Dawn in darkest Africa

by John H. Harris

PART V

I.	—The Map of Africa re-arranged.

I
THE MAP OF AFRICA RE-ARRANGED

For some months past eminent publicists in Europe have been busily engaged in rearranging the map of Africa in the interests first of one Power, then of another, but the unfortunate native has found scant place in these arguments. The only question which seems of any significance is the “price” this or that Power will pay for a given slice of the African continent. It would be rather interesting surely to know what the natives themselves think of the proposed change. Some of them have strong views upon the morality of disposing of other people’s rights, to say nothing of treaty obligations which they obtained when agreeing to European sovereignty.

Four territories are, so to speak, in the melting pot of political speculation—British Gambia, French Congo, Belgian Congo, and the Portuguese colonies of East and West Africa. None of the Powers in control of these territories desire to add another foot of tropical Africa to the burden they carry already. Great Britain has a full share of responsibilities in the African continent. France, Belgium and Portugal, even if they desired to enlarge their tropical dependencies, have not yet established a case for expansion. Quite the reverse. One Power alone—Germany—is not only capable but apparently desirous of adding to her colonial possessions.

BRITISH GAMBIA

Though Great Britain may have no wish to add to her responsibilities, her people cannot allow her to relegate any portion of them to another Power. British Gambia must never be allowed to pass into the hands of France, and the quicker the French Government is told this, the better, not only for Anglo-French amity, but for the tranquillity and progress of our oldest African colony. Thanks to our merchant adventurers and the goodwill of the natives, Gambia was able to hold her own against the Portuguese, French and Dutch, until the British Government assumed direct control.

The British Government made a solemn agreement with the native tribes for a Protectorate over the Gambia colony, and “this agreement shall stand for ever.” The British Minister who sets that agreement aside will be guilty of a crime against the fair fame of his country, but more especially against the loyal natives who so implicitly trust the unalterable promise of an Englishman.

The foregoing ethical argument cannot fail to find an echo in the breast of every Britisher, but there are Imperial reasons which reinforce that argument. The Gambia river possesses a draught of 30 feet right up the river to a position of twenty miles beyond Bathurst, providing altogether forty miles of deep waterway. I am told this is the only safe anchorage for a British fleet in West Africa, safe, that is, from attack. This little colony of 4000 square miles is contentedly following on in the path of progress, its inhabitants are loyally and affectionately attached to the British Crown. Only one thing troubles the population of Gambia and that is the periodic rumours of a transfer to another Power. A categorical and clear statement from a Minister of the Crown that no such transference is contemplated or would be entertained is the least the native has a right to expect, and the Empire to demand.

Next in order of discussion has been the question of Portuguese colonies, and it has been mooted more than once that these should, either as a whole or in part, be transferred by Portugal to Germany for a financial consideration. The territories in question comprise Portuguese East and West Africa together with the islands of the Gulf of Guinea; the area of the mainland possessions being 778,000 square miles and that of the islands 460 square miles, making a total area of 778,460 square miles.

No experienced Power would be prepared to purchase, even if Portugal would be prepared to sell, a portion only of the Portuguese possessions, because the several colonies properly managed dovetail into each others’ requirements in such a manner that a separation of either would in all probability spell ruin to all. The richest of the colonies is that small island of San Thomé, but it cannot maintain its financial prosperity unless fed by labour from the mainland colonies of East and West Africa. Then the Angola finances are nearly balanced by the financial position of the cocoa islands.

Another argument is put forth, to the effect that the Portuguese treatment of natives demands a transfer of the territory to some more progressive Power, such as, for instance, Germany. Are those who advocate this policy quite sure that the “Progressive Power” would treat the natives better than the Portuguese? if so, where is the evidence? Does East Africa provide it? Does the treatment of the Herreros and the shooting of British Kaffirs demonstrate it? Those who support a transfer on this ground should not lightly pass over these and similar incidents. They can be absolutely certain of this one thing, that Germany would be “progressive” enough to see to it that the cocoa plantations of San Thomé had an abundant supply of labour—no matter what the consequences to such a subordinate issue as labour conditions.

Then I am told that “in any case the condition of the natives as a whole could not be so bad under Germany as under the Portuguese.” To this I cannot agree, for though I admit that a number of colonial Portuguese are slave traders, and that slavery is prevalent on the mainland and on the islands, I must, in fairness to the Portuguese, point out first that the Portuguese have a kindly nature to which one can appeal, and secondly that signs are not wanting of an awakening of the conscience of the Portuguese nation in a manner which may lead to a thorough cleansing of the colonial possessions of the Republic. Thirdly, there is no colour-bar in the Portuguese dominions.

To this argument I get the reply, “Public opinion in Germany would insist on the abolition of existing slavery,” but this is an argument which has no shred of foundation in fact; Germany is, in many respects, a progressive Power, but she has no philanthropic soul for the well-being of native races. A single word from Germany indicating a willingness to co-operate with Great Britain during the Congo agitation would have saved thousands, if not millions, of lives. That word was never spoken, the Congo tribes were left to perish, and German public opinion maintained a cynical attitude until the end. A merchant or two rendered yeoman service, but they were as voices crying in the wilderness.

Let Portugal retain her colonies, and resolutely begin to purify their administration and abolish slavery, but she must do it quickly if she is to retain the goodwill of those—and they are still many—who would deplore her disappearance from the map of Africa. She has said with an intensity demanding appreciation that she will not dispose of her ancient colonies, and this courageous reply evoked a warm response from all her colonists who to a man are intensely patriotic, but if Portugal should refuse to abolish slavery, she cannot expect that her most powerful Ally will be allowed to maintain an Alliance valued to-day by many of us, yet viewed with increasing uneasiness by a large section of the British Public. No one wishes to utter a word which can be construed as a threat, but every one knows that there are paths along which no British Foreign Minister can lead, much less force the nation.

BELGIAN CONGO

Belgian Congo figures largely in every proposal for a rearrangement of the map of Africa. It is claimed that Belgium has annexed more territory than she can safely administer; certain it is that in annexing the Congo she did not take over an ordinary colony. When Great Britain assumed responsibility for her African colonies their virgin wealth was practically untapped; the people inhabiting the colonies, as a whole, welcomed the advent of her rule, and moreover Great Britain had in all her territories, with the exception of Egypt, a free hand. To a greater or less extent this applies to all African Powers, other than Belgium. When Belgian annexation took place, the Congo was in every respect a “squeezed orange”; not only so, but the administration of that territory must remain subject to the paternal control of the European Powers. There is another feature which should not be overlooked, and which may yet cause difficulty. In the event of a general insurrection in French or British colonies, or in the event of invasion, these Powers can at once bring in an outside coloured army, which can, if necessary, be reinforced with white troops. Belgium can do neither. Let any material section of the native army revolt, which, by the way, is the ever present fear of its officers, and the Europeans must run for their lives. They would call in vain for troops from the Mother Country, for by the Belgian Constitution the army may not be ordered abroad, and for other reasons European forces could hardly be used in the Congo. With the unification of language amongst the native troops which is rapidly taking place, with the ever increasing spread of knowledge as to the use of arms, this peril has been gravely accentuated within recent years.

Apart from these general—and some of them, remote—difficulties, there are existing reasons for believing that the extensive Congo territories are too heavy a responsibility for Belgium. The country is over eighty times the size of Belgium, a proportion to the Mother Country not by any means without parallel, but circumstances differ so widely that they remove the question from all comparison with any other incident of colonial expansion. The only countries which at all compare with the Congo are Uganda and Southern Nigeria, but these have not suffered as the Congo has done from thirty years of the maddest form of exploitation since Pizarro plundered Peru.

Uganda is just about 100,000 square miles and the Imperial grant-in-aid during the last ten years in direct administrative assistance (excluding railway credits) is no less than £1,075,000, or an average annual grant-in-aid of £107,500. This, it will be observed, is approximately an annual grant-in-aid of a sovereign per square mile.

The Belgian Congo cannot be managed upon less than Uganda, therefore it should require grants-in-aid from the Imperial Exchequer for the next twenty years, of not less than £1,000,000 sterling per annum. To this, however, must be added the exceptional demands from which no colony escapes. The question, therefore, is this: Are the Belgians ready to invest a sum of twenty to thirty millions sterling in the Congo during the next twenty to twenty-five years?

The Congo is thirteen times the size of Southern Nigeria; and though the density of the Congo population is considerably less, the tribes are much more widely scattered, and therefore require almost the same measure of white supervision, particularly in view of the direct taxation which everywhere prevails. There is the further consideration that many of the Belgian “officials” are to-day necessarily occupied with work which in other colonies is rightly left to the merchant. In view of these considerations a pro rata white personnel would seem to be essential. In Southern Nigeria Great Britain has from 800 to 1000 white men of all grades engaged in its administration. Taking the lowest figure as a basis, the Belgium Congo, with its 900,000 square miles of territory, coupled with the varied enterprises of the administration, would require over 10,400 men, but the colonial authorities find the greatest difficulty in maintaining an official personnel of about 2000!

With a few notable exceptions, the type of official on the Congo gives but little promise of any really effective and enlightened administration. Can the Belgian Government find the men which the colony requires? None can say actually what she may be able to do, although none will deny that up to the present she has failed to find either the number or the class of men vital to successful colonial government.

The question the Belgians would do well to ask themselves is—whether it would not be wiser for them to administer a smaller colony properly than to continue an attempt to govern a vast region like the Congo basin, which, in the very nature of things, would be an enormous task even for the most affluent European Power.

If Belgium could retain the Lower Congo, or a considerable portion of it, and transfer almost the whole of the upper regions to another Power, the indemnity she might expect to receive would, in such a case, permit of the development of the Lower Congo in a manner which would absorb all the activity that she could throw into it for generations. There are great possibilities in the Lower Congo, possibilities unprejudiced by the difficulties which obtain in the Upper Congo.

If the Belgians would agree to the disposal of the major part of the Upper Congo, the problem which would then confront statesmen would be that of finding another Power willing to assume so large a responsibility. France has the reversionary right, but could not be expected to add to her already too great African responsibilities. Clearly Great Britain could not accept the burden in view of the lead she took in the work of securing reforms. Portugal cannot effectively administer the territories she already possesses. We are thus driven to look to Germany.

GERMANY AND BELGIAN CONGO

It seems to be everywhere accepted that Germany would be willing to spend men and money on the administration of a large tropical colony, but again, is she prepared to accept the task of governing the Upper Congo?

A readiness to do so could hardly be other than welcome to the European Powers, always providing that Belgium were willing to share her present burden with Germany.

Such a transfer would not only unite the German colony of Cameroons with the Congo colony, but also with German East Africa, thus giving to Germany a great and uninterrupted trans-African colony larger than that possessed by any European Power in Africa. But the fatal objection to this re-arrangement is that there is no short and easy route to the sea which would be essential to a German control of the Congo. Even if the Matadi-Leopoldville railway territory were transferred, which would be extremely unlikely, the German Government would know that it was only a temporary route to the ocean.

Is it impossible for the Powers of Europe to take a truly large view of the situation and by making an immediate sacrifice, which in point of fact would be advantageous to each Power concerned, and thereby place the peace of the world upon a lasting basis? Is it entirely out of the question to persuade France for an adequate quid pro quo to transfer the major part of French Congo also to Germany?

France knows how she has been drawn into an almost impossible situation in that wretched colony, she knows how difficult it is for her to cleanse and administer it upon lines which are in accord with the obligations imposed upon her by the Berlin Conference. If France and Belgium together could be persuaded to transfer the whole, or the greater part, of French and Belgian Congo to Germany, a comparatively quick route to the ocean would be possible for the upper reaches of the Congo basin. If these two Powers could be brought to agree to such a transfer to Germany, they would individually be immeasurably the gainers, they would secure the peace of the world, and they would thereby add a lustre to their names which neither time nor eternity could tarnish.

Experience has shewn us that commerce need have no fear, for Germany welcomes and treats fairly the commercial houses of all nations. No favour is granted to a German firm which is prejudicial to the representatives of other Powers, whereas to-day the notorious fact is that merchants refuse to extend their commercial enterprises in French and Belgian Congo owing to the restrictions and irritating dues and charges which are imposed.

The remaining difficulty and the chief one is that of the treatment of the natives. Doubtless if it were possible to consult them, they would in both colonies vote for a transfer, not because they know anything of German rule, but because they would hope that a change would not involve them in a worse condition than they suffer at present. German administration of French Congo certainly could hardly be more oppressive than the French Government permits to-day. In Belgian Congo the natives would probably be treated as humanely and probably more justly than at present. Finally it is hoped that the German administration will, with the march of time, become less rigorous in theory and more humane in practice. On the whole, both from the commercial and native standpoint, the Congo basin stands to gain by a transfer to the German Empire.

PEACE IN THE WORLD

This transfer, joining as it would the Cameroons with German East Africa, would provide Germany with a single African colony of something over two million square miles in extent; occupied by a population of from twenty-five to thirty millions of people. A fertile colony larger than our Indian Empire, and approximately the same square mileage as the total possessions of Great Britain in the African continent.

The paramount question is, of course, what quid pro quo could Germany give in return for a re-arrangement of the African continent which would provide her with so vast a domain? Belgium would probably be willing to accept a cash indemnity with the retention of such portion of the Congo territory as she could safely and effectively administer. France is the only difficulty; but if France chose to be generous enough to part with French Congo, might not such a spirit find an echo across the Rhine? To put this into plain language, would not this vast colonial expansion thus placed in the hands of Germany be worth a rectification of the frontier of Alsace-Lorraine—or at least the gift of autonomy?

Such a solution of a great African problem would give a ray of light and hope to the darkest regions of the “Dark Continent,” whilst in Europe it would settle for generations the peace of the world; surely a fitting monument to erect to the memory of the martyred millions of the Congo!

Transcriber’s Note: click map for larger version.