CHAPTER VIII. — WASHINGTON QUELLS THE WESTERN INSURRECTION. 1794.
While Congress was in session several important matters had claimed the consideration of Washington, to which we will now call the reader's attention. It will be recollected that a request of the executive for the recall of Mr. Genet had been transmitted to the French government. During the time which elapsed before an answer could be returned Genet's proceedings had been such as to call for all the prudence, foresight, and moderation of Washington.
In that spirit of conciliation which adopts the least irritating means for effecting its objects, Washington had resolved to bear with the insults, the resistance, and the open defiance of Genet until his appeal to the friendship and the policy of the French republic should be fairly tried. Early in January (1794) this resolution was shaken by fresh proofs of the perseverance of that minister in a line of conduct not to be tolerated by a nation which has not surrendered all pretensions to self-government. Genet had meditated and deliberately planned two expeditions, to be carried on from the territories of the United States against the dominions of Spain, and had, as minister of the French republic, granted commissions to citizens of the United States, who were privately recruiting troops for the proposed service. The first was destined against Florida and the second against Louisiana. The detail of the plans had been settled. The pay, rations, clothing, plunder, and division of the conquered lands to be allotted to the military and the proportion of the acquisitions to be reserved to the republic of France were arranged. The troops destined to act against Florida were to be raised in the three southern States, were to rendezvous in Georgia, were to be aided by a body of Indians, and were to cooperate with the French fleet, should one arrive on the coast. This scheme had been the subject of a correspondence between the executive and Genet, but was in full progress in the preceding December, when, by the vigilance of the Legislature of South Carolina, it was more particularly developed, and some of the principal agents were arrested.
About the same time, intelligence less authentic, but wearing every circumstance of probability, was received, stating that the expedition against Louisiana, which was to be carried on down the Ohio from Kentucky, was in equal maturity.
This intelligence seemed to render a further forbearance incompatible with the dignity of the United States. The question of superseding the diplomatic functions of Genet and depriving him of the privileges attached to that character was brought before the Cabinet, and a message to Congress was prepared, communicating these transactions and avowing a determination to adopt that measure, unless one or the other House should signify the opinion that it was not advisable so to do, when the business was arrested by receiving a letter from Mr. Morris announcing officially the recall of this rash minister. Mr. Fauchet, the successor of Genet, arrived in February (1794), and brought with him strong assurances that his government totally disapproved the conduct of his predecessor. He avowed a determination to avoid whatever might be offensive to those to whom he was deputed, and a wish to carry into full effect the friendly dispositions of his nation toward the United States. For some time his actions were in the spirit of these professions.
Not long after the arrival of Mr. Fauchet, the executive government of France requested the recall of Gouverneur Morris. With this request Washington, as we have already seen, immediately complied, and James Monroe was appointed to succeed him.
The discontents which had been long fomented in the western country had assumed a serious and alarming appearance. A remonstrance to the President and Congress of the United States from the inhabitants of Kentucky, respecting the navigation of the Mississippi, was laid before the executive and each branch of the Legislature. The style of this paper accorded well with the instructions under which it had been prepared. It demanded the free navigation of the Mississippi as a right, and arraigned the government for not having secured its enjoyment. The paper was submitted to both Houses of Congress.
In the Senate the subject was referred to a committee who reported "that in the negotiation now carrying on at Madrid between the United States and Spain, the right of the former to the free navigation of the Mississippi is well asserted and demonstrated, and their claim to its enjoyment is pursued with all the assiduity and firmness which the magnitude of the subject demands, and will doubtless continue to be so pursued until the object shall be obtained or adverse circumstances shall render the further progress of the negotiation impracticable. That in the present state of the business it would improper for Congress to interfere, but, in order to satisfy the citizens of the United States more immediately interested in the event of this negotiation, that the United States, have uniformly asserted their right to the free use of the navigation of the river Mississippi, and have employed and will continue to pursue such measures as are best adapted to obtain the enjoyment of this important territorial right, the committee recommend that it be resolved by the Senate:
"That the President of the United States be, and he hereby is requested to cause to be communicated to the executive of the State of Kentucky, such part of the existing negotiation between the United States and Spain relative to this subject, as he may deem advisable and consistent with the course of the negotiation."
In the House of Representatives also a resolution was passed, expressing the conviction of the House, that the executive was urging the claim of the United States to the navigation of the Mississippi in the manner most likely to prove successful.
This answer was not satisfactory to the Kentuckians. Later developments showed that they had a different object from that of obtaining the free navigation of the Mississippi by negotiation.
In October, 1793, it was alleged by the Spanish commissioners that four Frenchmen had left Philadelphia, empowered by the minister of the French republic to prepare an expedition, in Kentucky, against New Orleans. This fact was immediately communicated by Mr. Jefferson to the governor of that State, with a request that he would use those means of prevention which the law enabled him to employ. This letter was accompanied by one from the Secretary of War, conveying the request of the President, that, if preventive means should fail, effectual military force should then be employed to arrest the expedition, and General Wayne was ordered to hold a body of troops at the disposal of the governor should he find the militia insufficient for his purpose.
The governor had already received information that a citizen of Kentucky was in possession of a commission appointing him Commander-in-Chief of the proposed expedition; and that the Frenchmen alluded to in the letter of Mr. Jefferson had arrived, and, far from affecting concealment, declared that they only waited for money, which they expected soon to receive, in order to commence their operations.
The governor, however, in a letter, containing very singular views of his duty in the affair, declined to interfere with the proposed expedition.
Upon the receipt of this extraordinary letter, Washington directed General Wayne to establish a military post at Fort Massac, on the Ohio, for the purpose of stopping by force, if peaceful means should fail, any body of armed men who should be proceeding down that river.
This precaution appears to have been necessary. The preparations for the expedition were, for some time, carried on with considerable activity; and there is reason to believe that it was not absolutely relinquished until the war ceased between France and Spain.
It will be recollected that, in the preceding year, the attempt to treat with the hostile Indians had suspended the operations of General Wayne until the season for action had nearly passed away. After the total failure of negotiation, the campaign was opened with as much vigor as a prudent attention to circumstances would permit.
The Indians had expected an attempt upon their villages, and had collected in full force, with the apparent determination of risking a battle in their defense. A battle was desired by the American general, but the consequences of another defeat were too serious to warrant him in putting more to hazard by precipitate movements than the circumstances of the war required. The negotiations with the Indians were not terminated till September, and it was then too late to complete the preparations which would enable General Wayne to accomplish his object. He, therefore, contented himself with collecting his army and penetrating about six miles in advance of Fort Jefferson, where he established himself for the winter in a camp called Greensville. After fortifying his camp, he took possession of the ground on which the Americans had been defeated in 1791, where he erected Fort Recovery. These positions afforded considerable protection to the frontiers, and facilitated the opening of the ensuing campaign.
Seeing only the dark side of every measure adopted by the government, and not disinclined to militia expeditions made at the expense of the United States, the people of Kentucky loudly charged the President with a total disregard of their safety, pronounced the Continental troops entirely useless, declared that the Indians should be kept in awe alone by the militia, and insisted that the power should be deposited with some person in their State to call them out at his discretion, at the charge of the United States.
Meanwhile, some steps were taken by the Governor of Upper Canada, which were well calculated to increase suspicions respecting the dispositions of Great Britain.
It was believed by Washington, not without cause, that the cabinet of London was disposed to avail itself of the nonexecution of that article of the treaty of peace which stipulates for the payment of debts, to justify a permanent detention of the posts on the southern side of the lakes, and to establish a new boundary line, whereby those lakes should be entirely comprehended in Upper Canada. Early in the spring a detachment from the garrison of Detroit repossessed and fortified a position nearly fifty miles south of that station, on the Miami, a river which empties into Lake Erie at its westernmost point.
This movement, and other facts which strengthened the belief that the hostile Indians were at least countenanced by the English, were the subjects of a correspondence between the Secretary of State and Mr. Hammond, in which crimination was answered by recrimination, in which a considerable degree of mutual irritation was displayed, and in which each supported his charges against the nation of the other, much better than he defended his own. It did not, however, in any manner, affect the operations of the army.
The delays inseparable from the transportation of necessary supplies through an uninhabited country, infested by an active enemy peculiarly skilled in partisan war, unavoidably protracted the opening of the campaign until near midsummer. Meanwhile several sharp skirmishes took place, in one of which a few white men were stated to be mingled with the Indians.
On the 8th of August (1794) General Wayne reached the confluence of the Au Glaize, where he threw up some works of defense and protection for magazines. The richest and most extensive settlements of the western Indians lay about this place.
The mouth of the Au Glaize is distant about thirty miles from the post occupied by the British, in the vicinity of which the whole strength of the enemy, amounting, according to intelligence on which General Wayne relied, to rather less than 2,000 men, was collected. The Continental legion was not much inferior in number to the Indians, and a reinforcement of about 1,100 mounted militia from Kentucky, commanded by General Scott, gave a decided superiority of strength to the army of Wayne. That the Indians had determined to give him battle was well understood, and the discipline of his legion, the ardor of all his troops, and the superiority of his numbers, authorized him confidently to expect a favorable issue. Yet, in pursuance of that policy by which the United States had been uniformly actuated, he determined to make one more effort for the attainment of peace without bloodshed. Messengers were dispatched to the several hostile tribes who were assembled in his front, inviting them to appoint deputies to meet him on his march, in order to negotiate a lasting peace.
On the 15th of August (1794) the American army advanced down the Miami, with its right covered by that river, and on the 18th arrived at the rapids. Here they halted on the 19th, in order to erect a temporary work for the protection of the baggage and to reconnoiter the situation of the enemy.
The Indians were advantageously posted behind a thick wood, and behind the British fort.
At 8 in the morning of the 20th the American army advanced in columns, the legion with its right flank covered by the Miami. One brigade of mounted volunteers, commanded by General Todd, was on the left; and the other, under General Barbee, was in the rear. A select battalion, commanded by Major Price, moved in front of the legion, sufficiently in advance to give timely notice for the troops to form in case of action.
After marching about five miles Major Price received a heavy fire from a concealed enemy, and was compelled to retreat.
The Indians had chosen their ground with judgment. They had advanced into the thick wood in front of the British works, which extends several miles west from the Miami, and had taken a position rendered almost inaccessible to horse by a quantity of fallen timber which appeared to have been blown up in a tornado. They were formed in three lines, within supporting distance of each other; and, as is their custom, with a very extended front. Their line stretched to the west, at right angles with the river, about two miles, and their immediate effort was to turn the left flank of the American army.
On the discharge of the first rifle, the legion was formed in two lines, and the front was ordered to advance with trailed arms and rouse the enemy from his covert at the point of the bayonet; then, and not until then, to deliver a fire, and to press the fugitives too closely to allow them time to load after discharging their pieces. Soon perceiving the strength of the enemy in front, and that he was endeavoring to turn the American left, the general ordered the second line to support the first. The legion cavalry, led by Captain Campbell, was directed to penetrate between the Indians and the river, where the wood was less thick and entangled, in order to charge their left flank; and General Scott, at the head of the mounted volunteers, was directed to make a considerable circuit, and to turn their right flank.
These orders were executed with spirit and promptitude, but such was the impetuosity of the charge made by the first line of infantry, so entirely was the enemy broken by it, and so rapid was the pursuit that only a small part of the second line and of the mounted volunteers could get into action. In the course of one hour the Indians were driven more than two miles through thick woods, when the pursuit terminated within gunshot of the British fort.
General Wayne remained three days on the banks of the Miami, in front of the field of battle, during which time the houses and cornfields above and below the fort, some of them within pistol-shot of it, were reduced to ashes. In the course of these operations a correspondence took place between General Wayne and Major Campbell, the commandant of the fort, which is stated by the former in such a manner as to show that hostilities between them were avoided only by the prudent acquiescence of the latter in this devastation of property within the range of his guns.
On the 28th (August, 1794), the army returned to Au Glaize by easy marches, destroying on its route all the villages and corn within fifty miles of the river.
In this decisive battle the loss of the Americans in killed and wounded, amounted to 107, including officers. Among the dead were Captain Campbell, who commanded the cavalry, and Lieutenant Towles of the infantry, both of whom fell in the first charge. General Wayne bestowed great and well-merited praise on the courage and alacrity displayed by every part of the army.
The hostility of the Indians still continuing, their whole country was laid waste, and forts were erected in the heart of their settlements to prevent their return.
This seasonable victory rescued the United States from a general war with all the Indians northwest of the Ohio. The Six Nations had discovered a restless, uneasy temper, and the interposition of the President to prevent a settlement which Pennsylvania was about to make at Presque Isle seemed rather to suspend the commencement of hostilities than to establish permanent pacific dispositions among those tribes. The battle of the 20th of August, however, had an immediate effect, and the clouds which had been long gathering in that quarter were instantly dissipated.
In the South, too, its influence was felt. In that quarter the inhabitants of Georgia and the Indians seemed equally disposed to war. Scarcely was the feeble authority of the government competent to restrain the aggressions of the former, or the dread of its force sufficient to repress those of the latter. In this doubtful state of things, the effect of a victory could not be inconsiderable.
About this time the seditions and violent resistance to the execution of the law imposing duties on spirits distilled within the United States had advanced to a point in the counties of Pennsylvania lying west of the Allegheny mountains, which required the decisive interposition of government.
The laws being openly set at defiance, Washington determined to test their efficiency. Bills of indictment were found against the perpetrators of certain outrages, and process was issued against them and placed in the hands of the United States marshal for execution.
The marshal repaired in person to the country which was the scene of disorder for the purpose of serving the processes. On the 15th of July (1794), while in the execution of his duty, he was beset on the road by a body of armed men, who fired on him, but fortunately did him no personal injury. At daybreak the ensuing morning a party attacked the house of General Nevil, the inspector, but he defended himself resolutely and obliged the assailants to retreat.
Knowing well that this attack had been preconcerted, and apprehending that it would be repeated, he applied to the militia officers and magistrates of the county for protection. The answer was that, "owing to the too general combination of the people to oppose the revenue system, the laws could not be executed so as to afford him protection; that should the posse comitatus be ordered out to support the civil authority they would favor the party of the rioters."
On the succeeding day the insurgents reassembled to the number of about 500 to renew their attack on the house of the inspector. That officer, finding that no protection could be afforded by the civil authority, had applied to the commanding officer at Fort Pitt, and had obtained a detachment of eleven men from that garrison, who were joined by Major Kirkpatrick. Successful resistance to so great a force being obviously impracticable, a parley took place, at which the assailants, after requiring that the inspector and all his papers should be delivered up, demanded that the party in the house should march out and ground their arms. This being refused, the parley terminated and the assault commenced. The action lasted until the assailants set fire to several adjacent buildings, the heat from which was so intense that the house could no longer be occupied. From this cause, and from the apprehension that the fire would soon be communicated to the main building, Major Kirkpatrick and his party surrendered themselves.
The marshal and Col. Pressly Nevil were seized on their way to General Nevil's house and detained until 2 the next morning. The marshal especially was treated with extreme severity. His life was frequently threatened, and was probably saved by the interposition of some leading individuals, who possessed more humanity or more prudence than those with whom they were associated. He could obtain his liberty only by entering into a solemn engagement, which was guaranteed by Colonel Nevil, to serve no more processes on the western side of the Allegheny mountains.
The marshal and inspector having both retired to Pittsburgh, the insurgents deputed two of their body, one of whom was a justice of the peace, to demand that the former should surrender all his authority, and that the latter should resign his office, threatening, in case of refusal, to attack the place and seize their persons. These demands were not acceded to, but Pittsburghh affording no security, these officers escaped from the danger which threatened them by descending the Ohio; after which they found their way, by a circuitous route, to the seat of government.
The rioters next proceeded to intercept the mail and take out letters from certain parties in Pittsburghh, containing expressions of disapproval of their proceedings. The writers of these letters they caused to be banished. They next held meetings on Braddock's Field and at Parkinson's Ferry, at which the determination to resist the laws by force of arms was openly avowed.
Affidavits attesting this serious state of things were laid before Washington. Affairs had now reached a point which seemed to forbid the continuance of a temporizing system. The efforts at conciliation, which, for more than three years, the government had persisted to make, and the alterations repeatedly introduced into the act for the purpose of rendering it less exceptionable, instead of diminishing the arrogance of those who opposed their will to the sense of the nation, had drawn forth sentiments indicative of designs much deeper than the evasion of a single act. The execution of the laws had at length been resisted by open force, and a determination to persevere in these measures was unequivocally avowed. The alternative of subduing this resistance or of submitting to it was presented to the government.
The act of Congress which provided for calling forth the militia "to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions" required, as a prerequisite to the exercise of this power, "that an associate justice, or the judge of the district, should certify that the laws of the United States were opposed, or their execution obstructed, by combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, or by the powers vested in the marshals." In the same act it was provided, "that if the militia of the State where such combinations may happen shall refuse, or be insufficient, to suppress the same, the President may employ the militia of other States."
The evidence which had been transmitted to Washington was laid before one of the associate justices, who gave the certificate, which enabled the chief magistrate to employ the militia in aid of the civil power.
Washington now called a cabinet to consider the subject, and the Governor of Pennsylvania was also consulted respecting it. Randolph, the Secretary of State, and the Governor of Pennsylvania urged reasons against coercion by force of arms; Hamilton, Knox, and Bradford were in favor of employing military force. These members of the Cabinet were also of opinion that policy and humanity equally dictated the employment of a force which would render resistance desperate. The insurgent country contained 16,000 men able to bear arms, and the computation was that they could bring 7,000 into the field. If the army of the government should amount to 12,000 men, it would present an imposing force which the insurgents would not venture to meet.
It was impossible that Washington could hesitate to embrace the latter of these opinions. That a government entrusted to him should be trampled under foot by a lawless section of the Union, which set at defiance the will of the nation, as expressed by its representatives, was an abasement to which neither his judgment nor his feelings could submit. He resolved, therefore, to issue the proclamation which, by law, was to precede the employment of force.
On the same day a requisition was made on the Governors of New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia for their several quotas of militia to compose an army of 12,000 men, who were to be immediately organized and prepared to march at a minute's warning. The force was ultimately increased to 15,000. While steps were taking to bring this force into the field, a last essay was made to render its employment unnecessary. Three distinguished and popular citizens of Pennsylvania were deputed by the government to be the bearers of a general amnesty for past offenses, on the sole condition of future obedience to the laws.
It having been deemed advisable that the executive of the State should act in concert with that of the United States, Governor Mifflin also issued a proclamation and appointed commissioners to act with those of the general government.
These commissioners were met by a committee from the convention at Parkinson's Ferry, and the conference resulted in a reference of the offer of amnesty to the people. This reference only served to demonstrate that, while a few persons were disposed to submit to the laws, the masses in the disturbed districts were determined to obstruct the re-establishment of civil authority.
On the 25th of September (1794), Washington issued a proclamation describing in terms of great energy the obstinate and perverse spirit with which the lenient propositions of the government had been received, and declaring his fixed determination, in obedience to the high and irresistible duty consigned to him by the constitution, "to take care that the laws be faithfully executed," to reduce the refractory to obedience.
The troops of New Jersey and Pennsylvania were directed to rendezvous at Bedford, and those of Maryland and Virginia at Cumberland, on the Potomac. The command of the expedition had been conferred on Governor Lee, of Virginia, and the Governors of New Jersey and Pennsylvania commanded the militia of their respective States under him.
Washington in person visited each division of the army, but, being confident that the force employed must look down all resistance, he left Hamilton, the Secretary of the Treasury, to accompany it, and returned himself to Philadelphia, where the approaching session of Congress required his presence. {1}
From Cumberland and Bedford the army marched in two divisions into the country of the insurgents. The greatness of the force prevented the effusion of blood. The disaffected did not venture to assemble in arms. Several of the leaders, who had refused to give assurances of future submission to the laws, were seized, and some of them detained for legal prosecution.
But although no direct and open opposition was made, the spirit of insurrection was not subdued. A sour and malignant temper displayed itself, which indicated but too plainly that the disposition to resist had only sunk under the pressure of the great military force brought into the country, but would rise again should that force be withdrawn. It was, therefore, thought advisable to station for the winter a detachment, to be commanded by Major-General Morgan, in the center of the disaffected country.
"Thus," says Marshall, "without shedding blood, did the prudent vigor of the executive terminate an insurrection which, at one time, threatened to shake the government of the United States to its foundation. That so perverse a spirit should have been excited in the bosom of prosperity, without the pressure of a single grievance, is among those political phenomena which occur not infrequently in the course of human affairs, and which the statesman can never safely disregard. When real ills are felt there is something positive and perceptible to which the judgment may be directed, the actual extent of which may be ascertained and the cause of which may be discerned. But when the mind, inflamed by suppositious dangers, gives full play to the imagination, and fastens upon some object with which to disturb itself, the belief that the danger exists seems to become a matter of faith, with which reason combats in vain."
Washington's own view of the insurrection and its causes is contained in a letter to John Jay, then on his mission to England. "As you have been," he writes, "and will continue to be fully informed by the Secretary of State of all transactions of a public nature which relate to, or may have an influence on, the points of your mission, it would be unnecessary for me to touch upon any of them in this letter were it not for the presumption that the insurrection in the western counties of this State has excited much speculation and a variety of opinions abroad, and will be represented differently, according to the wishes of some and the prejudices of others, who may exhibit, as an evidence of what has been predicted, 'that we are unable to govern ourselves.' Under this view of the subject, I am happy in giving it to you as the general opinion that this event having happened at the time it did was fortunate, although it will be attended with considerable expense.
"That the self-created societies which have spread themselves over this country have been laboring incessantly to sow the seeds of distrust, jealousy, and, of course, discontent, thereby hoping to effect some revolution in the government, is not unknown to you. That they have been the fomenters of the western disturbances admits of no doubt in the mind of anyone who will examine their conduct, but, fortunately, they precipitated a crisis for which they were not prepared, and thereby have unfolded views which will, I trust, effectuate their annihilation sooner than it might otherwise have happened, at the same time that it has afforded an occasion for the people of this country to show their abhorrence of the result and their attachment to the constitution and the laws; for I believe that five times the number of militia that was required would have come forward, if it had been necessary, to support them.
"The spirit which blazed out on this occasion, as soon as the object was fully understood, and the lenient measures of the government were made known to the people, deserves to be communicated. There are instances of general officers going at the head of a single troop and of light companies; of field officers, when they came to the place of rendezvous and found no command for them in that grade, turning into the ranks and proceeding as private soldiers, under their own captains; and of numbers, possessing the first fortunes in the country, standing in the ranks as private men, and marching day by day with their knapsacks and haversacks at their backs, sleeping on straw, with a single blanket, in a soldier's tent, during the frosty nights which we have had, by way of example to others. Nay, more; many young Quakers of the first families, character, and property, not discouraged by the elders, have turned into the ranks and are marching with the troops.
"These things have terrified the insurgents, who had no conception that such a spirit prevailed, but, while the thunder only rumbled at a distance, were boasting of their strength and wishing for and threatening the militia by turns, intimating that the arms they should take from them would soon become a magazine in their hands. Their language is much changed, indeed, but their principles want correction.
"I shall be more prolix in my speech to Congress on the commencement and progress of this insurrection than is usual in such an instrument, or than I should have been on any other occasion, but as numbers at home and abroad will hear of the insurrection, and will read the speech, that may know nothing of the documents to which it might refer, I conceived it would be better to encounter the charge of prolixity by giving a cursory detail of facts, that would show the prominent features of the thing, than to let it go naked into the world, to be dressed up according to the fancy or inclination of the readers or the policy of our enemies."
Sentiments similar to these were expressed in a letter to Washington's old and intimate friend, Edmund Pendleton. "The successes of our army to the westward," he writes, "have already been productive of good consequences. They have dispelled a cloud which lowered very heavily in the northern hemisphere (the Six Nations), and, though we have received no direct advices from General Wayne since November, there is reason to believe that the Indians with whom we are or were at war in that quarter, together with their abettors, {2} begin to see things in a different point of view."
One of the most important effects of the suppression of the western rebellion was the fatal blow it gave to the democratic societies founded by Genet.
Washington's opinion of these societies is thus expressed in a letter to one of his friends: "The real people, occasionally assembled in order to express their sentiments on political subjects, ought never to be confounded with permanent self-appointed societies, usurping the right to control the constituted authorities and to dictate to public opinion. While the former is entitled to respect, the latter is incompatible with all government and must either sink into general disesteem or finally overturn the established order of things."
1. Footnote: General Knox, the Secretary of War, accompanied the army to the expected scene of action. The command in chief was confided to Gen. Henry Lee, Washington's old friend and companion in the Revolutionary War. He was at this time Governor of Virginia.
2. Footnote: The British on the border.