Proportional Representation: A Study in Methods of Election

by John H. Humphreys

CHAPTER I

THE HOUSE OF COMMONS AS AN EXPRESSION OF THE NATIONAL WILL

"The virtue, the spirit, the essence of the House of Commons, consists in its being the express image of the nation."—BURKE.

"It is necessary," said Burke, "to resort to the theory of government whenever you propose any alteration in the frame of it, whether that alteration means the revival of some former antiquated and forsaken constitution or state, or the introduction of some new improvement in the commonwealth." The following chapters are a plea for an improvement in our electoral methods, and although the suggested improvement and the arguments with which it is supported are not new, yet it is desirable, in the spirit of Burke's declaration, to preface the plea with some reference to the main feature of our constitution.

The spread of representative government.

The outstanding characteristic of the British Constitution, its fundamental principle, is now, if not fully so in Burke's time, the government of the nation by its chosen representatives. Indeed, so much is this the case that, in spite of the continued presence of elements which are far from representative in character, originating in that distant past when commoners had little, if any, political influence, the British Constitution and Representative Government are almost synonymous terms, and the "mother of parliaments" has given birth to so long a succession of constitutions of which the cardinal principle is representative government—the association of the governed with the government—that we cannot now think of our House of Commons save as the most complete expression of this principle. Nor, despite the criticisms, many of them fully deserved, which have been directed against the working of parliamentary institutions, has the House of Commons ceased to be taken in other lands as a model to be reproduced in general outline. New parliaments continue to arise and in the most unexpected quarters. China is insistently demanding the immediate realisation of full representative government. Japan has not only assimilated western learning, but has adopted western representative institutions, and in copying our electoral machinery has added improvements of her own. Russia has established a parliament which, although not at present elected upon a democratic basis, must inevitably act as a powerful check upon autocracy, and in the process will assuredly seek that increased authority which comes from a more complete identification with the people. The Reichstag has demanded the cessation of the personal rule of the German Emperor, and will not be content until, in the nation's name, it exercises a more complete control over the nation's affairs. Parliamentary government was recently established at Constantinople amid the plaudits of the whole civilized world, and although the new régime has not fulfilled all the hopes formed of it, yet upon its continuance depends the maintenance of the improvements already effected in Turkey. Lord Morley signalized his tenure of office as Secretary of State for India by reforms that make a great advance in the establishment of representative institutions. Some of these experiments may be regarded as premature, but in the case of civilized nations there would appear to be no going back; for them there is no alternative to democracy, and if representative institutions have not yielded so far all the results that were expected of them, progress must be sought in an improvement of these institutions rather than in a return to earlier conditions. The only criticism, therefore, of the House of Commons that is of practical value must deal with those defects which experience has disclosed, and with those improvements in its organization and composition which are essential if in the future it is to discharge efficiently and adequately its primary function of giving effect to the national will.

The House of Commons and sovereign power.

"The essential property of representative government," says Professor Dicey, "is to produce coincidence between the wishes of the Sovereign and the wishes of the subject…. This, which is true in its measure of all real representative government applies with special truth to the English House of Commons." [1] This conception of the House of Commons as the central and predominant factor in the constitution, exercising sovereign power because it represents the nation which it governs, has been notably strengthened during the last fifty years. A change having far-reaching consequences took place in 1861, when the repeal of the paper duties was effected by a clause in the annual Bill providing for the necessary reimposition of annual duties, a proceeding which deprived the Lords of the opportunity of defeating the new proposal other than by rejecting the whole of the measure of which it formed a part. This example has since been followed by both the great parties of the State. Sir William Harcourt embodied extensive changes in the Death Duties in the Finance Bill of 1894; Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, in 1899, included proposals for altering the permanent provisions made for the reduction of the National Debt; Mr. Lloyd George, following these precedents, included in the Finance Bill of 1909 important new taxes which, prior to 1861, would have been submitted to both Houses in the form of separate Bills. The House of Commons, however, has not yet attained the position of full unqualified sovereignty, for, whilst the relations between the King and the Commons have been harmonised by making the King's Ministry dependent upon that House, the decisions of the House of Lords are not yet subject to the same control. The Lords successfully rejected the Education, Licensing, and Plural Voting Bills, all of which were passed by the Commons by large majorities during the Parliament of 1906-1909. Further, it refused its consent to the Finance Bill of 1909 until the measure had been submitted to the judgment of the country, and by this action compelled a dissolution of Parliament.[2]

The demand for complete sovereignty.

These assertions of authority on the part of the House of Lords called forth from the Commons a fresh demand for complete sovereignty—a demand based on the ground that the House of Commons expresses the will of the people, and that the rejection by the hereditary House of measures desired by the nation's representatives is directly opposed to the true principles of representative government. In consequence of the rejection of the Education and Plural Voting Bills of 1906, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, in June 1907, moved in the House of Commons the following resolution: "That, in order to give effect to the will of the people as expressed by their elected representatives, it is necessary that the power of the other House to alter or reject Bills passed by this House, should be so restricted by law as to secure that within the limit of a single Parliament the final decision of the Commons shall prevail." The first clause of this resolution advances the claim already referred to—that the House of Commons is the representative and authoritative expression of the national will—and in support of this claim Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman quoted the declaration of Burke, that "the virtue, the spirit, the essence of the House of Commons consists in its being the express image of the nation." In the Parliament elected in January 1910, further resolutions were carried by the Commons defining more precisely the proposed limitation of the legislative power of the Lords. It was resolved[3] that the House of Lords should be disabled by law from rejecting or amending a money Bill, and that any Bill other than a money Bill which had passed the House of Commons in three successive sessions should become law without the consent of the House of Lords.

These resolutions were embodied in the Parliament Bill, but the measure was not proceeded with owing to the death of King Edward, and a conference between the leaders of the two chief parties met for the purpose of finding a settlement of the controversy by consent. The conference failed, and the Government at once took steps to appeal to the country for a decision in support of its proposals. Meanwhile the House of Lords, which had already placed on record its opinion that the possession of a peerage should no longer confer the right to legislate, carried resolutions outlining a scheme for a new Second Chamber, and proposing that disputes between the two Houses should be decided by joint sessions, or, in matters of great gravity, by means of a Referendum. The result of the appeal to the country (Dec. 1910) was in favour of the Government. The Parliament Bill was re-introduced, and this measure, if passed, will mark an important step in the realisation of the demand of the Commons for complete sovereignty.

Complete sovereignty demands complete representation.

The Parliament Bill does not, however, contemplate the establishment of single-chamber Government, and it would appear that complete sovereignty is only claimed whilst the House of Lords is based upon the hereditary principle. For the preamble of the Bill declares that "it is intended to substitute for the House of Lords as it at present exists a Second Chamber constituted on a popular instead of hereditary basis," and that "provision will require hereafter to be made by Parliament in a measure effecting such substitution for limiting and defining the powers of the new Second Chamber." But whatever constitutional changes may take place, the national will must remain the final authority in legislation, and the ultimate position of the House of Commons in the constitution and in public esteem will depend upon the confidence with which it can be regarded as giving expression to that will. It cannot claim to be the sole authority for legislation without provoking searching inquiries into the methods of election by which it is brought into being. At a General Election the citizens are asked to choose representatives who shall have full power to speak in their name on all questions which may arise during the lifetime of a Parliament. But, although invariably there are several important questions before the country awaiting decision, the elector is usually restricted in his choice to two candidates, and it is obvious that this limited choice affords him a most inadequate opportunity of giving expression to his views upon the questions placed before him. There can be no guarantee that the decisions of representatives so chosen are always in agreement with the wishes of those who elected them. Even in the General Election of December 1910, when every effort was made to concentrate public attention upon one problem—the relations between the two Houses of Parliament—the elector in giving his vote had to consider the probable effect of his choice upon many other questions of first-class importance—the constitution of a new Second Chamber, Home Rule for Ireland, the maintenance of Free Trade, the establishment of an Imperial Preference, Electoral Reform, the reversal or modification of the Osborne Judgment, Payment of Members, Invalidity Insurance; in respect of all of which legislative proposals might possibly be submitted to the new Parliament. Obviously before the House of Commons can be regarded with complete confidence as the expression of the national will, the elector must be given a wider and more effective choice in the selection of a representative.

It is, however, contended by many politicians that the main object of a General Election is not the creation of a legislature which shall give expression to the views of electors on public questions. "A General Election," says the Report of the Royal Commission on Electoral Systems,[4] "is in fact considered by a large portion of the electorate as practically a referendum on the question which of two Governments shall be returned to power." But were this interpretation of a General Election accepted it would destroy the grounds on which it is claimed that the decisions of the Commons in respect of legislation shall prevail "within the limit of a single Parliament." Some means should be available for controlling the Government in respect of its legislative proposals, and the history of the Unionist administrations of 1895-1906, during which the House of Lords failed to exercise any such control, demonstrated the need of a check upon the action of a House of Commons elected under present conditions. Mr. John M. Robertson, whose democratic leanings are not open to the least suspicion, has commented in this sense upon the lack of confidence in the representative character of the House of Commons. "Let me remind you," said he, "that the state of things in which the Progressive party can get in on a tidal movement of political feeling with a majority of 200, causes deep misgivings in the minds of many electors…. Those who desire an effective limitation of the power of the House of Lords and its ultimate abolition, are bound to offer to the great mass of prudent electors some measure of electoral reform which will give greater stability to the results of the polls, and will make the results at a General Election more in keeping with the actual balance of opinion in the country." [5] The preamble of the Parliament Bill itself implies that the decisions of the House of Commons may not always be in accordance with the national wishes. It foreshadows the creation of a new Second Chamber, and the only purpose which this chamber can serve is to make good the deficiencies of the First.

The fact that our electoral methods are so faulty that their results produce in the minds of many electors deep misgivings as to the representative character of the House of Commons must materially undermine the authority of that House. All who desire the final and complete triumph of representative institutions—a triumph that depends upon their success in meeting the demands made upon them—all who are anxious that the House of Commons shall not only maintain, but increase, the prestige that has hitherto been associated with it, must, in the face of possible constitutional developments, endeavour to strengthen its position by making it in fact, as it is in theory, fully representative of the nation. For Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's quotation from Burke is double-edged, and may be expressed thus: "the virtue, the spirit, the essence of the House of Commons departs as soon as it ceases to be the express image of the nation." Such a House cannot furnish an adequate basis of support for a Government. For the Government which issues from it will not command public confidence. The debates in the House in 1905, before the resignation of Mr. Balfour, bore testimony to the fact that the strength and power of a Government which, according to the theory of our constitution, depends upon the number of its supporters in the House of Commons, in reality rests upon its reputation with the country. There was quoted more than once with excellent effect this dictum of Sir William Anson: "Ministers are not only the servants of the Crown, they represent the public opinion of the United Kingdom. When they cease to impersonate public opinion they become a mere group of personages who must stand or fall by the prudence and success of their actions. They have to deal with disorders at home or hostile manifestations abroad; they would have to meet these with the knowledge that they had not the confidence or support of the country; and their opponents at home and abroad would know this too." [6] The strength and stability of a democratic Government thus depend upon its capacity to interpret the will of the country, and the support which the House of Commons can give is of value only to the extent to which that House reflects national opinion. The Commons, if it is to maintain unimpaired its predominant position in the constitution, must make good its claim to be the representative expression of the national will. The measures for which it makes itself responsible must have behind them that irresistible authority, the approval of the electorate. If then our electoral methods fail to yield a fully representative House, and if, in consequence, the House cannot satisfactorily fulfil its double function of affording an adequate basis of support to the Government which springs from it, and of legislating in accordance with the nation's wishes, the resultant dissatisfaction and instability must give rise to a demand for their improvement. The House of Commons must re-establish itself upon surer foundations.

Strengthening the foundations of the House of Commons.

Each change in the constitution of the House of Commons—and its foundations have been strengthened on more than one occasion—has been preceded by a recognition of its failure to meet in full the requirements of a representative chamber. Large changes have again and again been made in consequence of such recognition since the day when Burke alleged that its virtue lay in its being "the express image of the nation." At the close of the eighteenth century, when these words were spoken, it could be alleged with apparent truth that 306 members were virtually returned by the influence of 160 persons.[7] The consciousness that such a House could not be the express image of the nation produced the Reform Bill of 1832, and a further recognition that a still larger number of the governed must be associated with the Government, produced the further changes of 1867 and of 1884, embodied in measures significantly called Acts for the Representation of the People. These changes, by conferring the franchise upon an ever-widening circle of citizens, have, from one point of view, rendered the House of Commons more fully representative of the nation at large. But even whilst the process of extending the franchise was still in operation, it was recognized that such extensions were not in themselves sufficient to create a House of Commons that could claim to be a true expression of the national will. The test of a true system of representation, laid down by Mill in Representative Government, has never been successfully challenged. It still remains the last word upon the subject, and, until the House of Commons satisfies that test with reasonable approximation, it will always be open to the charge that it is not fully representative, and that in consequence its decisions lack the necessary authority. "In a really equal democracy," runs the oft-quoted phrase, "any and every section would be represented, not disproportionately, but proportionately. A majority of the electors would always have a majority of the representatives; but a minority of electors would always have a minority of the representatives. Man for man, they would be as fully represented as the majority." [8]

Mill's philosophy finds but little favour in many quarters of political activity to-day, and the rejection of his philosophy has induced many to regard his views on representative government as of little value. Even so staunch an admirer as Lord Morley of Blackburn has underestimated the importance of Mill's declaration, for, in a recent appreciation of the philosopher[9] he declared that Mill "was less successful in dealing with parliamentary machinery than in the infinitely more important task of moulding and elevating popular character, motives, ideals, and steady respect for truth, equity and common sense—things that matter a vast deal more than machinery." Yet Lord Morley, in his attempt to make a beginning with representative institutions in India, found that questions of electoral machinery were of the first importance; that they, indeed, constituted his chief difficulty; and he was compelled in adjusting the respective claims of Hindus and Muhammadans to have recourse to Mill's famous principle—the due representation of minorities. Mill, as subsequent chapters will show, understood what Lord Morley seems to have insufficiently recognized, that the development or repression of growth in popular character, motives and ideals, nay, the successful working of representative institutions themselves, depends in a very considerable degree upon electoral machinery. Its importance increases with every fresh assertion of democratic principles, and the constitutional issues raised during the Parliaments of 1906, 1910, and 1911 must involve a revision of our electoral methods before a complete solution is attained. The demand on the part of the House of Commons for complete sovereignty must evoke a counter demand that that House shall make itself fully representative.

The rise of a new party.

But the relations which should subsist between the two Houses of Parliament, whether the upper House is reformed or not, is not the only question which is giving rise to a closer examination of the foundations of the House of Commons. To this external difficulty there must be added the internal, and in the future a more pressing, problem created by the rise of a new organized party within the House of Commons itself. The successive extensions of the franchise have given birth to new political forces which are not content to give expression to their views along the old channels of the two historic parties, and the growth of the Labour Party must accelerate the demand for a more satisfactory electoral method. For a system which fails in many respects to meet the requirements of two political parties cannot possibly do justice to the claims of three parties to fair representation in the House of Commons. It is true that some statesmen regard the rise of a new party with fear and trembling; they imagine that it forebodes the bankruptcy of democratic institutions, the success of which, in their judgment, is necessarily bound up with the maintenance of the two-party system. The two-party system must indeed be a plant of tender growth if it depends for existence upon the maintenance of antiquated electoral methods. But those politicians who deprecate any change on the ground that single-member constituencies afford the only means by which the two-party system can be preserved, have failed to explain why this electoral system has not prevented the growth of Labour parties in Australia and in England, or why numerous parties and single-member constituencies go hand in hand both in France and Germany. Single-member constituencies may distort and falsify the representation of parties, but they cannot prevent the coming of a new party if that party is the outcome, the expression, of a new political force.

The new political conditions and electoral reform.

Why should the rise of a new party cause so much uneasiness? Can democracy make no use of that increased diffusion of political intelligence from which springs these new political movements? Mr. Asquith takes no such pessimistic view. He, least, realises that our present system is not necessarily the final stage in the development of representative government. He does not imagine that, whilst we welcome progress in all things else, we must at all costs adhere to the electoral methods which have done duty in the past. Speaking at St. Andrews, 19 February 1906, he declared that: "It was infinitely to the advantage of the House of Commons, if it was to be a real reflection and mirror of the national mind, that there should be no strain of opinion honestly entertained by any substantial body of the King's subjects which should not find there representation and speech. No student of political development could have supposed that we should always go along in the same old groove, one party on one side and another party on the other side, without the intermediate ground being occupied, as it was in every other civilized country, by groups and factions having special ideas and interests of their own. If real and genuine and intelligent opinion was more split up than it used to be, and if we could not now classify everybody by the same simple process, we must accept the new conditions and adapt our machinery to them, our party organization, our representative system, and the whole scheme and form of our government." This is not a chance saying, standing by itself, for a fortnight later, speaking at Morley, Mr. Asquith added: "Let them have a House of Commons which fully reflected every strain of opinion; that was what made democratic government in the long run not only safer and more free, but more stable." Mr. Asquith's statements take cognizance of the fact that a great divergence between the theoretical and actual composition of the House of Commons must make for instability, and his pronouncement is an emphatic reinforcement of the arguments contained in the earlier portion of this chapter.

On a more important occasion, when replying to an influential deputation of members of Parliament and others,[10] Mr. Asquith, with all the responsibility which attaches to the words of a Prime Minister, made this further statement: "I have said in public before now, and am therefore only repeating an opinion which I have never ceased to hold, namely, that there can be no question in the mind of any one familiar with the actual operation of our constitutional system that it permits, and I might say that it facilitates—but it certainly permits—a minority of voters, whether in the country at large or in particular constituencies, to determine the representation—the relative representation in the one case of the whole nation, and the actual representation in the other case of the particular constituency—sometimes in defiance of the opinions and wishes of the majority of the electors. The moment you have stated that as a fact which cannot be disputed, and it cannot be contradicted by any one, you have pointed out a flaw of a most serious character, and some might say of an almost fatal character, when your constitutional and Parliamentary system appears at the bar of judgment upon the issue whether or not it does from the democratic point of view really carry out the first principles of representative government. I therefore agree that it is impossible to defend the rough and ready method which has been hitherto adopted as a proper or satisfactory explanation of the representative principle. It is not merely, as more than one speaker has pointed out, that under our existing system a minority in the country may return a majority of the House of Commons, but what more frequently happens, and what I am disposed to agree is equally injurious in its results, is that you have almost always a great disproportion in the relative size of the majority and minority in the House of Commons as compared with their relative size in the constituencies. That is the normal condition of our House of Commons. I have had experience of some of the inconveniences which result." In speaking at Burnley in support of the Parliament Bill during the electoral campaign of December 1910, Mr. Asquith again laid stress upon the need of making the House of Commons fully representative. "It is," he said, "an essential and integral feature of our policy … that we shall go forward with the task of making the House of Commons not only the mouthpiece but the mirror of the national mind."

There can be no doubt that the question of electoral methods must now occupy a prominent place in all discussions which centre around the purpose, efficiency and authority of the House of Commons. John Bright, in addressing the people of Birmingham, on the eve of an election, exhorted them to "bear in mind that you are going to make a machine more important than any that is made in the manufactories of Birmingham … a stupendous machine whose power no man can measure." [11] Can we afford in the manufacture of such a machine to be content with rough and ready methods of election? Accuracy and precision are being demanded with ever-increasing force in all other departments of human activity; on what grounds then can we in the most delicate of all—that of government—refuse to recognize their value? The necessity of ensuring the predominance of the House of Commons in our constitutional system, the problem created by the rise of the Labour Party, the increased recognition of the need of reform, cannot but contribute to one result. The House of Commons will make itself more fully representative by the adoption of more trustworthy electoral methods, and in so doing will not only increase its stability and efficiency, but will render its constitutional position impregnable.

The indispensable preliminaries to any such change are, in the first place, an analysis of the results, both direct and indirect, of existing methods and, in the second place, a careful comparison of the improvements possible. The subsequent chapters will be devoted to both these aspects of the problem, for in the elucidation of the system most suited to British conditions, the experience of those countries which, faced with the necessity for change, have already introduced new methods into their electoral systems, will be found to be of the highest value.

[Footnote 1: The Law of the Constitution, p. 81.]

[Footnote 2: Our constitution is an ever-changing one, and had the country endorsed the action of the Lords in withholding its assent to the Finance Bill of 1909, a great blow would have been dealt to the authority of the House of Commons. The Fabian Society, in its Manifesto to members, issued on the eve of the election of January 1910, put this aspect of the case very forcibly: "It may justly be claimed by the Socialists that they have steadily refused to be misled by idle talk about what is and what is not constitutional, and have recognized that the only real constitution is the sum of the powers that are effectively exercised in the country. If the House of Lords boldly refuses supply and compels a dissolution, and the country, at the election, supports the Lords, that support will make the action of the Lords constitutional in spite of all paper denunciations by the defeated party" (Fabian News, January 1910).

The verdict of the country, as interpreted by the present mode of election, condemned the action of the Lords by a substantial majority. Yet the figures in Chap. II. p. 19, show by how small a turnover of votes that judgment might have been reversed.]

[Footnote 3: 14 April 1910.]

[Footnote 4: Cd. 5163, par. 126.]

[Footnote 5: Manchester Reform Club, 2 February 1909.]

[Footnote 6: The Law and Custom of the Constitution, p. 372.]

[Footnote 7: Ibid., p. 124.]

[Footnote 8: Representative Government, Chap. VII.]

[Footnote 9: The Times, Literary Supplement, 18 May 1906.]

[Footnote 10: 10 November 1908.]

[Footnote 11: Thomas Hare, The Election of Representatives, p. 18]