IMBECILITY.

There is another subject connected in a legal point of view with the nature of the human mind, and with the state of its morbid conditions, on which I respectfully solicit your Lordship's elucidation. In your Lordship's judgment of 1815, on the Portsmouth petition, it is laid down that "from the moment that (meaning this questionable and disputed unsoundness) had been established, down to this moment, it appears to me however to have been at the same time established, that whatever may be the degree of weakness or imbecility of the party,—whatever may be the de

gree of incapacity of the party to manage his own affairs, if the finding of the jury is only that he was of an extreme imbecility of mind, that he has an inability to manage his own affairs; if they will not proceed to infer from that, in their finding upon oath, that he is of unsound mind, they have not established by the result of the inquiry, a case upon which the Chancellor can make a grant, constituting a committee either of the person or estate. All the cases decide that mere imbecility will not do: that an inability to manage a man's affairs will not do, unless that inability and that incapacity to manage his affairs, AMOUNT to evidence that he is of unsound mind: and he must be found to be so."

A conclusion is here drawn that the establishment of unsoundness necessarily involves, that the extreme degree of imbecility and incapacity of mind does not constitute this unsoundness: that is,—they may exist in the extreme degree, (or citing the words employed,) in any degree WHATEVER, which implies the ne plus ultra, without any resulting UNSOUNDNESS. This is a dictum, which proceeding from your Lordship, the highest authority, is intitled to the utmost deference:—but it is not an

inference from any acknowledged premises, nor established by the intervention of any corroborating argument. The very existence of this intrinsic unsoundness, is "down to the present moment" unproved, and all that can be inferred in this state of the question, is the accredited maxim that

"Nil agit exemplum litem quod lite resolvit."

By the common consent of philosophers and physicians, mental imbecility in the extreme degree is termed idiotcy; and this state may exist "ex nativitate," or supervene at various periods of human life. When a child proceeds from infancy to adolescence, and from that state advances to maturity, with a capacity of acquiring progressively the knowledge which will enable him to conduct himself in society and to manage his affairs,—so that he is viewed as a responsible agent and considered "inter homines homo," such a being is regarded of sound capacity or intellect:—but if in his career from infancy to manhood it is clearly ascertained that education is hopeless,—that the seeds of instruction take "no root, and wither away,"—that he is deficient in the capacity to attain the information requisite to pilot himself

through the world and manage his concerns, such a person would be deemed an idiot, and it might be safely concluded that his intellect was unsound, by wanting those capacities that constitute the sound mind. According to your Lordship's exposition he could not be pronounced unsound, because this word implies "some such state, as is to be contra-distinguished from idiotcy." In order that a definite signification may be affixed to the expression "some such state," it will not, I trust, be deemed indecorous to ask, what particular condition of morbid intellect is to be understood by this "some such state?" The solution of this difficulty would be most acceptable to the practitioners of medicine, and in my own humble opinion of great relief to the jury, who are called upon to "proceed to infer" this state of unsoundness without any other premises than the words "some such state." Although we are distinctly told by your Lordship, that the extreme degree of imbecility or incapacity will not constitute this "some such state" that may be denominated unsoundness; yet I feel highly satisfied with the force and precision by which it is expressed in the words "whatever degree," which if a scale were constructed on which imbecility might be estimated, would imply the ultimate gradation; and

whenever any subject can be regulated by definite quantity, expressed in numbers, it conveys the most certain information. Your Lordship may however judge of the surprize and disappointment I felt when I arrived at the following sentence in the same judgment, "All the cases decide that mere imbecility will not do; that an inability to manage a man's affairs will not do, unless that inability and that incapacity to manage his affairs AMOUNT to evidence that he is of unsound mind, and he must be found to be so."

This, my Lord, is an ample confession that there is a degree of mental weakness that does amount to unsoundness, and in this opinion all philosophers and medical practitioners will unhesitatingly concur: but at the same time this admission wholly upsets the former doctrine, that no degree of imbecility "WHATEVER" can constitute this required unsoundness. In your Lordship's judgment on the Portsmouth petition, delivered the 11th December, 1822, it is stated, "It may be very difficult to draw the line between such weakness, which is the proper object of relief in this court, and such as AMOUNTS to insanity," and in the next sentence, "This is the doctrine of Lord Hardwicke, and I

follow him in saying it is very difficult to draw the line between such weakness which is the proper object of relief in this court, and such as AMOUNTS to insanity." This is a second corroboration of an opinion that destroys the former doctrine. Finally in the "minutes of conference between your Lordship and certain physicians, held on the 7th January, 1823, in the Portsmouth case," there is an endeavour to explain the nature of unsoundness, and of imbecility or weakness;—but it is insufficient to direct the physician to any clue whereby his doubts can be solved, and unfortunately relapses into the original contradictory statement. "The commission which is usually termed a commission of lunacy, and which because it has that name, I observe many persons are extremely misled with respect to the nature of it, and which produced on a former occasion, with respect to this nobleman, a great mass of affidavits, in which they stated he was not an object of a commission of Lunacy.—I say that these words are not much understood.—The law acknowledges the state of idiotcy, and the state of lunacy, which properly understood, is a very different thing from that sort of unsoundness of mind which renders a man incapable of managing his affairs or his

person.—And it has now been long settled, not that a commission of lunacy is to be issued; but that a commission is to issue in the nature of a writ de lunatico inquirendo, and then the object of the commission is perfectly satisfied, if the jury shall find upon satisfactory evidence, that the party is of unsound mind, and incapable of managing his own affairs.—The finding of him incapable of managing his own affairs, is not sufficient to authorize further proceedings, but there must be a finding that he is of unsound mind, and unable to manage his affairs:—incapacity to manage his affairs being considered as evidence of unsound mind:—yet there may be, (and that every man's mind will suggest) instances of incapacity to manage a man's affairs, and yet no unsoundness of mind." That many persons are extremely misled with respect to a commission of lunacy, and too frequently concerning all other subjects, is fully admitted: and it is equally clear that the great mass of affidavits produced in 1814, in favor of Lord Portsmouth's soundness of intellect (for I have attentively perused the whole catalogue) did not go into the investigation of the supposed difference between this hypothetical unsoundness and lunacy; but attested, as far as his

Lordship's conversation and conduct had been the subject of their observation and judgment, that he was not a man labouring under any infirmity, or morbid state of mind, that ought, by any legal restraint, to disqualify him from the management of himself and his affairs. With such opinions I have no concern; they can only be regarded as negative evidence, and cannot operate against manifold overt acts of insanity.

In the progress of this respectful address, after numerous but unsuccessful endeavours to grapple with this sort of unsoundness, suspicions have arisen that I have been pursuing a phantom;—at times I have fondly imagined it within my immediate grasp, but it has always evaded my seizure with unaccountable dexterity:—it even now appears that I could "clutch" it, as your Lordship distinctly asserts that, "lunacy properly understood is a very different thing from that sort of unsoundness which renders a man incapable of managing his affairs or his person." This is at once coming manfully to the point; for the disclosure (whenever it may take place) of the circumstances that constitute lunacy properly understood, which means as it ought to be understood,

a very different thing from this sort of unsoundness, will be the solution of this desideratum,—and this development will impose a considerable weight of obligation on the medical profession.

It now only remains to consider the last material sentence, delivered by your Lordship at this conference, and which to my limited comprehension, appears, in the same breath, to affirm and deny the same position. "The finding of him incapable of managing his own affairs, is not sufficient to authorize further proceedings, but there must be a finding that he is of unsound mind, and unable to manage his affairs:—incapacity to manage his affairs, being considered as EVIDENCE of unsound mind."

With the citation of this memorable sentence,—unadulterated by any comment, I shall conclude this address to your Lordship, submitting at the same time my own impressions on the subject:—that, to search for its correct exposition is reverential to the law: to crave its elucidation from its exalted minister is an act of respectful deference:—this solicitude is increased from the consideration that the written opinion of the medical practitioner

is deposed on oath, and that he is examined by the commissioners and jury under the same awful responsibility:—therefore, when the solemnity of that obligation is contemplated, the anxiety for accurate information will scarcely require an apology.

I am, my Lord,
with the utmost respect,
your Lordship's
very obedient servant,
JOHN HASLAM.

No. 2, Hart Street, Bloomsbury,
May, 1823.

Works by the same Author.

A new edition of the Observations on Madness and Melancholy, with considerable additions, will shortly appear.

Printed by G. Hayden, Little College Street, Westminster.

FOOTNOTES:

[A] The following citation was introduced, with some comments, in my work on Medical Jurisprudence, as it relates to Insanity, according to the Law of England, 1817, which is now out of print.

[B] Lord Portsmouth's Commission.

Transcriber's Note: Other than one correction (p. 8, 'ideot' to 'idiot' in 'when the person was represented as not being idiot ex nativitate'), all archaic and unusual spelling (e.g. idiotcy) has been left as in the original.