CHAP. V.
The power established by the Mahommedans in India has never varied in its character from their first invasion of that country to the present time. The different qualities of the individuals by whom it has been exercised, have introduced a variety of shades both in the mode and substance of their rule, but the general features have remained the same. The Mahommedan emperors of Delhi, the Subadars of divisions of the empire, and the Nabobs and chiefs of kingdoms and principalities, supplanted and expelled, or extirpated, sovereigns and princes of the Hindu military tribe:—but while they succeeded to the power which these potentates had held, the management of the finance and revenue, and all those minuter arrangements of internal policy, on which the good order of the machine of government must ever depend, remained very nearly in the same hands in which the Mahommedans had found them. The unwarlike but well-educated Hindus of the Brahmin or the mercantile castes continued, as under the martial princes of their own tribe, to manage almost all the concerns of the state. A Hindu, under the denomination of minister, or as Naib (or deputy), continued at the head of the exchequer; and in this office he was connected with the richest bankers and monied Hindus of the country. Princes had private hoards,—but there was no public treasury. Advances were made to individuals and bodies of men by bankers (denominated Seits or Soucars), who were repaid by orders on the revenue, and obtained a double profit on the disbursement and the receipt of money. The proud and thoughtless Mahommedan prince, anxious only for the means necessary for his purposes of pleasure or ambition, was not over-scrupulous as to the terms he granted to the financial agents: and the advantages they gained, combined with their simple and frugal habits[123], enabled them to amass immense wealth. This they well knew how to employ, for purposes both of accumulation, and of establishing political influence; commanding, as they did, the money resources of the country, the prince, his officers, and army, were all in a great degree dependent upon them; and to treat them with extreme severity was certain to incur obloquy, and often defeated its aim, since, by their natural character, they were as patient of suffering as they were tenacious of their gains.
Besides, the wealth of Hindu ministers and managers was usually deposited with bankers; and the injury done to credit by acts of injustice or oppression towards any of the latter class, affected such numbers, as to prove ruinous to the reputation, and often to the interests, of the despot by whom it was attempted.
The Hindu ministers, or revenue officers, had not the same number of retainers as the Mahommedan. They were, therefore, seldom in the same degree objects of jealousy or dread: but though they were from this cause less exposed to extreme violence, they were more frequently objects of extortion; and for this they were better prepared, both from the great profits they made, and from their parsimonious habits.
A very quick and intelligent Mahommedan prince[124], on being asked why he gave so decided a preference to Hindu managers and renters over those of his own religion, replied, "that a Mahommedan was like a sieve,—much of what was poured in went through; while a Hindu was like a sponge, which retained all, but on pressure gave back, as required, what it had absorbed!"
But there were other reasons which prompted Mahommedan princes to employ and encourage Hindus, both at their court and in their armies. They formed a counterbalance to the ambition and turbulence of their relatives, and of the chiefs and followers of their own race. This feeling operated from the emperors on the throne of Delhi, when in the very plenitude of their power, down to the lowest chief: and it is from its action combined with that influence which the wealth and qualities of the Hindus obtained, that we are, in a great measure, to account for the easy establishment and long continuance of the Mahommedan power in India. The new dominion was attended with little of change, except to the Hindu sovereign and his favourites. The lesser Rajas (or princes) gave their allegiance and paid tribute to a Mahommedan instead of a Hindu superior, while their condition and local power continued nearly the same.
Hindu ministers and officers served probably to greater profit the idle and dissipated Moghul, than they could have done a master of their own tribe; and as there was complete religious toleration, and their ancient and revered usages were seldom or never outraged, they were too divided a people upon other subjects to unite in any effort to expel conquerors, who, under the influence of various motives, left to them almost all, except the name, of power.
From the composition and character of such governments, it is obvious that neither individuals nor the community can recognise, much less feel an attachment to what we call the state, as separated from the persons who, for the time being, preside over the different branches of its administration. The sovereign has his servants and adherents; his tributaries, chiefs, commanders, and officers have theirs; but the latter owe no fidelity or allegiance, except to their immediate superiors. Each individual of this body has personal privileges, and enjoys protection in certain rights, from established usages, which, affecting all of the class to which he belongs, cannot be violated with impunity: but as there is no regular constitution of government supported by fixed succession to the throne, men derive no benefit from the state, and owe it therefore no duty. From these facts it is evident that nothing can be so erroneous as to judge the conduct of the natives of India, amid the changes and revolutions to which the governments of that country are continually exposed, by those rules which apply to nations which enjoy civil liberty and equal laws. Treachery and ingratitude to their chief or patron are with them the basest of crimes: and obedience and attachment to those who support them, the highest of virtues. According as they fail in, or fulfil, the obligations which the relations of the society in which they live impose, men are deemed infamous or praise-worthy: and to the reciprocal ties by which such bands are held together, the prince and chief are as often indebted for their safety, as their followers for the just reward of their devoted service. The monarch is secure upon his throne no longer than while he can preserve a body of personal adherents. The chief that is threatened by his sovereign looks to his followers for support or revenge; while the latter, in the lesser vicissitudes to which they are subject, expect with equal confidence the protection of him to whom they give their allegiance.
In countries where men are influenced by such motives, the dethronement of a prince is regarded as no more than the fall of a successful leader or chief of a party; and the frequency of such an occurrence has perhaps tended, more than all other causes, to temper the exercise of despotic power, and to compel sovereigns who owned no other check to seek its continuance, by reconciling to their rule those by whom it was so liable to be subverted.
The construction of the government of Suraj-u-Dowlah was like that of other Mahommedan states: but the elements of which it was composed wanted the controlling spirit of a superior like Aliverdi Khan.
Among the chiefs of the army there were several who early took alarm at the excesses of their young prince, and who, confiding more in their own influence and strength than in his justice or consideration, assumed an attitude of very doubtful allegiance.
The greater number of these leaders enjoyed jaghiers, or estates, on the produce of which they maintained a band of followers. The principal person of this class was the Bukhshee, or commander, of the army, Meer Jaffier, a soldier of fortune, who had raised himself so high in the estimation of Aliverdi Khan, that he had not only promoted him to the highest military rank, but had given him his daughter in marriage.
The country of Bengal has ever been famous for the wealth and talent of the higher classes of its Hindu inhabitants; and we find, throughout its history, that these have filled the chief offices of the state. This was the case at the period of which we are treating. The managers and renters—of whom Ramnarrain the governor of the province of Patna, and Raja Ram the manager of Midnapore, were the principal—were almost all Hindus. Nor were the station and influence of this tribe less in the army and at court. Monick Chund, who had been governor of Calcutta, held a high military rank, and Roydullub, the dewan, or minister of finance, had great influence, which was increased by his being intimately associated with Jugget Seit, the representative of the richest soucar, or banking firm, in India; and who, through means of his riches and extensive connections, possessed equal influence at Lucknow[125] and Delhi as at Moorshedabad.
The above were the leading persons of the state, each of whom had numerous adherents who looked to them, not to the prince, for support and advancement. It is a very remarkable fact, and one that singularly illustrates the character of Suraj-u-Dowlah, that he appears to have been the only person for whom no one felt attachment, and in whom no one had confidence. The Nabob, like princes of similar character, had unworthy favourites, among whom a Hindu, named Mohun Lal, held a distinguished place, and without filling any high office, had at one period more power than any person in this weak and divided government.
Considerations of mutual security had for some time led Roydullub and Meer Jaffier to a secret understanding, and pledges of friendship had passed between them; but this connection appears to have been, at first, formed more for their personal security than with any purpose hostile to the Nabob; for it was not until a chief called Khuda Yar Khan Lattee, who aimed at the musnud, had made proposals to Mr. Watts, which were supported by Jugget Seit, that Meer Jaffier came forward with an offer to act in concert with the English for the dethronement of a prince, the continuance of whose reign, all seemed to agree, must prove destructive to the country.
We cannot have a more convincing proof of the mixed contempt and dread with which his own subjects regarded Suraj-u-Dowlah, than is afforded by the transactions of Moorshedabad at this period. Even the professional caution of Jugget Seit was roused into bold action, and his name was added to the list of those who invited the English to a confederacy, which soon spread too wide for concealment; and which, combining men of all classes and all interests, could only obtain success by the existence of a general sentiment of distrust and detestation of the ruler, against whom it was directed.[126]
Notwithstanding appearances and professions, it was with the greatest hesitation that the Committee of Calcutta ventured on the scene[127] that now opened to them; and certainly nothing could have justified the course of proceeding that was adopted, but a conviction that a change in the reigning prince was indispensable to the existence of the English in Bengal, combined with a firm belief that the means which presented themselves were the best to effect that change: but it was the genius of Clive which guided their councils, and pointed out the road by which he was to lead them to safety and honour, through a labyrinth of such apparently inextricable windings that even his experience and courage were at times startled by its intricacies.
Clive, having received several despatches from Mr. Watts[129], which, while they established the justice of the conclusions regarding what was to be expected from Suraj-u-Dowlah, pointed out the dangers of delay, wrote to Admiral Watson, requesting his opinion on the measures to be pursued; but the Admiral declined giving it; "as the squadron," he observes, "is at present in no condition to act; or, indeed, if the ships were, do I know of any use they would be at present in this river, when every thing is done that they are capable of undertaking. You, gentlemen of the Committee, will therefore best judge what steps will now be necessary for the Company's interest."[130]
In a letter to Mr. Watts, of the 23d of April, Clive expresses the following sentiments upon the extraordinary conduct of the Nabob:—"I have received both your favours of the 14th and 18th. The Nabob's behaviour makes it very difficult to pursue such measures as may not, in their consequence, be approved or disapproved of according to our success. His late transactions carry with them the appearance of an amendment in the situation of his affairs: surely he has received some hope of Bussy's approach, or has accommodated matters with the Patans. If they were approaching, I think he would never put us at defiance, which I think he has done by his message to you.
"If he has ordered the French out of his dominions, why are they to take the route to Patna? a route directly contrary to that of Golconda. I wish, at all events—now the French are gone—you would send the money and effects to Calcutta immediately, for fear of the worst.
"If Mr. Law and all the gentlemen could be prevailed upon to allow the common men to be made prisoners, and themselves to be free on condition of going to Pondicherry, it would be better than letting them travel through the country."
Clive, in this letter, alludes to a message which the Nabob had desired Mr. Watts to send to him, intimating that the conduct of the English, in the proceedings regarding the French, "looked more like a desire to rekindle war, than having their thoughts fixed on trade and merchandise."
In a private letter from the Resident to Mr. Walsh[131], secretary of Colonel Clive (dated 20th April), he observes, "Before I received your letter enclosing the Nabob's, that letter which was forwarded by Nuncomar[132] was delivered, on which the Nabob was much displeased; and on our vakeel going to him this afternoon, before he had time to speak or deliver the Colonel's letter to him he ordered him out of his presence; and said, that notwithstanding, to satisfy us, he had permitted us to take Chandernagore, and had ordered the French here out of his dominions, yet we were not contented, but were continually plaguing him with letters about delivering up the French and their effects: therefore, having done so much to please us, his patience was worn out. He could suffer no more, but saw he must be obliged again to march down against us."
Other circumstances occurred at this period, which distinctly proved the jealous and hostile spirit with which Suraj-u-Dowlah continued to view the English. A small detachment of sepoys, under Captain Grant, had been ordered to Cossimbazar; but Mr. Watts wrote, desiring that officer to return. In his letter to Clive, of the 28th of April, he observes, "As the Nabob will not allow a Tellingy[133] soldier, or any ammunition, to come this way, and as he has threatened to treat those he takes severely, I thought it prudent to desire Captain Grant and his party to return, lest they should meet with some affront."
Clive, in a letter to Mr. Watts[134], observes, "After the Nabob's last message I cannot depend upon his friendship; and therefore shall get every thing ready for a march. I shall consult the Committee, and not willingly undertake any thing which may occasion a rupture without I am obliged to it; notwithstanding I shall write the Nabob in high terms. I dare say there will be no objection to sparing the fifty cannon, if the Nabob will but convince us of his sincerity of intention by securing the French."
A letter of the same date was despatched to Mr. Collet, in charge of the factory at Cossimbazar.
"I think it necessary to advise you," Clive states, "that at a committee held here this day, it was agreed, in consideration of the uncertainty of the Nabob's disposition, to withdraw all money and effects from the subordinates as fast as possible, and that no more than a corporal and six men, with the Bucksarries, should remain at Cossimbazar; the rest to return here with the treasure. I shall send up by boat two of my officers and twenty sepoys, with some spare arms and ammunition, to escort the treasure likewise; as most of your people are deserters, and I am uncertain if with arms. You will please to get the treasure properly packed up, and provide boats, as well for that as the men of the garrison who are to come. No particular secrecy is to be used in this matter, but to be transacted in the usual manner."
Notwithstanding these preparations, it appears that even at this period hopes were entertained of Suraj-u-Dowlah changing his proceedings so far as to make it possible to preserve peace with him. In answer to a letter[135] from Mr. Watts, Clive observes, "I wrote the Nabob a letter a few days ago, which will reconcile him to us, and calm his resentment:" but emphatically adds, "If he is resolved to sacrifice us, we must avoid it by striking the first blow."
Suraj-u-Dowlah continued, however, to pursue his course in the most infatuated manner, while the storm gathered thick around him. The state of the Nabob's mind, and the intrigues now forming, are strongly depicted in a secret letter[136] from Clive to Admiral Watson. "I should be very glad," he observes, "to pay you my respects at Calcutta; but the critical situation of the Company's affairs will not admit of my quitting the camp on any consideration. The last letter I wrote the Nabob he tore in a violent passion, and ordered our vakeel out of the durbar. He sent for Meer Jaffier, and offered him ten lacs of rupees if he would march down and destroy us; and he has been often heard to say they would extirpate the English. The next morning he was sorry for what he had done, sent for the vakeel, and gave him a dress. I have not received a letter from him this many a day. In short, there is such a confusion and discontent at Moorshedabad, from the Nabob's weak conduct and tyranny, that I have received certain advice of several great men; among whom are Jugget Seit and Meer Jaffier, being in league together to cut him off, and set up Khuda Yar Khan Lattee, a man of great family, power, and riches, supported tooth and nail by Jugget Seit."
Clive, at this critical juncture, was not merely left alone to the resources of his own mind, but was embarrassed by the conduct of those who should have aided him. The Committee of Calcutta, though they had approved of the communications which had passed between him and Meer Jaffier, now stated their opinion that the negotiation into which he had entered was of too delicate a nature to be trusted to paper, and proposed sending a confidential European agent to Mr. Watts. The Committee also expressed themselves dissatisfied with the expense which attended the troops having remained so long in the field.
Clive, in his reply to this letter[137], after stating his surprise at its purport, observes, "You surely forget, gentlemen, that at a committee held here as late as the 23d, I laid my letters before you, consulted with you on the general measures to be taken in the conduct of our affairs with the Government, and was desired to manage a certain secret correspondence at the durbar. What has since come to my knowledge I have communicated to the President; and, indeed, I cannot think I have ever been deficient in acquainting you with all particulars, and advising with you whenever the subject was important enough to require it.
"It will not be improper to send a European of capacity and secrecy, as you observe, to Mr. Watts; but if you mean thereby, that nothing on so nice a subject is to be committed to writing, you may have occasion to despatch many such persons before the negotiation is concluded. Let me observe to you, a correspondence in cyphers, as now practised, is not less secret, and doubtless much more expeditious, which is of great moment in particular conjunctures.
"By your manner of expressing yourselves, with regard to putting the troops into garrison, it somewhat appears as if I had unnecessarily kept them in the field. Give me leave to say, gentlemen, I am equally desirous with you of saving every possible expense to the Honourable Company, and that it is long that I have waited for an opportunity of going into quarters: but let me ask you, whether the situation of affairs has admitted of it hitherto? I fully intend, in a day or two, to put the coast troops into garrison at Chandernagore, and to send the rest to Calcutta, if nothing very material occurs to prevent it. The former are entirely under my command; and you may be assured, as I will never make use of the power vested in me to the injury of the Honourable Company's affairs, that I will be as far from suffering you to take away any part of it. I say thus much to prevent further disagreeable intimations, which can tend to no good end."
About this period, a letter was received by Clive from the Paishwah Badjerow, expressing his indignation at the treatment the English had received from Suraj-u-Dowlah, and offering his aid to avenge their wrongs. The Paishwah proposed, on their co-operating with his troops in the invasion of Bengal, to repay double the amount of the losses that had been sustained, and to vest the commerce of the Ganges exclusively in the East India Company. Though this letter was delivered by the Mahratta agent at Calcutta, a doubt appears to have been entertained as to the character of the communication. It was even surmised to be an artifice of Suraj-u-Dowlah to discover the real sentiments and designs of the British authorities. Clive, who had no intention of inviting the destructive aid of a Mahratta army, sent the letter to the Nabob, concluding, that, if it was genuine, he would receive such a mark of confidence as a proof of friendship;—and if he had himself forged it, there could not be a more complete counteraction of his design. The letter was genuine; and the Nabob expressed himself much gratified by the conduct of Clive, who, on this occasion and others, endeavoured to remove the suspicions that Suraj-u-Dowlah entertained of the designs of the confederates.
As one means of lulling him into security, he ordered the English troops into garrison, stating that he had done so in expectation that the Nabob would follow his example, by recalling the detachment from Plassey. He observed, in a letter to the Nabob, "that, while the armies continued in the field, their enemies would be endeavouring to interrupt that perfect harmony and friendship which subsisted between them; that he had therefore put his army into quarters; and though he had no reason to doubt his Excellency's strict adherence to, and full compliance with, all the articles of the treaty, yet, nevertheless, he wished he could disappoint those hopes their mutual enemies entertained, by withdrawing his army from Plassey; and that he would hasten the payment of the money, and other articles of the treaty."
The Nabob expressed great satisfaction with these proofs of friendship; but, either from a suspicion of their sincerity, or from an obstinate perseverance in his plans against the English, he limited himself to promises, and met them with no corresponding acts.
Clive, alluding to his continuing the troops at Plassey, observes, in a letter to Mr. Watts, of the 30th of April,—"The Nabob is a villain, and cannot be trusted; he must be overset, or we must fall." And in a subsequent communication of the 2d of May, he gives him full authority to come to a settlement with Meer Jaffier upon terms which he specifies, stating, also, that every thing is prepared for immediate action. In this letter he observes, "Your letter of the 29th is come to hand,—every thing is settled with the Committee,—enclosed are the proposals, and if there be any other articles which you and Omichund think necessary to be added, you have full liberty to do so, or leave out any thing which you think may hurt our cause, or give disgust. As for any gratuity the new Nabob may bestow on the troops, it is left to his generosity, and to your and Omichund's management.—Now for business.
"To-morrow morning we decamp; part of our forces go to Calcutta, the other will go into garrison here; and, to take away all suspicion, I have ordered all the artillery and tumbrils to be embarked in boats and sent to Calcutta.
"I have wrote the Nabob a soothing letter: this accompanies another of the same kind, and one to Mohun Lal agreeable to your desire. Enter into business with Meer Jaffier as soon as you please. I am ready, and will engage to be at Nusary in twelve hours after I receive your letter, which place is to be the rendezvous of the whole army. The major[138], who commands at Calcutta, has all ready to embark at a minute's warning, and has boats sufficient to carry artillery-men and stores to Nusary. I shall march by land and join him there: we will then proceed to Moorshedabad, or the place we are to be joined at, directly. Tell Meer Jaffier to fear nothing;—that I will join him with five thousand men who never turned their backs; and that if he fails seizing him, we shall be strong enough to drive him out of the country. Assure him I will march night and day to his assistance, and stand by him as long as I have a man left."
Clive, in his letter to Mr. Watts, of the 5th of May, expressed his opinion, that Omichund, on account of his services, should have all his losses made good by an express article in the treaty. He also proposed, that a sum, not exceeding fifty lacs of rupees, should be granted for the reimbursement of private losses: and that ten lacs should be given to the Company for the expense of the expedition, and as a gratuity for the army.
At this critical period, it must have been a satisfaction to Clive to receive such aid as could be afforded by Admiral Watson, who, though he declined, for very sound reasons, any share of the responsibility of an enterprise, in which he could not co-operate, and offered his honest advice as to the hazards with which he thought it would be attended, no sooner perceived that Clive was determined to proceed alone towards his object, than he made every effort in his power to strengthen him, and expressed wishes for his success, in a manner that showed how cordially he went along with him in every point, except in the anticipation of the result.
When quite prepared to commence operations, Clive made an application for two hundred seamen to accompany the troops, with which the Admiral immediately complied. He appears, however, from the letter in which he promises this aid, to have still entertained fears for the result of the expedition. "I don't think," he observes, "your letters convey the most promising appearance of success. You cannot, therefore, be too cautious to prevent a false step being taken, which might be of very fatal consequences to our affairs."
This letter was written on the 29th of May. In one of the 17th of June, we find him inspired with better hopes. "I am glad to hear," he states, "that Meer Jaffier's party increases. I hope every thing will turn out in the expedition to your wishes, and that I may soon have to congratulate you on the success of it. I most heartily pray for your health and a speedy return crowned with laurels."
This letter has importance, as written after the troops had marched, and after all arrangements connected with the intended enterprise had been completed. Admiral Watson had been informed of every transaction, and though he might have differed in opinion upon many points, and have withheld himself from a participation in others, it is a reflection upon his memory to believe that he could, at this period, have written in such terms had he entertained the sentiments regarding any part of Clive's conduct, which were afterwards imputed to him.
The warm temper of this gallant seaman might have led to the occasional utterance of some hasty and unqualified opinions; but his manly mind was incapable of such a compromise of his honest feelings, as to express himself in terms of friendship and regard for the individual whose acts he was at the same moment describing[139] as dishonourable and iniquitous.
We discover from Clive's private letters, and those of Mr. Walsh, his secretary, that, from the period when Meer Jaffier's overture was accepted, he considered that the revolution was effected. He remained, however, in a state of the most anxious solicitude. He dreaded delay, both as it tended to increase the hazard of discovery, and as the season of the rains was fast approaching, when military operations would be impracticable. Yet it was difficult to accelerate the execution of a plan, in which so many interests were to be consulted, and which was liable to be impeded by so many events. At one time there appeared great danger lest it should be altogether defeated by a violent and premature rupture between Meer Jaffier and the Nabob; nor was the reconciliation that took place between these parties of a nature calculated to give Clive confidence in his new ally, who, within a few days, had sworn upon the Koran to be faithful both to the English and to their enemy Suraj-u-Dowlah.
Notwithstanding these changes, Mr. Watts continued confident in Meer Jaffier and those with whom he was combined; but he had for some time taken alarm at Omichund, with whom he had been associated in all his negotiations at Moorshedabad.
This Hindu merchant possessed great wealth, and was among the sufferers at the capture of Calcutta. He had, on that occasion, as well as on others, made himself very useful to the English; and, though known to be one of the most avaricious and grasping of human beings, yet the reputation he had for good sense, and the obvious and admitted profits and advantages which he must derive from being faithful to the trust reposed in him, banished all fear of his treachery, and led to his employment as one of the most active instruments in forming the combination by which the Nabob was to be dethroned.
Meer Jaffier early expressed his doubts of Omichund; whose conduct, in several instances, had made the same impression on the mind of Mr. Watts. It appeared to both, that the success or failure of the enterprise was considered, by this sordid man, as secondary to the promotion of his personal interests; and that he chiefly valued the confidence placed in him, as he could make it subservient to his private views. Clive appears to have been very reluctant to admit the truth of the suspicions entertained of Omichund; and it was not till proof which he deemed conclusive as to his treachery was brought forward, that he consented, with the Committee, to have his name left out of the treaty.
Mr. Watts, in his letter to Colonel Clive, of the 17th of May, states, "Meer Jaffier is determined he will by no means trust Omichund. If I had followed the interested counsel of the latter, all affairs would have been overset, all confidence of us lost. Contrary to Petrus's[140] and my advice, he went yesterday to the Nabob, and told him he had a secret of great importance to communicate to him; which, if discovered, he should lose his life. The Nabob promised secrecy; on which he told him the English had sent two gentlemen to Ganjam, to consult with M. Bussy; that we had made peace together, and that he was coming here to join us. By this lie, which he himself acquainted me he had told the Nabob, he has gained the Nabob's favour, who has granted him a perwannah on the Burdwan Rajah, for the paying him four lacs of rupees which he owes him, as also express orders for the payment of the ready money the Nabob had taken of his, and for the delivery of the remainder of his goods: he was till ten o'clock at night receiving them. This lie of his, I am apprehensive, will alarm the Nabob, and prevent his withdrawing his army, which will be very detrimental to our scheme; and for this reason Petrus and I advised him positively against this measure when he proposed it; but self-interest overruled. We are outwardly great friends, and it is necessary to appear so." Mr. Watts, in the concluding paragraph of his letter, adds, "Cojah Wazeed desires his respects to you. He is so strictly looked after that he cannot write. From him I have learned many particulars relating to Omichund, which would be too tedious to mention: they will astonish you."
These acts, however, were only the prelude to one more daring. Omichund waited on Mr. Watts, when all was prepared for action, and threatened instant discovery of the whole plot, unless it was settled that he should receive thirty lacs of rupees, in reimbursement of losses and reward of services. Omichund had recently received from the Nabob, as the reward of his feigned attachment, an order for four lacs of rupees, the estimated amount of his losses at Calcutta. The ground of the present demand, therefore, rested exclusively on his means of enforcing it, from being in possession of a secret which, if revealed, must not only sacrifice the life of Mr. Watts, of Meer Jaffier, and of all connected with them, but prove most injurious, if not ruinous, to the interests of the English. They, if the objects of the confederacy were defeated, could only hope for safety by calling in the Mahrattas; whose invasion, whatever other consequences might attend it, was certain to spread desolation over the whole country.
Mr. Watts, under dread of the consequences of the threatened discovery, soothed Omichund by promises; while he conveyed, as speedily as he could, intelligence of his conduct to Clive. The account of this transaction was probably communicated through Cojah Wazeed, or some confidential person, as we find no details of what passed with Omichund in any of Mr. Watts's letters.[141] In one to Mr. Scrafton, of the 20th of May, he merely states, "We are deceived,—Omichund is a villain; but this to yourself."
The obvious results of his treachery were not expected to deter Omichund from his purpose: he was believed to be so infatuated by the love of gain, that neither the ties of former service, nor the principles of honesty, would weigh against his desire of enriching himself. Such was the opinion of all who knew him; and there appeared no medium between submitting to his exorbitant demands, or deceiving him into a belief that he would receive, in due season, the exorbitant price he had fixed upon his fidelity.
Though Clive was aware of the sordid character of Omichund, yet, deeming him an useful agent, he had been desirous that he should be treated with favour and liberality. He had advocated his cause when his character was before questioned; and had censured Mr. Watts on account of the suspicions he had frequently expressed of his honesty. These circumstances made him receive with equal surprise and indignation the incontrovertible proofs now offered of his guilt. Viewing him, from the position which he had taken, as a public enemy, he considered (as he stated at the period, and publicly avowed[142] afterwards), every artifice that could deceive him to be not only defensible, but just and proper.
"I have your last letter[143]," he observes to Mr. Watts, in his communication on this subject, "including the articles of agreement. I must confess the tenor of them surprised me much. I immediately repaired to Calcutta; and at a committee held, both the admirals and gentlemen agree that Omichund is the greatest villain upon earth; and that now he appears in the strongest light, what he was always suspected to be, a villain in grain. However, to counterplot this scoundrel, and at the same time to give him no room to suspect our intentions, enclosed you will receive two forms of agreement; the one real, to be strictly kept by us; the other fictitious. In short, this affair concluded, Omichund will be treated as he deserves. This you will acquaint Meer Jaffier with."
Two treaties were accordingly framed; one real, the other fictitious. In the former there was no mention of Omichund; the latter had an article which expressly stipulated that he should receive twenty lacs of rupees; and Mr. Watts was desired to inform him, that "thirty lacs" was not inserted, as it might give rise to suspicion; but that a commission of five per cent. should be given to him upon all sums received from the Nabob, which would fully amount to the other ten lacs. Though Omichund appeared satisfied with this proceeding, Mr. Watts conceived there was no safety till he left Moorshedabad. But he had yet received only half the money for which the Nabob had given him orders: and such was his avarice, that he could not suffer the thoughts of leaving the other half unpaid, even though he stayed at the hazard[144] of his life.
Though Mr. Watts had succeeded in persuading Omichund that he could be employed by Clive in a manner that would make up all losses, and had prevailed upon him to accompany Mr. Scrafton, that gentleman, when he reached Cossimbazar, missed his companion; and the messenger despatched in search of him found the old man seated with the Nabob's treasurer, trying to obtain some more of the promised money. Seeing this fruitless, he set out on his journey; but again disappeared. When he rejoined Mr. Scrafton, he said he had been to visit his friend Roydullub, at Plassey, from whom he was surprised to learn that his name was not in the treaty; but Mr. Scrafton told him, with truth, that the last secret treaty had not, for various reasons, been communicated to Roydullub.
When Omichund arrived at Calcutta, he was received by Clive and by the members of the Committee with apparent cordiality; for Mr. Watts had written that his life, and those of all at Moorshedabad concerned in the confederacy, depended upon his entertaining no suspicion of being deceived. Not satisfied, however, with the enormous amount he deemed himself certain of receiving, this avaricious old man commenced further intrigues.
In a letter, under date the 8th of June, Mr. Watts, after repelling the charge of having been duped, and of having improperly submitted to delays and evasions, refers to Omichund as the real cause of the impediments that had occurred; and to satisfy Clive of the fact, he transmits him a letter to Petrus, of the following purport:—"Omichund's compliments to Petrus. There's letters gone down for Mr. Watts, to forbid his coming down till permission is given him from hence. You and I are one; let us consider what is for our own interests, and act so as to endeavour to make it pass that we have had the whole management of this affair. If our friend is not set out, keep him a few days. Affairs are not yet settled here; hereafter I will write you the particulars. You have a good understanding, therefore there's no occasion to write you much. Our success depends upon each other; all my hopes are in you."
This communication aggravated the impressions before entertained of Omichund's conduct, and every caution was taken to avoid giving him any opportunity of further interference; it being quite evident, that his views in being employed were exclusively limited to pecuniary gain, to which he was ready to sacrifice every other object.
Mr. Watts having communicated to the Committee of Calcutta, that Meer Jaffier was disposed to give a sum to the amount of forty lacs of rupees to the army and navy, through whose exertions he hoped to mount the throne; Mr. Becher, a member of the Committee, stated, that as they (the Committee) had set the machine in motion, it was reasonable and proper that they should be considered.[145] This suggestion, as may be imagined, was unanimously adopted, and Clive stated to Mr. Watts[146], that the Committee had agreed, "that Meer Jaffier's private engagement should be obtained in writing, to make them (the Committee, in which you are included) a present of twelve lacs of rupees, and a present of forty lacs to the army and navy, over and above what is stipulated in the agreement.
All preliminaries being arranged, and Meer Jaffier having agreed to separate himself, with a large body of troops, from the Nabob's army, and join the English on their advance, Clive determined to commence operations. The intelligence from Moorshedabad was still unsatisfactory; but relying on Mr. Watts's assurance, that Meer Jaffier continued firm to his engagement, he re-assembled his army, which, in the beginning of May, had been sent into quarters, partly in Chandernagore, partly in Calcutta. On the 12th of June the troops which were in Calcutta, reinforced by one hundred and fifty sailors from the fleet, proceeded to Chandernagore. Next day, one hundred seamen being left as a garrison in the place, the whole army was put in motion, the Europeans, artillery, and stores proceeding up the river in boats, while the sepoys marched in the same direction by the high road. On the 14th, at Culna, they were joined by Mr. Watts, who, on the preceding day, had succeeded in making his escape from Moorshedabad. Continuing their course up the right bank of the river, the army, on the 16th, halted at Patlee; whence, on the 17th, Major Coote, with a party, was pushed forward to attack the fort of Cutwa, which next day fell into his hands. The same evening, the army reached Cutwa and encamped in the plain; but on the 19th the rainy season began with such violence, that the troops were obliged to seek shelter in huts, and in the town.
Meanwhile the flight of Mr. Watts had greatly alarmed Suraj-u-Dowlah, whose terrors were increased by the receipt of a letter from Clive, despatched the day on which the army set out from Chandernagore, in which all the injuries and wrongs he had inflicted on the Company were recapitulated; and while he was reproached for connecting himself with the French, he was accused of not fulfilling the treaty into which he had entered; of having infringed its main article, by proffering only a fifth part of the sum to be paid into the treasury, and yet demanding a receipt for the whole[147]; and of cherishing the intention of attacking the English settlements, the moment the absence of the fleet and troops gave him a prospect of doing so with success.
For these reasons, Clive stated in this letter[148], "he had determined (with the approbation of all who are charged with the Company's affairs) to proceed immediately to Cossimbazar, and submit their disputes to the arbitration of Meer Jaffier, Roydullub, Jugget Seit, and others of his great men: that if it should be found that he (the Colonel) deviated from the treaty, he then swore to give up all further claims; but that if it appeared his Excellency had broke it, he should then demand satisfaction for all the losses sustained by the English, and all the charges of their army and navy." He concluded by telling him, "that the rains being so near, and it requiring many days to receive an answer, he found it necessary to wait upon him immediately!"
The style of this communication, and the military movements which followed, left no doubt as to the hostile intentions of the English; and the Nabob hastened to assemble his whole force, with which he advanced to Plassey.
Clive marched with an army[149] of about three thousand men, and nine pieces of artillery, and was for some days, after the commencement of operations, in a state of extreme anxiety, from there being no appearance of Meer Jaffier's separating himself and his adherents from the Nabob; whence it might be concluded, either that he was treacherous, or that his party was much weaker than had been represented.
Under these impressions Clive wrote to the Secret Committee[150]: "The party I sent has taken Cutwa town and fort. Both are strong. Notwithstanding which, I feel the greatest anxiety at the little intelligence I receive from Meer Jaffier; and, if he is not treacherous, his sangfroid or want of strength will, I fear, overset the expedition. I am trying a last effort, by means of a Brahmin, to prevail upon him to march out and join us. I have appointed Plassey the place of rendezvous, and have told him at the same time, unless he gives this or some other sufficient proof of the sincerity of his intentions, I will not cross the river: this, I hope, will meet with your approbation. I shall act with such caution as not to risk the loss of our forces; and, whilst we have them, we may always have it in our power to bring about a revolution, should the present not succeed. They say, there is a considerable quantity of grain in and about this place. If we can collect eight or ten thousand maunds[151], we may maintain our situation during the rains, which will greatly distress the Nabob; and either reduce him to terms which may be depended upon, or give us time to bring in the Beer-Boom[152] Rajah, Mahrattas, or Ghazee-u-Deen.[153] I desire you will give your sentiments freely, how you think I should act, if Meer Jaffier can give us no assistance."
On the 21st of June, two days after he had despatched this letter, Clive held a council of war[154], to which he proposed the following question:—"Whether in our present situation, without assistance, and on our own bottom, it would be prudent to attack the Nabob; or whether we should wait till joined by some country power?"
A majority of the officers composing the council voted against an immediate attack; a minority for giving battle to the Nabob; and at the head of the latter was Eyre Coote, subsequently so distinguished in Indian history.
Clive, though he had voted with the majority, appears, almost immediately afterwards, to have satisfied himself, that there was no other road to safety and honour, but by moving forward; and without consulting[155] any individual, much less the council of war he had so unwisely assembled, on the very evening of the day on which the council had been held[156], changing his purpose, he determined to march against the enemy, and accordingly gave orders for his army to cross the river the following morning.
It is stated[157], that before he carried this resolution into effect, he had received a letter from Meer Jaffier, which, though it in some degree removed the doubts he had before entertained of the sincerity of that leader, confirmed him in his opinion, that the success of the enterprize must wholly depend upon the advance of the British troops.
Though mature deliberation appears to have convinced Clive, that the object he had in view, the security of the English in Bengal, quite warranted the hazard which was incurred for its attainment, he still proceeded with that caution which was necessary in an enterprize, where the safety of the whole of the military force in this part of India might be compromised by the treachery or cowardice of a native chief, and where even success in a battle would not have accomplished his purpose, unless those with whom the English interests were associated proved true to their engagements.
It is only by considering the circumstances in which he was placed that we can understand the hesitating conduct of Clive previous to his advance to Plassey, the defensive character of the action, and the solicitude[158] which he showed to repress that ardour and forward spirit in those under him, which on ordinary occasions it was his habit and his pride to stimulate and encourage. It is obvious, that his qualities as a soldier, in this short and almost bloodless, but eventful campaign, were rendered strictly subordinate to the talents of the statesman.
At sunrise next morning[159] the army began to pass the Hooghley, and at four in the afternoon were all landed on the left bank of the river. The boats were then towed up the stream with great toil, accompanied by the army, and having advanced fifteen miles in eight hours, about one in the morning of the 23d of June, reached Plassey. The troops immediately took possession of an adjoining grove.[160]
Clive's intelligence had led him to expect that the enemy lay a few miles from Cossimbazar; but a rapid march had already brought them on to the fortified camp so long occupied by a part of the Nabob's forces near Plassey: and soon after he had taken his ground, the sound of drums, clarions, and cymbals distinctly heard, convinced him, that the whole force of the enemy was encamped about a mile off. Guards were immediately stationed, and the troops were permitted to take rest for the night.
At sunrise the enemy, now aware of his march, issued from their camp in all their force, with their artillery, and commenced a heavy cannonade. Clive, who expected a communication from Meer Jaffier, looked anxiously for its arrival: but the messenger, who on the morning of this eventful day was charged with a note from that officer, never delivered it. Still, however, Clive watched with anxiety to see his friends separate from his foes, ready to take advantage of that trepidation and confusion which such movements must produce. The charge of the English forces was accelerated by one of the Nabob's principal commanders[161] being killed: Clive advanced to an easy victory. But the account of the events which preceded this battle, the occurrences which gave success to it, and its results, are clearly and fully stated in the following letter, written by Clive a month after he reached Moorshedabad, to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors. In this letter, which is dated the 26th of July, Clive observes:—
"I gave you an account of the taking of Chandernagore; the subject of this address is an event of much higher importance, no less than the entire overthrow of Nabob Suraj-u-Dowlah, and the placing of Meer Jaffier on the throne. I intimated, in my last, how dilatory Suraj-u-Dowlah appeared in fulfilling the articles of the treaty. This disposition not only continued but increased, and we discovered that he was designing our ruin, by a conjunction with the French. To this end Monsieur Bussy was pressingly invited to come into this province, and Monsieur Law of Cossimbazar (who before had been privately entertained in his service) was ordered to return from Patna.
"About this time some of his principal officers made overtures to us for dethroning him. At the head of these was Meer Jaffier, then Bukhshee to the army, a man as generally esteemed as the other was detested. As we had reason to believe this disaffection pretty general, we soon entered into engagements with Meer Jaffier to put the crown on his head. All necessary preparations being completed with the utmost secrecy, the army, consisting of about one thousand Europeans, and two thousand sepoys, with eight pieces of cannon, marched from Chandernagore on the 13th, and arrived on the 18th at Cutwa Fort, which was taken without opposition. The 22d, in the evening, we crossed the river, and landing on the island, marched straight for Plassey Grove, where we arrived by one in the morning. At daybreak, we discovered the Nabob's army moving towards us, consisting, as we since found, of about fifteen thousand horse, and thirty-five thousand foot, with upwards of forty pieces of cannon. They approached apace, and by six began to attack with a number of heavy cannon, supported by the whole army, and continued to play on us very briskly for several hours, during which our situation was of the utmost service to us, being lodged in a large grove, with good mud banks. To succeed in an attempt on their cannon was next to impossible, as they were planted in a manner round us, and at considerable distances from each other. We therefore remained quiet in our post, in expectation of a successful attack upon their camp at night. About noon, the enemy drew off their artillery, and retired to their camp, being the same which Roy Dullub had left but a few days before, and which he had fortified with a good ditch and breast-work. We immediately sent a detachment, accompanied with two field-pieces, to take possession of a tank with high banks, which was advanced about three hundred yards above our grove, and from whence the enemy had considerably annoyed us with some cannon managed by Frenchmen. This motion brought them out a second time; but on finding them make no great effort to dislodge us, we proceeded to take possession of one or two more eminences lying very near an angle of their camp, from whence, and an adjacent eminence in their possession, they kept a smart fire of musketry upon us. They made several attempts to bring out their cannon, but our advanced field-pieces played so warmly and so well upon them, that they were always drove back. Their horse exposing themselves a good deal on this occasion, many of them were killed, and among the rest four or five officers of the first distinction, by which the whole army being visibly dispirited and thrown into some confusion, we were encouraged to storm both the eminence and the angle of their camp, which were carried at the same instant, with little or no loss; though the latter was defended (exclusively of blacks) by forty French and two pieces of cannon; and the former by a large body of blacks, both foot and horse. On this, a general rout ensued, and we pursued the enemy six miles, passing upwards of forty pieces of cannon they had abandoned, with an infinite number of hackaries[162], and carriages filled with baggage of all kinds. Suraj-u-Dowlah escaped on a camel, and reaching Moorshedabad early next morning, despatched away what jewels and treasure he conveniently could, and he himself followed at midnight, with only two or three attendants.
"It is computed there are killed of the enemy about five hundred. Our loss amounted to only twenty-two killed, and fifty wounded, and those chiefly blacks. During the warmest part of the action we observed a large body of troops hovering on our right, which proved to be our friends; but as they never discovered themselves by any signal whatsoever, we frequently fired on them to make them keep their distance. When the battle was over, they sent a congratulatory message, and encamped in our neighbourhood that night. The next morning Meer Jaffier paid me a visit, and expressed much gratitude at the service done him, assuring me, in the most solemn manner, that he would faithfully perform his engagement to the English. He then proceeded to the city, which he reached some hours before Suraj-u-Dowlah left it.
"As, immediately on Suraj-u-Dowlah's flight, Meer Jaffier found himself in peaceable possession of the palace, I encamped without, to prevent the inhabitants from being plundered or disturbed; first at Maudipoor, and afterwards at the French factory at Sydabad. However, I sent forward Messrs. Watts and Walsh to inquire into the state of the treasury, and inform me what was transacted at the palace. By their representations I soon found it necessary for me to be present, on many accounts; accordingly, I entered the city on the 29th, with a guard of two hundred Europeans and three hundred sepoys, and took up my quarters in a spacious house and garden near the palace. The same evening I waited on Meer Jaffier, who refused seating himself on the musnud till placed on it by me; which done, he received homage as Nabob from all his courtiers. The next morning he returned my visit; when, after a good deal of discourse on the situation of his affairs, I recommended him to consult Jugget Seit on all occasions, who being a man of sense, and having by far the greatest property among all his subjects, would give him the best advice for settling the kingdom in peace and security.
"On this, he proposed that we should immediately set out together to visit him, which being complied with, solemn engagements were entered into by the three parties, for a strict union and mutual support of each other's interests. Jugget Seit then undertook to use his whole interest at Delhi (which is certainly very great), to get the Nabob acknowledged by the Mogul, and our late grants confirmed; likewise to procure for us any firmans we might have occasion for.
"The substance of the treaty with the present Nabob is as follows:—
"1st. Confirmation of the mint, and all other grants and privileges in the treaty with the late Nabob.
"2dly. An alliance, offensive and defensive, against all enemies whatever.
"3dly. The French factories and effects to be delivered up, and they never permitted to resettle in any of the provinces.
"4thly. 100 lacs of rupees to be paid to the Company, in consideration of their losses at Calcutta and the expenses of the campaign.
"5thly. 50 lacs to be given to the English sufferers at the loss of Calcutta.
"6thly. 20 lacs to Gentoos, Moors, &c., black sufferers at the loss of Calcutta.
"7thly. 7 lacs to the Armenian sufferers.
"These three last donations to be distributed at the pleasure of the Admiral and gentlemen of Council, including me.
"8thly. The entire property of all lands within the Mahratta ditch, which runs round Calcutta, to be vested in the Company: also, six hundred yards, all round, without the said ditch.
"9thly. The Company to have the zemindary of the country to the south of Calcutta, lying between the lake and river, and reaching as far as Culpee, they paying the customary rents paid by the former zemindars to the government.
"10thly. Whenever the assistance of the English troops shall be wanted, their extraordinary charges to be paid by the Nabob.
"11thly. No forts to be erected by the government on the river side, from Hooghley downwards.
"12thly. The foregoing articles to be performed without delay, as soon as Meer Jaffier becomes Subadar.
"On examining the treasury, there were found about 150 lacs of rupees, which being too little to answer our demands, much less leave a sufficiency for the Nabob's necessary disbursements, it was referred to Jugget Seit, as a mutual friend, to settle what payment should be made to us; who accordingly determined, that we should immediately receive one half of our demand,—two thirds in money and one third in gold and silver plate, jewels, and goods; and that the other half should be discharged in three years, at three equal and annual payments.
"The part to be paid in money is received and safely arrived at Calcutta; and the goods, jewels, &c. are now delivered over to us; the major part of which will be bought back by the Nabob for ready money, and on the remaining there will be little or no loss. A large proportion was proposed to have been paid us in jewels; but as they are not a very saleable article, we got the amount reduced one half, and the difference to be made up in money.
"It is impossible as yet to form a judgment how much the granted lands will produce you, as the Europeans are quite ignorant of the extent of the country between the river and lake; but, in order to give you some idea of the value, I'll estimate it at 10 lacs per annum. An officer on the part of the Nabob is already despatched to Calcutta to begin the survey, in company with one of ours. Suraj-u-Dowlah was not discovered till some days after his flight; however, he was at last taken in the neighbourhood of Rajahmahul, and brought to Moorshedabad on the 2d inst., late at night. He was immediately cut off by order of the Nabob's son, and (as it is said) without the father's knowledge. Next morning the Nabob paid me a visit, and thought it necessary to palliate the matter on motives of policy; for that Suraj-u-Dowlah had wrote letters on the road to many of the jemidars of the army, and occasioned some commotions among those in his favour.
"Monsieur Law and his party came as far as Rajahmahul to Suraj-u-Dowlah's assistance, and were within three hours' march of him when he was taken. As soon as they heard of his misfortunes, they returned by forced marches; and, by the last advices, had passed by Patna, on the other side of the river. A party of Europeans and sepoys were quickly despatched after them; but I am doubtful if we shall be able to overtake them before they get out of the Nabob's dominions. Strong letters have been wrote from the Nabob to the Naib of Patna, to distress them all in his power, and to take them prisoners if possible. A compliance with which I am in anxious expectation of.
"I ought to observe, that the French I spoke of in the action were some fugitives from Chandernagore, who had assembled at Sydabad. It was by their advice, and indeed by their hands, that the English factory at Cossimbazar was burned and destroyed, after our gentlemen had quitted it on the renewal of the troubles.
"The present Nabob has every appearance of being firmly and durably seated on the throne.
"The whole country has quietly submitted to him, and even the apprehension of an inroad from the side of Delhi is vanished; so that this great revolution, so happily brought about, seems complete in every respect. I persuade myself the importance of your possessions now in Bengal will determine you to send out, not only a large and early supply of troops and good officers, but of capable young gentlemen for the civil branches of your business."