"MESSIEURS,
"We are here to meet to-day, in the name of God, to enter upon a treaty of general peace, between the high allies and the King your master. We bring sincere intentions, and express orders from our superiors, to concur, on their part, with whatever may advance and perfect so salutary and Christian a work. On the other side, we hope you have the same disposition; and that your orders will be so full, as to be able, without loss of time, to answer the expectation of the high allies, by explaining yourselves clearly and roundly upon the points we shall have to settle in these conferences; and that you will perform this in so plain and specific a manner, as every prince and state in the confederacy may find a just and reasonable satisfaction."
The French began, by promising to explain the overtures which Mons. Mesnager had delivered to the Queen some months before, and to give in a specific project of what their master would yield, provided the allies would each give a specific answer, by making their several demands; which method, after many difficulties, and affected delays in the Dutch, was at length agreed to.
But the States, who had, with the utmost discontent, seen Her Majesty at the head of this negotiation, where they intended to have placed themselves, began to discover their ill-humour upon every occasion; they raised endless difficulties about settling the Barrier Treaty, as the Queen desired; and in one of the first general conferences, they would not suffer the British secretary to take the minutes, but nominated some Dutch professor for that office, which the Queen refused, and resented their behaviour as an useless cavil, intended only to shew their want of respect. The British plenipotentiaries had great reason to suspect, that the Dutch were, at this time, privately endeavouring to engage in some separate measures with France, by the intervention of one Molo, a busy factious agent at Amsterdam, who had been often employed in such intrigues: that this was the cause which made them so litigious and slow in all their steps, in hopes to break the congress, and find better terms for their trade and barrier, from the French, than we ever could think fit to allow them. The Dutch ministers did also apply themselves with industry, to cultivate the imperial plenipotentiary's favour, in order to secure all advantages of commerce with Spain and the West Indies, in case those dominions could be procured for the Emperor: for this reason they avoided settling any general plan of peace, in concert with the plenipotentiaries of Britain, which Her Majesty desired; and Mons. Buys plainly told their lordships, that it was a point, which neither he nor his colleagues could consent to, before the States were admitted equal sharers with Britain in the trade of Spain.
The court having notice of this untractable temper in the Dutch, gave direct orders to the plenipotentiaries of Britain, for pressing those of the States to adjust the gross in equalities of the Barrier Treaty, since nothing was more usual or agreeable to reason than for princes, who find themselves aggrieved by prejudicial contracts, to expect they should be modified and explained. And since it now appeared by votes in the House of Commons, that the sense of the nation agreed with what Her Majesty desired, if the Dutch ministers would not be brought to any moderate terms upon this demand, their lordships were directed to improve and amend the particular concessions made to Britain by France, and form them into a treaty, for the Queen was determined never to allow the States any share in the Assiento, Gibraltar, and Port Mahon, nor could think it reasonable, that they should be upon an equal foot with her in the trade of Spain, to the conquest whereof they had contributed so little.
Nor was the conduct of the imperial minister at this time less perplexing than that of the States, both those powers appearing fully bent, either upon breaking off the negotiation, or, upon forcing from the Queen those advantages she expected by it for her own kingdoms. Her Majesty therefore thought fit, about the beginning of March, to send Mr. Thomas Harley, a near relation of the treasurer's, to Utrecht, fully informed of her mind, which he was directed to communicate to the plenipotentiaries of Britain.
Mr. Harley stopped in his way to Utrecht at The Hague, and there told the pensionary, "That nothing had happened lately in England but what was long ago foretold him, as well as the other ministers of the allies. That the proceedings of the House of Commons, particularly about the Barrier Treaty, must chiefly be ascribed to the manner in which the Queen and the nation had been treated by Mons. Bothmar, Count Gallas, Buys, and other foreign ministers. That if the States would yet enter into a strict union with the Queen, give her satisfaction in the said treaty, and join in concert with her plenipotentiaries at Utrecht, a safe and advantageous peace might be obtained for the whole alliance; otherwise Her Majesty must save her own country, and join with such of her allies as would join with her.
"As to the war, that the conduct of the allies, and their opposition to the Queen, by private intrigues carried on among her own subjects, as well as by open remonstrances, had made the House of Commons take that matter out of the hands of the ministers.
"Lastly, that in case the present treaty were broken off by the Dutch refusing to comply, Her Majesty thought it reasonable to insist, that some cautionary places be put into her hands as pledges, that no other negotiation should be entered into by the States General, without her participation."
Mr. Harley's instructions to the Queen's plenipotentiaries were, "That they should press those of France, to open themselves as far as possible, in concerting such a plan of a general peace, as might give reasonable satisfaction to all the confederates, and such as her Parliament would approve: That the people of England believed France would consent to such a plan; wherein if they found themselves deceived, they would be as eager for prosecuting the war as ever."
Their lordships were to declare openly to the Dutch, "That no extremity should make Her Majesty depart from insisting to have the Assiento for her own subjects, and to keep Gibraltar and Port Mahon; but if the States would agree with her upon these three heads, she would be content to reduce the trade of Spain and the West Indies, to the condition it was in under the late Catholic King Charles II."
The French were farther to be pressed, "That the Pretender should be immediately sent out of that kingdom; and that the most effectual method should be taken, for preventing the union of France and Spain under one prince."
About this time Her Majesty's ministers, and those of the allies at Utrecht, delivered in the several postulata or demands of their masters to the French plenipotentiaries, which having been since made public, and all of them, except those of Britain, very much varying in the course of the negotiation, the reader would be but ill entertained with a transcript of them here.
Upon intelligence of the last dauphin's death, the father, son, and grandson, all of that title,[4] dying within the compass of a year, Mons. Gaultier went to France with letters to the Marquis de Torcy, to propose Her Majesty's expedient for preventing the union of that kingdom with Spain; which, as it was the most important article to be settled, in order to secure peace for Europe, so it was a point that required to be speedily adjusted under the present circumstances and situation of the Bourbon family, there being only left a child of two years old to stand between the Duke of Anjou and his succeeding to the crown of France.
[Footnote 4: These princes were the grandfather, the father, and the brother, of Louis XV., who was then Duke of Anjou, and supposed to be at the point of death. [N.]
Her Majesty likewise pressed France by the same dispatches, to send full instructions to their plenipotentiaries, empowering them to offer to the allies such a plan of peace, as might give reasonable satisfaction to all her allies.
The Queen's proposal for preventing an union between France and Spain was, "that Philip should formally renounce the kingdom of France for himself and his posterity; and that this renunciation should be confirmed by the Cortes or states of Spain, who, without question, would heartily concur against such an union, by which their country must become a province to France." In like manner, the French princes of the blood were severally to renounce all title to Spain.
The French raised many difficulties upon several particulars of this expedient; but the Queen persisted to refuse any plan of peace before this weighty point were settled in the manner she proposed, which was afterwards submitted to, as in proper place we shall observe. In the mean time, the negotiation at Utrecht proceeded with a very slow pace; the Dutch interposing all obstructions they could contrive, refusing to come to any reasonable temper upon the Barrier Treaty, or to offer a plan, in concert with the Queen, for a general peace. Nothing less would satisfy them, than the partaking in those advantages we had stipulated for ourselves, and which did no ways interfere with their trade or security. They still expected some turn in England; their friends on this side had ventured to assure them, that the Queen could not live many months, which, indeed, from the bad state of Her Majesty's health, was reasonable to expect. The British plenipotentiaries daily discovered new endeavours of Holland to treat privately with France; and, lastly, those among the States, who desired the war should continue, strove to gain time, until the campaign should open; and by resolving to enter into action with the first opportunity, render all things desperate, and break up the congress.
This scheme did exactly fall in with Prince Eugene's dispositions, whom the States had chosen for their general, and of whose conduct, in this conjuncture, the Queen had too much reason to be jealous; but Her Majesty, who was resolved to do her utmost towards putting a good and speedy end to this war, having placed the Duke of Ormonde at the head of her forces in Flanders, whither he was now arrived, directed him to keep all the troops in British pay, whether subjects or foreigners, immediately under his own command; and to be cautious, for a while, in engaging in any action of importance, unless upon a very apparent advantage. At the same time the Queen determined to make one thorough trial of the disposition of the States, by allowing them the utmost concessions that could any way suit either with her safety or honour. She therefore directed her ministers at Utrecht, to tell the Dutch, "That, in order to shew how desirous she was to live in perfect amity with that republic, she would resign up the fifteen per cent., advantage upon English goods sent to the Spanish dominions, which the French King had offered her by a power from his grandson,[5] and be content to reduce that trade to the state in which it was under the late King of Spain. She would accept of any tolerable softening of these words in the seventh article of the Barrier Treaty, where it is said, 'The States shall have power, in case of an apparent attack, to put as many troops as they please into all the places of the Netherlands,' without specifying an attack from the side of France, as ought to have been done; otherwise, the Queen might justly think they were preparing themselves for a rupture with Britain. Her Majesty likewise consented, that the States should keep Nieuport, Dendermonde, and the Castle of Ghent, as an addition to their barrier, although she were sensible how injurious those concessions would be to the trade of her subjects; and would waive the demand of Ostend being delivered into her hands, which she might with justice insist on. In return for all this, that the Queen only desired the ministers of the States would enter into a close correspondence with hers, and settle between them some plan of a general peace, which might give reasonable content to all her allies, and which Her Majesty would endeavour to bring France to consent to. She desired the trade of her kingdoms to the Netherlands, and to the towns of their barrier, might be upon as good a foot as it was before the war began: That the Dutch would not insist to have share in the Assiento, to which they had not the least pretensions, and that they would no longer encourage the intrigues of a faction against her government. Her Majesty assured them in plain terms, that her own future measures, and the conduct of her plenipotentiaries, should be wholly governed by their behaviour in these points; and that her offers were only conditional, in case of their compliance with what she desired."
[Footnote 5: Philip V., King of Spain. [W. S, J.]
But all these proofs of the Queen's kindness and sincerity could not avail. The Dutch ministers pleaded, they had no power to concert the plan of general peace with those of Britain: however, they assured the latter, that the Assiento was the only difficulty which stuck with their masters. Whereupon, at their desire, a contract for that traffic was twice read to them; after which they appeared very well satisfied, and said they would go to The Hague for further instructions. Thither they went, and, after a week's absence, returned the same answer, "That they had no power to settle a scheme of peace; but could only discourse of it, when the difficulties of the Barrier Treaty were over." And Mons. Buys took a journey to Amsterdam, on purpose to stir up that city, where he was pensionary, against yielding the Assiento to Britain; but was unsuccessful in his negotiation; the point being yielded up there, and in most other towns in Holland.
It will have an odd sound in history, and appear hardly credible, that in several petty republics of single towns, which make up the States General, it should be formally debated, whether the Queen of Great Britain, who preserved the commonwealth at the charge of so many millions, should be suffered to enjoy, after a peace, the liberty granted her by Spain of selling African slaves in the Spanish dominions of America! But there was a prevailing faction at The Hague, violently bent against any peace, where the Queen must act that part which they had intended for themselves. These politicians, who held constant correspondence with their old dejected friends in England, were daily fed with the vain hopes of the Queen's death, or the party's restoration. They likewise endeavoured to spin out the time, till Prince Eugene's activity had pushed on some great event, which might govern or perplex the conditions of peace. Therefore the Dutch plenipotentiaries, who proceeded by the instructions of those mistaken patriots, acted in every point with a spirit of litigiousness, than which nothing could give greater advantage to the enemy; a strict union between the allies, but especially Britain and Holland, being doubtless the only means for procuring safe and honourable terms from France.
But neither was this the worst; for the Queen received undoubted intelligence from Utrecht, that the Dutch were again attempting a separate correspondence with France. And by letters, intercepted here, from Vienna, it was found, that the imperial court, whose ministers were in the utmost confidence with those of Holland, expressed the most furious rage against Her Majesty, for the steps she had taken to advance a peace.
This unjustifiable treatment, the Queen could not digest from an ally, upon whom she had conferred so many signal obligations, whom she had used with so much indulgence and sincerity during the whole course of the negotiation, and had so often invited to go along with her in every motion towards a peace. She apprehended likewise, that the negotiation might be taken out of her hands, if France could be secure of easier conditions in Holland, or might think that Britain wanted power to influence the whole confederacy. She resolved therefore, on this occasion, to exert herself with vigour, steadiness, and dispatch; and, in the beginning of May, sent her commands to the Earl of Strafford to repair immediately to England, in order to consult with her ministers what was proper to be done.
The proposal above mentioned, for preventing the union of France and Spain, met with many difficulties; Mons. de Torcy raising objections against several parts of it. But the Queen refused to proceed any farther with France, until this weighty point were fully settled to her satisfaction; after which, she promised to grant a suspension of arms, provided the town and citadel of Dunkirk might be delivered as a pledge into her hands: and proposed that Ypres might be surrendered to the Dutch, if they would consent to come into the suspension. France absolutely refused the latter; and the States General having acted in perpetual contradiction to Her Majesty, she pressed that matter no farther; because she doubted they would not agree to a cessation of arms. However, she resolved to put a speedy end, or at least intermission, to her own share in the war: and the French having declared themselves ready to agree to her expedients, for preventing the union of the two crowns, and consented to the delivery of Dunkirk; positive orders were sent to the Duke of Ormonde to avoid engaging in any battle or siege, until he had further instructions; but he was directed to conceal his orders, and to find the best excuses he could, if any pressing occasion should offer.
The reasons for this unusual proceeding, which made a mighty noise, were of sufficient weight to justify it; for, pursuant to the agreement made between us and France, a courier was then dispatched from Fontainebleau to Madrid, with the offer of an alternative to Philip, either of resigning Spain immediately to the Duke of Savoy, upon the hopes of succeeding to France, and some present advantage, which, not having been accepted, is needless to dilate on; or of adhering to Spain, and renouncing all future claim to France for himself and his posterity.
Until it could be known which part Philip would accept, the Queen would not take possession of Dunkirk, nor suffer an armistice to be declared. But, however, since the Most Christian King had agreed that his grandson should be forced, in case of a refusal, to make his choice immediately, Her Majesty could not endure to think, that perhaps some thousands of lives of her own subjects and allies might be sacrificed, without necessity, if an occasion should be found or sought for fighting a battle; which, she very well knew, Prince Eugene would eagerly attempt, and put all into confusion, to gratify his own ambition, the enmity of his new masters the Dutch, and the rage of his court.
But the Duke of Ormonde, who, with every other quality that can accomplish or adorn a great man, inherits all the valour and loyalty of his ancestors, found it very difficult to acquit himself of his commission;[6] for Prince Eugene, and all the field deputies of the States, had begun already to talk either of attacking the enemy, or besieging Quesnoy, the confederate army being now all joined by the troops they expected; and accordingly, about three days after the Duke had received those orders from court, it was proposed to his grace, at a meeting with the prince and deputies, that the French army should be attacked, their camp having been viewed, and a great opportunity offering to do it with success; for the Marechal de Villars, who had notice sent him by Mons. de Torcy of what was passing, and had signified the same by a trumpet to the Duke, shewed less vigilance than was usual to that general, taking no precautions to secure his camp, or observe the motions of the allies, probably on purpose to provoke them, the Duke said, "That the Earl of Strafford's sudden departure for England, made him believe there was something of consequence now transacting, which would be known in four or five days; and therefore desired they would defer this or any other undertaking, until he could receive fresh letters from England." Whereupon the prince and deputies immediately told the Duke, "That they looked for such an answer as he had given them: That they had suspected our measures for some time, and their suspicions were confirmed by the express his grace had so lately received, as well as by the negligence of Mons. Villars". They appeared extremely dissatisfied; and the deputies told the Duke, that they would immediately send an account of his answer to their masters, which they accordingly did; and soon after, by order from the States, wrote him an expostulating letter, in a style less respectful than became them; desiring him, among other things, to explain himself, whether he had positive orders not to fight the French; and afterwards told him, "They were sure he had such orders, otherwise he could not answer what he had done." But the Duke still waived the question, saying, "he would be glad to have letters from England, before he entered upon action, and that he expected them daily."
[Footnote 6: For an estimate of Ormonde's character see Swift's "Enquiry into the Behaviour of the Queen's Last Ministry," vol. v. of present edition (pp. 428-430). Ormonde had done very little to deserve succeeding such a soldier as Marlborough. Indeed, his name was associated with the disgraceful expedition to Cadiz, in which he was in command of the English troops. [T.S.]
Upon this incident, the ministers and generals of the allies immediately took the alarm, venting their fury in violent expressions against the Queen, and those she employed in her councils: said, they were betrayed by Britain, and assumed the countenance of those who think they have received an injury, and are disposed to return it.
The Duke of Ormonde's army consisted of eighteen thousand of Her Majesty's subjects, and about thirty thousand hired from other princes, either wholly by the Queen, or jointly by her and the States. The Duke immediately informed the court of the dispositions he found among the foreign generals upon this occasion; and that, upon an exigency, he could only depend on the British troops adhering to him; those of Hanover having already determined to desert to the Dutch, and tempted the Danes to do the like, and that he had reason to suppose the same of the rest.
Upon the news arriving at Utrecht, that the Duke of Ormonde had refused to engage in any action against the enemy, the Dutch ministers there went immediately to make their complaints to the lord privy seal; aggravating the strangeness of this proceeding, together with the consequence of it, in the loss of a most favourable opportunity for ruining the French army, and the discontent it must needs create in the whole body of the confederates. Adding, how hard it was that they should be kept in the dark, and have no communication of what was done in a point which so nearly concerned them. They concluded, that the Duke must needs have acted by orders; and desired his lordship to write both to court, and to his grace, what they had now said.
The bishop answered, "That he knew nothing of this fact, but what they had told him; and therefore was not prepared with a reply to their representations: only, in general, he could venture to say, that this case appeared very like the conduct of their field-deputies upon former occasions: That if such orders were given, they were certainly built upon very justifiable foundations, and would soon be so explained as to convince the States, and all the world, that the common interest would be better provided for another way, than by a battle or siege: That the want of communication which they complained of, could not make the States so uneasy as their declining to receive it had made the Queen, who had used her utmost endeavours to persuade them to concur with her in concerting every step towards a general peace, and settling such a plan as both sides might approve and adhere to; but, to this day, the States had not thought fit to accept those offers, or to authorize any of their ministers to treat with Her Majesty's plenipotentiaries upon that affair, although they had been pressed to it ever since the negotiation began: That his lordship, to shew that he did not speak his private sense alone, took this opportunity to execute the orders he had received the evening before, by declaring to them, that all Her Majesty's offers for adjusting the differences between her and the States were founded upon this express condition, That they should come immediately into the Queen's measures, and act openly and sincerely with her; and that, from their conduct, so directly contrary, she now looked upon herself to be under no obligation to them."
Mons. Buys and his colleagues were stunned with this declaration, made to them at a time when they pretended to think the right of complaining to be on their side, and had come to the bishop upon that errand. But after their surprise was abated, and Buys's long reasonings at an end, they began to think how matters might be retrieved; and were of opinion, that the States should immediately dispatch a minister to England, unless his lordship were empowered to treat with them; which, without new commands, he said he was not. They afterwards desired to know of the bishop, what the meaning was of the last words in his declaration, "That Her Majesty looked upon herself to be under no obligation to them." He told them his opinion, "That as the Queen was bound by treaty to concert with the States the conditions of a peace, so, upon their declining the concert so frequently offered, she was acquitted of that obligation: but that he verily believed, whatever measures Her Majesty should take, she would always have a friendly regard to the interest of their commonwealth; and that as their unkindness had been very unexpected and disagreeable to Her Majesty, so their compliance would be equally pleasing."
I have been the more circumstantial in relating this affair, because it furnished abundance of discourse, and gave rise to many wild conjectures and misrepresentations, as well here as in Holland, especially that part which concerned the Duke of Ormonde;[7] for the angry faction in the House of Commons, upon the first intelligence, that the Duke had declined to act offensively against France, in concurrence with the allies, moved for an address, wherein the Queen should be informed of "the deep concern of her Commons for the dangerous consequences to the common cause, which must arise from this proceeding of her general; and to beseech her, that speedy instructions might be given to the Duke to prosecute the war with vigour, in order to quiet the minds of her people, &c." But a great majority was against this motion, and a resolution drawn up and presented to the Queen by the whole House of a quite contrary tenor, "That they had an entire confidence in Her Majesty's most gracious promise, to communicate to her Parliament the terms of the peace, before the same should be concluded; and that they would support Her Majesty, in obtaining an honourable and safe peace, against all such persons, either at home or abroad, who have endeavoured, or shall endeavour, to obstruct the same."
[Footnote 7: This determination on the part of England to cease hostilities at this juncture has been most severely criticized. The matter formed, afterwards, the chief article in the impeachment of Bolingbroke, and an important article in the impeachment of Oxford. According to the "Report of the Committee of Secrecy," and the Earl of Oxford's answer to this charge in his impeachment, it seems as if St. John had instructed Ormonde so to act, without in any way consulting the council, and apparently purposely concealing the fact from his colleagues. Mr. Walter Sichel, however, in a note on p. 380 of his "Bolingbroke and his Times," clearly traces the order to the desire of the Queen herself, and in his text lays on the Queen the blame that was visited on the heads of her ministers. See also note on p. 156. [T.S.]
The courier sent with the alternative to Spain was now returned, with an account that Philip had chosen to renounce France for himself and his posterity, whereof the Queen having received notice, Her Majesty, upon the sixth of June, in a long speech to both Houses of Parliament, laid before them the terms of a general peace, stipulated between her and France. This speech, being the plan whereby both France and the allies have been obliged to proceed in the subsequent course of the treaty, I shall desire the reader's leave to insert it at length, although I believe it hath been already in most hands.[7]
[Footnote 7: This speech was printed by John Baskett, 1712. [W.S.J.]