FOOTNOTES:
[69] This vote is dated the 6th of Feb., 1754. With that delicacy and tenderness to the feelings of his old commander, Colonel Lawrence, which he always manifested, he objected to receiving this mark of distinction, unless a similar present was made to that officer; which was done accordingly.
[70] December, 1754.
[71] Severndroog, another fort belonging to Angria, had been taken a few months previously by Commodore James, of the Bombay marines.
[72] Feb. 13, 1756.
[73] Vide Lieutenant-Colonel Clive's evidence, Reports of the House of Commons, vol. iii., and Ives's Voyage, p. 82.
[74] Vide extract of consultations, Fort St. David, June 20. 1756.
[75] Orme, vol. ii. p. 88.
[76] A war was at this time expected between England and France.
[77] It is to be observed, that though the French gave upon this occasion their support to the pretensions of their favourite Nabob, yet Mahommed Ali was not at that time acknowledged by Salabut Jung, then subadar of the Deckan, his immediate superior: and it was only at the peace of Paris, in 1763, that he was acknowledged by the French government.
[78] Aliverdi Khan died on the 9th of April, 1756; and Suraj-u-Dowlah, having been nominated successor, mounted the throne without opposition. The name of this prince was Mirza Mahmud, but he is best known by his title of Suraj-u-Dowlah, which means "the sun of the state."
[79] The person the Nabob alluded to was Kishendass, the son of the late Dewan of the Nabob of Dacca, who visited Calcutta on his way to Juggernaut; and as he was strongly recommended to Mr. Drake, the President of Calcutta, by Mr. Watts, the chief of Cossimbazar, on account of services rendered by his family to the Company, he was treated with kindness and attention.
[80] The outposts of Calcutta were attacked on the 18th of June, 1756.
[81] Orme, vol. ii. p. 78.
[82] Mr. Drake.
[83] Captain Minchin.
[84] Vide Parliamentary Reports, vol. iii. p. 144.
[85] Mr. Mill, by his quotation from Seir Mutaquerin, and his observations upon the former state of prisons in England and India, appears desirous not only of palliating the guilt of the Nabob and his servants, but of throwing a share of the blame upon the unhappy sufferers: "Some search," he observes, "was made for a convenient apartment, but none was found; upon which, information was obtained of a place which the English themselves had employed as a prison, and into this, without further inquiry, they were impelled. It was unhappily a small ill-aired and unwholesome dungeon called the Black Hole; and the English had their own practice to thank, for suggesting it to the officers of the subadar as a fit place of confinement."—Mill, vol. iii. p. 149. Though I refrain from commenting on the tone in which the author quoted treats this memorable catastrophe, I must directly question the justice of the conclusions he has drawn from his own premises. Assuredly the use of a room of twenty feet square, with two small windows, as a prison for one, two, three, or ten prisoners, can be no justification for forcing, at the point of the sword, 146 captives into this inadequate space; much less for keeping them there, when their sufferings became so dreadful, and the death of almost all certain.
[86] The "Cumberland" seventy-four had Sir G. Pocock's flag on board.
[87] The "Marlborough" Indiaman carried a large proportion of the troops and stores.
[88] A village on the left bank of the river Hooghly, twenty miles in a straight direction below Calcutta, but more than double that distance by water.
[89] Situated on the left bank of the river Hooghly, ten miles below Calcutta in a straight line, but double that number by the windings of the river.
[90] This officer (afterwards the celebrated Sir Eyre Coote) commanded a company of H. M. 49th on board the flag ship.
[91] The grenadier volunteers and sepoys had been pushed as near the fort as they could be, under cover, to be ready for an assault. The remainder had been halted in a hollow plain, to intercept the garrison in the event of an attempt at retreat. No enemy was believed to be near, except in the fort of Budge-Budge. The consequence was a surprise, the bad effects of which were only remedied by Clive's presence of mind and courage. He has been censured for not using more precaution; but having only landed seven days, and being ill, he must have depended upon others for intelligence, and he justly complains of their want of it. The nature of the country, however, is such, as to offer to almost any numbers the power of concealing their advance.
It has further been stated, that "if the enemy's cavalry had advanced and charged at the same time that the infantry began to fire, it is not improbable that the war would have been concluded on the very first trial of hostilities."—Orme, vol. i. p. 124. In answer to this remark, there is one single fact to be stated;—the thick jungle which concealed the approach of the infantry was impervious to cavalry, who had no means of advancing except through openings, where they must have been seen, and the possibility of surprise defeated.
[92] Vide Ives's Voyage, p. 102.
[93] Letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Clive to select committee, of date 20th of January, 1757.
[94] Clive's letters to the Governor of Madras, 8th January, 1757.
[95] vol. ii. p. 126.
[96] Major Kilpatrick and Captain Eyre Coote commanded the King's and Company's troops. The naval armament was commanded by Admiral Watson.
[97] It is with pain I read, in the page of a modern historian, the following passage[98]:—"The English were very desirous to make their peace with that formidable ruler (Suraj-u-Dowlah); but the capture of Hooghley, undertaken solely with a view to plunder, had so augmented his rage, that he was not in a frame of mind to receive from them any proposition." I rejoice to state, I have hitherto searched in vain for the facts that could warrant so unqualified an imputation upon the fame and reputation of Admiral Watson, Colonel Clive, and the other naval and military officers, detached in command of the force employed on this occasion; and, until proof is produced of their having been actuated by the sordid motives here ascribed to them, I cannot give credit to the unsupported opinion of any author, however respectable.
Orme states, that Suraj-u-Dowlah was exasperated at the capture of Hooghley (as, no doubt, such a despot would be at any operation which implied a defiance of his power by a nation he had contemned and injured); but that clear and able historian, to whom his country is so deeply indebted for a minute narration of the facts connected with the early establishment of her power in India, has not one word in his page that can justify the opinions Mr. Mill expresses as to the motives of their attack.
I have the sincerest personal respect for Mr. Mill: I admire his accuracy, his industry, and indefatigable research; but our conclusions from the same premises often differ most widely. In this work, I shall have frequent occasion to claim that liberty of a free expression of my sentiments, which he so properly uses towards those who have written on the same subjects as himself. This will oblige me to question some of his assertions and opinions, which, however positive and unqualified, appear to me neither supported by arguments nor borne out by facts. I am aware of my own defects, and have laboured to amend them; I also acknowledge that early impressions, and the occupations of my life, may give a bias to my judgment: but no human mind is free from prejudices, and those of the closet author are not the fewest in number, or the easiest to be subdued. With a full sense of my own disadvantages, I confess that I am not convinced, by the laboured and metaphysical preface to Mr. Mill's History, that local knowledge, and an acquaintance with the languages, habits, and characters of the nations of whom I, and others similarly circumstanced, have treated on this and other occasions, are disqualifications for the tasks we have attempted. At all events, our efforts may be useful in collecting facts for more critical and philosophical historians. Though we do not withhold those opinions which our experience has led us to adopt, our chief purpose is to inform—theirs to speculate. We are satisfied if we can lay before our readers a true picture of the scenes we describe. They have what they deem a higher object; and the facts of their volumes are often rendered subservient to the propagation of their general principles and abstract theories.
[98] Mill's British India, vol. ii. p. 128.
[99] Letter to the Hon. G. Pigot, Esq. and Select Committee of Fort St. George, dated Camp, Barnague Plain, January 28. 1757.
[100] Dated Camp, on Barnague Plain, 1st February, 1757.
[101] Jugget Seit, here alluded to, was at the head of a great banking-house, and, from his immense wealth and credit, had much influence in the country.