FOOTNOTES:
[2] More exactly, out of 1,220,000 entitled to vote and 1,186,000 actual voters, 707,000 votes or seven–elevenths were cast for Germany, and 479,000 votes or four–elevenths for Poland. Out of 1522 communes, 844 showed a majority for Germany and 678 for Poland. The Polish voters were mainly rural, as is shown by the fact that in 36 towns Germany polled 267,000 votes against 70,000 for Poland, and in the country 440,000 votes against 409,000 for Poland.
[3] Up to May 31, 1920, securities and other identifiable assets to the value of 8300 million francs and 500,000 tons of machinery and raw material had been restored to France (Report of Finance Commission of French Chamber, June 14, 1920), also 445,000 head of live stock.
[4] Up to May, 1921, the cash receipts of the Reparation Commission amounted to no more than 124,000,000 gold marks.
[5] See Excursus VI.
[6] Lord DʼAbernon and Sir John Bradbury for Great Britain, Seydoux and Cheysson for France, dʼAmelio and Giannini for Italy, Delacroix and Lepreux for Belgium, and, in accordance with custom, two Japanese. The German representatives included Bergmann, Havenstein, Cuno, Melchior, von Stauss, Bonn, and Schroeder.
[7] The text of these Decisions is given in Appendix No. 2.
[8] The full text is given in Appendix No. 4.
[9] Compare this with the fixed payment of $500,000,000 and an export proportion of 26 per cent proposed in the second Ultimatum of London, only two months later.
[10] The Times, March 8, 1921.
[11] The Times, March 8, 1921.
[12] A week or two later the German Government made a formal appeal to the League of Nations against the legality of this act; but I am not aware that the League took any action on it.
[13] A few weeks later the Reparation Commission endeavored to put the action of the Supreme Council in order, by demanding one milliard marks in gold ($250,000,000), that is to say, the greater part of the reserve of the Reichsbank against its note issue. This demand was afterwards dropped.
[14] The full text is given in Appendix No. 5.
[15] The practicability of such a loan on a large scale is of course more than doubtful.
[16] The German Government is reported also to have offered, alternatively, to accept any sum which the President of the United States might fix.
[17] After the enforcement of the Sanctions and the failure of the counter–proposals, the Cabinet of Herr Fehrenbach and Dr. Simons was succeeded by that of Dr. Wirth.
[18] As late as January 26, 1921, M. Doumer gave a forecast of 240 milliards.
[19] Exclusive of sums due in repayment of war loans made to Belgium.
[20] Exclusive of sums due in repayment of war loans made to Belgium.
[21] Under the Spa Agreement (see Appendix No. 1) Germany was to be paid in cash 5 gold marks per ton for all coal delivered, and, in the case of coal delivered overland, “lent” (i.e., advanced out of Reparation receipts) the difference between the German inland price and the British export price. At the date of the Spa Conference this difference was about 70s. per ton (100s. less 30s.), but this sum was not to be advanced in the case of the undetermined amount of coal delivered by sea. The advances were made by the Allies in the proportions, 61 per cent by France, 24 per cent by Great Britain, and 15 per cent by Belgium and Italy.
[22] For details of these payments see p. 133.
[23] This very valuable tax, first imposed in 1917, yielded in 1920–21 mks. 4½ milliards.
[24] Dr. Wirthʼs first Government prepared a Bill to raise the tax to 30 per cent, with power, however, to reduce the rate temporarily to 25 per cent. It was estimated that the 30 per cent tax would bring in a revenue of 9.2 milliard marks.
[25] The same authority estimates that 85.6 of Upper Silesiaʼs zinc ore production and all the zinc smelting works fall to Poland. This is of some importance, since before the war Upper Silesia was responsible for 17 per cent of the total world production of zinc. Of the iron and steel production of the area 63 per cent falls to Poland. I am not in a position to check any of these figures. Some authorities ascribe a higher proportion of the coal to Poland.
[26] These are the figures according to the Polish authorities. But it is difficult to obtain accurate pre–war figures for an area which was not coterminous with any then existing State; and these totals have been questioned in detail by Dr. W. Schotte.
[27] See e.g., my controversy with M. Brenier in The Times.
[28] In The Economic Consequences of the Peace, p. 92 n., I wrote as follows: “The reader must be reminded in particular that the above calculations take no account of the German production of lignite.... I am not competent to speak on the extent to which the loss of coal can be made good by the extended use of lignite or by economies in its present employment; but some authorities believe that Germany may obtain substantial compensation for her loss of coal by paying more attention to her deposits of lignite.”
[29] That is to say, production in the middle of 1921 was at the rate of about 120,000,000 tons per annum. At that time the legal maximum price was 60 paper marks per ton (i.e., 5s. or less); so that the national profit on the output in terms of money cannot have been a very material amount.
[30] In order to secure the increased output the number of miners was increased much more than in proportion, namely from 59,000 in 1913 to 171,000 in the first half of 1921. As a result, the cost of production of lignite rose much faster than that of coal. Also since its calorific value is much less than that of coal per unit of weight (even when it is briquetted), it can only compete with coal, unless it is assisted by preferential freight rates, within a limited area in the neighborhood of the mines.
[31] At the Paris Conference of August 1921 Lord Curzon tried unavailingly to persuade France to abandon this illegal occupation. The so–called “Economic Sanctions” were raised on October 1, 1921. The occupation still continues, though both the above pretexts have now disappeared.