FOOTNOTES:
[2] Cicero's Letters to his Friends, Vol. I. p. 194. Octavo. London, 1753.
[3] As if an unqualified refusal to forward these Memorials was not adequate to produce this dangerous effect, the names of all the officers who had signed the first Memorial were placed on a proscribed list, and deemed ineligible to any promotion in commands or staff situations. One fact will show the impression that this act made upon the most moderate. I wrote to Colonel Aldwell Taylor, an officer of high rank and respectability, expressing my earnest desire to see him placed in a command in which I thought his principles and character would be useful to Government. In his answer, which is dated the 29th of July, he details the causes of his being in a situation of actual retirement. When he had applied for a command to which his services gave him a right to aspire, he observes, that he was informed of the crime by which he had not only forfeited all hope of that particular station, but also (he adds), "that for having affixed my signature to a respectful address to my superiors and employers, I was placed at the head of a list of names comprising nearly two thirds of the army, and thereby marked by the extreme displeasure of Government, and thence deprived of every future hope of situations of honour and emolument. Whilst smarting under these most serious injuries, I felt it impossible to resume the command of Masulipatam, and made application to retire." This case is more marked than others of the same kind, because there can be little, if any doubt, the violent mutiny that took place at Masulipatam would never have occurred, if Colonel Taylor had remained in command of that garrison. The nature of this unavowed punishment (for though there is, I imagine, no doubt such a resolution was passed by Government, it was never published in any order,) is very peculiar; but it is very characteristic of the system of measures pursued. It was teasing and aggravating in its operation, without efficiency in its end.
[4] Vide the preceding note.
[5] Vide Mr. Pigott's Opinion, printed with the Memorial of Major Boles.
[6] This crude and violent address was never transmitted to the Governor General. The crime laid to the charge of the officers here mentioned, was being implicated in framing it and in promoting its circulation.
[7] There may be some rare exceptions to this rule, which apply to secret confederacies against a state, where the object is to deprive an individual of power, more than to punish as an example. This consideration could, on the 1st of May, have hardly applied even as a fair pretext to any one individual of the many that were punished.
[8] In this officer's case there was no impropriety or disrespect in the letter, that could have aggravated the offence; and the motive which made him state what he had done, was assuredly honourable.
[9] It is, of course, meant the most moderate among those who were at all discontented.
[10] I heard this plan mentioned by an officer high on the staff, the day before I sailed for Masulipatam, and protested against its principle, as directly contrary to that on which I had been desired to act, and indeed to every effort of conciliation. The Governor, to whom I immediately stated this fact, appeared to me to accord in my opinion; but, a few days after my departure, he was induced to adopt this measure, and to provoke disobedience to authority.
[11] The following are the sentiments of Colonel Close upon this subject, as expressed in his letter to Major Barclay under date the 24th of July, 1809, and published in the correspondence laid before the House of Commons:
"It is generally admitted as a sound maxim, not to hazard the giving of an order unless there be a fair ground of presumption that it will be obeyed. From the apparent circumstances of the time, the orders sent to Masulipatam were perhaps fairly hazarded; but, after those orders had been disobeyed, to send orders to Hyderabad for the march of a battalion, might have been regarded as a measure in some degree exceptionable. The officers, who have opposed the orders sent for the purpose, are now more forcibly tied together than before. The extreme of their proceedings is increased, and their danger and fear seriously heightened. Their impulse to act is become more violent; and accordingly the loss to the public cause must be in proportion to all these augmentations. But this is not all. If the measure of moving the battalion was meant to be useful, in having an experimental effect, Hyderabad was assuredly the very place at which the experiment should not have been made; confusion could not be so hurtful any where else."
Those who know the delicacy of this superior man will judge, from this extract, what must have been the strength of his feelings upon the subject.
[12] The trial of Lieutenant-Colonel Innes, and the removal from the general staff of some officers obnoxious to the malecontents, were among the demands in this paper.
[13] Lord Minto has, in his letter to the secret committee, noticed this feeling, as forming a strong and operative principle of action in the minds of these infatuated men.
[14] Vide Appendix.
[15] The names of the principal of these officers, Colonel Clarke, Colonel Rumley, Colonel Floyer, Major Russel, and Captain Noble, will be received by all parties as full evidence of the truth of this assertion.
[16] July, 1809.
[17] Emissaries of a similar character were at and before this period sent to all the native corps.
[18] Government could not have supposed men very deep in guilt, upon whose solemn assurance that they would fulfil the obligation of their commissions such reliance was to be placed. It was evident, that had they cherished any serious designs against their country, or any of its constituted authorities, they would not have hazarded the failure of their schemes by stickling at the little additional guilt that would have attended the breach of any test so forced upon their acceptance; they would have signed, and watched the opportunity of accomplishing their plans. But of this there was no apprehension: they were acknowledged, at the moment this pledge was presented, to be men of honour, and alive to all the obligations that word implies. And can it be argued that men, with such feelings, were not to be fixed in their duty, or reclaimed to it, by other means than such as almost imposed opposition as a point of honour, as by it only they could avoid the reproach of having been trepanned, alarmed, and coerced into a promise to perform that duty which they owed to the state they served.
[19] Captain Moodie, the commanding officer, and almost all the officers of the first battalion of the 6th regiment, were among this number, though that corps had, up to this date, been remarkable for never having joined in any one of the guilty or objectionable measures of the army. It was a sense of their past conduct that made such treatment more insufferable.
[20] The senior Company's officer at this meeting was Colonel Clarke, commanding the artillery, who was known to be exempt even from suspicion of any share whatever in the violent proceedings of a part of the army, and had been recently selected on that ground to command at the Mount. Was it not natural that a sense of his own conduct should have led this honourable officer to reject with indignation a proposition made in a mode so insulting to his feelings as a man and an officer.
[21] To many of this class it must have been an agreeable release from the rigid obligations of their commission. It offered a temporary retirement from their duty to the state; and, in doing so, changed in some degree the character of that duty. By signing the test they became volunteers against men whose guilt they had to a certain extent shared, and had no longer, to support their minds in so trying a situation, that plea of indispensable necessity which their commission imposed.
[22] This was the substance of the order that I recommended to be issued at this period, the principle of which has been so arraigned by the Government of Fort St. George. A copy of this order is inserted in the Appendix.
[23] I might fill a volume if I were to enter into any general reasoning on the vital wound given to military subordination by this measure. The relation of the private soldier to the subaltern has been well termed the key-stone of the arch: an army may survive any other change; but to disturb that relation, is to dissolve the whole: here begins the obedience of the many to the few. In civil society, this problem appears of difficult solution: but there, it is the obedience of the dispersed and disarmed many; it is rare, and in well regulated communities almost unfelt. In military bodies it is the hourly obedience, even to death, of the armed and embodied many. The higher links which bind subalterns to their superiors, and these to one chief, are only the obedience of the few to the fewer, and these fewer to one. These relations are easily intelligible. Honour, and obvious interest, are sufficient to account for these: and any injury they sustain can be repaired. But the obedience of the whole body of soldiers to their immediate officers, is that which forms an army, and cannot be disturbed without the utmost danger of total destruction. It was upon this act of the French Assembly that Burke observed, "They have begun by a most terrible operation; they have touched the central point, about which particles that compose armies are at repose; they have destroyed the principle of obedience in the great essential critical link between the officer and the soldier, just where the chain of military subordination commences, and on which the whole of that system depends." Sir George Barlow, it has been forcibly remarked, could discover no other mode of suppressing a rebellion of officers than by exciting a mutiny of soldiers.
[24] 1794 and 1795.
[25] There can be no doubt of the truth of the observation which a great and well-informed statesman formerly made upon this question. "The European character in India" (Lord Melville observes in one of his letters to the Court of Directors) "cannot be raised too high. If the natives should be accustomed to look upon persons in the British service with indifference and contempt, they will rapidly annihilate our Empire there, and with it the very few Europeans by whom that country is held in subjection." If this is true of Europeans in general, and our Indian subjects, with what particular force must it apply to the relations between the sepoy and his European commander?
[26] The most violent even among the officers were so alarmed at the evil this impression must produce to their country, that they carefully avoided, till the last extremity, any mention of it to the natives under their command: not, I am satisfied, from any fear of failing in their efforts to debauch them from their duty, but from a deep sense of the danger of such a communication: and those who believe that the defeat of this confederacy through the means adopted will for ever prevent the occurrence of a similar evil, should recollect, that it is just as likely to have an opposite effect, and to render that evil, if brought on by similar causes, far more dangerous. The European officers may, in their next quarrel with their local Government, be taught by this failure to league with the native officers, and to hold out advantages to them that will secure their most zealous co-operation; and such a conspiracy would lose India. It is dangerous even to hold an opinion that this Empire can be preserved by any means but the action of a wise, temperate, and just Government, which, though firm and powerful, must rule its British subjects with the greatest attention to those habits and principles which are, from the form and character of the constitution under which they are born, inherent in their nature, and which can never be disregarded or offended without a danger of sedition or convulsion.
[27] As a proof of this, the following fact will suffice. At the period the test was promulgated, a direct correspondence, in the native language, was opened by the chief civil and military officers of Government with the native officers. This was equally maintained with those corps, the European officers of whom remained firm in their duty, as others; and a respectable Company's officer, who had signed the test, and was commanding a corps at Madras, (on his senior subahdar bringing him letters of this description, which he had received,) made a representation of the circumstance; but was reprimanded for doing so, and told it was a general rule, from which it was not deemed proper to make any deviation. If it had been desirable to make any communications in the native languages to the men, such could assuredly have been forwarded to the European officer in command, and the principles of military discipline observed; but an observance of the general rule was the point to which importance was attached, even in a case where the operation was admitted to be baneful, and consequently where the more limited that was, the better for the public interests.
[28] Burke.
[29] These are not sentiments formed on a contemplation of the result of the disturbances. I presented a similar picture of their situation to the deluded officers at Masulipatam, and circulated a letter containing all the substance of these reflections to the army previous to the occurrence of any deliberate opposition to Government. Vide Appendix: Letter to Lieutenant-Colonel McLeod.
[30] Lord Minto.
[31] Vide Lord Minto's dispatch.
[32] General Maitland, late Governor of Ceylon.
[33] These words have been, in the course of the discussion regarding the disturbances at Madras, as they were during their existence, greatly distorted from their simple and plain meaning. Concession, I conceive, is to grant the original and substantial objects of the demands made by the mutinous army. To have restored the tent contract, to have promised an effort to obtain an equalization of their allowances with the officers of Bengal, would have been concessions: but if the exercise of a generous clemency, in pardoning those who had offended in a moment of general insanity, and to have held out hope to others of even deeper guilt, be deemed concessions which a Government cannot make, there can be no such thing as conciliation in act: and as to the profession of kindness and consideration, when the conduct observed by the ruling power is inflexible and severe in its measures, it can have no effect but that of aggravating men's feelings into greater crime.
[34] The whole power was in the commanding officers of the sepoy battalion, and the native officers had much greater influence than the European subalterns of the corps: the latter were not even attached to companies. It has been the labour of near twenty years to supersede the effects of this system, which was deemed bad, and to transfer the influence formerly enjoyed by the native officers to the European: and the eagerness with which the native officers grasped at a prospect of reviving their power, though it might have had a favourable operation for Government under that desperate expedient to which they had resort, must have given rise to dangerous feelings, and produced jealousy and distrust in that important link between the European and native officers, where complete confidence and cordiality is most essential to our safety.
[35] Disturbances in Bengal in 1794 and 1795.
[36] Lord Teignmouth.
[37] Lord Melville.
[38] William the Third, and Demosthenes.
[39] See the letters to Lord Wellesley and Sir A. Wellesley, p. 64, 65.
[PART II.]
A
NARRATIVE
OF THE
CONDUCT OF LIEUT.-COLONEL MALCOLM
DURING THE
DISTURBANCES IN THE MADRAS ARMY.
A NARRATIVE, &c.
When the first violent agitation appeared in the coast army I was at Bombay, in charge of a force destined for service in the Gulf of Persia. A part of this force was composed of Madras troops; and it became my peculiar care to prevent, as far as could be effected by the influence of reason and discipline, any contagion from spreading among those under my command. That I succeeded in this object is chiefly to be ascribed to the excellent character of the officers of this force, and to the distance at which they were from the scene of agitation. From what I heard before I left Bombay, on the 1st of May 1809, of the transactions on the coast, and the perfect knowledge I had of the character of the Governor of Fort St. George, I early apprehended the most unhappy result; and on the 18th of April 1809, I wrote to Lord Minto in the following terms:—
"We hear every day the most exaggerated reports from Madras; but matters are, I fear, in a very bad state. It is said a Memorial has been sent to your Lordship for the removal of Sir George Barlow. I can hardly credit this, though stated on very respectable authority. I know that there is a personal irritation against him, which exceeds all bounds; and this, however unjust and indefensible, will make it almost impossible for him to adjust matters by any means short of coercion: and I trust in God such will not be found necessary; for even success would not prevent the ruinous effects with which any measure of violence would be attended. I cannot but think the great majority are yet to be reclaimed to their duty; and I should think one principal means of effecting this, would be your Lordship's presence at Madras: and assuredly there never was an occasion on which the active exertion of all the great powers lodged in your Lordship's hands was more necessary to the welfare of the state."
The impressions upon my mind at this moment will be still more forcibly shown by the following extract from a letter to the Marquis Wellesley, of the same date as that to Lord Minto, and upon the same subject:—
"Both Lord Minto and the Commander-in-Chief of India should come to Madras; or, at all events, Lord Minto. Whatever justice may be on the part of Sir George Barlow, it will be ten times more difficult for him to settle the question than any other; for the degree of personal dislike which all ranks and classes have of him, is not to be described. This may be, and I dare say is, very indefensible: but it exists, and cannot be changed; and the safety of the state should not be thrown into hazard, if that hazard can be avoided by the adoption of any measures that do not compromise its dignity, or permanently weaken its authority. I am quite satisfied of the purity and rectitude of Sir George Barlow's character. The public never had a more zealous or more laborious servant; he is devoted to his duty, and has no enjoyment beyond that of performing it; but his system is cold and inflexible, and proceeds in its course without the slightest attention to the feelings of those on whom it is to operate; and the present distracted state of affairs at Madras is, I fear, a comment, and a melancholy one, upon the result of such systems. All the reforms which Sir George Barlow thought it his duty to make, might have been made without giving rise to any serious discontent, if he had proceeded with that caution and that attention to the temper of the men which the situation in which he found the army required. They were in a state of great irritation when he arrived; and he was, from his reputation as a reformer and a retrencher, received with prejudices. The authority which should have controlled the army, acted a contrary part, and consequently made their ebullitions more to be dreaded. All these were subjects worthy of consideration; and relaxation from a severe system, till an insubordinate spirit was somewhat subdued, and the ruling authority fortified, would have not merely been warranted, but have been wise. At all events, the means of suppressing a disposition to violence should have been correctly calculated, before it was provoked to action. This, I fear, has not been the case; and it is most difficult to discover any means by which such a general spirit of discontent, as that which now exists, can be repressed. As it is unmixed with any thing like disaffection to the country, it will probably, if met with a firm and dignified spirit of conciliation, correct itself; and then every plan should be adopted that can prevent the recurrence of so dangerous an evil."
The following is the concluding paragraph of a long letter, dated the 16th of April 1809, which I wrote to Lord Wellington, on the same subject.
"I am yet very imperfectly informed of what has occurred. I shall soon know all. I proceed in a few days to Madras. Had I been there at an earlier stage of this affair, I might have done good; but that expectation is over: matters are too far gone; and there is too great irritation on the minds of all parties, to give hopes of reconciliation. You know Sir George Barlow: he is a highly respectable public servant. His principles of action are all right and correct; but his measures are often ill-timed, and consequently unfortunate. He generally leaves altogether out of the question, that which would engage the chief attention of an abler ruler,—men's minds: and though his cold system appears excellent in an abstract and general view, it often proves mischievous in its operation. He has another great fault, which looks so like an excellence at first glance, as to deceive most: he is perfectly inflexible with regard to every thing that he deems a principle or rule. Now this is good on most occasions, but on some it is the height of folly; for, in the endeavor to do a little good, are we justified in hazarding a world of mischief?"
Such were my sentiments, and such the view I took of the situation of affairs on the coast, before I left Bombay, from which I sailed on the 1st of May, and arrived at Madras on the 17th of that month. I was received by Sir George Barlow with even more than his usual kindness. He seemed to expect my personal efforts would aid greatly in allaying any little agitation that remained; for, at this moment, he was decidedly of opinion that the orders of the 1st of May had completely settled every thing that was serious, and that what appeared to remain, was merely the reaction of that seditious spirit which he had subdued. After a very few days' residence at Madras I became satisfied of the extent and danger of this error, and I laboured incessantly to convince Sir George Barlow that he was mistaken, and that a new, more extensive, and violent confederacy, than that which he had conquered, was in progress; the object of which was to obtain the repeal of the orders of the 1st of May. His unwillingness to believe this fact may be conceived, when I state, that he would not admit the conduct of the subsidiary force at Hyderabad, who, in a public address, disclaimed the compliment he had paid their fidelity, to be evidence of its truth.
I was not discouraged by that strong disinclination which I observed in Sir George Barlow to credit every information I gave him upon this subject, but continued to press upon him the urgency of the case, and to entreat him to adopt measures calculated to remedy so desperate and general an evil, before it had attained that maturity to which it was fast approaching. The great and generous object was, I said, to save, not to destroy, a body of brave and meritorious, though infatuated men, who were rushing upon their own ruin. They had (I not once, but a hundred times repeated to Sir George Barlow,) a more serious quarrel than that with Government, they had quarrelled with themselves; and, unless he could adopt some measure that would restore them to their own good opinion, every attempt to establish order and subordination would be vain, as they were goaded on to further guilt by a torturing sense of that into which they had already plunged. On being, at one of these conferences, desired by Sir George Barlow to suggest what I thought would promote this end, I proposed (if the expedient had his approbation,) to draw up an address to him from the Company's officers on direct opposite principles to those seditious papers that I knew were then in circulation; and to give, by this measure, a shape to that feeling which still existed in the army, but which was scattered, and, from having no union, was repressed by the combined action of the discontented and turbulent. This address was as follows:
"We, the undersigned officers of the Madras establishment, trust that the very extraordinary and unprecedented situation in which we are placed by some recent occurrences, will plead our excuse for an address which has no object but that of vindicating ourselves, as a body, from those serious imputations to which we conceive it possible we may become liable, from the nature of late proceedings in the army to which we belong; and to assert our devoted allegiance to our King, our unalterable attachment to our Country, and our consequent respect and submission to the laws and acts of that local Government under which we are placed, and whose commands it is our duty, under all circumstances, to obey, as those of a legitimate branch of the constitution of our country.
"It would be painful to retrace all those events which have led to the present unhappy state of feeling in the army, and have compelled Government to those measures which it has judged proper to adopt: we shall therefore content ourselves with expressing our conviction, that, however far they might have been carried by the warmth of the moment, none of our brother officers who were concerned in those proceedings which have been deemed so reprehensible by Government, ever harboured an idea in their minds that was irreconcileable to their allegiance as subjects, or their duty as soldiers. Government must be fully acquainted with the rise and progress of all the proceedings to which we allude, and can refer to its true cause any apparent excess, either in expression or act, that may have marked the conduct of any individuals: and it will, we are assured, separate actions which have their motive in generous and honourable though mistaken feeling, from any deliberate design of showing a spirit of contumely and insubordination to that authority which it is their duty to obey, and whose orders they could never dispute, without a total sacrifice of their characters as good soldiers and loyal subjects: and we feel perfectly satisfied there is not one officer in this army who would not sooner lose his life than forfeit his claim to such cherished distinctions.
"We cannot have a doubt but it must have been with extreme reluctance that Government has adopted the measures it has done, against those of our brother officers who have more particularly incurred its displeasure, from the forward share they took, or were supposed to take, in the proceedings which have met with its disapprobation: and though we never can presume to question in any shape the acts of that Government which it is our duty to obey, it is impossible for us to contemplate the present situation of those officers without sentiments of the deepest concern: and when we reflect on the general high reputation, and the well-merited distinction, which some of them have, by their valour and ability, obtained in the public service, we should be unjust to the characters of our superiors both in India and England, if we did not entertain a hope that their case would meet with a favourable and indulgent consideration. But we feel restrained from dwelling upon this subject, as we are aware its very mention might be deemed improper in an address, the great and sole object of which is to correct misapprehension, and to convey a solemn assurance of our continued and unalterable adherence to the same principles of loyalty and attachment to our King and Country, and of respect and obedience to the Government we serve, that have ever distinguished the army to which we belong."
The object of this address was to reconcile men to themselves; and it therefore ceded as much as was possible in its expression to the predominant feelings of the moment; but its principle was not to be mistaken: and the unqualified and decided declaration which it contained, of attachment and of implicit obedience to Government, must have had the certain effect of separating all those by whom this address was subscribed, from persons who cherished contrary sentiments. But the great object of this measure was to concentrate and embody the good feelings of the army; to hoist a standard to which men could repair, whose minds revolted at the proceedings then in progress, but who were deterred by shame, fear of reproach, and want of union, from expressing an open difference of opinion from the more violent. I was assured at the moment that I suggested this measure, of its partial success, and not without some hopes that it would be general; but I perfectly knew, that if the senior and more reflecting part of the officers of the army signed an address that pledged them to an active discharge of their duty to Government, all danger of the remainder having recourse to desperate extremes, was at an end; for the influence of the senior part of the army over the native troops was decided; and this open declaration would at once have drawn a line of separation betwixt the moderate and reasonable, and the turbulent, which would have deprived the leaders of the latter of their chief source of strength, which obviously lay in their being able to deceive the multitude they guided, by persuading them that the cause was general[40], and that many, whom prudence made reserved, would join them the moment they ventured on a bolder line of action.
In my anxiety to reconcile his mind to the adoption of this measure, I more than once modified the expression of the address; and softened, and in some instances struck out, those passages which he seemed to think were most objectionable. I also took every pains to satisfy his mind that it should never be known he had been consulted on the subject. It was my intention to endeavour to obtain the high and honoured name of Colonel Close at the head of this address; and after adding those of several other officers of rank and estimation, whose sentiments I knew would be favourable to such an object, to circulate it with an appeal to the good sense of the whole army. Sir George Barlow certainly hesitated regarding this measure, for he kept the draft of the address two or three days, and then returned it with a rejection of the expedient, grounded on his dislike to the adoption of any step that was contrary to the established rules of his Government; to his fear, that receiving such an address in a favourable manner might in some degree sacrifice[41] his dignity, and, by doing so, weaken that authority to which he trusted for the settlement of that partial spirit of discontent which still existed. It was in vain that I argued that the common rules of Government were adapted for common times, and that in emergencies like the present, which presented nothing but difficulties, those should be chosen which were likeliest to effect the object at the least hazard to the state. All my reasoning was ineffectual; and I was most reluctantly compelled to abandon this project, from which I at that moment expected great success. Every future event has satisfied my mind I was not too sanguine. I conscientiously believe, if it had been adopted, though numbers might, by their obstinacy and violence, have merited and received punishment, yet the large body of Company's officers on the Madras establishment would have restored the character of the army to which they belonged. The extremes which have occurred, with all their baneful, and perhaps irremediable consequences, would have been avoided; and assuredly the prospect even of attaining such ends and of averting such evils, was worth a slight departure from a common rule, and might have justified some small deviation from the rigid system pursued by the Government of Madras.
To show in the most convincing light the correct view I took at that moment of the actual state of affairs, and the very opposite sentiments entertained by Sir George Barlow, I shall here quote some passages from the private letters that I wrote from the 3d to the 15th of June, (which includes the whole of the period of which I am now speaking,) to Lord Minto and his private secretary. The following is a copy of my letter to Lord Minto of the 3d of June.
"I have delayed from day to day writing to your Lordship, till I could inform myself of the real state of affairs at this distracted Presidency; and I wish I could, in discharging my duty towards you, confirm those impressions which I believe you have received, of the general good effect produced by the orders of the 1st of May, and of the return of the officers of this Presidency to the principles of good order and subordination. The very contrary I believe to be the fact: and I am satisfied that general spirit of discontent which has long pervaded this army, had never more danger in it than at this moment. I differ with Sir George Barlow (who has behaved with the most flattering kindness to me, and given me his complete[42] confidence,) upon this point; but I have too good a reason to rely upon my sources of information. Besides, can there be a greater indication of this spirit than has been exhibited in the conduct of the subsidiary force at Hyderabad? They have, in an address to the whole army, disclaimed all title to the thanks bestowed upon them, and publicly avowed, that they not only shared the sentiments of the army, as expressed in their former addresses, but felt deeply for their brother officers, who had been arbitrarily suspended for just and honourable actions, and were determined to contribute to their support in a firm, legal, and moderate manner. These are, as nearly as my memory serves, the words of this address: but a copy has probably been sent to your Lordship; as one has, I understand, been received at head-quarters. Nothing can exceed the present irritation: and it has, I am assured, gone much greater lengths than Sir George Barlow can bring himself to believe. I confess I am not without some apprehension of misfortune: and however reluctant my mind is to believe that men can ever be so desperate as to forget their duty to their country, I cannot resist evidence; and I certainly have seen what convinces me that the most dangerous combinations are formed, and conducted on principles entirely hostile to order and good government. I have most frequent, and indeed daily, communications with Sir George Barlow upon this subject; and have not only given him every information I possess, but every opinion I have formed; and have the highest reason to be satisfied with the manner in which my communications are received. He is as satisfied as I am, that the best reliance which Government has at this moment, is the remaining good feeling of the army itself. We differ a little as to the best means of bringing this into action. He is adverse to every expedient that is not in consistence with usage. I think that those means are best which will most speedily effect the object in a manner that will be satisfactory to the pride and loyal feelings of the great majority of the army, and yet not compromise in the slightest degree the dignity of Government. The irritation that has been caused and kept up by those acts, which Government has taken from private information or reports of speeches at table, &c. is not to be conceived. The most extreme emergency can only justify any public authority opening such dangerous and suspicious channels, and they should be closed the moment the danger is past. At present I am satisfied, (and so is Sir George Barlow,) it is better to incur any hazard than have further resort to such unpopular and uncertain means of detecting delinquency: and he is resolved to let military law have its free course, in the conviction, that his best chance of reclaiming a body of honourable though misguided men, to their duty, is by showing he has not lost confidence in them.
"Sir George Barlow has hopes this agitation will subside[43] of itself. I cannot think so. They are maddened with a thousand reflections, and with none more than the shame and ruin which their rash proceedings have brought on some of the most popular of their brother officers. They have, in fact, not only quarrelled with Government, but with themselves; and such quarrels are difficult to settle. Besides, they are secretly goaded on by a thousand discontented men, who, defeated in other objects, wish to throw this Government into confusion."
On the 12th of June I again wrote to his lordship:
"I wish I could say affairs here were in a better state; but I cannot yet agree with Sir George Barlow that the discontent is subsiding. Addresses have come from every part of the army to the principal officers suspended by the orders of the 1st of May, containing assurances of support, &c. These, fortunately, have not yet been brought under the eye of Government. I say fortunately; because it would be impossible for Government, in consistence with its past proceedings, to pass such addresses unnoticed; and I should regret to see it obliged to notice them at a moment when the good sense and good feeling of the army seems lost, and the whole appears under the influence of blind passion. Sir George Barlow has put an end to all proceedings grounded on private information, and has resolved to maintain that dignified line which never stoops to suspicion, and makes men worthy of confidence by boldly giving it to them. If this is persevered in, it will do great good; for it will excite into action the remaining good feeling of the army, which, though dormant, must be considerable; and which forms, at this moment, the great, if not the only, strength of Government."
And upon the 15th of June I wrote to his Lordship's son and private secretary, Mr. John Elliott, as follows:
"With regard to this army I have already written to Lord Minto. I am satisfied he has never had a full idea of the danger to which the public interests are exposed, or I think he would have come to this spot. I am far from meaning to state that Sir George Barlow has not communicated all he knew or thought: but, in the first place, I am satisfied he has been, generally speaking, badly informed; and, in the next, he has been endeavouring to persuade himself that there was no danger, and even now he tries to think every thing will subside; though he knows (for I have told him) that papers of the most objectionable nature are in circulation, and that the most violent measures have been, and are, contemplated. It is impossible to convey to men who are calm and think rationally, any idea of the state of this army. All the respectable men in it appear to suffer a set of mad-headed boys to take the lead: and the greatest merit I see any man claim, is that of being passive; though all confess it is a period at which one step will involve the country in all the horrors of a civil war: and there are numbers (such is the insanity that has got head,) that desire to accelerate that event.
"You may be satisfied I would not even hint at a state of affairs so shocking to contemplate, if I had not the strongest grounds for what I state: but I have seen the greater part of their correspondence, and know, and have informed Sir George Barlow, of the extent to which matters have proceeded, and of the increase of irritation that has been lately produced: particularly by that ill-judged and unmerited compliment to the force at Hyderabad, who, from being moderate, have, with the customary zeal of converts, become the most violent; and would (but for the timely exercise of Colonel Montresor's personal influence,) have forced a paper a few days ago upon Government, which it must have noticed most seriously; and that notice was expected by some of the maddest to be the signal of some very violent measures. This remonstrance, as I said before, has been stopt; but there is, I fear, too much reason to conclude others of the same character will be forwarded. I know not whether Lord Minto is informed of all these circumstances; but it is proper he should know them, as they refer to one of the most serious dangers that can assail the Empire under his charge. I enjoy Sir George Barlow's fullest confidence upon this subject; but he has, I believe, more congenial counsellors, who are fonder of maintaining the consistency of Government upon paper, than of tranquillizing the minds of a meritorious and honourable, though misguided body of men: but assuredly every means should be adopted which human wisdom can suggest, to reclaim them to temper and attachment, provided always such means do not compromise the strength and dignity of Government. Concessions cannot be made to demand; but men may, perhaps, by management, be reconciled to themselves and the state by something short of concession. Sir George Barlow has rather an exaggerated opinion of my personal influence; and he thinks, I believe, it will effect what I only expect from the united good feeling of the army. I have, however, done all I can; and shall continue, under all circumstances, my most ardent efforts in the cause of good order and government."
I heard, towards the end of June, of some extraordinary proceedings that had taken place regarding the European regiment stationed at Masulipatam, in consequence of a dispute between the Lieutenant-Colonel commanding and the officers of the corps. The substance of these proceedings[44] may be given in a few words. Lieutenant-Colonel Innes, the day after he joined the regiment (the 7th of May), dined at the mess, where a toast was given, "The friends of the army;" to which he objected, and proposed it to be changed for one of less equivocal meaning—"The Madras army." This was not assented to, and he left the table. Next day he wrote an account of this circumstance to head-quarters, but desired it should not be noticed, as he expected an apology from those officers whose conduct he considered as most disrespectful. The moment his letter reached Madras, an order was transmitted, directing Lieutenant David Forbes, who was said to be the person who had given the toast, to proceed, at a few hours' warning, to the Fort of Condapilly, a solitary and far from healthy post, at the distance of forty miles, and one at which there was not one man of the corps to which he belonged. Lieutenant Maitland, who was reported to have seconded the toast, was, by the same order, deprived of his station of Quarter-Master. These measures, combined with an imprudent declaration of Colonel Innes, that the corps would be disbanded if a young officer refused to accept the vacant station of Quarter-Master, (by which probably it was only meant that that event might be apprehended, if such a spirit of insubordination continued,) threw the officers of the regiment into a great ferment, and led to their making a representation to head-quarters, earnestly soliciting the benefit of regular military trial, and deprecating the disgrace to which they were exposed from such punishments being inflicted, without the slightest opportunity being given to individuals of vindicating themselves from the private accusations made against them.
I was quite satisfied, from what I heard of those proceedings, of which I have only given the outline, that they were more than severe; and were calculated, in even ordinary times, to produce much irritation; and I therefore was not at all surprised at their aggravated effect at a period of such general agitation. Soon after these events had occurred, I was informed by Admiral Drury, that he had, in consequence of an order from the Duke of York, desiring all the men of his Majesty's regiments employed as marines to be landed, applied to the Government of Fort St. George for some men; and that a detachment had been ordered from the regiment at Masulipatam, for which a frigate and sloop of war were to sail that evening. Many circumstances had made me, about this period, very reluctant to press the attention of Sir George Barlow to a danger, the existence of which he appeared resolved not to believe; but I could not help, upon this occasion, stating to his private secretary, Lieutenant-Colonel Barclay, all I thought upon the subject. The following is an extract of my note to that confidential officer.
"The great object at present, is not to agitate, in any way, (if it can be avoided,) any of those questions which have disturbed the temper of the army; and to restore that, by every means short of concession, to its proper tone. To effect this, we must trust in large points to the action of the good feeling of the army itself, and small questions will soon die of neglect. Now it occurs to me, the ordering a large detachment of the European regiment at this moment on board his Majesty's ships, is liable to much misrepresentation, and is calculated to increase discontent. This has not been usual; and, after the conduct of the officers of the regiment, it will be considered as a punishment: and if it is so, it will, from its nature, have no good effect; for it will be referred to a desire to divide a corps, which men will say never could have arisen, if Government had been confident in their obedience and attachment. The corps itself will receive this order as an additional stigma on their character; and, in the heated state they are in, I should not be surprised if they went to greater extremities than they already have gone; and, if the accounts I have heard of their proceedings are correct, they have been bolder in their expressions of discontent than any corps in the service. All this is perhaps very improbable; but still no man acquainted with the present state of affairs can say it is impossible; and why incur the most distant hazard of aggravating men's feelings by a measure of such trifling consequence? No man could, at this moment, have recommended, as a political measure, such a wretched expedient as that of dividing this corps in the manner proposed; and if it is merely to comply with a requisition of the Admiral for marines, he might take them, as has been the usage, from any one of the King's regiments, or might go without, rather than give cause to misrepresentation at such a moment. If all or any of the officers of the European regiment merit punishment, let them be punished in an open manner, agreeable to usage, and my life upon the consequence: but to think of sending one here, and one there[45], is only to show weakness, and to give grounds to the wicked to circulate aggravated reports, and to kindle the flame of discord and discontent. Pardon this hasty note, and tear it[46]. You will understand what I mean perfectly. Depend upon it, it is trifles of this nature which merit all the attention of Government at this moment."
I did not receive any answer from Lieutenant-Colonel Barclay till next morning; when, after stating the hurry that prevented him from writing, and the causes which had made Government order this detachment, he states his belief, grounded on his knowledge of Masulipatam as a station, that there will be a competition between both officers and men to proceed as marines; and concludes by saying, "I shall only add further, that there is no guarding against wilful misrepresentations, and that those who are obliged to act, must, in such cases as the present, be satisfied with the uprightness of their intentions."
Every thing that I had foreseen occurred. The arrival of the orders for the marines occasioned an instant mutiny of the garrison of Masulipatam, and precipitated that crisis which it was of such great consequence to avoid. Sir George Barlow felt this occurrence as a serious evil; and, in a long conversation I had with him upon the subject, he expressed the extremest anxiety to prevent those bad consequences which were to be expected to result, by the adoption of every moderate and conciliatory means that he could use, without a compromise of the authority and dignity of Government. He told me he had rejected all the violent measures that had been proposed, of coercing the garrison into submission by the employment of his Majesty's troops; as such, he was convinced, would cause a general rupture, which he still hoped would be avoided; and which, at all events, it was most important to retard. His anxiety on this occasion was much increased by the receipt, at the same period, of a highly improper address from the officers of the subsidiary force at Hyderabad; and he desired my opinion on the best course to be pursued on so alarming an emergency. I advised a line that appeared to me likely to arrest the progress of men standing on a precipice of guilt. Every hour gained gave time for the operation of reason; and if that should fail, it was still of consequence that Government should be more prepared than it was at that moment for the occurrence of a rupture with its army. On these grounds, I recommended that an officer of rank should be sent to Masulipatam to assume the command, and that he should be appointed president of a committee to inquire into the causes of the mutiny, and report their proceedings to Government, who would, when the information upon this subject was complete, adopt measures for the prosecution and punishment of the most guilty. In this proceeding there was an appearance of great temper and moderation; no serious sacrifice of dignity was made; and time (which, for reasons before stated, appeared the great object,) was gained: and all those effects which must have attended the detachment of a force against the garrison, or the equally unwise proceeding of attempting (before either reason had time to operate, or the means of coercion were prepared) to arrest or confine any individual, were avoided. On Sir George Barlow's expressing his assent to my suggestions, I offered, in the warmth of my zeal, to proceed to Masulipatam. He accepted this offer with great apparent pleasure; and he evidently thought that the appointment of an officer who was known to enjoy his confidence, and who had so publicly professed a conciliatory disposition, proclaimed the character of the act: and the nomination of Lieutenant-Colonel William Berkley and Major Evans to aid me, (two officers who are now no more, but who, while they lived, enjoyed in an eminent degree the love and respect of all ranks in the army to which they belonged,) was a full confirmation (if any had been wanted) of the nature of this measure[47]. If it had been possible for me to have mistaken Sir George Barlow in the conversation I had with him on the morning he received this intelligence, I was completely confirmed by what passed in the evening after I had been in the fort, and, in the office of the commander of the forces, (General Gowdie,) had a discussion with some of the officers of the general staff upon the whole of this subject. One of those officers, who was known to enjoy the chief share of Sir George Barlow's confidence, stated at this conference, that movements of corps would be immediately ordered that would place the native troops under the complete check of his Majesty's regiments; and that the Governor should, in his opinion, have no hesitation in throwing himself at once upon the King's army. I could not but treat such sentiments with some warmth, as being altogether incompatible with that ardent wish which was professed of reclaiming the Company's officers to their duty. The very knowledge, I observed to General Gowdie, of such sentiments being held and declared, was in itself sufficient to drive men to extremes. The General fully acquiesced in my opinion. Another officer of the staff, who was also a principal adviser of the Governor, said upon this occasion, that he understood I was a friend to concessions that would degrade the Government; that his advice had been, to send a detachment to attack Masulipatam; and that unless I could, the moment I went there, send Major Storey and the other ringleaders under a guard to Madras, evil, instead of good, must result from my mission. I repelled this gentleman's attack with a warmth that produced interference to prevent a personal dispute, and concluded by telling him, that I was now aware of the true character of those sentiments entertained by the persons who had the chief influence over Sir George Barlow's mind; and that, with that knowledge, I should certainly not proceed to Masulipatam, as I saw the probability of measures being adopted, in my absence, of a directly opposite character to those I was desired to execute; and the only consequence I should anticipate, was failure and loss of character. Some explanations were made, but none that dispelled the alarm I had taken at the sentiments which I had just heard. I went immediately to the Governor, to whom I mentioned all that had passed: and I can most solemnly affirm, that Sir George Barlow gave me, at this second conference, every assurance that could be given to satisfy my mind. He declared he would not listen to any such violent counsels[48] as I had heard; that he gave me his entire confidence, and vested me with the fullest discretion to act in all respects as I thought proper, in my endeavours to reclaim the deluded men, to whom I was proceeding, to reflection and duty; and that he was satisfied the honour of his Government was perfectly safe in my hands. Not one word was mentioned, at this conference, regarding my commencing my proceeding by an appeal to the men, or by confining those officers who had been most active in the mutiny. It was, indeed, evident that the first of these acts would have caused a desperation in the minds of the officers, that must have led to that instant rupture which it was the object of my mission to avoid; and, with regard to the second, a military court of inquiry had been ordered to investigate the whole of the proceedings at Masulipatam, chiefly, if not exclusively, with the view of enabling Government to gain time, without loss of reputation; and any precipitate proceedings against the ringleaders would have been an obvious sacrifice of that great object.
Such were the sentiments of Sir George Barlow at the moment I was deputed to Masulipatam: at least such were the impressions which all his observations made upon my mind. He determined at this moment to return the address from Hyderabad, and to write a letter to the commanding officer of that force in terms calculated to show his forbearance, and indeed to evince to the violent and misguided officers of that station the same spirit of temperate and conciliatory disposition as had led him to depute me to Masulipatam. He desired me to make a memorandum of what I conceived he should write upon this occasion. I instantly drew out the following.
"Substance of a letter to the commanding officers at Hyderabad and Jaulnah.
"Expressing the great regret and disapprobation with which Government has received a Memorial from the officers of the subsidiary force, soliciting it to rescind the orders of the 1st of May.
"Pointing out in a calm but forcible manner the dangerous tendency of such addresses, and the total impossibility of complying with such a request; stating that Government is only fulfilling a sacred duty when it exhorts the officers who have signed and forwarded these papers to reflect most seriously upon the consequences which a perseverance in such measures must produce. It owes this warning and exhortation to a body of men, who, acting under warm and erroneous impressions, have for a moment forgot what is due to their own high character, and to that Government under which they are placed. The motives of this expostulation with the a officers of the subsidiary force will not be misunderstood; but it is necessary that they should distinctly know, that while Government can and does make every allowance for that momentary delusion and irritation which a variety of circumstances have been calculated to produce, that it will never either abandon or compromise its authority; and that it will, if compelled to act, maintain, under every extreme and at every hazard, those principles of obedience and subordination, without which, it is satisfied, neither it nor the army can exist."
With this memorandum Sir George Barlow was perfectly pleased, and desired me to give it the form of a letter, and deliver it to Lieutenant-Colonel Barclay, that it might be dispatched next day[49]. I did so, and carried the copy of the memorandum with me to Masulipatam, for which place I sailed on the 2d of July 1809, the whole of the circumstances to which I have alluded having taken place on the day preceding.
I landed at Masulipatam on the 4th of July; and the journal of my proceedings at that place, with the extracts of my letters to Sir George Barlow, General Gowdie, and Lieutenant-Colonel Barclay, and of the letters I received from the latter officer (all of which form numbers of the Appendix), will give the clearest and most faithful account of the manner in which I executed the arduous task that an imprudent, but I hope not an illaudable, zeal led me to undertake. During my residence at that place I continued active in my endeavours to disseminate, by letters to different quarters of the army, such sentiments as I thought calculated to counteract the poison of those inflammatory papers that were then in circulation: and the extract from my letter addressed to a respectable field officer (Lieutenant-Colonel McLeod), under date the 20th of July 1809, which forms a number of the Appendix, will show the complete and just view I took at that period of the result of the violent proceedings of the army.
I left Masulipatam on the night of the 22d of July, and arrived at Madras on the morning of the 26th, having travelled two hundred and ninety miles in little more than three days. I knew of the flagrant act of disobedience which the subsidiary force at Hyderabad had committed, in refusing to allow the 2d battalion of the 10th regiment to march to Goa, to which station it had been ordered in prosecution of the plan for dividing the native corps so as to place them under the check of his Majesty's regiments[50]. I thought it probable that this event would give rise to some strong measures on the part of Government, and I was most anxious to communicate all the information I had collected before any such were adopted: but, though no danger could have resulted from delay, the Governor, who knew I would be at Madras on the morning of the 26th, did not deem it necessary to wait even for a few hours, though strongly urged to do so by Major-General Gowdie[51], the commander of the forces; and the moment of my arrival was that of the execution of the orders of the 26th of July for the separation of the officers from their men. I did not see Sir George Barlow till next day: and the cold manner in which I was received, the slighting view which I saw was taken of my efforts at Masulipatam, and the reserve maintained, not only by him, but by others, left me without a doubt that I was no longer honoured with his confidence; which I was now, indeed, convinced I had never possessed but in a very limited degree. I therefore resolved, in future, to confine myself to an obedience of any orders I might receive, and no longer to expose myself to that failure and disgrace which must always attend the person who acts as a confidential agent, on delicate and important occasions, to one with whose proceedings his mind does not accord, whose confidence he does not enjoy, and of whose plans he is but imperfectly informed. But, before I proceed to explain the subsequent part I took in these transactions, it will be proper to offer some remarks on the observations made in the letter, under date 10th September, 1809, from the Government of Fort St. George to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, respecting my conduct at Masulipatam. The following is an extract from the letter from the Governor of Fort St. George upon this subject.
"On receiving intelligence of the mutiny, we appointed Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm, in whose zeal and talents we entertained the fullest confidence, to the command of the Madras European regiment, and the garrison of Masulipatam, for the purpose of re-establishing the authority of Government over the troops, inquiring into the causes of the mutiny, and placing the most guilty of the offenders under arrest. Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm was not furnished with any written instructions: it was left to his discretion to adopt such measures as circumstances might render advisable, with the view to the accomplishment of the objects of his deputation.
"Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm immediately proceeded by sea to Masulipatam. On his arrival he found that the officers of the garrison had formed themselves into a committee, in which every officer had a voice. The greatest anarchy and confusion prevailed; and it was with difficulty that he prevailed on the officers to acknowledge his authority.
"As it never was in the contemplation of the Government to disband the European regiment, it was expected that Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm would have taken the earliest opportunity to communicate to the men a distinct and public disavowal of that intention on the part of the Government, and have employed the most strenuous exertions to recall the men to a sense of their duty, by impressing upon their minds the degree of guilt and danger in which their officers, for purposes entirely personal to themselves, had endeavoured to involve them. It was also expected that Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm, by establishing his influence and authority over the troops composing the garrison, would have secured their obedience, and by that measure have deprived the officers of the power of prosecuting their designs, and brought the leaders to trial for their mutinous conduct.
"Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm appears, however, to have adopted a course of proceedings entirely different from that which we had in view in deputing him to Masulipatam. He abstained from making any direct communication to the men: and when we authorized him, with the view of detaching the troops from the cause of their officers, to proclaim a pardon to the European and native soldiers for the part which they might have taken in the mutiny, he judged it proper to withhold the promulgation of the pardon, from an apprehension (as stated in his letter to our President, dated the 18th of July) of irritating the minds of the European officers, and driving them to despair.
"To this apparent unreasonable forbearance and attention to the feelings of the officers, who had, by their acts of violence and aggression, forfeited all claims to such consideration, may, we conceive, be ascribed Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm's failure in the establishment of any efficient control over the garrison: and he appears to have been principally occupied, during the period of his residence at Masulipatam, in negociations with the disorderly committees; calculated, in our opinion, to compromise rather than establish his authority; and in fruitless attempts to induce them, by argument, to return to their duty, and abandon the criminal combination in which they had engaged. Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm's reasons for pursuing this line of conduct, and for recommending to us the adoption of conciliatory and temporizing measures, are detailed in his letters to our President, dated the 4th, 5th, and 6th of July. In those letters he states, that the officers at Masulipatam had received assurances from most of the military stations of the army, applauding their conduct, and promising them effectual support; that the whole army were united in a resolution to oppose the authority of Government; that there was not a single corps, from Ganjam to Cape Comorin, which was not prepared to break out into open rebellion. The measures recommended by Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm, as constituting, in his opinion, the only means of averting the most dreadful calamities, consisted of a modified repeal of the orders of the 1st of May; the restoration to the service, and to their appointments, of all the officers whom we had found it necessary to suspend or remove; with an intimation to the army, that their claims to Bengal allowances would be brought to the notice of the Honourable the Court of Directors. Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm returned to Madras, on the arrival of Major-General Pater at Masulipatam to assume the command of the northern division of the army, having succeeded no further in accomplishing the objects of his mission, than in preventing the officers from adopting any flagrant acts of outrage to authority during his residence at Masulipatam."
The first charge is hardly less than a direct accusation of disobedience of orders. It is stated, that as it never was in the contemplation of Government to disband the European regiment, it was expected I would have taken the earliest opportunity to communicate to the men a distinct and public disavowal of that intention. In the succeeding paragraph I am accused of having adopted a course of proceeding entirely different from what Government had in view in deputing me; and I am positively charged with "having abstained from making any direct communication to the men." My letter to Lieutenant-Colonel Barclay, of the 18th July, is a number of this dispatch, and has been printed with it. This letter contains the following passage: "You will satisfy Sir George Barlow, that one of the first things that I did, after I came on shore, was to satisfy the minds of the officers, and, through them, of the men, of the intentions of Government in ordering a party of marines from the corps; and you will see, by the enclosed extract from my Journal, that I took the first good opportunity that offered of STATING THIS FACT in the most public and impressive manner to the whole regiment." I may ask, with great surprise and some indignation, Why the extract alluded to in this letter was not transmitted to the Honourable the Court of Directors? This extract was a copy of my speech made to the European regiment under arms on the 15th of July. The whole of this speech is in my Journal[52]. The following is a part of it.
"I consider it my duty to declare to you at this moment, that it never was in the contemplation of Government to disband or disperse this corps; and that it never meant to employ any officer or man of the regiment in any manner, or upon any service, but such as was suited to the character of British soldiers; and which it, of course, conceived both officers and men would be forward to proceed upon."
Is it possible that any disavowal could be more distinct, or made in a more proper and military manner? Yet I am directly charged with having abstained from making any such communication to the men! It is possible a charge so completely unfounded may have originated in mistake or neglect: but where there exists, as on the present occasion, an evident desire to criminate; where the secret nature of the blow afforded no opportunity of defence; such mistake, even if proved, neither can nor ought to disarm honest resentment. It is too much to have a character, that has been obtained by the struggle of a whole life, assailed in such a manner. But the knowledge which the Governor of Fort St. George had of my proceeding, upon this point, was not limited to this communication through Lieutenant-Colonel Barclay. The day after my return to Madras, I read to him the whole of my Journal. It is true he did not pay much attention to it: and the little value he attached to the detail of my proceedings was the cause of my not loading my public report with a copy of its contents. I had neither received at that moment, nor at any subsequent period, the slightest official notice of even dissatisfaction; and the probability of my conduct being misrepresented to my superiors in England in the manner it has been, never once entered into my imagination.
In answer to the charge, "That I did not employ my strenuous exertions to recall the men to a sense of their duty, by impressing upon their minds the degree of guilt and danger in which their officers, for purposes entirely personal to themselves, had endeavoured to involve them," I must reply in the most solemn manner, that I was not withheld from acting in the manner the Government here state they expected I would, merely because I had no orders to do so, but because I considered that such a proceeding would have had an operation directly opposite to all Sir George Barlow's intentions, as expressed when I left Madras. His desire then was, (as has already been shown,) to conciliate and reclaim the officers of the Company's army, not to render them desperate. I was particularly instructed to point their views to England, to persuade them by every effort to await the decision of the Honourable the Court of Directors, and to prevent their precipitating themselves into a guilt from which they could never retreat. Sir George Barlow appeared satisfied I could effect this through the influence of my general character, and the power of reason, aided by the justice of the cause I had to support: and I most solemnly affirm, that if the Government of Madras desire to insinuate (as the substance of these passages in their letter would imply) that I acted contrary to the instructions of Sir George Barlow, communicated to me in private, that the charge is not founded in fact: and it is fortunate for me that the subsequent communications made by Sir George Barlow's Secretary, and all the circumstances of this case, completely corroborate and establish the truth of that unqualified assertion, which I have deemed it due to my character to make on this point. A letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Barclay[53], dated the 12th of July, and written by the Governor's order, in reply to my communications from Masulipatam of the 4th, 5th, and 6th of July, in which I had required further orders, repeats nearly the same sentiments in the same language Sir George Barlow had used before I left Madras. "You cannot," he observes, "render a more acceptable service to the public interests, than by the exertion of your influence and ability in keeping the garrison of Masulipatam firm to their duty, and satisfying the officers that it is not less for their interests than it is consistent with their duty, to await the decision of the authorities in England on the several questions which have occasioned so much agitation in the minds of a considerable portion of the army of this establishment."
The same officer wrote to me a short letter on the 20th of July, in which he repeats these sentiments, and concludes by stating, that the greatest service I could render my country, in the actual situation of affairs, was "to keep the garrison in order, and bring the minds of the officers back to reason."
I was authorized, through the same channel, to proceed with the inquiry, (if I thought it advisable,) without waiting for my colleagues, reporting the result, for the orders of Government: and a discretion was vested in me to grant a pardon to the non-commissioned officers and privates of the garrison, if I should judge it necessary: but this was evidently in reference to the possible occurrence of a case of extreme emergency, which Colonel Barclay stated the Governor felt assured would not arise.
It will certainly not occur, on a perusal of what I have stated, that there existed the slightest ground for the Government of Fort St. George indulging those expectations which they have declared they did in their letter to the Secret Committee. Is it possible that they could, at the moment, have expected that an officer, instructed as I was, should have commenced his proceedings with "strenuous exertions to excite the men against officers," whom he was directed to reclaim to their duty by the efforts of reason and argument? And when he had been commanded to carry on a military inquiry, in order to ascertain the nature and degree of the crimes of different individuals, was it reasonable to suppose he would disappoint the very object[54] for which that was instituted, by a premature attempt to seize and bring ringleaders to trial, on whose guilt he was expressly told "it was his duty to report, and to await the orders of Government?"
It is sufficiently obvious, from what has been stated, that when the Government of Fort St. George wrote those paragraphs (which have been quoted) to the Secret Committee, the object was more to preserve a character of consistence, than to give a correct view of the actual situation of affairs at the moment of the occurrence of those events which are described. The Government, in a subsequent part of the same dispatch, gives a more just account of the character of this proceeding. "We had hitherto," they observe, "continued to expect, that the firmness of our measures, and the good sense of the officers of the army, would have finally succeeded in restoring order: but we were convinced, by the failure of Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm's mission, by the addresses received from Hyderabad, and by the intelligence received from other quarters, that it was necessary to calculate on the possibility of the officers proceeding to the last extremities of rebellion; and to consider the means of preventing, or finally of meeting, that arduous state of things. The moderate course of conduct pursued by the Government, and which was founded on a favourable opinion of the loyalty of the army, had failed; and we were reduced to the alternative of making the concession demanded by the officers, or subduing them by force."
Is it not evident from this paragraph alone, if other evidences were wanting, that the Government considered my mission to Masulipatam as a proceeding which was calculated, by its moderation, to reclaim the officers to their duty; and in no degree whatever related to that course of measures which was subsequently adopted? A most desperate remedy was ultimately applied to the existing evils: and in having recourse to the expedient of exciting the men against their officers, and in impairing the strength if not destroying that link by which almost all are agreed we hold India, the Government of Fort St. George might perhaps be justified by the emergency of the moment; and the controlling authorities in England may be satisfied that this operation, however terrible, was necessary and politic; but assuredly (even if all this is granted) no person can believe that any authority but Government could adopt such a measure. It appears too much to have expected, that an officer sent to moderate the minds of a body of officers, and to reclaim them to their duty by argument and reason, should (acting upon his own discretion, and without orders) have adopted this desperate expedient; and that he should have commenced his efforts to persuade the officers to return to their duty, by exciting their men to throw off their authority.
The Government of Madras proceed to state, that it ascribes my failure to an apparent unreasonable and unwise forbearance and attention to the feelings of officers who had, by their acts of violence and aggression, forfeited all claims to consideration; that my time was occupied in negotiations with disorderly committees, and in fruitless attempts to bring officers back to their duty by argument. A reference is made to my reasons for this conduct, as stated in my letters[55] under date the 4th, 5th, and 6th of July. The measures which I recommended are there stated. These, the Government observed, "consisted of a modified repeal of the orders of the 1st of May; the restoration to the service, and to their appointments, of all the officers whom we had found it necessary to suspend or remove; with an intimation to the army, that their claims to Bengal allowances would be brought to the notice of the Honourable the Court of Directors." It is stated in the conclusion of this paragraph, that I returned to Madras, "having succeeded no further in accomplishing the objects of my mission, than in preventing the officers from adopting any flagrant acts of outrage to authority during my residence at Masulipatam." As my failure is ascribed to an apparent unreasonable and unwise attention to the feelings of officers who had by their acts of violence forfeited all claims to consideration, may it not be asked, What was the situation of these officers when I was deputed by Sir George Barlow with instructions to restore them to better feelings, and a juster sense of duty, by the efforts of reason and argument? Were they not in a state of outrageous mutiny? Their commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Innes, had been placed under sentries, and it was hourly expected they would openly throw off even the show of obedience; and yet at such a period I received instructions from Sir George Barlow to use every effort of reason and argument to reclaim the officers to their duty. When I had, as appears from my Journal[56] and letters, in a great degree succeeded, having released Colonel Innes from his arrest, prevailed upon a mutinous garrison to abandon its design of immediately throwing off its allegiance, and of marching to Hyderabad, obtained from them a reluctant recognition of my authority, and was proceeding with the inquiry which I had been directed to make: when all these changes, I say, had been effected without one concession, by the force of that reason which I was directed to employ; and I had reported all that I had done; I received a letter from Colonel Barclay, written by order of Sir George Barlow, approving of my measures, desiring me to continue my efforts to reclaim the officers, and to direct their attention to the decision of the authorities in England: and yet, when my success within the few days I was at Masulipatam had been as great as it was possible to expect such means could produce, (for changes in men's minds that are effected by reason and argument must be gradual,) I am accused, in a secret dispatch to my superiors in England, of having failed in my mission, from a forbearance, which, though subsequently termed unreasonable and unwise, I have shown Sir George Barlow deemed, or professed to deem, at the moment of my departure from Madras, wise and politic; and from an attention to the feelings of those very officers, to whose feelings and reason, when their crimes were at the greatest height, I had been directed, by the verbal instructions of Sir George Barlow, and the letters of his secretary, to address myself.
It is stated, that my time was occupied in communication with disorderly committees. To this I reply, that I never recognised any committee in any public or official manner that could either compromise my own authority, or commit the dignity of Government. I communicated, it is true, chiefly with those officers who, from their rank or ability, appeared to have most influence over the rest. Not to have done so, would have been to neglect the employment of those means to which I have shown Sir George Barlow exclusively trusted for my success. I learnt, that there existed a garrison committee, of which every officer was a member, and which could never meet without danger of a mutiny that in its consequences would have precipitated a rupture between the Government and most other parts of the army: an extreme which it was my constant labour to retard, if I could not altogether avert. This committee I endeavoured, by my influence with the senior and more reflecting officers of the garrison, to dissolve; and I considered my success in this point as a great step towards the restoration of order. The control of the proceedings of the whole became vested in a few senior officers of comparative moderation, whose minds were more accessible to reason, and whose small numbers rendered them less liable to those violent impressions which produce such mischief in large and turbulent meetings. But all the communications I ever had, either directly or indirectly, with any individual or bodies of officers at Masulipatam, are stated in my journal: and, it will be seen from that, I never made the slightest concession to the repeated demands of the officers of that garrison. That my proceedings were not such as is prescribed by an observation of the regular course of military discipline there can be no doubt: but Government had itself decided that question. They had refrained (for the reasons stated in the dispatch to which I have so often referred) from resorting to the usual means, the employment of force for quelling the mutiny at Masulipatam. I was deputed on what is termed in this very dispatch a mission, (a word in itself including a volume,) in order that I might reclaim to duty, by the efforts of reason and argument, the officers of a garrison which were known to be almost to a man unanimously bent on mutiny and opposition to authority; and yet I am subsequently condemned by the Government that sent me, for having used the only means by which it was possible I could accomplish that object.
The statement made in the same paragraph of this dispatch regarding the character of those measures which I recommended, with a view of terminating the agitation of the army, will, I am assured, not be considered as either fair or liberal, by any person who gives an attentive perusal to my secret and confidential letter to Sir George Barlow upon that subject. I saw, immediately after my arrival at Masulipatam, that some conciliatory measures must be instantly adopted by Government, if it intended to avoid the desperate extreme of a contest with its own army. A contest which, it will be recollected, I never doubted would early terminate in favour of the former: but success, I was convinced, would bring dangers of a hundred fold greater magnitude than any that could result from issuing the order[57] that I recommended.
On the succeeding day I wrote another letter[58], which contained the following paragraph:
"I can think of no improvement to this order, except you conceive the great object of avoiding hostilities would justify the following addition to it. 'Government received a representation from a number of the officers of the coast army, in which they solicit the equalization of their allowances with those of the officers of the Bengal army: This is a subject, the consideration of which must exclusively rest with the Honourable the Court of Directors, under whose notice this application will, in course, be brought, and by whose decision it will be the duty of the officers of the coast army to abide.'"
I may ask, Whether the order I suggested in my letter of the 5th of July justifies the assertion in the letter from the Madras Government, that I recommended "the restoration to the service and their appointments of all the officers the Government had removed." The terms of the order I suggested were only, that in the full confidence that the officers of the coast would immediately abandon their proceedings, Government would recommend the officers suspended to the Court of Directors. That it restored Colonels Bell and Chalmers to command, from which they had been removed, and also one or two staff officers who were in a similar predicament. There is assuredly a wide difference between the immediate restoration of all the officers suspended from the service, and the conditional promise of a favourable recommendation to that authority by which, under every circumstance, the fate of these officers must have been decided. With respect to Colonel Bell, I conscientiously believed at the moment, from what I knew of the case of that valuable officer, that Sir George Barlow would not be reluctant to consent to his restoration; and with regard to that of Colonel Chalmers and one or two others in nearly similar predicaments, I conceived that if any measure of this kind was adopted, it should be as complete as it was possible to make it, without affecting the principle which was to carry conciliation in act (words, after what had passed, could be of little or no avail) as far as was possible, without serious injury to the authority and dignity of Government. It was this consideration which led to the communication already quoted from my letter of the 6th of July regarding the first Memorial forwarded by General McDowall. What I recommended was nothing more than what had, I believe, been done as an act of course, and was stated in a mode which, though conciliatory, reminded the army of their duty, and gave them no reason to believe more, than that the Court of Directors would see the document in question. I think at this moment, as I did at that in which I recommended this measure, that nothing could have been more fortunate than its adoption. I know I differ on this point from very high authorities, who believe that any concessions, (and such they would appear to deem every act of conciliation,) however modified and corrected, would have been ruinous to Government: but, in spite of these imposing opinions[59], I must ask reflecting men to look near the subject, to examine the evil which this measure could have produced, consider the ills that were at that moment to be expected, and to think on those that have resulted from the complete success to authority that the most sanguine could have anticipated, and then to pronounce their cool and deliberate judgment. There certainly could be no apprehension entertained that this order would have strengthened, to any purpose of immediate violence or opposition, the discontented and turbulent: but the danger stated is, that those would have deemed it a victory. Let us for a moment suppose they had been led, by their first feelings of joy at their escape from a punishment which they had merited, to have considered it as such, what permanent effect could such a feeling produce? What had they gained? Nothing. The fate of the officers who had been suspended remained to be decided by the Directors; with whom it must, under all circumstances, ultimately rest. Their Memorial for an increase of allowances was to be brought before the same body, but without even a promise from Government of any recommendation. There was an end to their combinations and committees[60], and, with them, to all those threats they had thrown out against the local Government, which, it was evident, would acquire such a vast accession of strength by the spirit of moderation and conciliation which it had shown, as would fully enable it to enforce the most severe discipline, and particularly in all cases which were attended with a danger of the recurrence of evils of a similar character to those it had so recently encountered. The majority, indeed, of the officers of the army, and all the most respectable, had seen at this moment the desperate situation into which they had unwarily suffered themselves to be led. They would have had no sentiments but those of gratitude to a Government, whose consideration had presented them with the means of escape. All these would, if such an indulgence had been shown to their errors, have ranged themselves with enthusiasm on the side of Government, and would have been the most forward to retrieve the character of the service, by the punishment of those whom a hardened spirit of disaffection and turbulence had led to continue in opposition. That such a class would also have remained, there is no doubt; and Government might have been satisfied, at the moment this measure was taken, that future punishments would have corrected any erroneous opinions regarding the true motives that had induced so generous and politic a proceeding.
The situation of affairs at the period stated was such, that though there could be little doubt of the ultimate success of Government even under the violent course it pursued; yet that did not appear likely to be attained, if extremes were resorted to, without bloodshed. His Majesty's regiments at Hyderabad[61] and Travancore would be, if a contest was precipitated, in the utmost danger; and if the combat between our European and native troops had once commenced, feelings would have been instantly engendered, the dreadful action of which no man could calculate. That these results were averted, was owing to a variety of causes, very little, if at all, connected with either the foresight or vigour of the Government of Fort St. George.
But, passing over what was likely to be the probable results of the desperate extreme to which the Government of Fort St. George had resort, (though it is by a consideration of these results that the merit of my suggestions should be tried,) let us contemplate what has occurred, from the most favourable issue that could have been anticipated. The officers of the coast army must long continue to feel that degradation which they have endured. Years must elapse before the action of this feeling will cease to produce disunion and discontent in that establishment. But these are comparatively light considerations, as all questions must be, connected with a body of men over whom we must always have such strong ties and efficient control as the European officers of our armies in India. It is the firm allegiance and continued obedience of the natives of which the strength of those armies is composed, which forms by far the most important principle in our government of this great Empire. This can never be denied: and it is as true, that in that almost religious respect with which the sepoy of India has hitherto regarded his European officer, consisted what has been always deemed the chief link of this great chain of duty and obedience. That link (as far as relates to the sepoys of the coast establishment)[62] has, if not broken, been greatly shattered and impaired. A temporary object of importance, no doubt, has been gained by a sacrifice of one a thousand times the value of the object. The dignity of the local Government of Fort St. George has been saved from an imputation of weakness, by a measure which threatens the most serious danger to the future safety of our whole empire in India. An evil, for which there were many and certain remedies, has been averted, by incurring one, the progress of which (from its character,) cannot be calculated; which is, from its nature, irremediable; and of which we know nothing, except that it is efficient to our destruction.
The Government of Fort St. George appear resolved to withhold the expression of their sense of that benefit which the substance of their dispatch obviously shows flowed from my observation and conduct. Sir George Barlow, through his secretary, Lieutenant-Colonel Barclay, to me, under date the 12th of July, states, that, "in consequence of the information which I had communicated" from Masulipatam, he had ordered the assembling of a considerable force near Madras; and it is to this precautionary measure, adopted upon my information, to which the Government of Madras ascribes in a great degree the success of its subsequent proceedings: and it seems also to have entirely escaped the recollection of the Government, that if I had not, by my exertions, reclaimed the garrison of Masulipatam from their design of marching to join the Hyderabad force, and prevented from the 4th till the 22d of July their committing any outrage, that a great part of the army would, during that eventful period, have been precipitated into a rupture before the Government had time for executing any plan for the defeat of their designs. I do not mention these circumstances with a view of claiming any merit from my exertions at that period; but to show that the same principle, which led to an unfounded insinuation against my character, has caused an omission of every fact that could bring my services to the favourable notice of my superiors.
I shall resume my narrative, and state shortly what share I had in the transactions at Madras, from my return from Masulipatam till the arrival of Lord Minto at that settlement.
I have already stated that Sir George Barlow directed me, before I went to Masulipatam, to write the draft of a letter to the commanding officers at Hyderabad and Jaulnah, and had approved of what I had written. I had carried a copy of that draft to Masulipatam, and had, on my first violent discussion with the officers of that garrison, adduced it as a proof of the moderation and temper with which the Governor had acted. In a short period, however, it appeared that no such document had reached Hyderabad, and I was exposed to the charge of intended deception. I addressed a note to Colonel Barclay the day after I arrived at Madras, stating this fact, and begged that he would, by his answer, enable me to repel such a charge[63]. I received the following reply, dated Fort St. George, 28th July 1809.
"Dear Malcolm,
"I have just received your note of this date. I recollect perfectly well, that before your embarkation for Masulipatam you put into my hands, to be delivered to Sir George Barlow, a paper in the form of a draft of a letter to be written to Colonel Montresor, on the subject of addresses from the Hyderabad subsidiary force. I delivered the paper according to your desire. I know that Sir George Barlow did not approve of it; and I believe that no letter of the nature of it was sent to Colonel Montresor.
"I remain, &c. &c.
(Signed) "R. BARCLAY."
Greatly surprised at this answer, I wrote the following note:
"Dear Barclay,
"There must be a mistake, as the draft I gave you was written, by direction of Sir George Barlow, from a memorandum now in my possession, which I had read to Sir George not half an hour before, and of which he at that moment approved, or he would not have desired me to put it in the shape of a letter. I beg the nature of the request I made in my note of yesterday may not be misunderstood. I am aware Sir George Barlow, when he asked my opinion on the question of the reply to be made to the representation from the Hyderabad force, might, even if he approved my suggestion at the moment, be led by a thousand considerations to alter his sentiments before the tappal[64] was dispatched; but as I sailed for Masulipatam under the impression that no change had occurred in his opinion, and made use of the information I had upon the subject, to satisfy misguided men that they were in error regarding his disposition towards them, and by doing so have subjected myself to a charge of intended deception, I was naturally anxious to clear my character from this imputation; and the circumstances were evidently such, that it appeared in my mind I would be enabled to do so without the slightest embarrassment to either you or Sir George Barlow. If, indeed, I had not been satisfied of this, I should never have written, at a moment like the present, upon such a subject. Your note conveys no idea but that I had, without any previous communication with Sir George Barlow, sent a draft of a letter to him through you, of which he disapproved; and so far from answering the object for which it was solicited, could make no impression but that my assertions were founded on an ill-grounded presumption of my possessing an influence over the judgment of Sir G. Barlow. This, you must be aware, is exactly opposite to the circumstances of the case, as I have stated them to you at the period of their occurrence; for I told you it was by desire of Sir George Barlow I gave you the draft.
"I have felt it due to myself to say so much, but am not desirous a word more should pass on the subject. I trust it never has and never can be supposed, that I could either in word or deed do any thing that could occasion the slightest embarrassment upon any question, much less upon one of so personal a nature.
"Your's sincerely,
(Signed) "JOHN MALCOLM."
To this communication I received the following more satisfactory reply:
"Dear Malcolm,
"I have been so busy for the last two days, that I could not refer to the answer which I wrote on the 28th ultimo to your letter of that date, respecting the draft of the letter which you gave me for Sir George Barlow previous to your embarkation for Masulipatam.
"I now find that it is not mentioned in that answer that you had prepared the draft at Sir George Barlow's desire, after a long conversation with him on the subject; but I recollect perfectly well that you told me so when you gave me the draft.
"I remain, &c. &c.
(Signed) "R. BARCLAY,
"M. S."
"Fort St. George,
1st August, 1809."
This trifling but irritating circumstance confirmed me in the resolution I had taken regarding my own conduct. I had come from Bombay with the intention of joining my station at Mysore; but I had received, when at Masulipatam, a letter from Lord Minto reappointing me to Persia; and I had, since I reached Madras, been directed by a letter from his Lordship, under date the 15th of July, to await his arrival at that place. With such orders I could only offer my service as a volunteer to Sir George Barlow; and I had little encouragement to do that. He had, it is true, at the interview I had on the 27th, expressed in a cold manner his wish that I should go to Mysore; but that wish had never been repeated: he had made no further communication to me since my return; nor had I even been required to give that information which he knew I possessed. Under such circumstances, I felt that it was my duty to obey the orders of the Governor-General, and not to intrude my voluntary services when they were evidently not sought. In consequence of this determination I addressed a private letter to Sir George Barlow on the 1st of August; in which, after explaining very fully the sentiments by which my conduct was regulated, I offered the following observations on what had passed, and what might be expected from the measure he had adopted:
"You are no stranger to that enthusiasm with which I embarked in the present scene: and, whatever has been my success, I am assured that you are satisfied I have not been deficient in zeal in the exertion of my humble endeavours to reclaim my brother officers to temper and to the path of duty: and I indulged, to the very moment of my arrival at Madras from Masulipatam, a hope that this great object of your solicitude would be effected without having recourse to coercive measures; or at least that a great proportion of the officers of the Company's army (including almost all who had weight and influence with the men) would be recovered, and that the early submission of the rest would have been a certain consequence of the return of their seniors to their duty.
"The highly criminal violence of the force at Hyderabad, which is known to the whole army to be guided by weak and wrong-headed men, has unfortunately precipitated a very different issue to that which I was so sanguine as to expect. That force has declared that they speak the sentiments of the whole, or at least those of a great proportion of the Madras army; though it is evident, at the moment they made such an assertion, they could not have received an answer from any station to that absurd paper which they term an Ultimatum, which they have had the audacity to forward to Government; but which, I conscientiously believe, would, if it had been publicly promulgated, have been disowned and disclaimed by great numbers of the senior and most respectable officers at every station in the army. I can speak positively with regard to some, indeed all of the senior officers of the garrison of Masulipatam upon this subject, and they have lately been considered as the most violent of the whole. I am far from meaning (such meaning would, indeed, be as contrary to that high respect I have ever entertained for your character, as to the duties of my situation) to offer even an opinion on the wisdom and policy of that step which Government has lately adopted with the Company's officers of this establishment. The test these were required to sign was, as far as I understood it, a mere repetition of the obligations of the commission that every one of them held; and the only rational objection that could be made to it by men who were devoted to their duty, and who had never deviated from it in thought, word, or deed, was, that it was unnecessary; that it was, with regard to them at least, an act of supererogation, and one that had a taint of suspicion in it. These were, indeed, the feelings that passed in my mind when this paper was first put into my hands; but they were instantly subdued by a paramount sense of public duty; and I signed it to show (as far as my example could show) my perfect acquiescence in a measure which the Government I served had thought proper to adopt: but I am satisfied it was not the terms of this paper which led the great majority of the Company's officers both in camp and at the Mount, and in the garrison, to refuse their signatures; it was the manner in which it was presented, and the circumstances by which the whole proceeding was accompanied. The minds of the most honourable, and of those most attached to Government and to their Country, revolted more at the mode than the substance of the act: they felt (perhaps erroneously) that they were disgraced, because the manner in which their consent was asked showed they were not in the least trusted: and this was, I am assured, one of the chief causes of their almost general rejection of this proposed test of fidelity. It appears to me of the greatest importance that you should be aware of every feeling that this proceeding excited; and it is in discharge of the duties of that friendship with which you have ever honoured me that I have stated my sentiments so freely upon this subject. I am very intimately acquainted with a great number of the officers of whom I speak: some of them would, I am certain, have given their lives for Government at the very moment they refused to give a pledge which they thought, from the mode in which it was proposed, reflected upon their honour; and others, who had unfortunately gone to a certain extent in the late culpable and unmilitary proceedings, but who viewed the criminal excesses of some of their brother officers with undisguised horror and indignation, would, I am assured, if it had been possible for Government to have pardoned what was past, and to have expressed, in indulgent language, its kind intentions for the future, have been the most forward in their efforts to punish those who, by an unwarrantable perseverance in a guilty career, merited all the wrath of the state: but, unfortunately, (though such an intention, I am assured, never entered into your mind,) an almost general sentiment prevailed, that it was meant the service should be destroyed by the first blow, and that all were therefore included in one general mass, as just objects of suspicion and disgrace.
"I am far from defending such an interpretation of this measure of Government; I have only stated what I consider to be the fact, and explained, as far as I could, those causes by which I believe it to have been produced: their operation is, I fear, now almost irremediable, and events must take their course. I know (and my personal conduct has proved it,) that my brother officers are deeply wrong; and I am quite heart-broken when I reflect on the consequences to themselves and country which the guilt of some of them is likely to produce. I need not assure you of my sincere happiness at the success which has hitherto attended the execution of the measure you have adopted, and I anxiously hope it may meet with no opposition. I have never doubted the success of this measure, if it was resorted to, as far as related to the accomplishment of its immediate object; and I most earnestly pray that my judgment may have deceived me with regard to the collateral and remote consequences by which I have always deemed it likely to be attended."
The only reply I received to this communication, was by a note from Colonel Barclay, under date the 2d of August, to acquaint me, that, for the reasons I had stated, "Sir George Barlow would not press me to go to Mysore, and that it was the Governor's intention to reply to the other parts of my letter at more leisure." He never, however, condescended to make such a reply, or indeed to honour me with any subsequent communication whatever, either personally, or through the medium of any of his staff: and an event occurred sometime afterwards, which produced such irritation upon his mind, as to make him deny me the common civilities due to an officer in my public station. Some time after my return to Madras, an address[65] from the inhabitants of Madras to Sir George Barlow was drawn up, and sent in circulation. This address was said to have originated with a staff officer of rank. None of the usual forms of convening the inhabitants had taken place; and the mode adopted to obtain signatures was still more extraordinary than this glaring departure from common usage. Gentlemen of the first respectability in the civil service informed me, that when they had testified an aversion to sign this address unless parts of it were modified, they had received such plain intimations regarding the consequences with which their refusal would be attended, as left them in no doubt but that they must either sacrifice their opinions, or bring immediate distress, and perhaps final ruin, upon themselves and their families. Under these circumstances some had signed; while others had actually absented themselves for days from their own houses, to escape the painful importunities to which they were exposed. It is necessary here to state, that almost all ranks were ready at this moment to come forward with a public declaration of duty and attachment to Government, and of their readiness to sacrifice their lives and fortunes in its defence; but a strong objection was entertained by many to that part of the circulated address which cast reflections upon that body of officers who had embraced the alternative of retiring for a period from their duty, rather than sign the test which Government had proposed. It was said, and with great truth, that at the moment when Government professed its desire to reclaim these officers to a more active allegiance, nothing could be more unwise and useless than exasperating their minds to a sullen perseverance in error, by an abuse of them in an address signed by a few civil and military inhabitants of Madras; and that it was perfectly evident such an expression of sentiment could only have the effect of widening a breach it was most desirable to close, and of creating (by exciting discussion) further dissensions and difference of opinion among those of whose devoted attachment to Government there could be no doubt. Such were my own sentiments regarding this address: and while I foresaw the mischief it was calculated to produce, I could divine no possible good from its agitation. It was sent for my signature, with the following note from Colonel Leith:
"The accompanying address is submitted to Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm for his consideration, which, as soon as he is done with, it is requested he will return to the bearer."
To this I immediately sent an answer, as follows:
"Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm returns the address to Lieutenant-Colonel Leith. He has not signed it, for reasons very foreign to any want of respect and regard for Sir George Barlow, or of duty, obedience, and attachment to that constituted authority of his country under which he is placed."
I cannot recollect that I ever in my life took a step in which my mind was more decided respecting its propriety, on every public and private principle, than upon this occasion. I considered the address, both from the irregular mode in which it was brought forward, the unbecoming means resorted to in order to obtain signatures, and the expressions contained in it, as an unwise measure, which had originated in that spirit of undistinguishing violence which I conscientiously believed had been the chief means of producing a crisis that this act was calculated to inflame. It did not appear to my mind to be attended with the slightest benefit, for it brought no new friends to Government: and though it could not shake the attachment to the legitimate authority of their country of any persons whose principles were fixed, its tendency was to excite jealousy and division among those who were most warmly attached to order and Government: and among these, however actuated by a sense of public duty, it was natural that a difference of private opinion should exist. Some were, no doubt, more disposed than others to approve violent and unqualified proceedings, or perhaps less disposed to maintain that independence of mind which no man should ever be censured for maintaining upon such points; otherwise addresses of this stamp would not only lose their value, but become tests of the most odious and invidious nature that a tyrannic Government could invent, to degrade or alienate the minds of its subjects.
I certainly was most reluctant to believe that this measure had Sir George Barlow's sanction: it seemed to me of a character opposite to all the principles and habits of his life: nor could I forget those grounds which he had assumed when he recently refused to permit me to frame an address of a very opposite tendency, and one that would, in all probability, have prevented those evils which this seemed calculated to inflame. I never was more surprised than when (some days subsequent to my note to Colonel Leith) I was informed by a confidential officer of the Governor's staff, to whom I mentioned what I had done, and the reasons by which I was actuated, that the address, from the first, had the Governor's complete sanction and approbation.
In closing this subject, it may be necessary to state, that this address, after all the unbecoming efforts that were used to obtain signatures, had only fifty-seven names affixed to it; among which, twenty-four only were civilians and inhabitants of Madras: the remainder were officers of his Majesty's service, with a few of the staff of the Company's army. If all those who did not sign it were not actually considered as disaffected, they were deemed by those whom this measure had formed into a party, as lukewarm in the public cause. This species of injustice is too common to such times, to afford any individual a right of complaint; but there should be a difference between the momentary feeling of a violent party during a period of commotion, and the deliberate sentiments of a public ruler. I have already mentioned, that the crime of having presumed, though in the most respectful manner, to act conformably to the dictates of my own judgment on a question which was referred to me as a private individual, subjected me, at the moment, to the loss of those civilities from Sir George Barlow to which I had a right from my public station; and I did not require the evidence I have now obtained, from the publication of the letter from the Government of Madras to the Secret Committee, to satisfy my mind that my character has since had to war with all the weight that belongs to the influence and opinion of Sir George Barlow: but, great as this odds may appear to many, it can excite no apprehension in a mind fortified as mine is by a conscious sense of never having deviated from the path of private rectitude, or public duty.
Though, subsequent to this transaction, all personal intercourse between Sir George Barlow and me had ceased, I could not look with indifference on the events that occurred; and when the mad desperation of the officers of the two corps which marched from Chittledroog to proceed to Seringapatam led to an action, I thought the opportunity favourable to close this horrid scene in a manner every way suited to the dignity of Government. I first communicated my sentiments upon this point to Lieutenant-Colonel Barclay, and afterwards ventured to address the following note to Sir George Barlow, expecting that the importance of the subject, and a consideration of former acquaintance and regard, would at least obtain a pardon for such a liberty.
"Dear Sir,
"I wrote a note to Colonel Barclay some hours ago, which he informed me he sent to you for perusal. I have since received a letter from Masulipatam, at which place they are between hope and despair; but have refrained from further guilt, and mean to refrain, unless called upon by those who have now, thank God! shown them an example of returning to their duty. I am assured you will not blame that extreme anxiety which makes me intrude, unasked, my opinion at a moment like the present. I have, I am satisfied, the fullest information of the real temper of this army at this present period; and, if I am not the most deceived man in the world, there is an opportunity given, by the conduct of the Hyderabad force[66], which enables you to combine the immediate and complete settlement of these afflicting troubles with the advancement of the reputation, power, and dignity, of Government. I am aware of the very deep guilt into which almost all have gone; some in intention, others in act: but the force at Hyderabad, who, since the 1st of May, have been the cause of all the present evils, and who lately insulted Government with demands, are now supplicating clemency: a dreadful[67] example has occurred in Mysore, which will make a lasting impression on both officers and sepoys, of the horrors to which such illegal combinations lead. If it were possible to close the scene here, an impression must be made that will for ever prevent the repetition of such crimes; and the effect of shame and contrition, which the clemency and magnanimity of Government must produce, will have more effect upon the minds of liberal men than twenty examples. Men's minds will be at once reclaimed, and they will be fixed in their attachment by a better motive than fear. But this is not all. The officers at Hyderabad, like those of other stations, act at the present crisis entirely from the impulse of passion and feeling; and they fly, as I have witnessed, from one extreme to another, with a facility that is not to be credited by persons under the influence of calm reason. Such persons can never be depended upon, whatever pledges they make, while any strong causes of agitation remain: and no act, therefore, which does not embrace the whole, can give that complete security and tranquillity which is the object of desire. If a single question of irritation and inflammation be left, it is a spark which may again create a general explosion.
"You will, I am assured, pardon this communication. Nothing could have induced me to the freedom, but a conviction that this is one of those happy moments when all the dangers that threaten us may be dissipated. If you can, on the grounds of your granting that clemency to supplication, which you never would to demand; of military justice being satisfied, and the army lessoned, in the dreadful example that has been made in Mysore; and of your thinking it not derogatory, at such a moment, to grant a general amnesty, and to bury the past in oblivion: desiring all those who mean to perform their duty to join their corps, and those who do not, to consider themselves out of the service; and proclaiming every man a traitor, and liable to immediate military execution, who opposes legal authority one hour after the receipt of this order, I will answer with my life for the immediate re-establishment of the public authority on more secure grounds than it perhaps ever rested. Such an act as this will, I am assured, while it advances the fame and dignity of Government, raise your own reputation in the highest degree; and you will receive, as you will merit, the blessings of thousands, with the applause of your country.
"I have perhaps already said too much upon this subject; and I could adduce many more equally forcible reasons to those I have urged; but I shall not trouble you further. If you think the suggestions I have offered worthy of any attention, I shall attend you, and state them. With regard to the success of this measure I cannot have a doubt. If all did not immediately submit, they would be completely disunited: and those that ventured to oppose (if there were any such), would be the proper objects for example.
"I am, with great respect,
"Your obedient servant,
(Signed) "JOHN MALCOLM."
The receipt of this note was not even acknowledged; and it was, of course, the last communication I made to Sir George Barlow. When Lord Minto arrived at Madras, I laid every part of my conduct before him. I gave him every information I could regarding the actual state of affairs; and submitted with freedom my sentiments of those principles which should govern his final judgment on the important points that remained for his decision. He expressed no dissatisfaction at my conduct; he thanked me for my information; and though he differed with me in many of the opinions I stated, he did not condemn me for that difference: on the contrary, he appeared pleased with the liberty I took in offering my advice with such boldness and freedom. The whole of the manner, as well as the substance of the conduct, which this able and virtuous nobleman observed towards me on this occasion, had the effect of reconciling my mind to further exertions in the public service; from which, I confess, it was, before his arrival, much, if not wholly alienated. I had been employed, as I have shown, in a confidential manner, without being trusted. I had been deputed on a delicate and arduous mission, and recommended to pursue a system which mixed firmness with conciliation, while it proposed to reclaim by reason more than by terror; and before any time was given for the operation of the measures I had taken, a new course was adopted, grounded on coercion alone: and because I had not by inspiration divined that such would be the ultimate result, I now discover that I have been most unjustly censured, as disappointing the expectations of the Government: and it has been insinuated (a direct charge would have been too bold) that I acted contrary to orders. I trust I have refuted every charge of this nature: and if some should continue to think I have committed errors; none, I am assured, can accuse me of crimes. Let it be recollected that I was placed, throughout all the transactions I have described, in a most painful and difficult situation. I had no prescribed or distinct duty to perform; I was called upon by Sir G. Barlow to exert, in the manner I thought best adapted to the end, all the influence of my character to reclaim men with whom he thought I had great weight; and he appeared for a period to give me his confidence, and to trust implicitly to my discretion and judgment. I was all along sensible to the full danger of the situation in which I placed myself; but was too earnest in the cause to attend to prudence: and I may conscientiously add, that I never was more assured of meeting approbation from Sir George Barlow than at that moment when I found myself estranged from all share in his confidence, and treated with the most pointed neglect. But I had myself to reproach. I should certainly have foreseen that my efforts would have been useless, when combined with a system of measures to which they bore little or no affinity; and I was (I must confess it,) wrong in supposing, for a moment, that my advice, or any arguments I could adduce, could, under any circumstances, permanently divert the Governor of Fort St. George into a course that mixed feeling, and consideration for human failings, with the established maxims of his ordinary rule. I should have known better; and in fact I did, as my letters[68] before I went to Madras prove: but, when on the spot, my heart conquered my head, and I tried an impossibility: but I never shall regret the attempt, nor blush for having recommended principles of action that are congenial to the best feelings of human nature, that are calculated to make Government an object of rational attachment, and to give the mind a generous pride in submission and obedience; and which, so far from being of dangerous example, and subversive of order, are familiar in the practice to every free state, and have never been rejected in the most despotic, when such have been governed by great and wise rules.