CHAPTER VI.
PROPOSITIONS IN EXTENSION AND IN INTENSION.
135. Fourfold Implication of Propositions in Connotation and Denotation.—In dealing with the question whether propositions assert a relation between objects or between attributes or between objects and attributes, logicians have been apt to commit the fallacy of exclusiveness, selecting some one of the given alternatives, and treating the others as necessarily excluded thereby. It follows, however, from the double aspect of names—in extension and intension—that the different relations really involve one another, so that all of them are implied in any categorical proposition whose subject and predicate are both general names.[177] If any one of the relations is selected as constituting the meaning of the proposition, the other relations are at any rate involved as implications.
[177] In the discussion that follows we limit ourselves to the traditional scheme of propositions.
The problem will be made more definite if we confine ourselves to a consideration of connotation and denotation in the strict sense, as distinguished from comprehension and exemplification, our terms being supposed to be defined intensively.[178] Both subject and predicate will then have a denotation determined by their connotation, and hence our 178 proposition may be considered from four different points of view, which are not indeed really independent of one another, but which serve to bring different aspects of the proposition into prominence. (1) The subject may be read in denotation and the predicate in connotation; (2) both terms may be read in denotation; (3) both terms may be read in connotation; (4) the subject may be read in connotation and the predicate in denotation.
[178] With extensive definitions we might similarly work out the relations between the terms of a proposition in exemplification and comprehension; and with either intensive or extensive definitions, we might consider them in denotation and comprehension. The discussion in the text will, however, be limited to connotation and denotation, except that a separate [section] will be devoted to the case in which both subject and predicate are read in comprehension.
As an example, we may take the proposition, All men are mortal.[179] According to our point of view, this proposition may be read in any of the following ways:
(1) The objects denoted by man possess the attributes connoted by mortal ;
(2) The objects denoted by man are included within the class of objects denoted by mortal ;
(3) The attributes connoted by man are accompanied by the attributes connoted by mortal ;
(4) The attributes connoted by man indicate the presence of an object belonging to the class denoted by mortal.
[179] A distinction may perhaps be drawn between the four following types of propositions; (a) All men are mortal ; (b) All men are mortals ; (c) Man is mortal ; (d) Man is a mortal. Of these, (a) naturally suggests the reading of subject in denotation and predicate in connotation as meaning, the three other readings being implications ; (b) is similarly related to the reading numbered (2) above; (c) to (3); and (d) to (4).
It should be specially noticed that a different relation between subject and predicate is brought out in each of these four modes of analysing the proposition, the relations being respectively (i) possession, (ii) inclusion, (iii) concomitance, (iv) indication.
It may very reasonably be argued that a certain one of the above ways of regarding the proposition is (a) psychologically the most prominent in the mind in predication; or (b) the most fundamental in the sense of making explicit that relation which ultimately determines the other relations; or (c) the most convenient for a given purpose, e.g., for dealing with the problems of formal logic. We need not, however, select the same mode of interpretation in each case. There would, for example, be nothing inconsistent in holding that to read the 179 subject in denotation and the predicate in connotation is most correct from the psychological standpoint; to read both terms in connotation the most ultimate, inasmuch as connotation determines denotation and not vice versâ, and to read both terms in denotation the most serviceable for purposes of logical manipulation. To say, however, that a certain one of the four readings alone can be regarded as constituting the import of the proposition to the exclusion of the others cannot but be erroneous. They are in truth so much implicated in one another, that the difficulty may rather be to justify a treatment which distinguishes between them.[180]
[180] The true doctrine is excellently stated by Mrs Ladd Franklin in an article in Mind, October, 1890, pp. 561, 2.
(1) Subject in denotation, predicate in connotation.
If we read the subject of a proposition in denotation and the predicate in connotation, we have what is sometimes called the predicative mode of interpreting the proposition. This way of regarding propositions most nearly corresponds in the great majority of cases with the course of ordinary thought;[181] that is to say, we naturally contemplate the subject as a class of objects of which a certain attribute or complex of attributes is predicated. Such propositions as All men are mortal, Some violets are white, All diamonds are combustible, may be taken as examples. Dr Venn puts the point very clearly with reference to the last of these three propositions: “If I say that ‘all diamonds are combustible,’ I am joining together two connotative terms, each of which, therefore, implies an attribute and denotes a class; but is there not a broad distinction in respect of the prominence with which the notion of a class is presented to the mind in the two cases? As regards the diamond, we think at once, or think very speedily, of a class of things, the distinctive attributes of the subject being mainly used to carry the mind on to the contemplation of the objects referred to by them. But as regards the combustibility, the attribute itself is the prominent thing … Combustible things, other than the diamond itself, come scarcely, if at all, under 180 contemplation. The assertion in itself does not cause us to raise a thought whether there be other combustible things than these in existence” (Empirical Logic, p. 219).
[181] Though perhaps what is actually present to the mind is usually rather more complex than what is represented by any one of the four readings taken by itself.
Two points may be noticed as serving to confirm the view that generally speaking the predicative mode of interpreting propositions is psychologically the most prominent:
(a) The most striking difference between a substantive and an attributive (i.e., an adjective or a participle) from the logical point of view is that in the former the denotation is usually more prominent than the connotation, even though it may be ultimately determined by the connotation, whilst in the latter the connotation is the more prominent, even though the name must be regarded as the name of a class of objects if it is entitled to be called a name in the strict logical sense at all. Corresponding to this we find that the subject of a proposition is almost always a substantive, whereas the predicate is more often an attributive.
(b) It is always the denotation of a term that we quantify, never the connotation. Whether we talk of all men or of some men, the complex of attributes connoted by man is taken in its totality; the distinction of quantity relates entirely to the denotation of the term. Corresponding to this, we find that we naturally regard the quantity of a proposition as pertaining to its subject, and not to its predicate. It will be shewn in the following [chapter] that the doctrine of the quantification of the predicate has at any rate no psychological justification.
There are, however, numerous exceptions to the statement that the subject of a proposition is naturally read in denotation and the predicate in connotation; for example, in the classificatory sciences. The following propositions may be taken as instances: All palms are endogens, All daisies are compositae, None but solid bodies are crystals, Hindoos are Aryans, Tartars are Turanians. In such cases as these most of us would naturally think of a certain class of objects as included in or excluded from another class rather than as possessing or not possessing certain definite attributes; in other words, as Dr Venn puts it, “the class-reference of the predicate is no less definite than that of the subject” (Empirical Logic, p. 220). 181 In the case of such a proposition as No plants with opposite leaves are orchids, the position is even reversed, that is to say, it is the subject rather than the predicate that we should more naturally read in connotation. We may pass on then to other ways of regarding the categorical proposition.
(2) Subject in denotation, predicate in denotation.
If we read both the subject and the predicate of a proposition in denotation, we have a relation between two classes, and hence this is called the class mode of interpreting the proposition. It must be particularly observed that the relation between the subject and the predicate is now one of inclusion in or exclusion from, not one of possession. It may at once be admitted that the class mode of interpreting the categorical proposition is neither the most ultimate, nor—generally speaking—that which we naturally or spontaneously adopt. It is, however, extremely convenient for manipulative purposes, and hence is the mode of interpretation usually selected, either explicitly or implicitly, by the formal logician. Attention may be specially called to the following points:
(a) When subject and predicate are both read in denotation, they are homogeneous.
(b) In the diagrammatic illustration of propositions both subject and predicate are necessarily read in denotation, since it is the denotation—not the connotation—of a term that we represent by means of a diagram.
(c) The predicate of a proposition must be read in denotation in order to give a meaning to the question whether it is or is not distributed.
(d) The predicate as well as the subject must be read in denotation before such a process as conversion is possible.
(e) In the treatment of the syllogism both subject and predicate must be read in denotation (or else both in connotation), since either the middle term (first and fourth figures) or the major term (second and fourth figures) or the minor term (third and fourth figures) is subject in one of the propositions in which it occurs and predicate in the other.
The class mode of interpreting categorical propositions is nevertheless treated by some writers as being positively 182 erroneous. But the arguments used in support of this view will not bear examination.
(i) It is said that to read both subject and predicate in denotation is psychologically false. It has indeed been pointed out already that the class mode of interpretation is not that which as a rule first presents itself to our mind when a proposition is given us; but we have also seen that there are exceptions to this, as, for example, in the propositions All daisies are compositae. All Hindoos are Aryan, All Tartars are Turanians. It is, therefore, clearly wrong to describe the reading in question as in all cases psychologically false. On the same shewing, any other reading would equally be psychologically false, for what is immediately present to the mind in judgment varies very much in different cases. Undoubtedly there are many judgments in regard to which we do not spontaneously adopt the class reading. Still, analysis shews that in these judgments, as in others, inclusion in or exclusion from a class is really implicated along with other things, although this relation may be neither that which first impresses itself upon us nor that which is most important or characteristic.
(ii) It is asked what we mean by a class, by the class of birds, for example, when we say All owls are birds. “It is nothing existing in space; the birds of the world are nowhere collected together so that we can go and pick out the owls from amongst them. The classification is a mental abstraction of our own, founded upon the possession of certain definite attributes. The class is not definite and fixed, and we do not find out whether any individual belongs to it by going over a list of its members, but by enquiring whether it possesses the necessary attributes.”[182] In so far as this argument applies against reading the predicate in denotation, it applies equally against reading the subject in denotation. It is in effect the argument used by Mill (Logic, i. 5, § 3) in order to lead up to his position that the ultimate interpretation of the categorical proposition requires us to read both subject and predicate in connotation, since denotation is determined by connotation. But if this be granted, it does not prove the class reading of the 183 proposition erroneous; it only proves that in the class reading, the analysis of the import of the proposition has not been carried as far as it admits of being carried.
[182] Welton, Logic, p. 218.
(iii) It is argued that when we regard a proposition as expressing the inclusion of one class within another, even then the predicate is only apparently read in denotation. “On this view, we do not really assert P but ‘inclusion in P,’ and this is therefore the true predicate. For example, in the proposition ‘All owls are birds,’ the real predicate is, on this view, not ‘birds’ but ‘included in the class birds.’ But this inclusion is an attribute of the subject, and the real predicate, therefore, asserts an attribute. It is meaningless to say ‘Every owl is the class birds,’ and it is false to say ‘The class owls is the class birds.’”[183] This argument simply begs the question in favour of the predicative mode of interpretation. It overlooks the fact that the precise kind of relation brought out in the analysis of a proposition will vary according to the way in which we read the subject and the predicate. An analogous argument might also be used against the predicative reading itself. Take the proposition, “All men are mortal.” It is absurd to say that “Every man is the attribute mortality,” or that “The class men is the attribute mortality.”
[183] Welton, Logic, p. 218.
(iv) It is said that a class interpretation of both S and P would lead properly to a fivefold, not a fourfold, scheme of propositions, since there are just five relations possible between any two classes, as is shewn by the Eulerian diagrams. This contention has force, however, only upon the assumption that we must have quite determinate knowledge of the class relation between S and P before being able to make any statement on the subject; and this assumption is neither justifiable in itself nor necessarily involved in the interpretation in question. It may be added that if a similar view were taken on the adoption of the predicative mode of interpretation, we should have a threefold, not a fourfold scheme. For then the quantity of our subject at any rate would have to be perfectly determinate, and with S and P for subject and predicate, the three possible statements would be—All S is P, Some S is P and 184 some is not, No S is P. The point here raised will presently be considered further in connexion with the quantification of the predicate.
(3) Subject in connotation, predicate in connotation.
If we read both the subject and the predicate of a proposition in connotation, we have what may be called the connotative mode of interpreting the proposition. In the proposition All S is P, the relation expressed between the attributes connoted by S and those connoted by P is one of concomitance—“the attributes which constitute the connotation of S are always found accompanied by those which constitute the connotation of P.”[184] Similarly, in the case of Some S is P,—“the attributes 185 which constitute the connotation of S are sometimes found accompanied by those which constitute the connotation of P”; No S is P,—“the attributes which constitute the connotation of S are never found along with those which constitute the connotation of P”; Some S is not P,—“the attributes which constitute the connotation of S are sometimes found unaccompanied by those which constitute the connotation of P.”
[184] This is the only possible reading in connotation, so far as real propositions are concerned, if the term connotation is used in the strict sense as distinguished both from subjective intension and from comprehension. Unfortunately confusion is apt to be introduced into discussions concerning the intensive rendering of propositions simply because no clear distinction is drawn between the different points of view which may be taken when terms are regarded from the intensive side. Hamilton distinguished between judgments in extension and judgments in intension, the relation between the subject and the predicate in the one case being just the reverse of the relation between them in the other. Thus, taking the proposition All S is P, we have in extension S is contained under P, and in intension S comprehends P. On this view the intensive reading of All men are mortal is “mortality is part of humanity” (the extensive reading being “the class man is part of the class mortal”). This reading may be accepted if the term intension is used in the objective sense which we have given to comprehension, so that by humanity is meant the totality of attributes common to all men, and by mortality the totality of attributes common to all mortals. To this point of view we shall return in the next section. Leaving it for the present on one side, it is clear that if by humanity we mean only what may be called the distinctive or essential attributes of man, then in order that the above reading may be correct, the given proposition must be regarded as analytical. In other words, if humanity signifies only those attributes which are included in the connotation of man, then, if mortality is included in humanity, we shall merely have to analyse the connotation of the name man, in order to obtain our proposition. Hence on this view it must either be maintained that all universal affirmative propositions are analytical, or else that some universal affirmatives cannot be read in intension. But obviously the first of these alternatives must be rejected, and the second practically means that the reading in question breaks down so far as universal affirmatives are concerned.
Hamilton’s reading breaks down even more completely in the case of particulars and negatives. The attributes constituting the intensions of S and P partly coincide is clearly not equivalent to Some S is P ; for example, the intension (in any sense) of Englishman has something in common with the intension of Frenchman, but it does not follow that Some Englishmen are Frenchmen. Again, from the fact that the intension of S has nothing in common with the intension of P, we cannot infer that No S is P ; suppose, for example, that S stands for “ruminant,” and P for “cloven-hoofed.” Compare Venn, Symbolic Logic, pp. 391–5.
It will be noticed that in the connotative reading we have always to take the attributes which constitute the connotation collectively. In other words, by the attributes constituting the connotation of a term we mean those attributes regarded as a whole. Thus, No S is P does not imply that none of the attributes connoted by S are ever accompanied by any of those connoted by P. This is apparent if we take such a proposition as No oxygen is hydrogen. It follows that when the subject is read in connotation the quantity of the proposition must appear as a separate element, being expressed by the word “always” or “sometimes,” and must not be interpreted as meaning “all” or “some” of the attributes included in the connotation of the subject.
It is argued by those who deny the possibility of the connotative mode of interpreting propositions, that this is not really reading the subject in connotation at all; always and sometimes are said to reduce us to denotation at once. In reply to this, it must of course be allowed that real propositions affirm no relation between attributes independently of the objects to which they belong. The connotative reading implies the denotative, and we must not exaggerate the nature of the distinction between them. Still the connotative reading presents the import of the proposition in a new aspect, and there is at any rate a prima facie difference between regarding one class as included within another, and regarding one attribute as always accompanied by another, even though a little 186 consideration may shew that the two things mutually involve one another.[185]
[185] Mill attaches great importance to the connotative mode of interpreting propositions as compared with the class mode or the predicative mode, on the ground that it carries the analysis a stage further; and this must be granted, at any rate so far as we consider the application of the terms involved to be determined by connotation and not by exemplification. Mill is, however, sometimes open to the charge of exaggerating the difference between the various modes of interpretation. This is apparent, for example, in his rejection of the Dictum de omni et nullo as the axiom of the syllogism, and his acceptance of the Nota notae est nota rei ipsius in its place.
(4) Subject in connotation, predicate in denotation.
Taking the proposition All S is P, and reading the subject in connotation and the predicate in denotation, we have, “The attributes connoted by S are an indication of the presence of an individual belonging to the class P.” This mode of interpretation is always a possible one, but it must be granted that only rarely does the import of a proposition naturally present itself to our minds in this form. There are, however, exceptional cases in which this reading is not unnatural. The proposition No plants with opposite leaves are orchids has already been given as an example. Another example is afforded by the proposition All that glitters is not gold. Taking the subject in connotation and the predicate in denotation we have, The attribute of glitter does not always indicate the presence of a gold object ; and it will be found that this reading of the proverb serves to bring out its meaning really better than any of the three other readings which we have been discussing.
It is worth while noticing here by way of anticipation that on any view of the existential interpretation of propositions, as discussed in [chapter 8], we shall still have a fourfold reading of categorical propositions in connotation and denotation. The universal negative and the particular affirmative may be taken as examples, on the supposition that the former is interpreted as existentially negative and the latter as existentially affirmative. The universal negative yields the following: (1) There is no individual belonging to the class S and possessing the attributes connoted by P ; (2) There is no individual common to the two classes S and P ; (3) The attributes 187 connoted by S and P respectively are never found conjoined; (4) There is no individual possessing the attributes connoted by S and belonging to the class P. Similarly the particular affirmative yields: (1) There are individuals belonging to the class S and possessing the attributes connoted by P ; (2) There are individuals common to the two classes S and P ; (3) The attributes connoted by S and P respectively are sometimes found conjoined; (4) There are individuals possessing the attributes connoted by S and belonging to the class P. We see, therefore, that the question discussed in this section is independent of that which will be raised in [chapter 8]; and that for this reason, if for no other, no solution of the general problem raised in the present chapter can afford a complete solution of the problem of the import of categorical propositions.
136. The Reading of Propositions in Comprehension.—If, in taking the intensional standpoint, we consider comprehension instead of connotation, our problem is to determine what relation is implied in any proposition between the comprehension of the subject and the comprehension of the predicate. This question being asked with reference to the universal affirmative proposition All S is P, the solution clearly is that the comprehension of S includes the comprehension of P. The interpretation in comprehension is thus precisely the reverse of that in denotation (the denotation of S is included in the denotation of P); and we might be led to think that, taking the different propositional forms, we should have a scheme in comprehension, analogous throughout to that in denotation. But this is not the case, for the simple reason that in our ordinary statements we do not distributively quantify comprehension in the way in which we do denotation; in other words, comprehension is always taken in its totality. Thus, reading an I proposition in denotation we have—the classes S and P partly coincide ; and corresponding to this we should have—the comprehensions of S and P partly coincide. But this is clearly not what we express by Some S is P ; for the partial coincidence of the comprehensions of S and P is quite compatible with No S is P, that is to say, the classes S and P may be mutually exclusive, and yet some attributes may be common to the whole of S and 188 also to the whole of P ; for example, No Pembroke undergraduates are also Trinity undergraduates. Again, given an E proposition, we have in denotation—the classes S and P have no part in common ; but for the reason just given, it does not follow that the comprehension of S and the comprehension of P have nothing in common.
It is indeed necessary to obvert I and E in order to obtain a correct reading in comprehension. We then have the following scheme, in which the relation of contradiction between A and O and between E and I is made clearly manifest:
All S is P, The comprehension of S includes the comprehension of P ;
No S is P, The comprehension of S includes the comprehension of not-P;
Some S is P, The comprehension of S does not include the comprehension of not-P;
Some S is not P, The comprehension of S does not include the comprehension of P.