THE
LIFE
OF
ROBERT, LORD CLIVE:
COLLECTED FROM THE FAMILY PAPERS
COMMUNICATED BY
THE EARL OF POWIS.
BY
MAJOR-GENERAL
SIR JOHN MALCOLM, G.C.B. F.R.S. &c.
IN THREE VOLUMES.
WITH A PORTRAIT AND MAP.
VOL. III.
LONDON:
JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET.
MDCCCXXXVI.
London:
Printed by A. Spottiswoode
New-Street-Square.
CONTENTS
OF
THE THIRD VOLUME.
| [CHAPTER XV.] | Page | |
Mutinous Combinations among the Officers of the Army.—Repressedby Clive.—His general Conduct towards theArmy, 1766 | [1] | |
| [CHAP. XVI.] | ||
Proceedings regarding the Salt Trade.—Gold Coinage.—GeneralMeasures of Clive's Government.—He resigns inJanuary, 1767 | [81] | |
| [CHAP. XVII.] | ||
Clive's Transactions in England.—Honours paid him.—Prolongationof Period of holding his Jaghire.—His illHealth.—Disorders in the Company's Affairs.—Sharewhich the Government take in them.—Clive's Politics.—Deathof Mr. Grenville.—Letter to Mr. Hastings.—1771 | [173] | |
| [CHAP. XVIII.] | ||
Increased Disorder of the Company's Affairs.—Chargesagainst Lord Clive.—His Answer in the House of Commons,1772.—Select Committee and Committee ofSecrecy, 1772.—Resolutions moved by Burgoyne.—Debates.—Votesof the House, 1773.—ParliamentaryProceedings.—Clive's Death and Character | [263] | |
| [APPENDIX.] | ||
Agreement between the East India Company and the RightHonourable Lord Clive respecting the Fund establishedfor Relief of the Honourable Company's Military; datedApril 6. 1770: together with general Regulations fortransacting the Business of the said Fund, and Instructionsfor the Pensioners | [397] | |
MEMOIRS
OF
LORD CLIVE.
Difficult as was the situation in which Lord Clive was placed when he adopted those active measures to remedy the abuses in the civil administration of Bengal, which have been already described, a much more arduous task awaited him; that of carrying into execution the positive orders he had received from the Directors, to reduce the allowances of the officers of the army of that presidency. This excited a spirit of mutinous defection from their duty in that body, which it required all the energy and decision of Clive to subdue. The subject has importance in various ways, and in none more than as it is so singularly illustrative of his character. To make it clearly understood, it will be useful to give a concise account[1] of the whole transaction.
The plea for the mutinous defection from their duty of a great proportion of the officers of the Bengal army in 1766, was the reduction of double batta, which was first introduced after the battle of Plassey, by the Nabob Jaffier Ally Cawn, who granted it to the English force, of which, according to treaty, he was to pay the expenses. Lord Clive, at the period of this grant, warned the army, that it must be considered as an indulgence on the part of the Nabob, which the Company would not be inclined to continue. It happened as he anticipated; for, when the Nabob assigned certain districts to the Company, in order to defray the expenses of the army, the Court of Directors, unwilling to adopt so expensive a precedent, issued the most positive orders[2], that double batta should be abolished. These orders were several times repeated, but the remonstrances of the army had hitherto prevented the Governor and Council carrying them into execution. In 1764, when Lord Clive accepted for the second time the government of Bengal, this was one of the points most strongly pressed[3] upon him by the Court of Directors.
The whole army had been formed into regiments, and divided into three brigades, according to a plan of Clive. The first, under Lieutenant Colonel Sir R. Fletcher, garrisoned Monghyr; the third brigade, under Colonel Sir Robert Barker, was cantoned at Bankipore; and the second, under Colonel Smith, was stationed at Allahabad, at the request of the Emperor of Delhi and Sujah Dowlah, to keep the Mahrattas in check. The peace which had been established, and the regimenting the troops, offered a favourable opportunity for carrying into effect the positive commands of the Directors; and accordingly an order was issued by the Select Committee, directing that, from the 1st of January, 1766, double batta to the European officers of the army should cease, except at Allahabad, where, on account of the distance from Calcutta, it was continued to the second brigade, as long as it should be actually in the field; but when in cantonments, that corps was to be reduced to single batta. At Patna and Monghyr, the troops were allowed half batta when not on service; while those at the presidency were put upon the same footing as the troops on the coast of Coromandel, who drew no batta, except when actually marching or serving in the field.
In reply to the remonstrances of the officers, the positive commands of the Company were stated; and, on the appointed day, the reduction took place. Though the officers seemed to acquiesce, secret meetings were held in each brigade, at which a general resignation of their commissions was proposed. This plan was originally formed at Monghyr, in December[4] 1765, or January 1766, and, when matured, proposed to the second and third brigades. The second, at first, considering themselves as engaged in actual service by being on the frontier, declined taking an active part; but these sentiments of honour soon gave way to the general infatuation, and nearly two hundred commissions of captains and subalterns were, in a short time collected, to be placed, on the 1st of June, in the hands of the officers commanding the respective brigades; though it was agreed that they should offer to serve as volunteers till the 15th, to give time for an answer to be received from Lord Clive and the Select Committee. The officers combined in this proceeding, bound themselves by an oath to secresy, and to preserve, at the hazard of their own lives, the life of any one of their body who might be condemned by a court-martial to death. In order to avoid the charge of mutiny, they determined to refuse the usual advance of pay for the month of June. Each officer bound himself separately by a bond of 500l., not to accept his commission again, if double batta was not restored. And subscriptions were entered into for those who might be cashiered. To this subscription several civilians were said to have contributed.
The advance of between fifty and sixty thousand Mahrattas towards Corah, about one hundred and fifty miles from Allahabad, inspired those in the plot with fresh hopes of success, as it appeared that the services of one brigade, at least, would be required, at the very time fixed for the general resignation. Colonel Smith, who commanded on the frontier, was ordered to encamp at Serajapoor, with the whole of the second brigade, except the European regiment, who were not to march on account of the great heat.
Such was the state of affairs in March, 1766, when Lord Clive and General Carnac set out from Calcutta, to regulate with Mr. Sykes (the Resident at the Nabob's court) the collections of the revenue at Moorshedabad and Patna for the ensuing year; to receive from Sujah Dowlah the balance of the fifty lacs of rupees stipulated by the treaty of August, 1765, and to form alliances with the princes of the Empire against the Mahrattas.
In April, 1766, Lord Clive arrived at Moorshedabad, when he received a letter, dated 19th April, from Mr. Verelst and the Council at Calcutta, enclosing the remonstrance of the third brigade relative to the reduction of the batta, signed by nine captains, twelve lieutenants, and twenty ensigns.[5] The Board having declined answering it without obtaining Lord Clive's sentiments thereon, Lord Clive, in a letter dated 22d April, 1766[6], recommended that it should be sent to Sir R. Barker for his information, as the Board could take no notice of any paper brought before them, except through the commanding officer. But lest it should have been regularly transmitted through the commanding officer, he proposed that the same answer should be given as had been on a former remonstrance; remarking, at the same time, that many lieutenants of the Sepoy battalions had signed, who, having an extra allowance of two rupees per diem, could not be considered as having any great hardship to complain of. Hitherto no suspicion had been entertained of the intended resignation. On the 28th of April, Lord Clive received a letter from Sir Robert Fletcher, dated 25th April, which contained the first intimation on the subject.[7] He stated that the officers seemed determined to make another attempt for the recovery of batta; that their commissions were to be sent to him at the end of the month; but that they would continue to serve in May as volunteers. To explain the matter further, he enclosed a letter from Sir R. Barker, 21st April[8], informing him of a quarrel among some officers of the third brigade, which had developed a serious combination, which, he had reason to believe, was not confined to that part of the army. Sir R. Fletcher also transmitted his answer[9] to Sir R. Barker, dated the 24th April, in which he states that, though he has for some days heard that the officers had thoughts of resuming their demand, he could not think it deserved much notice; observing, at the same time, that should it prove that they offered to resign, as Lord Clive would probably not alter his resolution, it would afford him an opportunity of "picking out the best officers, and getting rid of the useless ones."
To this communication Lord Clive replied on the 28th April[10], 1766, approving of Sir Robert Fletcher's proceedings, and declaring his determination, that any officer who offered his resignation should be immediately dismissed, and never restored to the service. The quarrel among the officers alluded to in Sir R. Barker's letter, arose from Ensign Davis refusing to give up his commission to Captain Duff, which, connected with the result of a Court of Inquiry, led to a discovery of the whole of their proceedings. In consequence of this premature disclosure of their combination, the 1st of May was fixed on instead of the 1st of June, for the resignation of their commissions, with a view of preventing Lord Clive and the Committee having time to counteract the execution of their intention. A letter signed "Full Batta," dated 15th April[11], addressed to Captain Carnac (who was with Lord Clive), was received about the same time, informing him of the plan of resigning, and calling upon him to send his commission to some friend of his, and to sign the subscription for such officers as might be turned out of the service. The contents of this letter, being communicated to Lord Clive, convinced him that the combination was general; nor was he without apprehension that the troops might follow the example of their officers, and a general mutiny ensue. He was, however, determined not to concede; and resolved to leave Moorshedabad as soon as his important business would allow, and to reach Monghyr before the 15th of May. In conjunction with General Carnac and Mr. Sykes, he despatched an express to the Council at Calcutta, dated the 29th April[12], informing them of the proposed resignation, and desiring them to write to Madras, in order that all officers and cadets that could be spared from that presidency should be held in readiness to embark for Bengal at the shortest notice, promising them rank according to their standing. Alluding to the Bengal officers, he observes, in this letter, "Such a spirit must at all hazards be suppressed at the birth, unless we determine upon seeing the government of these provinces pass from the civil into the hands of the military department." In the same letter he desired that the Presidency of Fort St. George should be informed of the approach of the Mahrattas, of the number of the officers who had placed their commissions at the disposal of the combination (being then one hundred and thirty); and he concludes, by stating the necessity of the Committee at Calcutta coming to an absolute determination that no officer now resigning shall ever hereafter hold any place or station in the East India Company's service. The Council sent off a despatch to Fort St. George[13] to the above effect. Lord Clive wrote also to Colonel Smith, Sir R. Barker, and Sir Robert Fletcher, enclosing a copy of his letter to the Council, and giving those officers leave to make his opinions known to their respective corps, who, he still hoped, when they knew his resolution not to yield to their threats, would change their conduct. From not having heard from Colonel Smith and Sir R. Barker, he was in hopes, as appears by a letter to Mr. Verelst (2d May), that the officers, finding the Committee steady in their resolution, would not venture to brave the consequences. He soon, however, received a letter from Sir R. Barker, dated 27th April, 1766[14], stating what he had discovered, in consequence of the Court of Inquiry respecting the fire at Bankipore; that he had sent Captain Duff and Ensign Davis prisoners to Calcutta, and would send those who were active in the combination there too, as any trial of them by their comrades would be mere trifling; intimating also, that the civilians at Calcutta were supposed to have subscribed in aid of this combination to a large amount. To this Lord Clive replied[15], 2d May, 1766, approving of what he had done, desiring him to arrest such officers as he thought might be tried for mutiny, till a court martial of field officers could be summoned. "The ringleaders," he observed, "of this affair must suffer the severest punishment that martial law can inflict, else there is an end of discipline in the army, and of authority in the East India Company over all their servants!!" Similar letters were sent to Sir R. Fletcher and Colonel Smith.[16] In one of these letters he takes notice of certain inflammatory anonymous letters, and says, that if he could discover their authors, his utmost endeavours should be used "to have them shot." On the 4th of May[17], he received a letter from Sir R. Fletcher, enclosing one signed by forty-two of his officers, complaining of the hardships to which they were subjected by the reduction of their batta, and enclosing their commissions, but informing him at the same time of their intention to serve without pay until the 15th of May.[18] He immediately wrote to Calcutta, directing that officers should be sent for from Fort St. George, and the free merchants at Calcutta be requested to assist. On the 5th of May, a letter was received from Sir R. Barker[19], of the 30th April, informing Lord Clive, that on the 29th of April his officers had informed him of their intention to resign on the 1st of May; that he had assembled them, and informed them of the crime they were committing, and the ruin they were bringing on themselves; but that they had answered, "that they were solemnly engaged with the other brigades, and could not be off." Sir Robert states in this letter his apprehension about the resolution of the men at Monghyr to mutiny, and mentions that one lac and forty thousand rupees (16,000l.) was said to be subscribed for the officers, by gentlemen at Calcutta. These circumstances Lord Clive communicated to the Council[20], requesting them to endeavour to discover the civilians who had granted such encouragement to the army in their mutiny. Directions were also sent to Sir R. Fletcher[21] to be on his guard against any disorders on the part of the troops, and to have every thing necessary for detaching them in small parties. Boats were also ordered to be provided for sending the officers, at twenty-four hours' notice, to Calcutta. On the 1st of May, Sir R. Barker received a letter from Mr. Robertson, the Field-Adjutant, enclosing the commissions of the officers of the third brigade, which Sir Robert returned to them, with an expression of his resolution to put the severity of military law in execution, in case any of them should misbehave. He wrote to Lord Clive[22], informing him of what he had done, and that he had directed Mr. Robertson and three others to proceed instantly as prisoners to Calcutta. Mr. Robertson claimed exemption from military law, on the plea that he had resigned; but nevertheless he was obliged to comply with the orders. Affairs now becoming critical, Lord Clive determined to set off with all expedition for Monghyr; and on the 6th of May, leaving the business at Moorshedabad to the care of Mr. Sykes, he and General Carnac left Mulajyl, sending forward such officers as he had been able to collect at so short a notice, and on whom he could rely.[23] Finding, by a letter he received on the road from Sir R. Fletcher, that the officers still remained determined in their purpose, and that a correspondence was begun by them to induce the Madras officers to refuse to come to the assistance of Government, Lord Clive[24] ordered that all private letters between Calcutta and Madras should be stopped, and directed Sir R. Fletcher to secure the assistance of the serjeants and native officers[25], in case of any appearance of mutiny among the men.[26] In a letter to Sir R. Barker, dated 8th May, 1766, Lord Clive, alluding to the report just received of the determination of the officers to persevere, observes,—
"Will men, so abandoned to all sense of honour, and who still persevere in supporting acts of mutiny and desertion, when they have abandoned one point, cease there? History can furnish but few instances of that nature. For my own part, I must see the soldiers' bayonets levelled at my throat, before I can be induced to give way; and then, not so much for the preservation of my own life, as the temporary salvation of the Company: temporary only it can be, for I shall think Bengal in the utmost danger, when we are reduced to the necessity of submitting the civil power to the mercy of men who have gone lengths that will frighten and astonish all England.
"With me it is beyond a doubt, that if the officers do not resolve to submit, and acknowledge their crime, ruin and destruction must be equally their lot, whether they succeed or not; and if arguments of this kind can make no impression, none will. I cannot help thinking more evil is still intended."
In the mean time, the Council had resolved that all commissions tendered should be accepted, and the officer tendering them immediately sent to Calcutta. On applying to the free merchants to come forward to do duty as officers on the present emergency, two only would accept commissions, which confirmed the suspicions that the greater part of them approved the conduct of the officers, even if they had not entered into a subscription to support the combination.
Advice was received from Colonel Smith, that the Mahrattas were in motion. It appeared that he was still unacquainted with the intended resignation of his officers. Lord Clive, however, in his answer[27] contemplating this act, authorised him to enter into alliance with the neighbouring princes; and, should he find himself reduced to the utmost extremity, but not otherwise, to make terms with the malecontents. The officers who had been sent forward by Lord Clive, on their arrival at Monghyr, endeavoured to impress those who had resigned with a sense of the enormity of their conduct; informing them that Lord Clive was coming, determined not to yield to them; and remarking strongly on their ingratitude towards a person who had lately given up 70,000l.[28], to form a fund for invalids and widows. The officers replied, that it was impossible for them now to retract. They stated that Sir R. Fletcher had never communicated to them Lord Clive's donation to the army; and concluded by accusing Sir Robert as the originator of the whole plan for resisting the orders of government. On the 13th of May, the European soldiers got under arms, intending to follow their officers; but the appearance of Captain Smith with the sepoy battalion restored order; and when Sir R. Fletcher addressed them, and distributed money among them, they informed him, that they had been assured that he was to head them; but as that was not the case, they would return to their duty. The officers offered to assist, but were ordered to quit the garrison immediately. On the 15th of May, Lord Clive arrived at Monghyr, and received the account of past proceedings from Sir R. Fletcher, who added, that he had known of the combination of the officers since January, and had seemed to approve of their schemes, that nothing might be done without his knowledge. It is here to be remarked, that the date of Sir Robert's letter, which first intimated any thing about the resignation of the officers, was the 25th of April. Whatever were Lord Clive's sentiments on this communication, he did not think fit either to express his dissatisfaction, or take any steps at the moment. Immediately on his arrival he addressed the soldiers, explaining the crime of their officers, and mentioning his own donation to the European part of the army. He ordered double pay to be issued to the native troops for May and June.
At Bankipore[29], where Sir Robert Barker commanded, neither officers nor men behaved in so violent a manner as at Monghyr. More of the officers remained with their corps, and there was no appearance of mutiny among the troops.
At Serajipoor, Colonel Smith, who was daily in expectation of a battle, was placed in a peculiarly difficult situation. On the 6th of May, all the officers in camp, except two, requested leave to resign, some immediately, and others from the first of June. The Colonel immediately ordered the first to proceed to Calcutta, and informed the latter that they should have an answer before the time they had fixed; remarking to both, that he should be obliged to place that confidence in the black troops which he had before their recent conduct reposed in the zeal of his own countrymen. The officers answered this, by complaining of the attempt to asperse their honour; to which Colonel Smith replied, that the first point of honour in a soldier was military obedience, and repeated his order, that all those who had offered to resign immediately should leave camp, and go to the presidency. Lieutenant Vertue having been refused permission to resign, and leaving his commission on Colonel Smith's table, was ordered into arrest, to be tried by a court-martial at Patna. The officers of the European regiment who were stationed at Allahabad declared their intention of setting out for Calcutta on the 20th of May, and behaved in so disorderly a manner, that Major Smith, who commanded that fortress, would have ordered them all into arrest, if he could have depended on the men; but, as there was some idea that the soldiers would assist the officers, he sent for an old battalion of sepoys, which had been long under his command. These troops having performed a march of one hundred and four miles from Serajipoor, in fifty-four hours, arrived in camp a few hours before the officers were on the point of leaving the garrison. With their assistance Major Smith compelled the officers to make apologies and submission for the insult they had offered to his authority, and he contented himself with sending off six to Calcutta. Colonel Smith at Serajipoor, pursuing the same vigorous measures, had secured tranquillity at that station, by sending half his officers to Calcutta.
On the 20th of May, Lord Clive arrived at Bankipore; many of the officers who had resigned still continuing to do duty were restored to their commissions. The officers who had been ordered to Calcutta having attempted to assemble on the road, and disturbance being apprehended, some detachments of sepoys were sent to compel them to continue their journey. The principal leaders of this mutinous opposition to authority being now arrested, and ordered to prepare for their trial, repentance and humiliation became general, the objects of the combination were defeated, their union and strength broken, and those who were restored were compelled to sign a contract to serve the Company for three years, and to give a year's notice of their intention to quit the service. Messrs. Duffield and Robertson of the third brigade, who were ringleaders, on being ordered to embark for England, protested against the order, and blockaded themselves in their houses till the ships for England left Calcutta; but, on their making their appearance, they were seized and sent off to Madras, and from thence to England.
Though there was no doubt of the assistance which the military derived from the civilians, yet from the precaution taken by the latter, of sending their letters by private posts in disguised hands, it was difficult to substantiate the charge against any individuals. Mr. Higginson, however, the sub-secretary to the Council, and Mr. Grindal in the secretary's office, having the charge brought home to them, were dismissed. Captain Stainforth, accused of having expressed a determination of assassinating Lord Clive, was tried and condemned to be cashiered. When authority was fully vindicated, as much lenity was shown by Lord Clive as was consistent with the public safety to those concerned in this combination. Out of six officers tried and found guilty of mutiny, not one was sentenced to death. A defect of the Mutiny Act for the East India Company's service, in omitting the contract between the officer and Company, might, it was thought by many, render the legality of the proceedings doubtful; and this inclined the members of the court-martial to mercy. Lieutenant Vertue, on this ground, refused to plead; nevertheless, he was put on his trial, condemned, and cashiered with infamy.
Sir Robert Fletcher, who was publicly accused by many of the officers who resigned, and more particularly by Captain Goddard[30], of having been the instigator of the whole plan, was tried by a court martial, found guilty, and cashiered. It appeared in evidence for the prosecution, that Sir Robert Fletcher was acquainted throughout with the design of the general resignation; and that he, in fact, proposed it, as a scheme by which the officers might recover their double batta.[31]
Such is the detail of a combination of officers, which threatened with the most imminent danger the newly established authority of the Company over the rich provinces of Bengal and Bahar. Never did Lord Clive display more prominently that superior knowledge of human nature, that intimate acquaintance with the feelings and motives of military men, or that firmness and decision by which alone those can be kept in subordination, than on this trying occasion. He never hesitated nor swerved from the resolutions he adopted on the first moment that he learnt the extent of the combination formed against the government. He was well supported by the members of the committee, of which General Carnac, commander of the troops, was a member; and with the conduct of the senior officer of the army, Colonel R. Smith, who commanded one of the brigades, as well as of Sir Robert Barker, who commanded another, he had every reason to be satisfied.
The high opinion he entertained of Sir R. Fletcher as a gallant officer, his apparent zeal and constant communications, long misled Lord Clive into a confidence on his co-operation, which, had he been a man of less talent and less prompt decision, would have occasioned a ruinous compromise of the public interests. But that and all the other evil consequences which this alarming combination threatened, were subdued by his presence, and by the personal display of that calm and unyielding courage, which, in military bodies, extorts, even from those it subdues, respect and admiration.
During these proceedings Clive's mind appears, from his whole correspondence, public and private, to have been resolutely fixed on the accomplishment of the objects for which he abandoned ease and affluence in his native country; namely, those of restoring discipline in the military, and order in the civil, branches of the service. But we are able to trace the motives under which he acted on this momentous occasion more minutely in his private than in his public communications. From his letters to General Carnac and others it is evident that Lord Clive cherished, even at the moment he was reducing them to obedience, the kindest feelings towards the officers of the Bengal army. In one to the General he makes some mild but judicious remarks upon the warm language which his friend had used in representing the discontent of the officers under his orders (prior to the combination) at their being superseded by Captain Macpherson, whom the Council-Board at Calcutta had admitted to the rank of captain in a mode which the Bengal officers deemed injurious to their interests. "I am concerned," Lord Clive observes in this letter[32], "at the warmth of your letter to the Board. Although they have used both you and me extremely ill, and, as individuals, deserved our utmost contempt, yet I think there is some indulgence due to their stations. That they have acted unjustly, as well as contrary to the known rules of the army, in the case of Captain Macpherson, cannot be doubted; yet I cannot think the officers ought to carry matters so far as to insist upon a Governor and Council retracting what they have done. There must be an absolute power lodged somewhere, and that certainly is in the hands of the Governor and Council, until the pleasure of the Court of Directors be known. However, if the account of Captain Macpherson is proved true, I will be answerable that he shall act as youngest of the corps he has been introduced to, and take care that no such unjust proceedings shall be countenanced in future. I hope this will prove satisfactory to the officers, who, by their gallant behaviour, are entitled to every mark of attention and distinction from the Company."
This kind and friendly remonstrance, on the part of Lord Clive, had not the desired effect: on the contrary, it appears by the following letter to his respected friend General Lawrence, that the resentment of the officers at this act of government gave rise to demands of a character that showed how much a spirit of insubordination had spread throughout the Bengal army.
"I[33] should have done myself the pleasure of writing to you sooner, if I had not deferred it from day to day, in hopes of being able to entertain you with some important news from camp. There has, however, but one material circumstance happened, and that I am sure will astonish you. Some time ago, the Governor in Council here permitted Captain Whichcot to dispose of his commission to Captain Macpherson, and appointed the latter to the same rank among the captains, that Whichcot held. Upon a representation of this grievance, Macpherson was ordered to take rank as youngest captain; but the military gentlemen, still dissatisfied, thought fit to remonstrate against his being appointed to any other than that of youngest ensign. Such an unreasonable request could not be granted, and the consequence of the refusal has been, it seems, a general association among the officers, captains as well as subalterns; the former thinking it incumbent on them to support what they are pleased to suppose the rights of the latter. The import of this association is, that all the officers, captains, lieutenants and ensigns are to resign their commissions, unless Macpherson be degraded to the lowest rank! Civil departments, in every state, will now and then entertain abuses, in spite of the most vigilant magistracy; but I appeal, my dear General, to your memory, whether, in the long experience you have had in military affairs, a single instance can be given of a corps of officers, in time of actual service and an enemy in the field, uniting in a combination of this nature. To me it appears so repugnant to every regulation of discipline, so destructive of that subordination, without which no army can exist, and above all, so disobedient to the Mutiny Act and Articles of War, that I am determined to refuse them the liberty of resigning (I mean those at least whose contract with the Company is not expired), and break them, or perhaps proceed to greater extremities by a general court-martial. The expediency of my plan of regimenting the forces, and appointing the proper proportion of field officers, appears now, I think, in a stronger light than ever; and in consequence of this mutiny (must I call it?) I have already ordered all the corps which I brought from Europe to march up to camp, whither I intend to be myself, as soon as the interior policy of affairs will permit. To say truth, every principle of government in this presidency has within these few months past been so debauched, that one can hardly determine upon the branches which ought first to be lopped. Pray tell Mr. Palk that I do not write to him by this post because my politics are not yet ripe for communication, and I consider this as a letter to you both."
Some time before the combination of the officers took place, several efforts were made by Clive to enforce the principles of subordination, which, we find from his private letters, were greatly relaxed in all ranks. He appears to have grounded his chief hopes of restoring and maintaining discipline on his plan of giving shape to the army, by forming it into corps and brigades, and placing it under officers of rank and reputation; but his difficulty was to keep those in order who had been selected to command others. This is strongly evinced in a letter to Sir R. Fletcher, who, while he recommended the introduction of better discipline, objected to serve under Sir R. Barker.
"I have received your letter[34]," Lord Clive observes, "and agree entirely with you in the necessity of introducing discipline and subordination among the officers and soldiers in the service of the Company, although I see no such difficulty in bringing this about, since those who decline complying with the regulations which are to be made will most certainly be dismissed the service.
"I must confess it gives me much concern, that you, who preach up the necessity of discipline and reformation, should be the first to act in contradiction to your own declared sentiments, by declining to serve under Sir R. Barker; but what surprises me still more is, that you who have been removed from one settlement to another, and have actually superseded numbers, should object to serve under an officer, who was a captain when you were only an ensign or volunteer on the same establishment. Without disparagement to your merit, which I shall always be ready to acknowledge, it is not in the eyes of the world equal to that of Sir R. Barker, who has had more time and more opportunities than you possibly could of distinguishing himself. You think he should have remained in the artillery. That would not have hindered him from commanding you, upon all occasions when you were both upon service together. Indeed his rank is so high, that he must always command wherever he is, if Carnac or Smith be not present, which may seldom happen; except, indeed, by being an artillery officer, he should be thought improper to command the whole; and by that means an officer of his rank and merit would be deprived of an opportunity of acting in the field at all. In short, every one who knows Sir R. Barker esteems him equal to any command, both military and artillery; and as a proof of what I affirm, General Lawrence, Mr. Palk, and the Nabob[35] pressed me, in the strongest terms, to have Sir R. Barker; promising that he should have both rank and command next to Colonel Campbell.
"I am persuaded that when you reflect upon the merits and pretensions which Sir Robert Barker has to the Company's favour, you will not hesitate a moment to give up the point. If you consider that Mr. Sulivan alone sent you out, in that distinguished station which you now possess, and that his interest is at best become a very precarious one, I am sure your own good sense will prevail upon you not to oppose my appointment; for I must frankly tell you, that, though I am really inclined to do you every service in my power, yet, in this instance, you must not expect the same indulgence from me which you have received from General Carnac."
In a subsequent letter he states his disapprobation of Sir Robert Fletcher's receipt of a large present from the King, subsequent to the arrival of the covenants, by which all such sources of emolument were prohibited to public servants.
"[36]With regard to the lac of rupees received from the King, I think you ought not to have received it in the manner you did, for three reasons; first, on account of the King's distresses and poverty; secondly, because General Carnac had never received one farthing from his Majesty, whom he had laid under obligations much beyond what you had rendered him; and, lastly, because you knew it was the intent of the Court of Directors that no presents should be received, after the receipt of the covenants, without the consent of the Governor and Council. Indeed, most of the gentlemen of council are under a very severe censure for their accepting of presents after the receipt of the covenants."
Lord Clive appears, from some of his letters at this period, not to have been quite satisfied with some parts of the conduct of his friend General Carnac.
"You will observe," he writes in a letter[37] to Mr. Sumner, "that the General does not mention a word about the conduct of the officers; and I should not be surprised to find them in a disposition, not only to insist upon Macpherson's appointment, by the Governor and Council being set aside, but also to refuse signing the covenants and submitting to the reduction of batta. However, I am determined totally to subdue this mutinous and unsoldierlike behaviour, which may easily be effected with the assistance of the field officers, as soon as we have concluded a peace with Sujah Dowlah."
In a letter written next day to the General, from which I have already quoted, he begs him, if uneasy under the part he is to act, to let the whole weight fall upon his shoulders; concluding with reference to the recent violent representations in the case of the appointment of Captain Macpherson.[38]
"If the officers of the army," he observes, "think it concerns their honour to support and countenance so very unmilitary a proceeding, I think it still more concerns my character and reputation to support the dignity and power of the Governor and Council."
Writing to Mr. Verelst[39] a few days afterwards, he comments on the long silence of the General, and his feelings as a military man, in the following terms:—
"I have at last received a letter from Carnac, copy of which has been sent you. However, his silence upon particular subjects convinces me, he has too much given way to the warmth of his passions; and much I fear, he thinks too highly of the services, dignity, and authority of the military.
"With regard to the first, although a soldier myself, I am of opinion that we imbibe such arbitrary notions, by the absolute power which we are obliged to exercise towards the officers and soldiers, in order to keep up subordination and military discipline, so essentially necessary for the good of the service, that we shall always be endeavouring to encroach upon the civil power, if they do not repeatedly make use of that authority with which they are invested; and I appeal to yourself, whether the commanding officers, whoever they were, since my departure from India, until my second arrival in this quarter, have not, by their conduct, endeavoured to impress upon the minds of the princes of the country, that the power was rather in the Commander-in-chief of the army, than in the Governor and Council. Indeed, a few months more of Mr. Spencer's government would have made them Lords paramount."
Colonel Richard Smith, who was next in rank to General Carnac, and with whose decided conduct, during the combination of the officers, Lord Clive appears to have been fully satisfied, was evidently considered by his Lordship (with whom he had been a passenger in the same ship from England) as a person that required to be kept in as good order, as he was disposed to keep others. To preserve the means of doing this, Clive had acted towards him with a reserve that gave offence; and the Colonel, in the concluding paragraph of an able letter[40], upon the future arrangements of the army observes:—
"Your Lordship well knows what public-spirited motives influenced me to return to India; and by this time, I flatter myself, you are convinced, that I am determined religiously to observe the same uniform conduct which has been my principal object. Your late letters to me seem to breathe that same air of confidence, which only could first prevail on me to think of quitting England. Why there has been any interruption to it, your Lordship can only tell; for I declare myself an utter stranger to the cause. I have been induced to open myself thus frankly, from some conversations that passed with General Carnac on this subject. It remains now in your breast, whether my correspondence with your Lordship, in future, shall be simply from the Colonel to the Commander-in-chief, or, whether I shall go beyond that line, and offer my own sentiments on such matters regarding the public service, as from time to time may occur."
No notice was taken by Lord Clive of these remarks; but, on their being repeated, he replied, in that explicit and manly tone which was characteristic of his mind. He evinced, on all such occasions, an equal disdain for evasion, or the concealment of his sentiments.
"I had resolved," he observes[41], "to give you an answer to your letter of the 31st August last; but, when I considered the explanation required, could neither afford you pleasure, or be of any service to the Company in your present situation, I determined to remain silent upon so disagreeable a subject. But as you have called upon me a second time, I will answer you with a frankness free of all disguise.
"Your behaviour towards Colonel Peach at the Cape, in reprimanding him for not paying his respects to me through you, was, in my opinion, assuming an authority which did not belong to you; and tended to the lessening of mine. Lieutenant Wenthorp, after he had obtained my consent for returning to India, because he did not apply to you first, was discouraged in such a manner, that he chose rather to forego all the advantages he might obtain from my promises, than risk the consequences of your displeasure. Such an authority assumed, and resentment expressed, could not but give me great offence. The warmth shown and dissatisfaction expressed, (because you was not looked upon as one of the Committee, and allowed to sign the letter of instructions to Captain Abercrombie,) by immediately connecting yourself with a person whom you had been but very little connected with before, and who had often declared, in the presence of many witnesses, that he would never be connected with you; the continuance of that very extraordinary connection the rest of the voyage; convinced me at once, I could not be on a footing of intimacy, without subjecting myself to inconveniences which a spirit like mine could never brook. These, Sir, among many other reasons, have occasioned my acting with reserve towards you. Indeed, in the whole course of so long a voyage, I could observe a mind too actuated by ambition: such a tendency in Colonel Smith, to govern and command those who ought to govern and command him, that I could not be unreserved, without giving up that authority which I am determined ever to support; and although I do, and always have allowed you many virtues, so long as you continue to give so much general offence by that kind of behaviour, so long will you be exposed to mortifications and disappointments."
Sir Robert Barker had made an application to Lord Clive to have a share, as Colonel commanding the brigade at Bahar, in the civil government of the country; and to form one of the Committee at Patna. The character of this officer was very different from that of Colonel Smith, and the reply from Lord Clive, which by a curious coincidence was written on the following day, was in very different terms.
"I must confess," he observes[42], "the receipt of your letter of the 2d February, has given me infinite concern, because I feel for you as I should for myself, and there is no officer in this part of the world for whom I entertain so strong and true regard, or whom I am so very desirous of serving. I am sure, if it depended upon me, you should, upon Carnac's departure, succeed to his rank and station; so well acquainted am I with your merits as a soldier, your moderation and temper as a man. Your being hurt, therefore, at not having an appointment which is not in my power to obtain for you, cannot but hurt me. I am convinced that, great as my interest is, were I to propose your being joined with Mr. Middleton in directing the collection of the revenues of the Bahar province, I could not carry that point. Consider, Barker, how very separate and distinct the services are; consider how very jealous the Directors are of military men, and how very attentive they will be to every action of mine, whom they look upon in a military more than in a civil light. Recollect that they would not even allow Coote to have a seat at the Board to give his advice, except upon military matters only. I say further, that were I to take such an unprecedented step, I doubt whether it would not add such weight of argument to those counsellors and malecontents, who are gone home with a full design to exclaim against arbitrary and military power, that the Company might be induced to disapprove of every thing I have done for them, from an apprehension that I meant to accomplish every measure, by the subversion of civil liberty. Persuaded I am, that the joining with Middleton a man of your steadiness, moderation, and discretion, would be of singular advantage to the Company: notwithstanding which, I dare not attempt to do it.
"But, let us suppose for a moment that I could gratify you in this request, what would be the consequence? Would not every officer commanding a brigade insist upon the like privilege? What use do you imagine the man of Allahabad would make of such a concession? Indeed, Barker, if such an appointment were to take place, the letters from this settlement would occasion such an alarm in Leadenhall Street, that I verily believe I should be turned off my government, and all the field officers ordered home in the first ship. Point out to me, my friend, any method of extending your influence, without prejudice to the service we both wish to promote, and no man shall be readier than I to give the strongest proof of friendship and regard for you. Middleton shall have orders to consult with you upon all occasions where military duties are in agitation; so shall Setabroy and Durge Narain, and be ordered often to wait upon you."
Lord Clive, in this letter, after making some observations on the discontents of the officers, and giving an explanation of the origin of double batta, makes some excellent remarks upon those principles that should regulate the distribution of rewards to military bodies; which should, in his opinion, be such as to make men look to service and advanced rank as the means of attaining these objects of ambition. He concludes this letter with some strong observations on the advantages enjoyed by the Company's army, and the determined resolution of the Committee not to yield to unreasonable demands. "I am very glad," he observes, "the officers have been so prudent as to lay aside their intentions of presenting a memorial; and the Company and myself are much obliged to Sir R. Barker for his soldier-like conduct and behaviour upon the occasion; although, I can assure you, there has been no memorial presented from the other brigades on the like subject. It is true, the Governor and Committee have received a remonstrance from the officers of Colonel Smith's brigade, setting forth the dearness of provisions and all other necessaries, at that great distance; and we have, in consequence of its being only a temporary expense to the Company, agreed to let things remain on their present footing, until the brigade be withdrawn from Sujah Dowlah's dominions; but the officers are at the same time informed, in the most positive terms, that this indulgence will cease the instant the troops cross the Carumnapa.
"I need not repeat how positive and absolute the Company's orders from Europe are, about reducing the military expenses to the proportion of the establishments on the coast of Coromandel, nay, even to less, because they imagine the price of provisions is lower; and I believe you are not unacquainted that the officers, for the first year they served in Bengal, were all satisfied with single batta: the double batta was merely an indulgence obtained by me, and came immediately out of the Nabob's own pocket. It has been continued ever since, by the authority of the King's officers; and the Governor and Council have been obliged to acquiesce, in opposition to frequent orders from the Court of Directors. In short, our military gentlemen (countenanced and supported by the King's officers, who over-awed the Governor and Council in such a manner, that, had quadruple batta been demanded, I doubt whether it would have been refused,) have continued to receive the indulgence almost as a matter of right. But now that the Company have appointed so many field officers, who are immediately in their own service, the salutary effects are visible; and I hope not only to see the strictest discipline and subordination enforced, but likewise economy established; for unless luxury and extravagance be abolished, discipline must fail, and the officers and soldiers be rendered incapable of doing their duty to their country and the Company. My grand object, you know, is, that none under the rank of field officers should have money to throw away. When they arrive at that rank, their hands are filled with such large advantages, that they may be certain of acquiring an independency in a few years. This consideration might, one would imagine, induce the officers to rest satisfied with their present appointments, since they have a greater advantage in prospect than they ever enjoyed before. My dear Colonel, let them look at all other services. Is there such another service in the world as this is, upon the footing on which it now stands? In the West Indies, in America, where all European articles and provisions likewise are full as dear as in Bengal, the officers and soldiers have scarce any extraordinary allowances at all. Let them reflect for a moment on the miserable condition of the half-pay officers in England, many of whom have undergone dangers and fatigues much superior to any in India. How many of them would be glad to serve the Company on their own terms? Add to this, that the revenues of Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa belong to the Company themselves, and not to the Nabob; that what is now paid comes immediately out of their own pockets; and although the officers may plead prescription for indulgences from the Nabob, they can plead no such prescription from the Company. I may indeed assure you, the Committee are resolutely determined upon carrying the Company's orders into execution, and enforcing the new regulations. The only indulgence they could reconcile to their duty to the Company, was the extra allowance of 40 rupees per diem to each commanding officer of the brigades when in garrison, in order that his table might be a help to the other officers, till a moderate way of living had taken place."
Lord Clive, it has been before mentioned, had received a legacy of five lacs of rupees bequeathed to him by the Nabob Meer Jaffier, which he had lodged in the Company's treasury, in order that it might be converted into a fund for the relief of disabled or decayed European officers and soldiers, and of destitute widows of officers of the Company's army. Noticing, in a letter to Sir R. Fletcher[43], an absurd combination which the officers of his brigade had entered into, against Captain Ducarell and his brothers, he alludes to this munificent act. "On my arrival at Monghyr," (he observes) "I shall consider of some effectual means to put a stop to such unjust resentment." "I have," (he adds) "at present, a scheme on foot for the benefit of officers in the Bengal establishment; but I shall not hesitate to exclude any whom I may think undeserving, in any respect soever."
On the 28th of April, 1766, Lord Clive intimated to Sir R. Fletcher, his decided resolution to treat with the utmost severity, all who proceeded to the extreme of resigning the service; and, on the 29th of April, 1766, he makes the following observations in a letter to Sir R. Barker:—
"During your absence upon the Bettoa expedition, the captains, lieutenants, and ensigns of your brigade have preferred a very extraordinary remonstrance to the Governor and Council, upon the subject of batta. This proceeding was, I think, somewhat contemptuous towards you; and, as the remonstrance was not transmitted through the channel of the commanding officer, I have given it as my opinion, that the Board should pay no other attention to it than that of sending it to you for your information. By the behaviour of our present corps of officers, one would actually conclude that every true idea of military discipline was effaced. I have just received authentic intelligence, that no less than one hundred and thirty officers of the third brigade have deposited their commissions, and entered into an association not to serve, unless the double batta be restored. To this, it seems, is added an agreement to subscribe for the maintenance of the principals (who they imagine will be the only sufferers), till their arrival in Europe, and to purchase for them commissions of equal rank in his Majesty's service. Can any man in his senses imagine that the Secretary at War, being made acquainted with the names and conduct of these officers, will ever give his consent to their admission into the King's regiments? With regard to these who have already served in Europe, and are now upon the half-pay list, they would do well to recollect that they will not be entitled to their half-pay, on their return to England, without producing a certificate of their good behaviour in the service of the Company; for such is his Majesty's declared resolution; and if they cannot obtain half-pay, how can they expect to be admitted upon full pay? The enclosed copy of a letter we have just despatched to the gentlemen of Council at Fort William, will inform you of the measure that must take place, if this unmilitary association be not dissolved. And I will add, for my own part, that any officer who resigns his commission, from no other cause of disgust than the Company's orders for the reduction of batta, shall be absolutely dismissed the service, and never restored. For their own sakes, I hope they will speedily resolve upon a change of conduct, and I doubt not you will use your utmost influence to bring them to a right sense of their duty. If my sentiments have any weight, you are at liberty to make this as public as you please, as also the copy of the letter to the Council."
Lord Clive appears, throughout the whole of the violent proceedings of the officers, to have been convinced that the civil servants of the Company had instigated and aided the military in their mutinous acts; and in answer to a letter from Mr. Verelst[44], he observes,—"With regard to the assistance you say we may have from the civilians on an emergency, I can never consent to receive it, as I am certain they were the original cause of this mutinous association." When he learnt that the combination of officers had taken a formidable shape, he thus expresses himself, in a letter[45] to the same gentleman:—"I am determined to leave this place (Moorshedabad) on Tuesday next, and proceed with all expedition to Monghyr. Our business at this city, material as it is, must for a little while give way to the more pressing occasion which requires our presence at the army. If I find a fair opportunity, my endeavours to get some of the mutinous ringleaders shot will not be wanting. At all events, most of them shall be dismissed the service."
Lord Clive, at this period, felt the greatest annoyance from the want of cordial support from Mr. Sumner, the senior member of the Committee; and, irritated as he was by the continued opposition of several of the members of Council, the discontent of the civil, and the violence of the military, we are not surprised at the first paragraph of a private letter, written at this period to Mr. Palk, Governor of Madras, under date the 6th of May, 1766. "Do you think," he asks, "History can furnish an instance of a man, with 40,000l. per annum, a wife and family, a father and mother, brother and sisters, cousins and relations in abundance, abandoning his native country, and all the blessings of life, to take charge of a government so corrupt, so headstrong, so lost to all principle and sense of honour, as this is?"
When a communication from Sir Robert Barker led him to believe that the officers would proceed to the last extreme, he wrote[46], as we have already seen, in terms that strongly expressed his sense of their conduct, and the resolution to which he had come in respect to his own.
The heavy rains made Lord Clive's progress to Monghyr slow, but he directed every act of the officers commanding brigades, and to each of them he wrote private letters daily. He gave to Sir R. Fletcher and Sir R. Barker powers to promise forgiveness to subalterns, but not the captains, whom it was his fixed resolution to bring to condign punishment, on the just ground that their better experience rendered them less excusable than the young men to whom they gave so evil an example. To Colonel Smith a greater latitude was given. He was authorised, as has been stated, in the event of the Mahrattas invading the country, but in no other case whatever, to make terms with his insubordinate officers, if they tendered their commissions.
On reaching Monghyr, he wrote to Colonel Smith[47] what had occurred, explaining the riotous conduct of the officers on his sending off some of the ringleaders to Calcutta, and the apprehended mutiny of the soldiers, which occurred from their expecting that their commanders were to head them. With respect to the native troops, he observes, "The black Sepoy officers, as well as men, have given great proofs of fidelity and steadiness upon this occasion; and, so long as they remain so, nothing is to be apprehended from the European soldiery, even if they should be mutinously inclined." In the conclusion of this letter, he desired Colonel Smith to inform his brigade, of his having recently vested 70,000l., the legacy left him by Meer Jaffier, for the purpose of its interest being applied for the relief of disabled, worn-out officers and men of the Indian army.
In a letter dated the 4th of May, in which Lord Clive announced his positive intention to Sir R. Fletcher of proceeding to Monghyr as speedily as possible, he informs that officer that he is determined "those who have been most active shall be dismissed the service." Immediately on his arrival at Monghyr, he assembled the troops, and harangued them with the best effect, as far as the men were concerned. "I have this morning," he observes in a letter to Colonel Smith[48], "had all the troops under arms, and made them a speech on the occasion. The sepoys are very firmly attached to their duty; and I am now confident that the Europeans likewise will give us no cause of complaint or apprehension. In short, every thing here is as quiet and as well regulated as could be wished."
From a letter to Mr. Verelst, Lord Clive appears to have learnt, in two days after his arrival at Monghyr, of the encouragement given to the officers by Sir R. Fletcher; a circumstance at the discovery of which he expresses great astonishment. From considerations of prudence, to which we have before alluded, he was, however, withheld from acting in an affair of so delicate a nature, without complete information. But his chief anxiety at this moment was the situation of Colonel Smith, who occupied an advanced position on the frontier, and had to apprehend an attack from the Mahrattas, at the very moment his officers were threatening to leave him. Though Lord Clive expressed great indignation at the conduct of these officers, he appears to have contemplated forgiveness to those who had been led by the influence of bad example, or by fears, weakness, and inexperience, into a guilty association. In answer to a letter from Colonel Smith[49], he observes, "The very infamous behaviour of so many officers will be an everlasting reproach upon the English nation, and cast a stain upon the Company's service, which all the water of the Ganges can never wash away. The Court of Directors will have before them a very convincing proof of the fatal effects of donation money, and extravagant allowances, and will be reduced to the necessity of taking some very extraordinary measures, to prevent such dangerous steps being taken by the officers in future." * * * * *
"When the officers were turned out of Monghyr, and obliged to embark, many of them went away with tears in their eyes, and saw their crime in the proper light. Some were first frightened into the measure, and then threatened with death if they retracted; others were inveigled, and there is not the least doubt but we shall soon have it in our option to choose from among the whole the most moderate and deserving of those who have resigned the service. It will shock you much to hear that there is great reason to imagine that a very principal person at Monghyr has been the chief instigator of this mutinous behaviour; and you will be still more surprised to learn that the civilians have been very active in promoting the association. All the officers at Monghyr affirm there has been a subscription of 160,000 rupees made for that purpose. This last circumstance I can scarce credit."
Alluding, in a subsequent letter to Colonel Smith[50], to the conduct of the officers of his brigade, Lord Clive observes, "The behaviour of those officers who were serving under you in the lines, and who resigned their commissions almost in the face of an enemy, is so very infamous, that no consideration on earth shall induce me to restore one of them to the service." "I wish," he goes on to observe, "with all my heart, your letter to the officers at Allahabad may persuade some of them to return to their duty; though, from the behaviour of the officers of the other brigades, I much doubt it. If any thing can have effect, it will be the fate of the other officers, all of whom I have sent down to Calcutta. Captain Stainforth and Ensign Hoggan having expressed a proper sense of their late misbehaviour, I have permitted them both to return to their duty; and I have no doubt, from the surprise shown, and distress felt, at my accepting all their commissions, as many of them will offer to return to the service as we shall choose to accept of."
At the same time that these communications were made to Colonel Smith, a number of the best officers of the army, who were unassociated with the others, and had been called from different quarters, were sent to Allahabad to render his field brigade efficient for service; and those measures, added to the decided conduct of the Colonel, made Clive deem his own presence at Allahabad unnecessary; and he therefore determined to proceed no further than Chuprah. He had received information that the officers in garrison at Allahabad had left that place, after writing an impertinent letter to Colonel Smith. Orders were immediately given to send detachments of sepoys to make them prisoners, when they were directed to be sent to Calcutta; and Mr. Sumner and the Committee were requested[51] to keep them confined till vessels were ready to sail for England, when he desired that they should be sent home. Orders were given, upon this occasion, that the private letters by the post from Allahabad should be stopped, and sent in a separate bag to the post-master at Calcutta.
It would appear from the contents of several of his private letters of the same date, that Clive did not apprehend the slightest danger to the public interests from the defection of the officers at Allahabad. Major Smith, who commanded that fortress, had exhibited much spirit and firmness. His influence with the native troops gave him great strength; and none of the officers in command of the sepoy corps had joined the combination. Their situation was, at this period, one of consequence and emolument; their influence with their men great; and to this circumstance is, in a great degree, to be ascribed the unshaken fidelity of the sepoys, on a confidence in whom, it may be pronounced, the measures taken by Lord Clive, as well as those of the officers commanding brigades, were chiefly grounded.
Anxiety of mind, fatigue of body, and the extreme heat of the weather, affected Lord Clive's health; and, for one or two days, some letters were written to various quarters, by his secretary, Mr. Henry Strachey. And it is here to be remarked, as illustrative of the character of this extraordinary man, that from the day he received intimation of the discontent of the officers of the army, there are entered in his letter-books never less than three, and sometimes five, six, and seven letters, written daily by himself on the subject; and the same books fully show that, during this period of great mental and bodily exertion, he gave personally the most minute attention to every other branch of public affairs. At the same time, he does not appear to have neglected any private correspondents, either in India or England.
On the 29th of May, Mr. Strachey informed Mr. Verelst, by Lord Clive's desire, that a considerable number of officers had returned to their duty, and desired to have their commissions restored; but that, while Lord Clive was disposed to act with much lenity and indulgence, it was far from his intention to accept the services of all those by whom they had been proffered. Some of these his Lordship (Mr. Strachey writes) is resolved to bring to justice.
"The only observation," he writes[52], "Lord Clive directs me to make upon Mrs. W.'s intelligence about the rage of the civilians, and more than madness of the military, is, that they have mutually encouraged each other to such a degree of licentiousness, in defiance of civil and martial law, that he hardly expects to see a change of sentiments till the severity of example shall have convinced the settlement of his resolution to save it from destruction."
Lord Clive wrote to Monsieur Law[53], the French Governor of Chandernagore, and Monsieur Vernet, the Dutch Chief at Chinsurat, on the subject of the officers who had deserted their duty; and, while he informed them of the dishonourable course of action these officers had pursued, he requested they should not receive or give protection to men who had so dishonoured themselves. These respectable individuals, to whom, both personally, and as representatives of their country, Lord Clive always paid the greatest attention and respect, acted on this, and on all occasions during the time he was in India, in a manner suited to their own high characters.
A short letter from Lord Clive to Mr. Sykes, resident at Moorshedabad, of the 28th of May, in which he states the grounds on which alone he would allow those officers who were repentant to remain with their corps, and his steady resolution to admit of no compromise, shows that he viewed the combination to be, at this date, completely broken and subdued. "I have received," he observes, "your favours of the 19th and 20th. Captains Cummings and Mackenzie, having not yet absolutely declared their resolution to keep or resign their commissions, I desire you will send for these gentlemen, and oblige them to be explicit upon the occasion. If they intend to continue in the service (I do not mean as volunteers for a time of their own limiting), it is well; if not, you will be pleased to inform them you have my orders to dismiss them the service, and insist on their departing, and immediately, for Calcutta. Lieutenants Padman and Clirchue have, by their answers to Mr. Strachey's letters, sufficiently expressed their assent to the combination. You will, therefore, order them down without delay, acquainting them that they are no longer in the service. I shall consider of a proper officer to send you for the command of the troops: in the mean time, as every thing is quiet in the city, you will have no difficulty in preserving discipline.
"Matters are very well regulated in the 1st and 3rd Brigades. The officers of the 2d do not intend to resign till the 1st of June, by which time Colonel Smith will have received a good supply; and I doubt not, with the assistance of the coast, that we shall, ere long, have the satisfaction of seeing our army in a better condition than ever."
The following letter from Lord Clive to Mr. Verelst at Calcutta[54] is too important to have one word omitted; for, while it shows the nature and extent of the combination formed against all authority, it exhibits the master mind by which the danger was foreseen and overcome, and it explains the mode in which it was deemed best to prevent the possibility of its recurrence:—
"Enclosed you will receive two letters, one from Mr. Martin, the other, although not signed, I know to be Higginson's handwriting; so that you see we are betrayed even by our own sub-secretary; and I make no doubt but the assistant-secretary is still deeper in the plot.
"You will observe, in the last general letter, the Directors order us to dismiss, not suspend; and I think near all the Company's servants concerned in exciting this mutiny might not only be dismissed, but sent home in the first ship. Such a behaviour in England would be high treason to the state, and every man of them would be hanged.
"I hope the Council will not hesitate one moment about turning out of the office both Stephenson and Higginson, and dismissing them the service, if concerned in fomenting the late mutinous combination. Indeed, very few are to be trusted; and, in my opinion, the Council should immediately require the assistance of twelve or fourteen junior servants from Madras and Bombay; for, I am fully persuaded, this settlement can never be restored to order, or the honour of the nation or the Company retrieved, until there be a total change in the morals of individuals: and that can only be effected by turning out the most rich and factious, and transplanting others. I have some hopes the Directors will empower me to take such a step in their answer by the Admiral Stevens.
"How shocked must Sulivan and those Directors be, who opposed this appointment of field officers! Certain it is that, without their assistance, we must have given way to the mutiny amongst the officers; and it is equally certain, if we had, Bengal must have been lost, or a civil war carried on to restore to the Company their lost authority, rights, and possessions; for it is beyond a doubt, that men capable of committing such actions as they have lately done would soon have gone such lengths as to have made it impossible ever to return to their native country.
"There was a committee to each brigade, sworn to secrecy; and I have it from undoubted authority, that the officers thought themselves so sure of carrying their point, that a motion was made and agreed to, that the Governor and Council should be directed to release them from their covenants. The next step would, I suppose, have been the turning me and the Committee out of the service. In short, I tremble with horror when I think how near the Company were to the brink of destruction.
"The plot hath been deeply laid, and of four months' standing. I can give a shrewd guess at the first promoters. One of them I have already mentioned to you, who will ere long, I hope, be brought to condign punishment.
"Remember again to act with the greatest spirit; and if the civilians entertain the officers, dismiss them the service; and if the latter behave with insolence, or are refractory, make them all prisoners, and confine them in the new fort. If you have any thing to apprehend, write me word, and I will come down instantly, and bring with me the third brigade, whose officers and men can be depended upon.
"I wish the Board would allow Hare two months longer to settle his affairs: he is one of the best among the servants of Patna.
"I am, &c.
"Clive.
"P.S. A box of intercepted letters will be sent down to-morrow by water, under a guard of Sepoys. I would advise the Board to open every one of them."
Sir Robert Fletcher, of whose guilt, though suspected, no public proof had as yet been adduced, wrote to Lord Clive, expressing his willingness to pay the penalty bond into which three officers in whom he took an interest had entered, in order to remunerate those who might suffer in consequence of their being prominent as advocates of the claims of their brother officers. The following answer of Lord Clive is a valuable document, as it exhibits, in a clear and convincing manner, the erroneous principles and the baneful results of this part of the combination; of the total impossibility of its being recognised as either consistent with law or honour by any constituted authority. It shows, also, that disposition to forgive the young and inexperienced, which his Lordship throughout these proceedings entertained:—
"I have this morning received yours without date.[55] Your proposal to pay the 500l. penalty for the two M'Phersons and Ensign Patton is what I never can approve of. Were they the best officers in the world, I would not consent to receive them again into the service on such terms.
"The engagement entered into among themselves is not only mutinous and absurd, but illegal; and, therefore, the penalty cannot be recoverable by law. Besides, I consider the paying of it actually raising a subscription ourselves for the benefit of those who do not retract: nor is it at all unlikely that, were they to find the penalty money paid, a collusion would follow, for many of them to retract, in order to obtain a maintenance, nay, an independency, for the remainder. If only fifty of them should return on that plan (and I am sure there must be a much greater number who would be glad to return on any terms), a fund amounting to no less than 25,000l. would be established, which, at 4 per cent. interest, would produce 1,000l. per annum. In short, the affair will not bear a moment's reflection; and I must insist upon your dropping all thoughts of it. You will please to communicate my sentiments to Major Ironside, positively forbidding him to pay the penalty for his brother.
"If the young man repents of his association, and is desirous to resume the service, I consent to his being restored, the General and you having no objection; but I expect that the penalty money, that unjust debt of false honour, shall not be paid.
"Be assured that the report of my having written, or in any manner applied for the return of the gentlemen you hint at, is without foundation.
"Neither Lieutenant Britton, nor any of those who signalised themselves in the combination, shall have my consent to be restored, however strongly they may be recommended to my protection.
"Captain Hampton and Kinloch have both resigned. The former, together with Ensign Pellans, I have ordered from Midnapore to Calcutta."
From Lord Clive's private correspondence with the commandants of brigades, in the beginning of June, it appears, that the officers, disheartened and disunited, sought only to save themselves from that ruin and disgrace which they were now sensible they had brought upon themselves. No victory was ever more complete than that which he had gained; and it must have been the more gratifying, as he owed his success almost exclusively to his personal wisdom, firmness, and prompt decision. He met every danger, as it arose, with an unshrinking mind. Satisfied that concessions would only generate further demands, he made none: but when he had vindicated authority, and restored order, he displayed a degree of temper and of clemency worthy of his character. He attended to the petitions of many to be restored to the service which they had too hastily resigned. From such indulgent consideration he excluded most of the senior officers, and all those persons whose character made it desirable to keep them out of the service, with all those who had been prominent as ringleaders; while officers who had not actually resigned, however intemperate their threats and conduct had been, were pardoned on expressing contrition for their past conduct.
After subduing this combination in the military employed in the provinces, Clive appears to have thought that the bad spirit which existed at Calcutta required strong measures.
"The spirit of civil as well as military mutiny," he observes[56], "that has lately appeared in Calcutta deserves so much of our attention, as to mark the most turbulent, whether Company's servants, or free merchants, and resolutely send them to Europe; for Bengal never can be what it ought to be whilst licentiousness is suffered to trample upon authority."
When Captain Goddard, and some others, came forward to accuse Sir R. Fletcher of having encouraged the mutinous combination of the officers of his brigade, Lord Clive placed him under arrest. An appeal was made by Sir Robert to have his case judged by the Governor in Council; but this Lord Clive, though disposed to oblige him, declined. "Your repairing to Calcutta," his Lordship observed[57], "in order to be tried by the President and Council, upon an accusation your exculpation from which depends merely upon military law, is totally unprecedented, and therefore improper for me to comply with. That you may not, however, imagine that I intend to take any other part upon this occasion than my public station requires, be assured that the court-martial to be held upon your late conduct will be assembled by an order from the Board, and the sentence confirmed or disapproved by them."
The junior field officers, who had, by their recent conduct, entitled themselves to the fullest approbation of Lord Clive, presumed upon their services so far as to send a memorial, claiming the right of sharing in the salt revenue; an allowance which, in the military line, had been limited to their seniors.
This memorial Lord Clive prevented being delivered; pointing out, at the same time, to the memorialists the injury they would do themselves, and the impropriety of Government complying with so unreasonable a request. They attended to his advice, and the memorial was withdrawn; on which he addressed to them the following flattering letter:—
"Colonel Smith[58] has undoubtedly acquainted you that I declined presenting your memorial to the Board previous to my receipt of your application for withdrawing it; and I conclude that the arguments I urged against the memorial, in my letter to him, have convinced you of my wish to preserve the enjoyment of the present emoluments to the field officers upon this establishment. The general good of the whole, added to the consideration that every supernumerary Major will succeed, upon vacancies, to a share in the salt trade, will, I hope, prevail upon you to rest satisfied with the present distribution.
"I cannot omit this opportunity of mentioning how sensible I am of the service done by you, and the other field officers, on the late mutinous combination; as without such assistance the resolution of the President and of the Council must have proved ineffectual. And, perhaps, you will not be displeased upon my assuring you, that, in my letters to the Court of Directors, I have represented your conduct, upon that particular occasion, in the very favourable light it so justly deserved."
For Sir Robert Barker Lord Clive had the sincerest regard[59]; but he always regretted the too easy character of that excellent officer. It appears by a letter from Sir Robert Barker, that some observations which had been made by the Governor upon Lieutenant Vertue's court-martial, of which he was President, and upon the subject of bazars, had reached him; and that he addressed Lord Clive in a tone of complaint. The following observations, made by the latter in reply, are interesting, both as they exhibit that frankness with which he ever explained himself to those whom he regarded, and the opinion he entertained of those indirect sources of emolument which military officers in India, who held commands, so long continued to derive from the sale of liquor and bazars:—
"I have received your letter[60] of the 3d of August, and rejoice to find that you have recovered your former state of health. Orders are sent to the commanding officers to appoint a greater number of members than thirteen, which, I hope, will prevent these delays in future.
"I am sorry you should think yourself obliged to defend your own conduct, as well as that of the members of the general court-martial appointed to sit upon the trial of Lieutenant Vertue. When I suggested to you my opinion at Bankepore, I addressed myself to you alone, without mentioning the other members. The liberty I then took very nearly regarded your honour and reputation, as well as the welfare of the East India Company, in which is included the welfare of the nation.
"I must call to your remembrance some particular expressions I made use of that morning at breakfast, as others were present, and can prove the truth of what I assert. I told you, that, where conscience was in the case, exclusive of the sacredness of an oath, the world should not bias me to swerve from my opinion; but where that was not so, and I was convinced in my own mind, a man was guilty, neither apprehensions of law, or any deficiency in forms, should influence me to act in favour of those who were not deserving of it. I told you, at the same time, all the general officers in Great Britain would canvass this general court-martial, and that their attention would be more particularly fixed upon you, the President. These were my words, or words to that purpose; this also is my opinion, which I am not ashamed to declare to the whole world. If, therefore, any busy, intermeddling person has represented to you my expressions in another light, he has represented a falsity.
"With regard to the bazar duties, you may be assured from me, that, when I mentioned the circumstance of Sir Robert Fletcher's conduct, I was an utter stranger to any duties whatever being collected by the commanding officers on the necessaries of life. I never received such myself, or knowingly suffered others under me to receive them, either upon the coast or at Bengal; and had Colonel Smith, when he prided himself upon never having received bazar duties, informed me that he had allowed Colonel Peach to receive them, it would have been more consistent with that sincerity which he has always professed.
"No one has shown himself a greater friend to the field officers than myself; yet they seem already to forget the great advantages they enjoy. However, I must remark, that, to an officer whose pay and emoluments amount to 12,000l. per annum, the bazar duties can scarce be an object.
"I am surprised to find myself accused of erecting Colonel Gunge at Patna. To speak plainly, Barker, I never established a Gunge in my life, and never will; because I never approved of receiving duties on the necessaries of life; although I do not think those officers much in fault who have done the same from prescription only. Colonel Gunge was created by Colonel Caillaud, and revived by Colonel Cook. The Committee have forbid this custom in future.
"To conclude, the style and diction of this last letter is so contrary to Sir Robert Barker's natural disposition, that I am persuaded some evil-minded persons, who have their own interests more than your reputation at heart, have been the occasion, through misrepresentation. However, since my friendship for you is mistrusted, and the regard and attention which I have shown for your welfare, from the day of your embarkation to this hour, forgotten, I can only lament your misfortune and mine, that there should be men in the world who can make these impressions. For my own part, I am almost weary of the burden. I have found the pride, ambition, resentment, and self-interestedness of individuals so incompatible with the public good, that I should have given up the contest long ago, if I had not set the greatest value upon my own reputation, which is all I must expect to preserve upon my return to England, after so odious and disagreeable an undertaking."
In a second letter[61] upon the same subject, Lord Clive observes,—
"With regard to bazars, the vindication of yourself amounted so near to an accusation of me, that I could not avoid replying as I did. You must, however, have been by my letter convinced of your mistake in supposing that I either established, or enjoyed any advantages from, the Gunge at Patna; and I hope you are no less convinced that my arguments against the practice of levying duties upon the necessaries of life were urged with as much tenderness as the nature of the subject would admit. I wished to prevent your doing in future what I was of opinion would affect your reputation, but I did not suppose that what had passed was from the motive of extortion or avarice.
"Be assured, Barker, upon the whole, that all I said and wrote was dictated by a sincere regard to your honour, and by a desire to see you act with propriety and dignity in matters which I judged were of no small importance to your own character."
The officers concerned in the combination, who were brought to a court-martial, were all cashiered except Captain Parker, and he was dismissed by an order of Government. That more severe sentences were not awarded to several who were guilty of mutiny, appears to have been occasioned by some doubts on the part of the Court by which they were tried as to an expression in the Mutiny Act, which subjected those to martial law who have contracted to serve the Company; and it was conceived that the acceptance of a commission formed no contract. This interpretation was erroneous; and had it been otherwise, it would have been as illegal to have deprived an officer of his commission as of his life. But we cannot be surprised that, where a doubt was raised, a body of officers unskilled in law, though they might have deemed it essential to maintain subordination, were disposed to as much lenity as was compatible with that object.
Lieutenant Stainforth, and another officer, were accused, among other crimes, of a declared intention of assassinating the Governor. Such assertions were certainly made, but no overt act warranted the belief of the intention; and it was never credited by Lord Clive, who alluded to it on his addressing the officers and men at Monghyr. He was speaking, he said, he was assured, to Englishmen, not assassins. To Lieutenant Stainforth, when ordered to England with the other officers who were dismissed, his secretary addressed, by his desire, a letter pointing out in kind but decided terms the impossibility of compliance with his request to be restored to the service; and that, even if he were restored, the officers, after what had passed, would refuse to do duty with him. Towards this officer, and others, who had shown in their language and acts the extreme of personal hostility to him, Clive, neither at the moment nor afterwards, cherished any resentment. His efforts to establish discipline, and repress an insubordinate and mutinous spirit, were strong and uncompromising; but, that object gained, he appears to have shown as much lenity and consideration for individuals as was compatible with the maintenance of that authority which had been so violently assailed.
The circumstances under which Lord Clive had to act, and the difficulties he had to overcome, are well stated by his successor, Mr. Verelst, in a work which he subsequently published in defence of his own conduct.
"The impolitic arrangement of affairs[62] was among the least evils of the Company's situation, antecedent to Lord Clive's arrival. The dissolution of government in Calcutta kept pace with that of the country. A general contempt of superiors, a habit of equality among all orders of men, had obliterated every idea of subjection. To reclaim men from dissipation, to revive a general spirit of industry, to lead the minds of all from gaudy dreams of sudden-acquired wealth to a patient expectation of growing fortunes, were no less difficult in execution than necessary to the existence of the Company. Large sums of money, obtained by various means, had enabled many gentlemen to return to Europe. This cause, superadded to the massacre of Patna, occasioned a very quick succession in the service, which encouraged a forward spirit of independency, and produced a total contempt of public orders, whenever obedience was found incompatible with private interest. To check such impatient hopes, where youths aspired to the government of countries at an age scarcely adequate to the management of private affairs, four gentlemen, being called from Madras, were admitted into Council.
"The universal discontent among the civil servants which had arisen from the late measures, restraining the power of individuals, was hereby greatly increased; and, united with the mutinous spirit of the military officers, broke forth, the following year, into a flame, which threatened destruction to the English empire in Bengal.
"This event, though among the transactions of a later period, may, not improperly, be here explained. The military in Bengal had for several years enjoyed an indulgence beyond those in the other settlements of the Company, which first arose from the bounty of the Subahdar, when they were employed in his service. By the advice of an officer who had long commanded the Company's troops upon the coast of Coromandel, with great reputation to himself and honour to the nation, representing this extraordinary allowance as destructive of discipline, the Directors, in their public letters, had frequently ordered the double batta to be withdrawn.[63] Such directions, in a settlement where all idea of subordination was lost, and where the conduct of the superior servants respecting their own interests could ill be reconciled with a rigid exaction of obedience to the Company's commands in others, produced little effect. One feeble effort was made; but a remonstrance from the military induced a ready submission on the part of the Governor and Council. The Select Committee, very justly conceiving, that a regard to private interest would not justify a disobedience to the positive injunction of their superiors[64], resolved to carry the measure into immediate execution."
A historian little disposed to take a favourable view of Lord Clive's motives or actions, commenting upon his conduct on this trying occasion, observes[65]; "It was one of these scenes, however, in which he was admirably calculated to act with success. Resolute and daring, fear never turned him aside from his purpose, or deprived him of the most collected exertions of his mind in the greatest emergencies. To submit to the violent demands of a body of armed men, was to resign the government."
This praise, reserved as it is, has value coming from such a quarter; but it is fair to state, that the historian formed his judgment on this and other acts of Lord Clive solely from public records. He has not, like the writer of these pages, had access to that private correspondence, by which he has been enabled to examine every letter or note which Clive received or wrote daily to persons of all ranks and classes; nor could he trace his feelings, as the writer has done, at every hour of this great crisis, during which, it appears from the most authentic documents, that his mind was not only cool and unshaken, but that, though often ruffled with honest indignation at proofs of cowardice, treachery, and guilt, he was never betrayed into one act unworthy of his private or his public character. He not only warned all of the dangers into which they were rushing headlong, but personally entreated them to remain in the path of duty; or, when they had left it, to return. In the prosecution of the most guilty he never mingled his own name; on the contrary, we find him extending to all such as had attacked him personally, as much clemency and consideration as was compatible with the public interests; and this kindness not only reached those who deceived him most grossly, but was extended to an unfortunate individual who, in a moment of rage, had threatened to become his assassin. On the other hand, when warmth of temper and impatience led him, as it sometimes did, to express himself with unkindness, if not harshness, to those whose efforts and zeal did not keep pace with his own, we find him treating their remonstrances in a manner which, from its frankness and tone of friendship, was alike calculated to establish his own superiority, and to gain their respect, if not their attachment.
There is no event of his life in which Lord Clive showed more knowledge of human nature, and a more intimate acquaintance with all the elements which compose military bodies, than on this occasion. While he visited with severity of punishment bold offenders, he gave the most delicate attention to the high feelings of honour, which had kept others free from guilty associations. When, under an impression that there was a defect in the articles of war, he would restore none of those who had joined the combination, until they signed a contract to serve a certain period, he made no such call upon those who had been true to their duty. The contract might be necessary, he said; but men who had undergone such a trial ought not to be insulted with a suspicion that any further tie was required to bind their allegiance. They repaid this confidence by voluntarily insisting upon signing the contract, into which officers with whom they continued to serve had been compelled to enter.
Lord Clive appears, from both his public and private letters, to have estimated the complete victory he had obtained on this occasion beyond any he ever gained in the field: and, in fact, it was with reason that he did so. Considering that upwards of two hundred officers had not only combined, but had pledged themselves by every tie that could bind men, to oppose authority, Clive had solid ground for exultation in the success of measures, planned and executed by himself, the result of which was to restore subordination, to vindicate an insulted Government, and to save the country from ruin. And this achievement was the more gratifying, from being attended with comparatively few consequences that were ultimately injurious to any great body of individuals. It must, moreover, have been satisfactory to Lord Clive, to know that this combination had not its source in any of those evil designs by which such mutinous proceedings are often marked. It originated in the too long continuance of a temporary grant, of an extra allowance, to which young officers (and almost all concerned were such) soon adapted their expenditure; and when luxuries, recommended by the climate and character of the service, became necessaries, they were not likely to recognise the justice of the distinction, which had been made by the Directors, between the boon of a Nabob (which the double batta first was), and a direct payment from the treasury of Government, which it became after the Company had obtained the grant of the Dewannee.
The opposition which the officers offered to the reduction of their allowances, was in some measure countenanced by the local Government, which had evaded the execution of the orders issued by the Directors for the abolition of double batta. Nor is it very surprising, that the officers should have heedlessly rushed on the extreme measure of resigning their commissions, when we advert to the encouragement which their combination had received from an officer of the rank and reputation of Sir Robert Fletcher; and to the sympathy and support which had been expressed and afforded by the civilians, among whom were some who held confidential situations under the Government, and others who were believed to have great influence in England: these persons were, as well as the military, discontented with the revisions and reductions which Lord Clive had adopted. Under these circumstances, and under the impression that their services could not be dispensed with, at a time when the country was not only unsettled, but threatened with invasion by a large Mahratta army, the officers felt confident that the Governor must have yielded to their demands. But in thus judging, they appear to have little understood the character of him with whom they had to contend; and when they were met, not only with an unyielding spirit, but treated at once as criminals, and every measure adopted for their punishment, they fell without a struggle. They had prepared no means to go beyond their first act; and this, though it was by some brought forward as a proof of want of forethought and weakness, was, in fact, a proof of their innocence of any deliberate intention to injure the interests of their country: though, but for the overruling genius of Clive, the most fatal injury would assuredly have been the consequence of the success of their guilty combination; for, had they succeeded, the civil Government would have lost all respect, and the usurpation of the public authority, by a combination of officers, would have given an example to their men which, if followed, would have been alike destructive of all discipline, and have terminated in the subversion of the English government in Bengal.