompany slavery, and now developing themselves in our own country, there are no clear indications of what is the will of God.”
We subscribe to the doctrine that God often reveals his will concerning a thing by the acts of his providence affecting it. But we contend that God has extended the field of Christian vision by a more direct revelation, and by the gift of faith; and that the mind which can neither hear the revelation, nor feel the faith, is merely the mind of a philosopher, not of a Christian: he may be a believer in a God, but not in the Saviour of the world.
The direction contained in the foregoing quotation, by which we are to discriminate what are the will and law of God, may be considered, when presented by the mere teacher of abolition, among the most artful, because among the most insidious, specimens of abolition logic. It is artful, because, to the unschooled, it presents all that may seem necessary in the foundation of a sound system of theology; and, further, because every bias of the human heart is predisposed to receive it as an entire platform of doctrine. It is insidious and dangerous, because, although the mind acquiesces in its truth, yet it is false when proposed as the lone and full foundation of religious belief. On such secret and hidden rocks, infidelity has ever established her lights, her beacons to the benighted voyager; and, in their surrounding seas, the shallops of hell have for ever been the most successful wreckers, in gathering up multitudes of the lost, to be established as faithful subjects of the kingdom of darkness.
The religious fanatical theorists of this order of abolition writers have further only to establish their doctrine about the “conscience,” “inward light,” or “moral sense,”—that it is a distinct mental power, infallibly teaching what is right, intuitively spreading all truth before them,—and they will then succeed to qualify man, a being fit to govern the universe, and successfully carry on a war against God!
The man thus prepared, if an abolitionist, reasons: “My conscience or moral sense teaches me infallible truth; therefore, my conscience is above all law, or is a ‘higher law’ than the law of the land. My conscience, feelings, and sympathies all teach me that slavery is wrong. Thus I have been educated. My conscience or moral sense teaches me what are the laws of God, without possible mistake; and according to their teaching, slavery is forbidden.”
In short, he thinks so; and, therefore, it is so. He “is wiser in his own conceit than seven men that can render a reason.”
But we proceed to notice how the doctrine of the author most distinctly agrees with the precepts of infidelity.
“The deist derives his religion by inference from what he supposes discoverable of the will and attributes of God, from nature, and the course of the Divine government.”Watson’s Theo. Inst. vol. ii. p. 542. This learned theologian differs widely from Mr. Barnes. When treating of slavery, Watson frankly admits that we are indebted to direct revelation for our knowledge on the subject.
In page 556, he says—
“Government in masters, as well as in fathers, is an appointment of God, though differing in circumstances; and it is therefore to be honoured. ‘Let as many servants as are under the yoke, count their own masters worthy of all honour;’ a direction which enjoins both respectful thoughts and humility and propriety of external demeanour towards them. Obedience to their commands in all things lawful is next enforced; which obedience is to be grounded on principle, on ‘singleness of heart as unto Christ;’ thus serving a master with the same sincerity, the same desire to do the appointed work well, as is required of us by Christ. This service is also to be cheerful, and not wrung out merely by a sense of duty; ‘not with eye-service as men-pleasers;’ not having respect simply to the approbation of the master, but ‘as the servant of Christ,’ making profession of his religion, ‘doing the will of God,’ in this branch of duty, ‘from the heart,’ with alacrity and good feeling. The duties of servants, stated in these brief precepts, might easily be shown to comprehend every particular which can be justly required of persons in this station; and the whole is enforced by a sanction which could have no place but in a revelation from God,—‘Knowing that whatsoever good thing any man doeth, the same shall he receive of the Lord, whether he be bond or free.’ Eph. vi. 5. In other words, even the common duties of servants, when faithfully, cheerfully, and piously performed, are by Christianity made rewardable actions: ‘Of the Lord ye shall receive a reward.’
“The duties of servants and masters are, however, strictly reciprocal. Hence, the apostle continues his injunctions as to the right discharge of these relations, by saying, immediately after he had prescribed the conduct of servants, ‘And ye masters, do the same things unto them;’ that is, act towards them upon the same equitable, conscientious, and benevolent principles as you exact from them. He then grounds his rules, as to masters, upon the great and influential principle, ‘knowing that your Master is in heaven;’ that you are under authority, and are accountable to him for your conduct to your servants. Thus masters are put under the eye of God, who not only maintains their authority, when properly exercised, by making their servants accountable for any contempt of it, and for every other failure of duty, but holds the master also himself responsible for its just and mild exercise. A solemn and religious aspect is thus at once given to a relation which by many is considered as one merely of interest.”
“All the distinctions of good and evil refer to some principle above ourselves; for, were there no Supreme Governor and Judge to reward and punish, the very notions of good and evil would vanish away.” Ellis on Divine Things.
The qualities good and evil can only exist in the mind as they are measured by a supreme law. “If we deny the existence of a Divine law obligatory on men, we must deny that the world is under Divine government, for a government without rule or law is a solecism.” Watson’s Theo. Inst. vol. i. p. 8.
Divine laws must be the subject of revelation. The law of a visible power cannot be known without some indications, much less the will of an invisible power, and that, too, of an order of existence so far above our own that even its mode is beyond our comprehension. Very true, the providence of God towards any particular course of conduct may be taken as the revelation of his will thus far, but, by no means, preclude the necessity of a more direct revelation, until man shall be able to boast that he comprehends the entire works of Jehovah.
The difference between the Christian and the mere theist is, while the latter admits that a revelation of the will of God is or has been made by significant actions, he contends that is a sufficient revelation of the laws of God for the guidance of man. “They who never heard of any external revelation, yet if they knew from the nature of things what is fit for them to do, they know all that God can or will require of them.” Christianity as Old as Creation, p. 233.
“By employing our reason to collect the will of God from the fund of our nature, physical and moral, we may acquire not only a particular knowledge of those laws, which are deducible from them, but a general knowledge of the manner in which God is pleased to exercise his supreme powers in this system.” Bolingbroke’s Works, vol. v. p. 100.
“But they who believe the holy Scriptures contain a revelation of God’s will, do not deny that indications of his will have been made by actions; but they contend that they are in themselves imperfect and insufficient, and that they were not designed to supersede a direct revelation. They also hold, that a direct communication of the Divine will was made to the progenitors of the human race, which received additions at subsequent periods, and that the whole was at length embraced in the book called, by way of eminence, the Bible.” Watson’s Theo. Inst. vol. i. p. 10.
Faith “is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen.” Heb. xi. 1.
As an instance of revelation, we present Lev. xxv. 1, and 44, 45, 46.
“And the Lord spake unto Moses in Mount Sinai, saying: Both thy bondmen and bondmaids, which thou shalt have, shall be of the heathen that are round about you; of them shall ye buy bondmen and bondmaids.”
“Moreover, of the children of the strangers that do sojourn among you, of them shall ye buy, and of their families that are with you, which they begat in your land: and they shall be your possession.”
“And ye shall take them as an inheritance for your children after you, to inherit them for a possession, they shall be your bondmen for ever; but over your brethren, the children of Israel, ye shall not rule over one another with rigour.”
Here is direct revelation, and faith gives us evidence of the truth of its being of Divine origin.
Mr. Barnes proposes, by human reason, without the aid of revelation and faith, to determine what is the will of God on the subject of slavery; and it suggests the inquiry, How extensive must be the intellectual power of him who can reason with God? “For he is not a man, as I am, that I should answer him, and we should come together in judgment; neither is any daysman betwixt us, that might lay his hand upon us both.” Job ix. 32, 33.
We frankly acknowledge, that, in the investigation of this subject, we shall consider the Divine authority of those writings, which are received by Christians as a revelation of infallible truth, as so established; and, with all simplicity of mind, examine their contents, and collect from them the information they profess to contain, and concerning which information it had become necessary that the world should be experimentally instructed.
But the passage quoted from Mr. Barnes gives us a stronger suspicion of his want of orthodoxy and Christian principle from its connection with what he says, page 310:
“If the religion of Christ allows such a license” (to hold slaves) “from such precepts as these, the New Testament would be the greatest curse ever inflicted on our race.”
The fact is, little can be known of God or his law except by faith and revelation. Beings whose mental powers are not infinite can never arrive at a knowledge of all things, nor can we know any thing fully, only in proportion as we comprehend the laws influencing it. In conformity to the present limited state of our knowledge, we can only say, that we arrive at some little, by three distinct means: the senses open the door to a superficial perception of things; the mental powers to their further examination; while faith gives us a view of the superintending control of One Almighty God.
In the proportion our senses are defective, our mental powers deficient, and our faith inactive or awry,—our knowledge will be scanty. The result of all knowledge is the perception of truth. Under the head of the mental powers, philosophers tell us our knowledge is acquired by three methods: intuition, demonstration, and analogy. By intuition they mean when the mind perceives a certainty in a proposition where the relation is obvious, as it is obvious that the whole is greater than a part; and such propositions they call axioms.
When the relation of things is not thus obvious, that is, when the proposition involves the determination of the relation between two or more things whose relations are not intuitively perceived, the mind may sometimes come to a certainty, concerning the relation, by the interposition of a chain of axioms; that is, of propositions where the relations are intuitively perceived. This is called demonstration.
In all such cases, the mind would perceive the relation, and come to a certainty intuitively, if adequately cultivated and enlarged; or, in other words, all propositions that now, to us, require demonstration, would, to such a cultivation, become mere axioms: consequently, now, where one man sees a mere axiom, another requires demonstration.
But the great mass of our ideas are too imperfect or too complicated to admit of intuitive conclusions; consequently, as to them, we can never arrive at demonstration. Here we substitute facts; and reason, that, as heretofore one certain fact has accompanied another certain fact, so it will be hereafter. This is what the philosophers call analogy. Analogy is thus founded on experience, and is, therefore, far less perfect than intuition or demonstration. That gravitation will always continue is analogical; we do not know it intuitively; nor can we demonstrate it. Analogical propositions are, therefore, to us mere probabilities.
But our knowledge has cognizance of ideas only. These ideas we substitute for the things they represent, in which there is a liability to err. Thus a compound idea is an assemblage of the properties of a thing, and may be incomplete and inadequate; wholly different from any quality in the thing itself. What is our idea of spirit, colour, joy? Yet we may conceive an intelligence so extended as to admit that even analogical problems should become intuitive: with God every thing is intuitively known. But even intuitive propositions sometimes reach beyond our comprehension. Example—a line of infinite length can have no end: therefore, the half of an infinite line would be a line also of infinite length. But all lines of infinite length are of equal length; therefore, the half of an infinite line is equal to the whole. Such fallacies prove that human reason is quite limited and liable to err: and hence the importance of faith in God, in the steadfastness of his laws, and the certainty of their operations. “And Jesus answering said unto them, have faith in God.” Mark xi. 22. “And when they were come, and had gathered the church together, they rehearsed all that God had done with them, and how he had opened the door of faith unto the Gentiles.” Acts xiv. 27. “So, then, faith cometh by hearing, and hearing by the word of God.” Romans x. 17. That is, by revelation. “Now faith is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen.” Heb. xi. 1. “But without faith it is impossible to please God; for he that cometh to God must believe that he is, and that he is the rewarder of them that diligently seek him.” Heb. xi. 6. “Even so faith, if it hath not works, is dead.” James ii. 17. “And he said, I will hide my face from them, I will see what their end shall be; for they are a very froward generation, children in whom there is no faith.” Deut. xxxii. 20. To which add Romans xii. 3.
These passages seem to imply an unchangeable reliance on faith and revelation for all knowledge of God, his laws, and our peace hereafter; and we do feel the most heartfelt regret to see those who claim to be religious teachers, laying the foundation for the most gross infidelity.