CHAPTER IX. EVE OF THE BATTLE OF WILSON'S CREEK
Mountainous perplexities and burdens weighed upon Gen. Lyon during the last days of July.
The country was hysterical over the safety of the National Capital, and it seemed that the Administration was equally emotional. Every regiment and gun was being rushed to the heights in front of Washington, and all eyes were fixed on the line of the Potomac.
The perennial adventurer in Gen. Fremont did not fail to suggest to him that the greatest of opportunities might develop in Washington, and he lingered in New York until peremptorily ordered by Gen. Scott to his command. He did not arrive in St. Louis until July 25.
Like Seward, Chase, McClellan, and many other aspiring men, Fremont had little confidence that the untrained Illinois Rail Splitter in the Presidential chair would be able to keep his head above the waves in the sea of troubles the country had entered. The disaster at Bull Run was but the beginning of a series of catastrophes which would soon call for a stronger brain and a more experienced hand at the helm.
Then?
Mrs. Jessie Benton Fremont was not the only one to suggest that the man for the hour would be found to be the first Republican candidate for President—the Great Pathfinder of the Rocky Mountains!
Upon his arrival at St Louis Gen. Fremont was immediately waited upon by the faithful Chester Harding and others who had been awaiting his coming with painful anxiety. They represented most energetically Gen. Lyon's predicament, without money, clothing or rations, and with a force even more rapidly diminishing than that of the enemy was augmenting. They revealed Gen. Lyon's far-reaching plans of making Springfield a base from which to carry the war into Arkansas, and begged for men, money, arms, food; shoes and clothing for him.
Fremont was too much engrossed in forming in the Brant Mansion that vice-regal court of his—the main requirement for which seemed to be inability to speak English—to feel the urgency of these importunities.
The country was swarming with military adventurers from Europe, men with more or less shadow on their connection with the foreign armies, and eager to sell their swords to the highest advantage. They swarmed around Fremont like bees around a sugar barrel, much to the detriment of the honest and earnest men of foreign birth who were rallying to the support of the Union.
Next to his satrapal court of exotic manners and speech, Fremont was most concerned about the safety of Cairo, Ill., a most important point, then noisily threatened by Maj.-Gen. Leonidas Polk, the militant Protestant Episcopal Bishop of Louisiana, and his subordinate, the blatant Gen. Gideon J. Pillow, of Mexican War notoriety.
Gen. Fremont made quite a show of reinforcing Cairo, sending a most imposing fleet of steamboats to carry the 4,000 troops sent thither.
Pretense still counted for much in the war. Later it burnt up like dry straw in the fierce blaze of actualities.
Not being Fremont's own, nor contributing particularly to his aggrandizement, Gen. Lyon's plans and aims had little importance to his Commanding General.
Gen. Lyon saw clearly that the place to fight for St. Louis and Missouri was in the neighborhood of Springfield, and by messenger and letter he importuned that St. Louis be left to the care of the loyal Germans of the Home Guards, who had shown their ability to handle the city, and that all the other troops there and elsewhere in the State be rushed forward to him, with shoes and clothing for his unshod, ragged soldiers, and sufficient rations for the army, which had well-nigh exhausted the country upon which it had been living for so long.
But Fremont frittered away his strength in sending regiments to chase guerrilla bands which dissolved as soon as the trail became too hot.
Two regiments were ordered to Lyon from points so distant that they could not make the march in less than 10 days or a fortnight, and some scanty supplies sent to Rolla remained there because of lack of wagons to carry them forward to Springfield, 120 miles away.
Later Gen. Fremont testified before the Committee on the Conduct of the War that he had ordered Gen. Lyon, if he could not maintain himself at Springfield, to fall back to Rolla, but singularly he did not produce this order.
Though Gen. Lyon had marched his men 50 miles in one day to prevent the junction of Gen. Ben Mc-Culloch's Arkansas column with the hosts Gen. Sterling Price was gathering from Missouri, he was not able to interpose between them.
On Saturday, Aug. 3, the Confederates had all gotten together on the banks of Crane Creek, 55 miles southwest of Springfield, with general headquarters in and around the village of Cassville.
How many were concentrated is subject to the same obscurity which usually envelops Confederate numbers. Lyon estimated there were 30,000. Later estimates by competent men put the number at 23,000. Gen. Snead, Price's Adjutant-General, put the number at 11,000, which would be a severe reflection on the loyalty of the Missouri Secessionists to their Governor, since Gen. McCulloch certainly brought up about 5,000 from Arkansas, which would leave only 6,000 to respond to Gov. Jackson's proclamation, and gather under the standards set up by his seven Brigadier-Generals—Parsons, Rains, Slack, J. B. Clark, M. L. Clark, Watkins and Randolph.
While Lyon had incomparable troubles, there was far from concord in the camp of his opponents. Like thousands of other men, McCulloch's ambition far transcended his abilities. He at once assumed the attitude that as a Brigadier-General in the Confederate army he out-ranked Sterling Price, who was a Major-General of state troops. This, at that early period of the war, was a humorous reversal of the State Sovereignty idea, so flagrant in the minds of those precipitating Secession.
Jefferson Davis and his school of thought had been fierce in their contention that the part was greater than the whole, and that the States were greater than the General Government. Yet Gen. McCulloch was unflinching in his insistence that a Confederate Brigadier-General outranked a State Major-General. The dispute became quite acrimonious, but was at last settled by Price's yielding to McCulloch, so anxious was he that something decisive should be done toward driving back Lyon and "redeeming the State of Missouri." According to Gen. Thomas L. Snead, his Chief of Staff, he went to Gen. McCulloch's quarters on Sunday morning, Aug. 4, and after vainly trying to persuade McCulloch to attack Lyon, he said:
"I am an older man than you, Gen. McCulloch, and I am not
only your senior in rank now, but I was a Brigadier-General
in the Mexican War, with an independent command, when you
were only a Captain; I have fought and won more battles
than you have ever witnessed; my force is twice as great as
yours; and some of my officers rank, and have seen more
service than you, and we are also upon the soil of our own
State; but, Gen. McCulloch, if you will consent to help us
to whip Lyon and to repossess Missouri, I will put myself
and all my forces under your command, and we will obey you
as faithfully as the humblest of your own men. We can whip
Lyon, and we will whip him and drive the enemy out of
Missouri, and all the honor and all the glory shall be
yours, All that we want is to regain our homes and to
establish the independence of Missouri and the South. If you
refuse to accept this offer, I will move with the
Missourians alone against Lyon; for it is better that they
and I should all perish than Missouri be abandoned without a
struggle. You must either fight beside us or look on at a
safe distance and see us fight all alone the army which you
dare not attack even with our aid. I must have your answer
before dark, for I intend to attack Lyon tomorrow."
Gen. McCulloch replied that he was expecting dispatches from the East, but would make known his determination before sundown. At that time, accompanied by Gen. Mcintosh, in whose abilities Gen. McCulloch had the highest confidence, and was largely influenced by him, he went to Price's headquarters and informed him that he had just received dispatches that Gen. Pillow was advancing into the southeastern part of the State from New Madrid with 12,000 men, and that he would accept the command of the united forces and attack Lyon. Price at once published an order that he had turned over the command of the Missouri troops to Gen. McCulloch, but reserved the right to resume command at any time he might see fit.
Their friends in Springfield kept Price and McCulloch well-informed as to Lyon's diminishing force and perplexities.
Brilliant as McCulloch may have been in command of 100 or so men, he was clearly unequal to the leadership of such a host. He was as much feebler in temper to Lyon as he was inferior in force and grasp to Sterling Price.
An audacious stroke by Lyon on Friday, Aug. 2, quite unsettled his nerves. Getting information that his enemies were moving on him by three different roads, Lyon formed the soldierly determination to move out swiftly and attack one of the columns and crush it before the other could come to its assistance.
Putting Capt. D. S. Stanley—of whom we shall hear much hereafter—at the head with his troop of Regular cavalry, and following him with a battalion of Regulars under Capt. Frederick Steele—of whom we shall also hear a great deal hereafter—and a section of Totten's Regular Battery, he marched out the Cassville Road with his whole force and at Dug Springs, 20 miles away, came up with McCulloch's advance, commanded by Brig.-Gen. J. S. Rains, of the Missouri State Guards, of whom, too, we shall hear much. Col. Mcintosh, McCulloch's adviser, was also on the ground with 150 men.
Rains attempted to put into operation the tactics employed against Sigel at Carthage, but Steele and Stanley were men of different temper, and attacked him so savagely as to scatter his force in wild confusion.
Lyon marched forward to within six miles of the main Confederate position, and lay there 24 hours, when, not deeming it wise to attack so far from his base, retired unmolested to Springfield.
This startling aggressiveness quite overcame Gen. McCulloch, and the conduct of the Missourians disgusted him. He was strong in his denunciation of them and quite frank in his reluctance to attack Gen. Lyon without further information as to "his position and fortifications," and complained bitterly that he could get no information as to the "barricades" in Springfield and other positions he might encounter. He said that "he would not make a blind attack on Springfield," and "would order the whole army back to Cassville rather than bring on an engagement with an unknown enemy."
Gen. Price was strenuous in his insistence upon attack, and finally McCulloch consented to meet all the general officers at his headquarters. In the council McCulloch was plain in his unwillingness to engage Lyon or to enter on any aggressive campaign, but Price, seconded by Gens. Parsons, Bains, Slack and McBride, were most determined that Lyon should be attacked at once, and declared that if McCulloch would not do it he would resume command and fight the battle himself. McCulloch finally yielded, and ordered a forward movement, and on the morning of Aug. 6 the entire force was in camp along the bank of Wilson's Creek, about six miles south of Springfield. This position was taken largely because of its proximity to immense cornfields, which would supply the troops and animals with food.
Wilson's Creek, rising in the neighborhood of Springfield, flows west some five miles, and then runs south nine or 10 miles in order to empty into the James River, a tributary of White River. Tyrel's Creek and Skegg's Branch, which have considerable valleys, are tributaries of Wilson's Creek. Above Skegg's Branch rises a hill, since known as Bloody Hill, nearly 100 feet high. Its sides are scored with ravines, the rock comes to the surface in many places, and the hight was thickly covered with an overgrowth of scrub-oak. There are other eminences and ravines, generally covered with scrub-oak and undergrowth, and the Confederates were camped in an irregular line along these for a distance of about three miles up and down Wilson's Creek, from the extreme right to the extreme left. Here they remained three days, with the much-disturbed McCulloch riding out every day with his Maynard rifle slung over his shoulder for a personal reconnoissance, which, as far as could be judged from his conversation on his return, was quite unsatisfactory.
He had little stomach for the attack, and naturally found reasons against it.
Price and his Generals, on the other hand, were fretting over the delay. Price's accurate information of Lyon's condition made him sure that Lyon would do the obvious thing—retreat. It was the warlike thing to do to attack at once, which had every chance of success. Success meant as telling a stroke for Secession in the West as Bull Run had been in the East It would be quite as sensational, for there was no refuge or rallying point for the beaten Union army short of Rolla, 120 miles away, and the rough country, cut by innumerable valleys, gorges and streams, would enable the swarming mounted force to get in its wild work, and not permit the escape of a man, a gun or a wagon.
McCulloch, yielding to Price's importunities, ordered the army forward, and at dawn of Aug. 19 he and Mcintosh were sitting down to breakfast with Price and Snead, preparatory to leading their forces forward, when they were startled by their pickets being driven in. McCulloch, who had hated Rains from Old Army days, and despised him and his Missourians since the Dug Springs affair, remarked contemptuously, "O, it's only one of Rains's scares," and turned to his meal.
But the matter instantly became more pressing than breakfast. Gen. Lyon had returned to Springfield Monday, Aug. 5, to meet an intense disappointment. Not a thing had been sent to meet his desperate needs. Fremont had ordered one regiment from Kansas and from the Missouri River to go forward to him, but they could hardly reach him in less than a fortnight. There were at that time some 44 regiments in Missouri—regiments commanded by men whose names afterward shine in history—U. S. Grant, John Pope, S. A. Hurlbut, John M. Palmer, John B. Turchin, S. B. Curtis, Morgan L. Smith, O. E. Salomon, John McNeil, etc.,—but they were kept garrisoning posts, chasing guerrillas, and at almost everything else than hurrying forward toward him, as they should have been.
Two of his regiments—the 3d and 4th Mo.—took their discharge and started for St. Louis. The 1st Iowa's time was out, but Lyon asked the men to stay with him a few days longer, and they did to a man.
Aside from the military reasons for holding Springfield there were others which appealed to Lyon's mind with equal power. His heart had bled over the outrages committed by the Secessionists upon the Union people in that section of the State. The presence of his army was the only security that the loyal people had that their farms would not be robbed and themselves murdered. Hundreds of them had gone into Springfield to be under his protection. How they could be ever gotten back to a place of safety in retreat was the gravest of problems. Gen. Schofield, at that time his Adjutant-General, and who disapproved of fighting the battle of Wilson's Creek, thinks that this consideration had more weight with him than the military reasons, and induced him to fight where the judgment of the soldier was against it.
Four anxious days longer Lyon remained at Springfield. He called a council of his principal officers, and the unanimous decision was that the army should retreat.
On Aug. 9 he sent the following letter to Gen. Fremont, the last he ever wrote:
General: I retired to this place, as I before informed you,
reaching here on the 5th. The enemy followed to within 10
miles of here. He has taken a strong position, and is
recruiting his supply of horses, mules, and provisions by
forages Into the surrounding country, his large force of
mounted men enabling him to do this without much annoyance
from me. I find my position extremely embarrassing, and am
at present unable to determine whether I shall be able to
maintain my ground or be forced to retire. I can resist any
attack from the front, but if the enemy move to surround me
I must retire. I shall hold my ground as long as possible,
though I may, without knowing how far, endanger the safety
of my entire force, with its valuable material, being
induced by the valuable considerations involved to take the
step. The enemy showed himself in considerable force
yesterday five miles from here, and has doubtless a full
purpose of attacking me.
N. LYON, Commanding.
The simple, soldierly dignity of this is pathetic. There is no murmur of complaint, such as a man treated as he had been was eminently justified in making. After sending this note, Gen. Lyon received intelligence that one of his cavalry parties had been attacked by rebel cavalry, but after a brief fight had beaten them off. He thereupon sent out a reconnoitering party to learn if the Secessionists had moved forward, and the party presently returned with two Texan and two Tennesseean prisoners, from whom Lyon learned for the first time of the junction of McCulloch's forces and Price's. He at once decided upon a bold stroke. Everything was prepared as if in readiness for retreat, with the tents struck and the Quartermaster's and Commissary's stores in the wagons. Quartermaster Alexis Mudd went to headquarters and asked Gen. Lyon:
"When do we start back?"
The General fixed his keen blue eyes upon the Quartermaster and said, clearly and firmly:
"When we are whipped back, and not until then."
An order was at once issued for every man to be prepared to march at 6 o'clock that evening, without any luggage, and with all the ammunition he could carry.
Calling a council of officers, Gen. Lyon announced his intention to move out and attack the enemy in his chosen position. Gen. Sigel proposed that he be allowed to take his regiment and Col. Salomon's to move independently and take the enemy in flank and rear. The other officers strongly opposed this, while Gen. Lyon withheld his consent, but finally yielded to Sigel's entreaties and authorized the movement, giving Sigel 1,400 infantry, two companies of cavalry and six pieces of artillery, to move along the Fayetteville Road until he should reach the right flank and rear of the enemy, and at daybreak attack them vigorously.
Lyon was to retain 3,700 men and 10 pieces of artillery and move down the Mount Vernon Road and attack in the morning on the left front and flank simultaneously with Sigel's attack on the right.
A force of 250 Home Guards with two pieces of artillery was left at Springfield to guard the trains and public property. Col. Sigel's column moved out at 6:30 o'clock in the evening by the left and arrived at daybreak of the 10th within two miles of the extreme right and rear of the enemy's camp, where they proceeded to cut off and bring into camp some 40 stragglers who were out foraging. This was done to prevent their carrying intelligence into camp.
Gen. Lyon with the First, Second and Third Brigades, set out about the same hour, and by 1 o'clock in the morning came within sight of the enemy's camp-fires, where they halted until morning. Capt. Plummer was ordered to deploy his battalion to act as skirmishers on the left, while Maj. Osterhaus did the same on the right with his battalion of the 2d Mo.