PART II.
LOGICAL SUPERSTRUCTURE ON THE ABOVE PHYSICAL FOUNDATIONS. Chh. VI–XIV.
[CHAPTER VI.]
MEASUREMENT OF BELIEF.
§§ 1, 2. Preliminary remarks.
3, 4. Are we accurately conscious of gradations of belief?
5. Probability only concerned with part of this enquiry.
6. Difficulty of measuring our belief;
7. Owing to intrusion of emotions,
8. And complexity of the evidence.
9. And when measured, is it always correct?
10, 11. Distinction between logical and psychological views.
12–16. Analogy of Formal Logic fails to show that we can thus detach and measure our belief.
17. Apparent evidence of popular language to the contrary.
18. How is full belief justified in inductive enquiry?
19–23. Attempt to show how partial belief may be similarly justified.
24–28. Extension of this explanation to cases which cannot be repeated in experience.
29. Can other emotions besides belief be thus measured?
30. Errors thus arising in connection with the Petersburg Problem.
31, 32. The emotion of surprise is a partial exception.
33, 34. Objective and subjective phraseology.
35. The definition of probability,
36. Introduces the notion of a ‘limit’,
37. And implies, vaguely, some degree of belief.