Proportional Representation: A Study in Methods of Election

by John H. Humphreys

CHAPTER IX

A COMPARISON OF LIST SYSTEMS WITH THE SINGLE TRANSFERABLE VOTE

"Les partis sont une institution de la vie politiquo actuelle. Ils sont une partie, non écrite, de la Constitution."—P. G. LA CHESNAIS

Influence of previous conditions.]

List methods of proportional representation have been favoured on the Continent, the transferable vote in English-speaking countries, and the question naturally arises, whence this difference? It would appear from the history of proportional representation that advocates of the reform have always kept in mind local customs, and have adapted their proposals to them. Thus a list system of proportional representation was adopted in Switzerland because such a system was more easily grafted upon previous electoral conditions. This is the explanation given by Ernest Naville, who for more than forty years was the leading advocate of electoral reform in Switzerland, in a letter[1] addressed to the late Miss Spence of Adelaide, South Australia. "The Swiss Cantons," said he, "have adopted the system of competing lists. I do not think the system is the best, but, as it involved the least departure from customary practices, it was the system for which acceptance could be more easily obtained. My ideal is a system which leaves the electors face to face with the candidates without the intervention of lists presented by parties; that is to say, that the method of voting indicated at the end of the pamphlet[2] forwarded by you has my preference. It is the system which I, inspired by the works of Mr. Hare, first proposed in Geneva, but, in order to obtain a practical result, account has to be taken of the habits and prejudices of the public to which the appeal is made, and the best must often be renounced in order to obtain what is possible in certain given circumstances." In a further letter Professor Naville was even more emphatic. "I consider," said he, "the Hare system preferable to that of competing lists. I have always thought so. I have always said so. But our Swiss people are so accustomed to the scrutin de liste, or multiple vote, that we could not obtain from them the profound modification which would have been necessary to pass to the Hare-Spence system."

Partly the basis of representation in a list system.

The long familiarity of the Belgian electors with the scrutin de liste also paved the way for the adoption of the list system of proportional representation, but there is an additional reason why list systems have found favour on the Continent. Some continental writers consider that parties as such are alone entitled to representation in Parliament, and are not enamoured of any scheme which makes personal representation possible. This view is also taken by Mr. J. Ramsay Macdonald, who, speaking of the Belgian scheme, says that "it makes party grouping the most important consideration in forming the legislative order, and is therefore much truer to the facts of Government than any other proportional representation scheme."[3] The Royal Commission on Electoral Systems also seems to have accepted the continental theory, that "in political elections it is the balance of parties which is of primary importance." In England, however, representation has never theoretically been based upon party. The limited vote, the cumulative vote, the double vote in double-member constituencies, have all allowed the elector complete freedom of action to follow party instructions, or to act independently. The electoral method has not been chosen to suit the convenience of party organizations; parties have had to adapt themselves to the system of voting. The single transferable vote in accordance with these traditions bases representation upon electors, and preserves to them freedom to vote as they please. So much is this the case that some critics consider it unsuitable for a system of proportional representation, and although Mill evidently regarded the Hare scheme not only as a system of personal representation, but as a plan for securing the representation of majorities and minorities in due proportion, the Royal Commission on Electoral Systems took the view that the transferable vote "was not originally invented as a system of proportional representation, but as a system of personal representation to secure the return of men as men, not as party units." Again, Professor Commons says that "the Hare system is advocated by those who, in a too doctrinaire fashion, wish to abolish political parties."[4] But in making this statement Professor Commons himself supplies the answer. "They apparently do not realize," says he, "the impossibility of acting in politics without large groups of individuals, nor do they perceive that the Hare system itself, though apparently a system of personal representation, would nevertheless result in party representation." The more complete organization of parties is a direct consequence of the more democratic franchise now existing. Political action in modern times without organization is impossible. The Johannesburg municipal elections in November 1909, despite the success of two independent candidates, showed that the most effective way of conducting elections with the transferable vote is that of organizations presenting lists of candidates. Indeed, so great a part does organization take in the political life of to-day that it is desirable, if possible, to have some counteracting influence. The transferable vote supplies this by securing for the elector the utmost measure of freedom of action.

This freedom of action is greatly appreciated by electors. A voter, asked after the Johannesburg elections to give his impressions of the new method of voting, stated that "the new system had put him on his mettle. He had never experienced so much pleasure in the act of voting; he had had to use his intelligence in discriminating between the claims of the various candidates." Voting with the single transferable vote ceases to be a purely mechanical operation, the voter becomes conscious of the fact that in voting he is selecting a representative. It is of little value to ask electors to exercise their intelligence if on the day of the poll they have no means of doing so. There was some complaint in Sweden after the first proportional representation elections because the new system compelled an elector, if he wished to use his vote with effect, to act rigidly with his party. With the transferable vote party action has sufficient play. Electors can freely combine and vote as parties, and effective organization will reap its legitimate reward. But the elector will not be constrained to act against his wishes. He will play an effective part in the election. In view of the great freedom conferred by the single transferable vote on electors, it is not surprising that the Royal Commission on Electoral Systems reported that the "Belgian system is foredoomed to rejection by English public opinion," and Mr. J. R. Macdonald states that "the British mind would not submit to this (the Belgian) simplest and most efficient form of proportional representation."

The freedom of the elector within the party.

Even when representation is based, as in the list systems, upon parties as such, it becomes necessary to determine the degree of liberty that shall be allowed to the individual elector in the exercise of the franchise. If a party has obtained five seats and the party has nominated seven candidates, how are the five successful ones to be selected, and what part is the elector to take in the selection? There is considerable dissatisfaction in Belgium with that part of the system which enables the party organizations to arrange the order in which the names shall appear upon the ballot paper, although this order may have been arrived at by a preliminary election among members of the party. In the election of 1910 there was a considerable increase in the number of voters who exercised their right of giving a vote of preference to individual candidates. The extensive use of this right resulted at Brussels in the alteration of the order of election as determined by the party organizations, and Count Goblet d'Alviella points out that this will demand the consideration of the political parties.[5] Some device such as that of making the vote transferable within the list will be required in order to ensure that the majority within the party shall obtain its full share of the representation. As stated in the previous chapter, the French Parliamentary Committee felt it necessary to provide for the elector a greater freedom of action than is possible under the Belgian system. In the report issued by this Committee in 1905 the use of the limited vote was recommended; in the report of 1907 the cumulative vote, which confers still greater freedom upon the elector, was proposed. In the Swedish system electors not only have full power to strike out, to add to or to vary the order in which candidates' names appear upon the ballot papers issued by the party organizations, but they have the opportunity of presenting a non-party list. The Finnish electoral law was deliberately framed so as not to interfere with or to check the liberty of the voter in making up the lists.[6] This law not only allows the names of candidates to figure on more than one list, but permits the voter to prepare a list of his own composed of any three of the candidates who have been duly nominated. In a list system two problems, the allotment of seats to parties and the selection of the successful candidates, have to be solved and the solution must in each case respect the personal freedom of the elector. With the single transferable vote the same mechanism solves both problems; it gives to each party its due proportion of seats, it determines in the most satisfactory way which of the candidates nominated by a party shall be declared elected, and it does not encroach in any way upon the elector's freedom of action. There is one point in which the single transferable vote differs essentially from the list systems. With the former the vote never passes out of the control of the voter, and the returning officer can only transfer the vote to some candidate whom the elector has named. With the list systems adopted in Belgium, Switzerland, Sweden and Finland, or with that recommended by the French Parliamentary Committee, a vote given for any one candidate is also a vote for the party which has nominated the candidate, and the vote may contribute to the success of some candidate of this party whose election the voter did not desire to advance. This fact explains the difficulties which have been associated with the formation of cartels in Belgium. A cartel is an agreement between two parties to present a common list, and if, as has taken place in some of the Belgian constituencies, Socialists and Liberals present a combined list, a Liberal by voting for one of the Liberal candidates of the cartel may contribute to the success of one of the Socialist candidates. The Socialist voter may, on the other hand, contribute to the return of a Liberal candidate. For this reason some Liberals and some Socialists refuse to support cartels. In Sweden it is possible that the elector's vote may, if he make use of a party ticket, contribute to the return of some candidate whom he may have struck off the list. If two parties agree to place the same motto at the head of their respective lists, which may be quite distinct, a member of one party may help to elect an additional candidate of the other party. Yet a list system affords no way by which votes can be transferred from one party to an allied party save by a cartel; if transferred at all they must be transferred en bloc from one party to another party, and not from one candidate to another candidate, in accordance with the expressed wishes of the elector. Mr. J. R. Macdonald states that "proportional representation seeks to prevent the intermingling of opinion on the margins of parties and sections of parties which is essential to ordered and organic social progress." The statement is in no sense true of the single transferable vote which affords every facility for the intermingling of opinion on the margins of parties and sections of parties, whilst even in Belgium groups within a party have always presented a common list.

Comparative accuracy.

Considerable discussion has taken place as to which of the list systems yield the most accurate results. It is obvious that as electors do not divide themselves into groups which are exactly one-fourth, one-fifth, or one-sixth of the whole, the utmost that a system of proportional representation can do in the allotment of seats is to approximate as closely as possible to the proportions in which the electors are divided. There is very little difference in the results obtained by the various list systems and by the single transferable vote. The Belgian (d'Hondt) rule slightly favours the larger party; this rule allots seats to parties according to the number of times the party total contains the common divisor, the votes remaining over being ignored. For this reason other advocates of list systems prefer the simple rule-of-three or méthode rationelle.[7] With this system the total number of votes polled is divided by the number of seats. The totals gained by the respective lists are then divided by the quotient thus obtained and the seats allotted to the lists accordingly. If after the allotment of seats to the different lists there remain some seats not allotted, these are awarded to the lists with the largest numbers of votes not utilized. The transferable vote in practice, if not in theory, also awards seats to the various parties according to the number of times the party total contains the quota. If there is a seat not allotted it does not necessarily fall to the party having the largest number of votes not utilized. All the votes not utilized are taken into consideration, and the smaller remainders may, by combination, win the odd seat. For example, suppose that in a six-member constituency five seats have been allotted and three candidates remain in competition for the last seat with votes as follows:—

Candidate A 4,000
" B 3,000
" C 2,000

Then if the supporters of candidate C prefer B to A and have indicated this fact on the ballot papers, the votes given to C would be transferred to B, who would be elected to fill the last seat. With the d'Hondt rule remainders are ignored; with the "rational method" the largest remainders are favoured; with the single transferable vote the last seat is awarded to the majority of the electors not otherwise represented. The transferable vote therefore gives a result at least as accurate as any of the rules devised in connexion with the list systems. But in the majority of cases all three rules will yield the same result.

Panachage.

In the previous chapter reference has been made to the possible abuse of panachage. In order to prevent such practice the Belgian system provides that the elector shall vote for a member on one list only. In Switzerland the elector is permitted to vote for members of more than one list, and any abuse of this privilege is prevented by allowing the elector to cumulate as many as three votes upon any of his favourite candidates. This provision assures the return of the favourite candidates of each party. The problem hardly arises with the single transferable vote; the favourites of each party will doubtless always receive more votes than are sufficient to ensure their election. The elector who desires to advance the interests of his own party as much as possible must indicate his preferences among all the members of his own party before recording any preference for a candidate of another.

Applicability to non-political elections.

The single transferable vote possesses another advantage over list systems. It is not only applicable to political elections, but to all elections in which it is desired that the elected body should be representative in character, but in which party lists are undesirable. The British Medical Association has decided to conduct all its elections so far as possible by the transferable vote; Trades Unions have made use of it in the election of their committees; it has been used in Australia by the Labour party for the selection of parliamentary candidates by members of the party before the date of election. Thus the single transferable vote would produce a much to be desired uniformity in method in different elections.

Bye-elections.

The list systems have an advantage over the transferable vote in the simplicity of their solution of the problem of bye-elections. Under list systems bye-elections are abolished. But the preliminary question, whether it is desirable that they should be abolished, needs consideration. The Report of the Royal Commission on Electoral Systems says: "Neither the single transferable vote nor list systems provide for a solution of the problem of bye-elections which is both fitted to English ideas and practically satisfactory." The Report continues: "Bye-elections are generally regarded as valuable, if rough, tests of public approval or disapproval of the proceedings of the Government, and useful indications of the trend of political feeling. A system, therefore, which would abolish or seriously hamper them is bound to excite opposition."[8] If bye-elections are desirable because of the indications which they give of the trend of political feeling, then the large constituencies which the proportional system demands would add to their value. The opinion of a larger number of electors would be obtained.

Wherever the single transferable vote has been adopted bye-elections have been retained. In Tasmania, whenever a vacancy occurs the whole constituency is polled; the Transvaal Municipal Act allows single vacancies to remain unfilled, but provides for bye-elections when two or more seats become vacant. The Proportional Representation Society, in view of the demand for the retention of bye-elections, suggests that single vacancies should be immediately filled by a bye-election when they occur in a three-membered constituency, but that in larger areas no bye-election should be held until two seats are vacated. But is not the importance of bye-elections overrated? In many respects they are the least satisfactory feature of English elections, and it is noticeable that the change of opinion registered in a bye-election has often not been maintained when the same constituency is polled at a General Election. A considerable proportion of bye-elections are consequent upon the taking of office by members of Parliament, and it is generally agreed that such bye-elections are not necessary. Further, the House of Commons has already resolved that it is desirable to reduce the length of parliaments to five years, which in practice would mean a working life of four years. The shortening of parliaments would destroy what little value bye-elections possess.

With a system of proportional representation bye-elections may produce results which are unfair to the minority. If, for example, at a General Election a constituency returned four Conservatives, two Liberals, and one Socialist, and the Socialist member died or retired during the lifetime of the parliament, the largest party would at a bye-election be able to gain another member at the expense of the smallest party in the constituency. This possible injustice is avoided in the list systems by the abolition of bye-elections. Supplementary members are chosen at the time of the General Election, and these are called upon to fill vacancies in the order of their election. The party character of representation remains unchanged from one election to another. When the cumulative vote was used for School Board elections casual vacancies were filled by co-option, and the party in whose ranks the vacancy occurred was usually allowed to nominate his successor by consent of the whole Board. Doubtless were bye-elections abolished there would be a similar willingness to act fairly towards the smaller parties, but if it was felt desirable to bring the transferable vote into agreement with the practice followed in the list systems the necessary arrangements could be made. On the death or retirement of a member the quota of ballot papers by which he was elected, kept meanwhile under official seal, could be re-examined, and the candidate who had secured a majority of the highest preferences recorded on the papers could be called upon to fill the vacancy.

Relative simplicity of scrutiny.

Experience shows conclusively that proportional systems, even the most complex, present no great difficulty to the voter, and therefore there is little to choose between them. The work thrown upon the returning officer varies considerably, but in every country the returning officers have proved equal to their task. The author has been present at Belgian elections and at Swedish elections; he has conducted model elections in England, and has been present at elections in the Transvaal, and has therefore had some opportunity of judging different systems from the point of view of facility in the counting of votes. The conclusion arrived at is that the different schemes may be arranged in the following order:—

1. The single transferable vote when the surplus votes are taken from the top of the successful candidate's heap;

2. The Belgian list system with its single vote;

3. The single transferable vote with the surplus votes distributed proportionately to the next preferences, as prescribed in the Schedule of Lord Courtney's Municipal Representation Bill.

4. List systems in which more than one vote is recorded. With these, the counting increases in difficulty with the complexity of the scheme.

The reasons for this conclusion are briefly these: Whenever the ballot paper (as in the Belgian system and with the single transferable vote) represents but one vote only, the process of counting consists of sorting papers according to the votes given, and then in counting the heaps of papers so formed. Whenever there is more than one vote recorded upon a ballot paper it becomes necessary to extract the particulars of each paper upon recording sheets. This is the case in the London Borough Council elections, when the scrutin de liste in its simple form is used, and when, as in the list system proposed by the committee of the French Chamber, the elector may cumulate or distribute his votes as he pleases, selecting candidates from any or all the lists, this process of extracting the details of the ballot papers must involve considerable labour. By comparison, the process of sorting and counting ballot papers is extremely simple. The Belgian law makes provision for the employment of two "professional calculators," who are responsible for the accuracy of the arithmetical calculations, and if the more accurate form of the single transferable vote is adopted, it will be desirable that the returning officer should have two assistants whose special duty it should be to verify the accuracy of each stage of the process.

In any comparison between the two main systems of proportional representation there is no need to understate the advantages of either. The results which have followed from the adoption of list systems on the continent have shown how immeasurably superior these are to ordinary electoral methods. Even in the most rigid of these systems—the Belgian—there is within each party considerable freedom of opinion in respect of all political questions which do not spring directly from the principles on which the party is based. It is claimed, however, for the single transferable vote that it is more elastic than the most complex of list systems, that it more freely adapts itself to new political conditions, and that in small constituencies returning, say, five or seven members, it yields better results. Moreover, this system, based as it is upon the direct representation of the electors, has appealed with greater force to English-speaking peoples; it has its advocates in South Africa, Australia, New Zealand and Canada, as well as in England, and as a common electoral method for the British Empire is a desideratum in itself, the balance of advantage, at least for English-speaking peoples, would appear to be with the single transferable vote.

[Footnote 1: October 1894.]

[Footnote 2: An address given by Miss Spence at River House, Chelsea,
London.]

[Footnote 3: Socialism and Government, vol. i. p. 146.]

[Footnote 4: Proportional Representation, New Edition, p. 104.]

[Footnote 5: "Il serait désirable que nos associations politiques se prononcent plus explicitement sur sa légitimité, si l'on ne veut pas que ce genre de propagande reste une duperie pour les candidats les plus scrupuleux." —Nos Partis Politiques au lendemain du 22 Mai 1910, p. 10.]

[Footnote 6: Cf. pamphlet, The Finnish Reform Bill, Helsingfors, 1906.]

[Footnote 7: Readers who desire to follow the discussion as to the comparative merits of the d'Hondt rule and the méthode rationelle, should consult the following works:—

Examen Critique des Divers Precédés de Répartition Proportionnelle en Matière Electorale, par M. E. Macquart; Revue Scientifique, 28 October 1905.

La Représentation Proportionnelle et les Partis Politiques, par M. P.G. la Chesnais.

La Vraie Représentation Proportionnelle, par M. Gaston Moch.]

[Footnote 8: Ibid., par. 83.]